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Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch

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Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

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Effective January 1, 1976, all manuscripts submitted for possible publication in the *Review* should go to

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ARTICLES

393 **Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas.** Using an exchange model, this article examines two ethnic groups, mobilized and proletarian diasporas, in a broad range of modernizing polities. The salient dimensions of myth, communications networks, and role differentiation permit one to distinguish these groups analytically over a long time period, and to subdivide the mobilized diasporas into archetypal diasporas and situational diasporas. The latter are politically detached elements of a great society, whereas the "homeland" of the archetypal diaspora is symbolically significant as a major component of the diaspora's sacral myth. Because internal resentments and the pressures of the international environment tend to undermine the value of a diaspora to the dominant elite of a slowly and unevenly modernizing multiethnic polity, these polities (Russia and the Ottoman Empire are examined closely) exhibit a succession of mobilized diasporas. Rapidly modernizing polities, on the other hand, tolerate mobilized diasporas, but turn increasingly for their unskilled, transient labor to groups which are more distant culturally and in physical appearance from the dominant ethnic group, and which, therefore, are increasingly disadvantaged and restive.

By JOHN A. ARMSTRONG, Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

409 **Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon."** Television journalism can produce significant changes in opinions about basic American institutions and may also foster political malaise. Laboratory investigation revealed that the CBS documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon," convinced viewers that the military participated more in national politics and misled the public more about Vietnam than these viewers had previously believed. The program also caused a significant decrease in political efficacy among all our groups. This finding led to correlational research to determine if exposure to television news is also associated with lower levels of efficacy.

SRC survey data suggest that reliance upon television news programs is associated with feelings of inefficacy and political self-doubt. These data also indicate that reliance upon television news fosters political cynicism and distrust, political instability, and frustration with civil rights. Holding constant the level of education or income of these respondents does not appreciably alter these relationships.

In short, the two sets of data imply that the networks helped to create Scammon's Social Issue and that video journalism fostered public support for George Wallace.

By MICHAEL J. ROBINSON, Assistant Professor of Politics, The Catholic University of America.

433 **A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana.** This study examines the extent, impact and implications of political information in Ghana using survey data. A major interest is to identify and examine variables which influence level of information and to look at the consequences for the political process of different levels of political information. I examine conventional wisdom concerning the ignorance of the masses about national politics and call into question some common assumptions. Many of the differences usually assumed between developed and underdeveloped nations are found either not to exist or to be smaller than hypothesized. The data suggest that in some areas of national political information the masses in non-modernized societies are more politically aware than their counterparts in modernized societies. It is also suggested that there is no necessary link between education (literacy) and political information and that there are a number of functional equivalents to formal education. In the last section of the study several propositions about the informed citizenry are discussed.

By FRED M. HAYWARD, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
452 **Comment.** By JOEL D. BARKAN, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Iowa.

456 **Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy.** This article examines two key political beliefs of high level American federal executives: their views on the role of government in providing social services and their views regarding inequities in political representation. Data were collected in 1970 through open-ended interviews with a sample of 126 political appointees and supergrade career civil servants in the domestic agencies. Both of the beliefs analyzed were pertinent to the efforts of the Nixon administration to reorder national priorities and policies. The evidence in the paper establishes differences in the outlooks of ad-

ministrators depending on agency, job status, and party affiliation. Agency and party affiliation are particularly important variables, and their joint effects on the beliefs examined are substantial. Democratic administrators in the social service agencies were the most liberal and Republicans in the non-social service agencies the most conservative. Our data document a career bureaucracy with very little Republican representation and a social service bureaucracy dominated by administrators ideologically hostile to many of the directions pursued by the Nixon administration in the realm of social policy. The article closes with a discussion of the implications of our findings for future conflicts between the elected executive and the bureaucracy.

By JOEL D. ABERBACH, Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Research Scientist at the Institute of Public Policy Studies. The University of Michigan, and BERT A. ROCKMAN, Assistant Professor of Political Science, The University of Pittsburgh.

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469 **Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974.** A large and growing proportion of Americans claims to be neither Republican nor Democratic, and partisan independence is most widespread among young adults. A time-series cohort analysis of eleven surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan between 1952 and 1974 strongly suggests that the low level of partisan identification among young adults results largely from fundamental differences between their socialization and that of their elders. The overall decline in party identification results largely from generational change. High levels of partisan identification persist among persons who entered the electorate before World War II, but among those who entered the electorate more recently levels of identification are low. The analysis strongly suggests that overall levels of party identification will continue to decline, and permits examination of one process by which party loyalties among mass electorates gradually are transformed.

By PAUL R. ABRAMSON, Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University.

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479 **Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case.** This article explores the extent to which Shanghai City, and its subordinate units, have been politically independent of higher authorities in the Chinese government. Evidence from the 'fifties and early 'sixties suggests increasing managerial and cultural independence at the city level. Evidence from the early Cultural Revolution however suggests conceptual problems in the connection of usual notions of "autonomy" with substantive issue areas, and in their connection with local and central patterns of factions. The slow reconstruction of a local Party hierarchy in Shanghai was paralleled by a decentralization of some commercial and industrial decisions. Shanghai's role as a model in Party rebuilding increased the fully national role of the city's top leadership. Analysis of autonomy, power, or dependence in administrative units is affected when strong local leaders acquire national ambitions. Suggestions are made about the characteristics of an organization these words might describe.

By LYNN T. WHITE III, Assistant Professor, Departments of Politics, East Asian Studies and Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University

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492 **Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War.** Right-wing and Left-wing attitudes toward the cold war are strikingly similar because in some cases the anti-communist is himself an ex-communist. This is particularly true of James Burnham, a former disciple of Leon Trotsky and presently the diplomatic columnist of William F. Buckley's *National Review*. Burnham's writings have had profound influence in America, especially at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War when officials in Washington saw in his books both an answer to "containment" and the first theoretical formulation of the new policy of "liberation-rollback."

Burnham's own views on the cold war, however, have undergone a number of significant changes and revisions. At different times in his career he has offered four different and often contradictory interpretations of communism: (a) first, the Soviet Union as a "managerial" state that marks the end of Trotsky's dream of "permanent revolution"; (b) next, communism as the latest expression of Machiavellianism that augers the eclipse of liberal democracy and seemingly the inevitability of Stalin; (c) then, during the early cold war period, managerialism and Machiavellianism are dropped and Soviet behavior is now attributed to a Marxist *Weltanschauung* that replaces power politics with ideological determinism; (d) finally, Burnham criticizes Kennan, Morgenthau, and Lippmann for failing to adopt a "dialectical" viewpoint in order to understand the "dual" nature of the Soviet Union—an ironic reinvocation of Trotsky's earlier message to the Old Left.

The article attempts a critical analysis both of Burnham's shifting perspectives and of the ethical dilemmas in his political thought. It may also be read as a chapter in the intellectual history of the cold war.

By John P. Diggins, Professor of History, University of California, Irvine.

509 **Prediction Analysis in Political Research.** Procedures for empirical tests of political theory should be designed to evaluate the success of the specific prediction being tested. This paper introduces; (1) a formal language, termed "prediction logic," for stating an important class of predictions, including predictions that imply there will be relatively few cases in certain cells of a cross-classification; (2) a population measure, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ ("del"), that indicates the degree of success achieved by a statement in the language; (3) partial measures for the multivariate case; (4) bivariate statistical inference methods when the data arise from a sample rather than a population, both for an *a priori* prediction statement and for a statement selected *post hoc*. A number of well-known measures of "association" are $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measures for specific prediction logic statements. Research applications are indicated through the use of contingency tables appearing in *APSR* articles by Eulau and Eyestone, Goldberg, Muller, Riker and Zavoina, Rosenthal, Sawyer and MacRae, Sickles, Wolfinger and Field, and Wolfinger and Heifetz.

By David K. Hildebrand, Associate Professor of Statistics, University of Pennsylvania, James D. Laing, Visiting Associate Professor of Engineering-Economic Systems, Stanford University, and Howard Rosenthal, Professor of Political Science and Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University.

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557 **EDITORIAL COMMENT**

BOOK REVIEWS AND ESSAYS

560 **"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954. A Review Essay.** For the past decade historians have debated the major domestic and foreign policy issues of the Truman era. This debate has centered upon the origins of the Cold War, the interplay between politics and diplomacy, and the alleged responsibility of President Harry S. Truman and American liberals for the demise of civil liberties and the onset of McCarthyism. During the course of this debate Truman's reputation diminished significantly. From one of America's greatest chief executives, as pictured by Arthur M. Schlesinger, the man from Missouri emerged in accounts by New Left revisionists as a small man who was incapable of providing progressive leadership at home and whose conservative temperament and anti-Soviet rhetoric needlessly escalated the Cold War and extinguished New Deal reform. To their credit, the revisionists have broadened the parameters of diplomatic history by demonstrating the impact of social and economic institutions upon the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. On the other hand, revisionist history has often been colored by ideological premises, a presentist bias, and a combativeness that diverted attention from the validity of revisionist conclusions to social and psychological explanations of why these accounts were written at all. As a result of careful work by Thomas Paterson, John Gaddis, George Herring, and Alonzo Hamby, the debate on the politics and diplomacy of the postwar years has entered a new phase, in which historians have begun to fashion interpretations based upon combinations and variants of liberal, realist, and radical hypotheses. This development portends a healthy movement toward a fairer, more empathetic rendering of the Truman era, and the complex roles played by the thirty-third President.

By Geoffrey S. Smith, Associate Professor of History, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.

583 Political Participation in America: A Review Essay. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality.*

By Jerrold G. Rusk, Professor of Government, University of Arizona.

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By John H. Whyte, Reader in Politics, The Queen's University of Belfast.

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Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas

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The recent revival of interest in the historical dimension of social and political development necessarily entails a concern for types of polities which have been outside the mainstream of political science as a discipline. Both the older institutionalism and newer systems approaches have tended to take the nation state and the coincidence of polity and society for granted.[1] Political scientists specifically concerned with areas outside Europe and its overseas descendants have been more sharply aware that multiethnic composition is nearer the norm than the exception for major polities. Historically, however, multiethnicity has been still more clearly the norm, even in European polities. Consequently, an extended longitudinal framework is almost essential for adequate comparative investigation of the multiethnic polity. One of its most significant components, the diaspora, constituting a distinctive collectivity—perhaps even a separate society—can hardly be understood except in historical perspective. Much of the literature on contemporary diasporas appears to consider them to be anomalies, or at least very transitory. Some diasporas are indeed the result of contemporary social and economic forces. A deeper historical perspective suggests, on the other hand, that other types of diasporas, like multiethnic polities themselves, are the norm rather than the exception.

The first purpose of this article is to suggest a typology of the more significant types of diasporas. A typology constitutes, by itself, a limited step toward further theoretical development. In elaborating the kind of typology suggested here, one can hardly avoid examining data and making assumptions which have further, though more tentative, theoretical implications. Second, therefore, I offer a partial explanation of the changing position of the major types of diasporas within multiethnic polities. This explanation is based on close study of a wide range of historical data, a small part of which is cited by way of illustration. The present essay, however, is an exploration, not a verification. Consequently, its propositions, while (I hope) logically interrelated and not in conflict with existing secondary data, are designed primarily as hypotheses for further investigation.[2]

In the sense in which I use the term, "diaspora" applies to any ethnic collectivity which lacks a territorial base within a given polity, i.e., is a relatively small minority throughout all portions of the polity. Obviously this category embraces numerous ethnic collectivities such as widely dispersed hunting or pastoral nomads and certain semitribal groups like Gypsies. Since, however, the concern of this article is the major ways in which diasporas have interacted with the multiethnic polity, it focuses on two types: the *proletarian diaspora*, essentially a disadvantaged product of modernized polities; and the *mobilized diaspora*, an ethnic group which does not have a general status advantage, yet which enjoys many material and cultural advantages compared to other groups in the multiethnic polity. Because the mobilized diaspora has a much longer and more complex history, most of the article will be devoted to it, with the emergence of the proletarian diaspora considered primarily as a contrast to the mobilized diaspora.

Even the preliminary definitions just advanced suggest that my consideration of diasporas rests on two theoretical positions. The first, derived in part from the work of Frederik Barth and his associates, stresses the significance of boundaries among collectivities which cannot be defined by geographical partition.[3] Clearly, a diaspora is something more than, say, a collection of persons distinguished by some secondary characteristic such as, for example, all persons with Scottish names in Wisconsin. For the mobilized diaspora, which has often constituted for centuries a separate society or quasi-society in a larger polity, the factors making for stable identification require especially close examination.

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[1] Even historical studies of nationalism pay scant attention to diasporas. See for example Carleton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Smith, 1931); Friedrich Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1911); Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1944); and Salo W. Baron, *Modern Nationalism and Religion* (New York: Harper, 1947). Recent social science discussions like R. A. Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations* (New York: Random House, 1970) and Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973) deal only in passing with mobilized diasporas.

[2] I am completing a monographic study on the German diaspora in the Russian Empire and the beginnings of its replacement by the Jewish diaspora. This work will employ in a limited context both quantitative and nonquantitative data to test some of the hypotheses advanced here. The study will appear in a book edited by Jeremy Azrael for the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Collaborative Research Project on Nation-Building and National Integration in the USSR. Since considerable amounts of data on Russia are cited in this and in previous studies I have published, I have documented here only the most important assertions about the Russian multiethnic polity.

[3] *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, ed. Frederik Barth (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1969).

Consideration of the factors leading to persistence of the mobilized diaspora also rests on assumptions derived from exchange theory. In contrast to many subordinate ethnic groups (including, nearly always, proletarian diasporas), the mobilized diaspora is apt to have an elite which is more sophisticated in calculation of advantages and in symbol manipulation than is the elite of the dominant ethnic group. Because it assumes that both participants in an interaction may improve their positions, although the more powerful (in the present study, the dominant ethnic elite) achieves the better terms, an exchange model appears most appropriate. Only (as happens infrequently) when one participant (the mobilized diaspora) is coerced by the superior physical force controlled by the dominant ethnic elite, must the exchange framework give way to a conflict model.[4]

Utilization of the exchange framework requires two important qualifications. In the first place, rational calculation of the terms of exchange has been limited to elite members. While I do not attempt to examine elite decision making, the historiographical consensus does provide reasonably strong evidence that mobilized diaspora elite members, and members of dominant ethnic group elites, have in fact calculated the costs and benefits involved in their interactions. It is less easy to show that elites have represented the interests of their co-ethnic masses; but, as will appear later, there is evidence that mobilized diaspora masses identify with their elites in terms of perceived life chances. A second qualification relates to the derivation of the exchange model from economics, where values accruing to participants can ordinarily be expressed quantitatively. At this stage of our knowledge about mobilized diasporas, such calculations are completely unfeasible. Consequently, the exchange model used here is only a heuristic device; and the propositions derived with the aid of the model, because they refer to tendencies rather than precise parameters, constitute only weak hypotheses.

Boundary Maintenance in Mobilized Diasporas

Examination of the boundary-maintenance mechanisms which have enabled mobilized diasporas to persist leads one to conclude that the category contains two subtypes with considerably different characteristics. Because the Jews are commonly considered the model for all diasporas, I shall refer to the first subcategory, in which they fit, as the *archetypal diaspora*. The second subcategory may be termed the *situational diaspora*. As these terms imply, the superficial difference between the two subcategories is the completeness and permanence of the diaspora condition of the first, or archetypal, as compared to the partial and temporary condition as a diaspora of the situational ethnic group. The most important situational mobilized diasporas have been the Germans, throughout Eastern Europe, and the Chinese, dispersed over broad areas of Southeast Asia. In both cases the situational diasporas were fragments of far larger, compact ethnic masses constituting two of the world's great societies. The considerable degree of individual movement between the situational diaspora and its great society homeland suggests that the diaspora condition was perceived as a transitory phenomenon. In contrast, for millennia, Jews (and groups like the Parsees) did not constitute compact majorities anywhere.

At the level of historical "reality," the superficial distinction based on attachments to homelands is harder to maintain. The obvious case of the recent formation of a Jewish homeland immediately comes to mind. More important than this isolated instance is the fact that, by the criterion of possession of a territorial base, a large majority of mobilized diasporas occupy an intermediate position. The case of the Armenians, second only to the Jews in historical importance, is instructive. As late as 1915, two-thirds of the Armenian ethnic group continued to live in Eastern Anatolia and the central Transcaucasus, although Armenians probably constituted the majority in only restricted portions of these regions. Even after the unprecedented Turkish holocaust during World War I, one-third of all Armenians have continued to live in Soviet Transcaucasia. As early as the thirteenth century, however, it was clear to observers like Marco Polo that the dispersed segment of the Armenian ethnic group was behaving like an archetypal diaspora.[5] The basic reason was that the compact settlement area had not only been subjugated for centuries by foreign conquerors, but had suffered an equally long period of economic and cultural eclipse compared to the affluence and vitality of the Armenian diaspora.

The major significance of the different relations of situational and archetypal diasporas to their "homelands," however, lies in the dimension of ethnic *myth* rather than external historical reality.[6] In both cases the myth of the homeland is crucially important, but the two forms of myth are sharply distinguished. In turn, the different forms of ethnic myth crucially influence two other boundary-maintaining mechanisms: *communications specialization* and *role specialization*. This complex of factors is decisive not only for maintaining the stable boundaries of the mobilized diaspora, but for the latter's exchange relationship with dominant ethnic elites.

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[4] See especially R. L. Curry, Jr. and L. L. Wade, *A Theory of Political Exchange* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. ix ff.; and Peter Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 151 ff. On the uses of conflict theory in ethnic relations see Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations*, p. 44.

[5] Speros Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh Century through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 235.

The situational diaspora's myth is relatively close to the familiar "modern" myth of nationalism. Diasporas such as the Eastern European Germans (prior to 1945) and the Overseas Chinese resembled modern nations in their belief (not utterly unfounded) that they were parts of larger ethnic collectivities which had achieved distinctively superior levels of secular civilization.[7] For most, like the Chinese, attachment to a peculiar religion has been very weak. Because of its syncretic nature, the Chinese belief system readily accommodated to Thai and Burmese Buddhism, and considerable numbers of Chinese even converted to Islam in Malay regions.[8] German peasant settlers in Russia and Hungary kept their Protestant religion and rarely intermarried with neighboring Orthodox peasants. In the mobile society of metropolises such as St. Petersburg, however, numerous upper-class Germans intermarried and made the relatively slight denominational transition from Lutheranism to Orthodoxy.[9] Moreover, the situational diaspora myth of cultural superiority was rarely—until a very recent period—associated with the typical nationalist claim for *political* unification of all members, diaspora and homeland, of the ethnic group. The German diaspora in the Russian Empire (perhaps to a lesser extent in Poland-Lithuania and Hungary) was explicitly averse to political attachment to its great society.[10] The very concept of political attachment of the Southeast Asian Chinese to the Chinese Empire was, except for transitory incidents noted below, unrealistic until very recently. As will become apparent, the situational diaspora's rejection of ethnic political unification has not saved it from the suspicions of the dominant elites of their multiethnic polities; these elites have less frequently suspected archetypal diasporas, lacking any realistic connection to a homeland, of disloyalty.

Deprived of a great society to which to attribute cultural superiority, the archetypal diaspora has found a more intense focus of distinctiveness in its peculiar religion. This has been true for intermediate groups like the Armenians or the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire as well as for more obviously archetypal diasporas like the Jews and the Parsees. In each case, moreover, the religious myth, although perhaps predominantly other-worldly, has had a significant territorial focus. The Iranian shrines of the Indian Parsees, the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Phanar district of Istanbul, and of course the city of Jerusalem, provided territorial foci for the myth of ethnic identity during the long centuries when these religious centers had very restricted practical relation to the life of the diasporas. The manner in which the Gregorian Catholicosate of Echmiadzin has increased in significance as the symbolic center of Armenian life, although transferred in fact from one alien polity to another, is a still better illustration of how the religious myth defines a substitute homeland for the archetypal diaspora. Moreover, precisely because the myth is religious, its ability to maintain the crucial element of endogamy is stronger among archetypal than among situational diasporas.

Communication networks, as Karl Deutsch has shown, constituted a major basis for *modern* ethnic identification.[11] Distinctive communication patterns connected to religious and cultural myths have been significant for mobilized diasporas for centuries. All mobilized diasporas have sought to maintain their peculiar languages for internal use. Situational diasporas, with some access to cultural resources of their great societies, have generally been more successful: thus most Germans in Russia continued to speak German, and most Overseas Chinese speak some form of Chinese.[12] This linguistic distinctiveness is more necessary for maintaining *secular* myths, whereas the archetypal diaspora can rely on sacral resources. However little this diaspora actually uses the linguistic vehicle of its religion, the sacral language constitutes a vital element of the myth. Moreover, while adopting alien languages for the vast majority of communications, the archetypal diaspora usually maintains two important restrictions. First, the written word, with its exceptionally strong sacral implications, remains in the group's original alphabet, which is often very different from those of surrounding ethnic groups.[13] For example, while employing Arabic, Persian, Romance, or Germanic dialects, Jews have continued to write in the Hebrew alphabet; one Armenian script is used for two very different dialects. Moreover, borrowed linguistic elements which offend the central religious elements of the myth are avoided. Thus medieval Spanish Jews were more receptive to Arabic than to Latin, regarded as a specifically ecclesiastical vehicle of a hostile church; and they purged the dialects they did accept (Yiddish and Ladino) of words with specific Christian connotations.[14]

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[6] "Myth" refers to an integrated set of beliefs emphasizing the historical continuity and peculiar identity of a group. Since the myth has strong affective connotations, group members commonly resist efforts to subject it to critical analysis; none of these features implies, of course, that the myth is either true or false.

[7] See especially Richard J. Coughlin, *Double Identity: The Chinese in Modern Thailand* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), pp. 121, 160. Indians in East Africa and Malaya and Lebanese in West Africa also probably should be considered situational mobilized diasporas; Indians in Africa are convinced of their cultural superiority, according to Pierre L. Van den Berghe, *Race and Ethnicity* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 277, 293–94.

[8] Coughlin, *Double Identity*, pp. 78, 192; Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 59; *The New York Times*, September 16, 1974. The Chinese maintain intense family (ancestral) identification; this appears closer to identification with a superior culture than with religion in the usual sense.

[9] Fervent Lutherans did protest, but the extent of their concern and the numerous cases they cite are in themselves evidence of the tendency of the German diaspora to assimilate religiously. It had before it, of course, the frequent example of marriages and conversions to Orthodoxy among Lutheran royal families.

[10] It is precisely this rejection of political ties with the homeland which distinguishes mobilized diasporas, as I conceive them, from minorities like English-speaking Canadians in Quebec, who can be more aptly categorized as outposts of a dominant ethnic group.

[11] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1953). Deutsch suggested the importance of communications networks for modern ethnic identity in an earlier work, "Medieval Unity and Its Economic Conditions for an International Civilization," *Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science*, 10 (February, 1944), 18–35.

Although some measure of linguistic peculiarity is important for the mobilized diaspora, it cannot avoid accommodating to a considerable extent to the linguistic patterns of its environment if the diaspora is to maintain material and cultural advantages in the multiethnic polity. The tension between maintaining at least symbolic attachment to its own language, and the practical employment of other languages, leads diaspora members to acquire unusually strong linguistic skills. In Southeast Asia the Chinese quickly acquired a minimum command of the colonial powers' languages; even in Thailand the Chinese have been far ahead of the dominant ethnic group in mastering English.[15] In nineteenth-century Russia, Germans constituted a disproportionate element of the Asian consular service skilled in Oriental languages, just as Armenians are very numerous among Soviet Orientalists. For most archetypal diasporas, transmission of the archaic sacral language required some type of formal training in communications skills. It was a short step from the study of the sacral language to the essential study of more utilitarian languages and then, through the broadening circle of cultural contacts, to a structured educational experience.

The combination of linguistic skills and their relation to broader patterns of communications specialization has probably contributed more than the diasporas' myths themselves to their occupational role specialization. In turn, it is just this specialization which has made mobilized diasporas so useful as modernizing or proto-modernizing elements. Apart from purely linguistic skills, the network of personal and family relations (buttressed by the latent threat of diaspora community sanctions) were highly effective premodern devices for facilitating long-distance commerce. Thus Spanish Jews were indispensable for international commerce in the Middle Ages and Armenians controlled the overland trade between Europe and the Orient as late as the nineteenth century. Because of their special skills, dominant ethnic elites have often calculatingly assigned advantageous roles to mobilized diaspora members. Thus, in seventeenth-century Java, the Dutch rulers pragmatically calculated that the Chinese should be allowed to substitute a poll tax for military construction labor because they were more productive "in merchant services, agriculture, lime-burning, tailoring and other ways."[16] Two centuries earlier the Ottomans had exempted Armenian and Jewish diasporas from the "boy tax" (children forcibly recruited for the Janissaries) for very similar reasons.[17] More generally, dominant elites have retained military leadership and formal governing roles, while leaving despised but lucrative commercial roles to the mobilized diasporas. In these role allocations the implicit exchange relationship is often based on the economist's principle of relative advantage. For example, Lebanese Christians began to occupy middleman roles, which the dominant Ottoman elites despised, in eighteenth century Egypt, and more recently have acted as a mobilized diaspora in West Africa. In Lebanon itself, although native Christians are dominant in middleman roles such as banking and mercantile activities, the small Armenian diaspora community has, through its *relatively* greater skills in industrial development, provided 18 per cent of capital investment in large industry, 43 per cent in minor manufacturing.[18] Indeed, the case for referring to these diasporas as "mobilized," thus implying that they have a certain modernizing potential, does not rest on their specialization in middleman roles. Situational diasporas have often been directly involved in transmitting innovative economic techniques—e.g., Saxon miners in Eastern Europe and Chinese exploitation of gold and tin mines in Borneo and Malaya.[19] Perhaps archetypal diasporas are less inclined to provide the heavy manipulative labor in geographically isolated settings which mining entails. But, as a historian of seventeenth-century Istanbul writes: "Only the [Jewish, Armenian, and Greek] minorities, less hampered by religious imperatives [than Moslems], are capable of starting an adaptation to new conditions, all the more naturally since it is to them that the foreigners [possessing new techniques] turn."[20]

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[12] Coughlin, *Double Identity*, pp. 140–41, 144, 158; W. L. Cator, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), pp. 19, 29, 35; Guy Hunter, *South-East Asia—Race, Culture, and Nation* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 44 ff.; G. William Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 169.

[13] See especially Matthias Mieses, *Die Gesetze der Schriftgeschichte: Konfession und Schrift im Leben der Völker* (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1919), pp. 67 ff.; Istvan Hajnal, "Le Rôle Social de l'Ecriture et l'Evolution Européenne," *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie* (Brussels), IV (1924), 32 ff.

[14] Max Weinreich, "The Reality of Jewishness versus the Ghetto Myth," in *To Honor Roman Jakobson* (The Hague: Mouton, 1967), III, 2209; *Language in Sociocultural Change: Essays by Joshua A. Fishman*, ed. Anwar S. Dil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 297 ff.; Stephen Sharot, "Minority Situation and Religious Acculturation; A Comparative Analysis of Jewish Communities," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 16 (June, 1974), 340, 347; Yitzhak Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, II (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1966); Abraham A. Neuman, *The Jews in Spain*, I (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1942).

[15] Skinner, *Chinese Society*, p. 169; Coughlin, *Double Identity*, p. 153.

[16] Cator, *Economic Position of the Chinese*, p. 13.

[17] H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, I, Part 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 223.

Dynamics of Interaction Within the Multiethnic Polity

The typology presented in the preceding section required some discussion of the interaction of mobilized diaspora and dominant ethnic elite, but emphasized the internal development of the diaspora itself. Significant aspects of this development very frequently have taken place long before the diaspora's incorporation in a given multiethnic polity. Hence, in a sense, the special qualifications of the diaspora appear to the dominant elite as "given" factors, and this elite may not even be aware of the extent to which (in the long run) these diaspora skills may be strengthened or weakened by the exchange relationship. In the following set of propositions, therefore, one must be careful to distinguish between short-run advantages, usually perceptible to both the diaspora and to the dominant elites, and long-run advantages which may be discernible (if at all) only to the outside observer.

(1) Within the multiethnic polity, the mobilized diaspora is temporarily indispensable for the dominant ethnic elite. Much of the reasoning behind this proposition, particularly the analysis of diaspora skills, has already been presented. But it is important to stress the other side of the exchange relationship: the paucity of skills among the dominant ethnic elite, which often consists almost entirely of warriors, landlords, and perhaps priests of the dominant religion. As a Turkish nationalist, Ziya Gökalp, plaintively expressed it, "the poor Turks inherited from the Ottoman Empire nothing but a broken sword and an old-fashioned plow."[21] As long as they *were dominant*, however, the elites of the major ethnic group could acquire from others the skills they needed. Among diaspora technical skills prized by dominant elites, medicine has always ranked very high. As an early student of the question wrote, Jews (but the generalization could also be applied to Germans, Chinese, or Armenians) acquired medical skill because it was highly transferable: "The study of philosophy did not afford a prospect of earning a living and at that period jurisprudence afforded the least prospect of all (moreover, at first the latter was valid only in one's homeland, since other laws prevailed elsewhere); but the study of medicine was a cosmopolitan one which, *mutatis mutandis*, could be utilized everywhere."[22] In fact, medicine often acted as the entering wedge for Jews and other diasporas to secure access to a broader range of skilled professions.

In addition to their technical role specilization, the diasporas' communications skills have been especially prized by dominant elites who rarely possess either the multilingual ability or the more subtle understanding of diverse communication patterns required to deal effectively with a multiethnic population. Thus the first Arab caliphs found it necessary to employ Christian secretaries for civil administration; as late as the fourteenth century the Egyptian Coptic minority monopolized the secretarial roles.[23] Even where diasporas have been excluded from formal administrative position, they nearly always occupy (Spain, Ottoman Turkey, Russia, and the colonial empires of Southeast Asia) the quasi-administrative roles of tax farmers. In the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, it is said, there was an Armenian banker behind every high official, indispensable for providing the surety bond which permitted the official to be entrusted with revenue collection.[24]

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[18] Loretta Kh. Ter-Mkrtichian, *Armiane v Stranakh Arabskogo Vostoka* (Moscow: "Nauka," 1965); Eugen Wirth, "Damaskus-Aleppo-Beirut: Ein geographischer Vergleich dreier nahöstlicher Städte im Spiegel ihrer sozial und wirtschaftlich tonangebenden Schichten," *Die Erde*, 97 (1966), 180.

[19] Roger Portal, *L'Oural au XVIIIe Siècle* (Paris: Institut d'Etudes Slaves, 1950), pp. 65, 99; F. Ia. Poliansky, "Promyshlennaia Politika Russkogo Absoliutizma vo Vtoroi Chetverti XVIII v. (1725–1740 gg.)," *Voprosy Istorii Narodnogo Khoziaistva SSSR*, 1957, p. 106; Cator, *Economic Position of the Chinese*, pp. 139 ff.

[20] Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la Second Moitié du XVIIe Siècle* (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1962), p. 510.

[21] Quoted by Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London: Luzac, 1950), p. 74.

[22] G. Wolf, "Zur Geschichte jüdischer Aertze in Oesterreich," *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 13 (1864), 196–97; cf. Guido Kisch, *Die Prager Universität und die Juden, 1348–1848* (Mährisch-Ostrau: Julius Kittls Nachfolger, 1935), p. 36.

[23] Dominique and Janine Sourdel, *La Civilisation de l'Islam Classique* (Paris: Arthaud, 1968), p. 370; A. S. Tritton, *The Caliphs and Their Non-Muslim Subjects*, 2nd ed. (London: Cass, 1970), p. 72; cf. H. Montgomery Watt,

(2) Within the multiethnic polity, the mobilized diaspora depends for security on the dominant ethnic elite. Among the upper stratum of mobilized diasporas, at least, there has been considerable awareness of the mutual dependency between diaspora and dominant elite. Faced with the terror of the Inquisition, late fifteenth-century Jews came close to identifying with the Ottoman power. "You do not know who the Turk is. If God will favor us, that is, conversos [unwilling converts to Christianity], the Turk will be in Castile within a year and a half . . . The Turk is called the Destroyer of Christianity and the Defender of the Jewish Faith," wrote an Istanbul Jew.[25]

Perhaps the most articulate legitimization for adherence to a multiethnic polity was advanced by the Baltic German situational diaspora as a rearguard stand against both Russian and German nationalism. An 1870 editorial, appropriately entitled "About the Situation," idealizes the recent past:

> When we looked to the East, we saw a strong overlord whose arm protected us from disorder and preserved for us the blessings of peace. Further, we saw a broad field in which our sons and younger brothers had always been able to make a way and a position for themselves with slight effort and where a gracious monarch regarded us with great and well-earned trust. We saw a great empire, whose institutions we knew little of, except that none equalled ours in autonomy and enlightenment appropriate to the times.[26]

The note of personal loyalty to the sovereign is frequent in mobilized diaspora commentaries; but allegiance to a dominant elite perceived as embodying a superior ideal of supranationalism is not confined to traditional fealty. For example, Chinese diasporas in Southeast Asia and the Indian middleman minorities of East Africa strongly identified with colonial elites against indigenous nationalist movements, with little regard for the nominal source of these elites' authority.

(3) From the internal standpoint, the delicate balance of forces maintaining a mobilized diaspora's position within the multiethnic polity is most apt to be upset by a sharp overall rise in social mobilization. Such evidence as is available strongly suggests that widespread deprivation in a stagnant, traditional social order does not incite strong anti-diaspora activity *even* among dominant ethnic elements engaged in direct competition with diaspora middlemen. It would be difficult to find a recent independent polity as stagnant as late nineteenth-century Morocco. Yet excellent impartial studies testify to the good relations between Jewish and Moslem traders and artisans in the same occupations. "In sum, each asks only to perpetuate a lazy indifference which time has in some manner sanctified. In this rural life, stupefying for the mind but subjected to the quest for daily bread, economic contacts sufficed, perhaps, to engender a climate of mutual comprehension and collaboration between Moslems and Israelites."[27] In the common situation of specialized occupational roles, stable division of roles between the dominant and the diaspora ethnic groups appears to be readily accepted. Thus the Hungarian gentry, throughout much of the nineteenth century, seems to have been satisfied with the arrangement whereby Magyars owned estates, ruled, and commanded, while Jews occupied the liberal professions as well as middleman roles.[28] A similar mutual satisfaction apparently prevailed between dominant Thais and the Chinese diaspora up to the 1930s.

Hungary and Spain, are, however, classic instances of ouster of Jewish diasporas from favorable positions as the result of *mobilization* of lower strata of the dominant ethnic group. Accompanying a general increase in territorial and occupational mobility was awareness that advantages enjoyed by the diasporas were not "inevitable" but could be altered to the apparent advantage of the dominant ethnic group. While not discounting such influences as the anti-Judaism of the Spanish

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Islam and the Integration of Society (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961), p. 121, on the persistence of crypto-Zoroastrians (i.e., what are today known as "Parsees") in the civil service of the caliphs.

[24] Avedis K. Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 36. On the ubiquity of Chinese tax farmers, see especially Purcell, *Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 664.

[25] Baer, *History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, II, 347.

[26] "Zur Lage," *Baltische Monatsschrift*, 19 (1870), 8; cf. Hans Rothfels, *Reich, Staat und Nation in deutsch-baltischen Denken* (Haale: Niemeyer, 1930), pp. 226 ff.

[27] Pierre Flamand, *Un Mellah en Pays Berbère: Demnate* (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1952), p. 141. See also Roger LeTourneau, *Fès avant le Protectorat* (Casablanca: Société Marocaine de Librairie et d'Editions, 1949), pp. 186, 448; H. Z. Hirschberg, "The Jewish Quarter in Moslem Cities and Berber Areas," *Judaism*, 17 (Autumn, 1968), 406; J. Goulven, *Les Mellahs de Rabat-Salé* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1927) presents a somewhat less favorable picture. Cf. Mantran, *Istanbul*, p. 65.

[28] Robert A. Kann, "Hungarian Jewry during Austria-Hungary's Constitutional Period (1867–1918)," *Jewish Social Studies*, VII (1945), 357–86.

Church, the principal authorities on late medieval Spain stress the importance of lower strata attacks on Jews in a situation of expanding opportunities, while the elite—including bishops and religious-military orders—was eager to protect the Jews because of their economic value.[29] As Américo Castro trenchantly puts it:

> Finally, a day would come when the Catholic Sovereigns had an urgent need for the "common people" to further their militant imperial enterprises, and with it would come at last the annihilation of the two castes [Moslems and Jews] who no longer possessed any possible defenses . . . the lower strata of Christian society began to rise in the ranks and the way became clear for them to govern those who had formerly dominated them as *grandes de Castille* without being Christians.[30]

The passage just quoted implies that the position of the dominant elites themselves, closely identified with the mobilized diasporas through symbiotic activity, conversion, and sometimes intermarriage, was insecure. As larger elements of the dominant ethnic population became politically and economically mobilized, the "impurity" of the upper stratum threatened to become a ground for drastic turnover in elites. In other words, the *terms of exchange* had become distinctly less favorable for the dominant ethnic elite. The diaspora had not effected this change; but it could in a sense "compensate" for it by becoming a sacrifice ("shock absorber" is Blalock's term)[31] to divert populist animosity from the elite. As a result, the latter frequently turned to scapegoating, thus essentially altering its relation with the diaspora from *exchange* to *coercion*. Just as Ferdinand of Aragon sanctioned the Inquisition to quiet populist rumors assailing his Jewish ancestry, Sultan Abdul Hamid preferred to turn violently on the Armenian diaspora rather than to risk being identified with it in rising Turkish public opinion as he was in fact by descent. There are some indications that similar motivations lay behind the anti-Chinese measures taken by the Thai elite (with its considerable Chinese ancestry) after the revolutionary upheavals of the 1930s.[32] In a very similar way, the slow, uneven process of modernization in Russia has made antidiaspora tactics attractive to very different kinds of dominant ethnic elites. No one would deny that Alexander III was sincerely anti-German; but his weak son, Nicholas II, took anti-German measures at the outbreak of World War I partly to divert attention from the notorious German atmosphere of his Court. More recently, Soviet leaders with Jewish in-laws (including Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev) have probably been motivated to some degree by fear of too close identification with the disliked diaspora.[33]

Dynamics of the International Context

By definition, multiethnic polities belong to James Rosenau's category of highly penetrated systems in which domestic developments are extraordinarily dependent on extrasystemic conditions.[34] These polities have operated in an international environment geographically or chronologically remote from the modern Western model of impenetrable nation states. Consequently, the numerous treatments which depict mobilized diasporas exclusively as *victims* of intrasystemic forces ignore the crucial effects of international *politics* upon the exchange relation between diaspora and dominant ethnic elite.

(4) In the external relations of the multiethnic polity, the mobilized diaspora is as indispensable (and as transitory) as it is for the internal interests of

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[29] See especially Neuman, *The Jews in Spain*, I, 182; Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, II, 25; Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'Epoque de Philippe II*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Colin, 1966), II, 29. Cf. Weinreich in *To Honor Roman Jakobson*, III, 2201, for a description of the similar situation in the medieval Rhineland.

[30] Américo Castro, *The Spaniards* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 502, 570.

[31] Hubert H. Blalock, Jr., *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations* (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 81. On p. 79 Blalock appears to agree with my point that a mobilized diaspora is relatively secure in a traditional social order.

[32] Coughlin, *Double Identity*, pp. 128, 168; Purcell, *Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 169.

[33] John A. Armstrong, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Anti-Semitism," *Soviet Jewry: 1969* (Academic Committee on Soviet Jewry, 1969), pp. 65–69. I do not pretend that the explanation of internal factors presented above is adequate to explain all cases of persecution of mobilized diasporas, especially those involving recent anti-Semitism. Ernst Nolte in *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York: Reinhart, 1966), emphasizes quite rightly the importance of the search for scapegoats after military defeat (in Weimar Germany and late nineteenth-century France; he might have added Turkey after defeats in 1876–78 and 1915–19). Still, it can be argued that *one* significant factor in all three of these countries was the highly uneven pace of modernization, which made it profitable for elites of premodern origin to condone scapegoating by discontented members of their ethnic group. More directly contrary to my interpretation, at least on the surface, is the important study by Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Dynamics of Prejudice* (New York: Harper, 1950), which attributes increases in anti-Semitic attitudes in both Germany and the United States to *downward* mobility. Of course outbreaks of anti-Semitism occasionally occur in successfully modernized countries, despite what I contend is the generally favorable position of the vestigial mobilized diasporas there. Unfortunately, such an ingrained historical prejudice is hardly likely to disappear merely because of economic and social transformations. It is not surprising that when anti-Semitism does occur in a modernized society the causes are different from those in slowly modernizing multiethnic societies. Apart from the hideous Nazi exception, however, dominant elites in Western modernized societies *have* succeeded in preventing the *attitudes* Bettelheim and Janowitz note from resulting in catastrophic *behavior*.

[34] James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1971).

the dominant ethnic elite. Two basic factors account for the importance of the mobilized diaspora in external relations. In the premodern period, international commerce, although small in terms of the overall economic activity of the large multiethnic states, was indispensable to rulers. Luxury items were needed to nurture dominant elite loyalties and some military items (including the technological innovations mentioned earlier) had to be imported. Consequently, the activity of the mobilized diasporas was vital when the polity was expanding territorially, and retained considerable defensive significance even during stagnation. For example, in the late sixteenth century Sephardic Jews, through their contacts with European traders, contributed significantly to the Saadian dynasty's revival of Moroccan power, just as earlier their long-range commercial contacts had strengthened Moslem and Christian monarchies in Spain. Other refugee Sephardic Jews and Armenians from Kaffa in the Crimea extricated the Ottoman Empire sufficiently from Venetian commercial domination to enable the Empire to reach the pinnacle of its power.[35]

The situations just mentioned are excellent illustrations of the point made earlier, that the dominant elite of a given multiethnic polity customarily takes the skills of its mobilized diaspora as a given, since they were acquired under other regimes. The case of the Armenians shows how complicated this competition for diaspora skills can become. Apparently the Armenians began to be a mobilized diaspora during the early Middle Ages, when they occupied a precarious but profitable position between the Byzantine Empire and Moslem states. A few centuries later, in 1590, Shah Abbas recognized the importance of Armenian skills by forcibly transplanting their major center for transit trade, Julfa, to New Julfa, a suburb of his Persian capital. However, he was not the only ruler to profit from this drastic move. By breaking up the homeland center of Armenian commerce, Abbas set in motion a new dispersion which fructified the Armenian diaspora in the rival Ottoman Empire as well as in Poland and even in the Moghul Empire.[36] Two centuries later, the Tsar harvested many of the long-term benefits of increased Armenian dispersion (and the heightening of skills which accompanied it) by incorporating the remaining Armenian centers on the Transcaucasus trade route. The Russian government recognized its potential, although wholly unearned advantage, by conceding to the Armenian mercantile elite exemption from tariffs on the route from Persia to Leipzig. A few years later Prussian finance minister Friedrich von Motz sought a treaty with Russia to enable Prussian trade to penetrate Asia with the aid of the Armenian "commercial people" under Russian protection.[37]

The example just cited suggests that the commercial advantages accruing to multiethnic empires from their mobilized diasporas could provide leverage in international negotiations. But mobilized diasporas have often been more directly involved in foreign policy. Perhaps the most striking example is the way in which the Phanariot Greeks maintained de facto direction of Ottoman foreign policy for one hundred fifty years. The key move occurred when "in the later seventeenth century the Phanariot Greeks gradually ousted the renegades and Levantines who had hitherto served as interpreters in dealing with foreign embassies."[38] The office of Grand Dragoman (created in 1669) soon became equivalent to permanent head of the Ottoman foreign office. One Grand Dragoman even acquired the formal title of Minister of Secrets (ordinarily the Greeks prudently left these honorific posts to Moslems) and acted as chief Turkish delegate at the Carlowitz peace conference.[39] In the neighboring Russian multiethnic empire, German diaspora diplomats were so influential that not until the 1880s did a Tsar (Alexander III) order all diplomatic correspondence to be conducted in Russian. As late as 1914 one indispensable diplomat of German origin was still reporting home to St. Petersburg in French, since he simply did not know Russian. Just five years later, the new Bolshevik elite found the polyglot Polish Jew, Karl Radek, equally indispensable for foreign negotiations.

(5) Dominant ethnic elite perceptions of mobilized diaspora disloyalty tend to negate the value of the diaspora for external relations. The very characteristics which originally made the diasporas valuable have tended, over considerable time periods, to arouse the suspicions of the dominant elites. Groups which partially escaped the control of absolute monarchs, groups whose co-ethnics lived under rival sovereigns, groups which carried on constant intercourse across frontiers could hardly avoid arousing distrust. For more xenophobic elites—the fifteenth-century Spanish monarchs and latter-day Soviet elites—simple distrust of "cosmopolitans" has been sufficient to damn the Jewish diasporas. Yet it is remarkable how long and well a more sophisticated elite like the Ottomans trusted their Jewish subjects; most Eastern European elites were equally tolerant of German diaspora contacts.

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[35] Gaston Deverdun, *Marrakech* (Rabat: Editions Techniques Nordafricaines, 1959), p. 453; Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p. 129; Moise Franco, *Sur l'Histoire des Israélites de l'Empire Ottoman depuis les Origines jusqu'à Nos Jours* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1973—reprint of 1897 ed.), p. 57.

[36] Sanjian, *Armenian Communities*, p. 48; V. A. Baiburtian, *Armianskaia Koloniia Novoi Dzhulfy v XVII Veke* (Erevan: Akademiia Nauk Armianskoi SSR, 1969); *Istoricheskie Sviazi i Druzhba Ukrainskogo i Armianskogo Narodov* (Kiev: "Naukova Dumka," 1965), pp. 101 ff., 122 ff.; R. L. Abramian, *Armianskie Istochniki XVIII V. ob Indii* (Erevan: Akademiia Nauk Armianskoi SSR, 1968).

[37] Valentin Wittschewsky, *Russlands Handels-, Zoll- und Industrielpolitik von Peter dem Grossen bis auf die Gegenwart* (Berlin: Mittler, 1905), p. 57; Hermann von Petersdorff, *Friedrich von Motz* (Berlin: Hoffing, 1913), II, 323.

[38] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 87.

[39] *Ibid.*, Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 364; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, Part 2, p. 236.

(6) The most potent source of the dominant ethnic suspicion of the mobilized diaspora is the existence of its "homeland" outside the dominant elite's territorial control. This proposition requires careful qualification. As was discussed in the preceding section, a sharp rise in social mobilization with concomitant populist pressures is *the most* important factor jeopardizing a mobilized diaspora. *That* danger arises, however, only when a dominant elite's interest in utilizing a diaspora has eroded and the alternative of scapegoating affords a short-run advantage. In contrast to this "cynical" calculation, real suspicion that a diaspora has transferred its loyalty to the occupants of its homeland pervades the dominant elite itself.

It is important to distinguish the positions of the *situational* and the *archetypal* diasporas. For the former, much depends on the political activity of its great society. Probably German disunity is the basic reason that Eastern European German minorities were rarely distrusted by dominant elites (although often denounced for their overbearing manner by lesser figures) until the formation of the Second Reich. After that, for understandable reasons, it was all downhill for the diaspora Germans until the expulsions at the end of World War II. The Southeast Asian Chinese, on the other hand, while never suffering as extreme a reversal, have been intermittently distrusted precisely because the polity of the great Chinese society, while *choosing* isolation, at all times possessed considerable potential for imperialist intervention. Thus Spanish suspicion that a haughty mandarin mission was preparing to oust Spain from the Philippines led to the brutal massacre which terminated a local Chinese uprising in 1603. A factor behind the Dutch decision (1854) to suppress the Borneo mining *kongsis* was their sending envoys to the Emperor of China.[40] More recent suspicions, associated with the attraction Sun Yat-Sen exerted in the 1920s and the Chinese Peoples Republic in the 1960s have induced equally harsh reactions from new indigenous elites in countries like Indonesia.

One might suppose that the vastly lower power *potential* of the archetypal diasporas' homelands would correspondingly reduce the dominant elites' suspicions. At times this has indeed been the case. Generally the religious nature of the archetypal diaspora myth, with its transcendental element, has induced diaspora members to accommodate to the curses and revilings of the ethnic groups among which they live. Even when the dominant elite protected the diaspora from serious physical harm, it eventually reinforced the diaspora's ignominious position by formally excluding it from positions of power and by enforcing residential segregation and sumptuary laws. This happened in sixteenth-century Istanbul, despite the Jews' exceptionally favored position. It is not surprising that messianic movements became noticeable among them about that time.[41] Since, however, recovery of the Jewish homeland was not then within the realm of practical politics, these movements aroused little concern among the dominant Ottoman elite which, moreover, had rather less need for diaspora services as the Empire became more homogeneously Moslem in population and more stagnant in economic and military affairs. The sharp decline of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire is, however, one of the few instances of a diaspora's being largely displaced in an *unmodernized* context without extreme coercion by the dominant ethnic elites.

More often, as Karl Deutsch has noted, a minority "with links to the domestic system and some particular links to the international or foreign input" will eventually react to persecution by loosening its ties to the multiethnic polity.[42] In other words, the dominant ethnic elite's suspicions tend to be self-fulfilling. The Phanariot Greeks' loss of their influential position in the Ottoman Empire is a good example of this interaction. Soon after acquiring their extraordinary influence in foreign negotiation, Phanariot elites began to dream of recreating the Byzantine Empire. At first they regarded partnership with the dominant but declining Moslem elites as the only feasible tactic. By the latter part of the eighteenth century, however, revival of an Orthodox Empire sponsored by Russia attracted those Phanariots who were too impatient to endure the humiliating terms which the Ottoman elite exacted from its Christian junior partners. Eventually the first wave of modern nationalism induced the Greeks to strike for independence at a time when the Ottoman elite was gravely concerned with Russian and other European Christian encroachments. The result was nearly catastrophic for the Phanariot diaspora: "The Turks were no longer prepared to trust the Orthodox. With the holocaust at the Patriarchate the old dispensation was ended."[43] The long period of Phanariot access to top policy making terminated in 1821 with the execution of two successive Grand Dragomans. "The chief beneficiaries were the Armenians, already well established as money-changers and bankers; better trusted than the Greeks, better educated than the Jews, they moved into many positions previously held by both. . . ."[44]

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[40] Purcell, *Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 591; Cator, *Economic Position of the Chinese*, p. 157.

[41] Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, Part 2, pp. 217, 241; Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 454; Haim Nakoum (former chief rabbi), "Jews," in *Modern Turkey*, ed. Elliot Mears (New York: Macmillan, 1924), p. 87; Uriel Heyd, "The Jewish Communities of Istanbul in the Seventeenth Century," *Oriens*, 6 (No. 2, 1952), 308 ff.

[42] Karl W. Deutsch "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 12.

Incipient independence for the Greek homeland entailed destruction of Greek diaspora ascendancy. The position of the Armenians provides a still sharper illustration of the sensitivity of dominant elites to the attraction exerted on diasporas by their homelands. Although the Armenian diaspora (particularly in India) resented Persia more than the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the location of the sacral center, Echmiadzin, in the Persian domains worried the Ottoman elite. Even earlier, the latter had maneuvered to secure control of the diaspora by inventing the title of "patriarch" for the Gregorian Bishop of Bursa and bringing him to Istanbul. Gradually the cultural center of Armenian life gravitated there. Far into the nineteenth century Ottoman leaders referred to the Armenians as the "loyal *millet*," i.e., the most loyal of the non-Moslem minorities. But continued concern with the religious attraction of Echmiadzin led the Ottomans to make repeated efforts to encourage rival Armenian religious centers in their own territory (Jerusalem and Cilicia). The threat became greater when Echmiadzin and the surrounding Transcaucasian homeland passed from the stagnating Persians (who, in any event, as Moslems could not easily pose as champions of an Armenian ethnic revival) to the dynamic Christian Russian Empire. The Russian government, while encouraging the Gregorian Church, moved quickly to place it under the supervision of St. Petersburg officials. By the 1830s the Armenians had acquired the status of a significant secondary mobilized diaspora within the southern borderlands of the Russian Empire, both commercially (as noted earlier) and in governmental and military posts concerned with its Oriental subjects.[45] A more recent Armenian analysis provides a good indication of the way in which sophisticated diaspora elites have been able to comprehend the delicate balance of exchange relation with the dominant elite:

> The position of the Armenian authorities at the capital was obviously influenced by the Porte's apprehensions of, the hostility to Russia. . . . [since control of all ecclesiastical institutions by the Echmiadzin Catholicos] would surely be construed by the Porte as tantamount to placing them under Russian authority. This was a contingency that the Armenian leaders at Constantinople felt must be avoided at all costs if the security of the empire's Armenian *millet* was to be safeguarded.[46]

Unfortunately for the Armenian diaspora, its internal conflicts prevented the solution of replacing Echmiadzin church authority by that of the Cilician center. Still more dangerous was the coincidence between the rise of a Russian-sponsored threat to the Ottoman Anatolian frontier and the birth of modern nationalism in both the Turkish Moslem dominant ethnic group and among the Armenians themselves. All of these developments came to a head in 1876 when the Ottoman and Russian Empires clashed militarily. Massacres of the Armenians during that period were succeeded twenty years later by worse atrocities, and in 1915 (once again under the threat of Russian invasion) by the near-final "solution" of genocide.

Succession of Mobilized Diasporas

(7) In a multiethnic polity where slow mobilization of the dominant ethnic group results in a persistent need for mobilized diaspora skills, diasporas will tend to succeed one another in advantageous positions. The preceding discussion of the factors which jeopardize mobilized diasporas has contained many hints that, as one's position declined, another arose in some polities to provide the middleman and communication skills the dominant elite continued to need. Indeed Proposition 7 can be deduced (although not rigorously) from Propositions 1, 3, 4, and 5: if a diaspora is indispensable for both internal and external purposes, yet is incapacitated by factors (increased mobilization among the dominant ethnic group, growing dominant elite suspicion of the diaspora's external connections) largely independent of the elite's continuing need for these skills, it is at least probable that that elite will turn to a more trusted mobilized diaspora if one is available.

A possible alternative, of course, for the dominant elite is to forego the advantages which *any* mobilized diaspora could contribute. The sixteenth-century Spanish elite's reaction is often considered the paradigm of this alternative. Having massacred or expelled the Jewish diaspora and the important Moslem communities, the Spanish elite itself resolutely renounced the skills they had supplied. As Américo Castro has written:

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[43] Runciman, *Great Church*, p. 406.

[44] *Ibid.*; Lewis, *Emergence*, pp. 87, 455; Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History* (London: Alcove Press, 1973), p. 135.

[45] Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 27, 43, 71, 133; Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 350.

[46] Sanjian, *Armenian Communities*, p. 242.

> An essential requisite to be a counselor of the emperor was that he be the son or grandson of *labradores*, that is, of peasants, farmers, or people who tilled the soil. . . . In sum, the ideal was that the ancestor of a counselor of His Imperial Majesty, the lord of half the world, should be illiterate, that he should lack even the elementary knowledge or technical experience to be a bricklayer, muleteer, tailor, or itinerant salesman. By no means should he be a physician, pharmacist, or—an hidalgo! Neither the status of the hidalgo nor one's patent of nobility guaranteed beyond the shadow of doubt that the royal counselor was free from Jewish or Moorish ancestry. . . . Since the Jews had a reputation for being the most intelligent and learned men, they [Spaniards] purposely chose to appear ignorant and illiterate on the surface to avoid the risk of being earmarked as Jews.[47]

No doubt there is an element of rhetorical exaggeration in Castro's generalization. Much indirect evidence suggests that there was indeed a continuing need for diaspora skills in Spain, and the downward course of Spanish power during this period is incontestable.[48] Still, one should be on guard against exaggerating the importance of the rejection of diasporas. After all, unusual tolerance for diasporas did not prevent a strikingly parallel decline of the Ottoman Empire. After his magisterial examination Fernand Braudel concluded that basic conditions of economic growth had turned against the large imperial polities by the end of the sixteenth century.[49] On the whole, however, the Spanish course is hardly one which sophisticated dominant ethnic elites will wish to emulate.

While some tendencies toward succession of mobilized diasporas appear in other polities,[50] the experiences of the Russian and the Ottoman Empires are clearest and historically most significant. Consequently, a tabular juxtaposition of these experiences, bringing out the striking similarity of successive but chronologically remote stages in the dynamics of diaspora-dominant elite interaction in the two multiethnic Empires, is suggestive. The comparison is especially significant because the Ottoman Empire made little progress toward economic and social modernization, while the Russian polity eventually did achieve modernization, although in an exceptionally protracted, uneven manner.[51] The comparison does, however, suggest two important differences: (a) the tendency of the interval between successions of mobilized diasporas to decrease in the successfully modernizing polity (Russia); and (b) the diminishing importance of successive mobilized diasporas in such a polity. In the Ottoman case, intervals are uneven in a random way which may reflect the dominance of "extraneous" or chance factors. The Russian case, on the other hand, suggests a chronological telescoping of the dynamic variable (diaspora succession) as modernization proceeds.

A recent monograph reveals that Lenin himself recognized that Jewish mobilized diaspora skills were essential to replace Russian bourgeois defectors—to "sabotage the saboteurs."[52] Some of these defecting specialists were in fact Germans, although the Germans had been declining as a diaspora for several decades prior to the Revolution. For example, German capital pioneered in textile manufacturing in Russian Poland, but during the last decades of Tsarist rule, Jewish capital became increasingly significant there.[53] Jews had operated the highly important grain and timber trades in the western parts of the Russian Empire for a century and were extremely important in central banking by 1914.[54] The very intensity of attacks on Jews (largely perpetrated by lower strata of the dominant Russian ethnic group directed by its elite in a classic example of scapegoating) aroused Jewish eagerness to acquire overtly powerful positions after the Revolution: "There can be little doubt that the thirst for power had been exacerbated by centuries of drought and that Jews were determined to drink deeply of the sweet waters of power."[55] By the 1920s Jewish membership in Soviet policy-making bodies was roughly comparable (one-fourth to one-half of the total) to

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[47] Castro, *The Spaniards*, pp. 550–52.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 591; Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p. 24.

[49] Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II, 46. The Spanish kingdom was obliged to import Flemish and Burgundian administrators from its outlying possessions and (more or less surreptitiously) French merchants and artisans (forty thousand in Madrid alone by 1655) to assume specialized roles Spaniards could not fill.

[50] Notably in nineteenth-century Hungary, where Jews replaced the urban German diaspora in many occupations with the tacit acquiescence of the Magyar elite, which regarded Jews as more assimilable, Kann, "Hungarian Jewry," pp. 371 ff.

[51] I have analyzed the social implications of the pace of Russian modernization in "Communist Political Systems as Vehicles for Modernization," in *Political Development in Changing Societies*, ed. Monte Palmer and Larry Stern (Lexington: Heath, 1971), pp. 135 ff.

[52] Zvi Y. Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 23.

[53] Ezra Mendelsohn, *Class Struggle in the Pale* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 17; cf. S. B. Weinryb, *Neueste Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Juden in Russland und Polen* (Breslau: M. and H. Marcus, 1934).

[54] Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality*, p. 76.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

Comparative Succession of Mobilized Diasporas

Ottoman Polity			Interval Scale (Years)	Russian Polity		
Principal Diaspora	Secondary Diasporas	Dates		Dates	Principal Diaspora	Secondary Diasporas
Catholic Levantines	*Greeks* (few *Jews* and *Armenians*)	1453–	0	1710–	*Germans* (mainly Baltic; slowly declining after 1881)	*Jews* and *Armenians* (by mid-nineteenth century)
Jews (mainly Sephardic; high point in mid-sixteenth century then slow decline due to cultural and economic factors without coercion)	*Greeks* (ten times more numerous than *Armenians* in Istanbul, but latter most important in Syria)	1490–	100			
Greeks (mainly Phanariot; sharp decline after nationalist uprising)	*Jews* (major residual position); *Armenians* (rapidly rising in Istanbul); *Lebanese* (becoming important in Egypt)	1650–	200	1919–	*Jews* (declining after 1942)	*Armenians* (rising after mid-1950s)
				1952–	*Armenians* (limited, slightly declining after 1964)	*Jews* (highly jeopardized residual position)
			300			
Armenians (rapidly declining after 1876)	*Jews* (modest recovery after 1880, as most trusted); *Greeks; Lebanese*	1821–	400			
		1919	500			

German proportions in the Tsarist governing elite of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Probably Jews were even more important in the liberal professions. But the constant insecurity of their position, in contrast to the widely accepted superiority of the Russian German diaspora prior to Alexander III, is indicated by the fact that the small portion of the Jewish group which acquired influential posts was obliged to renounce (and actively attack) the major elements of its diaspora culture.

As I have shown elsewhere,[56] officially sponsored anti-Semitism, like the secret setting of employment quotas, undermined the Soviet Jewish position at least by 1942. This chronology irrefutably demonstrates that the internal dynamics of the Soviet system, particularly the rapid replacement of the cosmopolitan Old Bolshevik elite by lower-strata Russians imbued with popular prejudices, was the main factor at the start of the anti-Semitic campaigns. Certainly the dramatic establishment of a Jewish homeland in 1948 could not have been the instigating force. Nevertheless, certain indiscreet (though thoroughly understandable) demonstrations of Jewish attachment to the concept of Israel (e.g., Madame Polina Molotov's declaration to Minister Golda Meir—"I am a Jewish daughter"), like the Armenian or Greek responses to Ottoman humiliations during the preceding century, exacerbated dominant elite suspicions. Although the crescendo of accusations and arrests during 1949–53 was not completely sustained by Stalin's successors, the position of Jews as an influential diaspora in the USSR was ended. In their place, but to a much more restricted degree (mainly in foreign commerce and on the southern borderlands) were installed Armenians—whose homeland, with the religious center of Echmiadzin—lay securely under Soviet control.

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[56] John A. Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism* (New York: Random House, 1961), chapter 11.

(8) In polities (whether or not multiethnic) where social and economic modernization has proceeded rapidly and evenly, mobilized diasporas do not perform indispensable activities and are generally not subject to discrimination. The greatly diminished position of the Armenian diaspora, as compared to its German and Jewish predecessors in the Russian polity, suggests that as modernization proceeds, mobilized diaspora skills become less significant. Even in a slowly, unevenly modernizing polity like the Russian, the dominant ethnic group (and some others) eventually provide the communications and technical role specialists once provided by diasporas. Western polities rapidly accomplished this phase of modernization decades ago. In such societies, vestigial diasporas may continue to be represented somewhat disproportionately in certain middleman roles, but never predominate in a broad range of crucial roles as they have in traditional or slowly modernizing multiethnic polities. Not only does a well-educated portion of the dominant elite possess considerable communication skills, but it is generally strong enough to enforce universal adoption of its language (or occasionally a bilingual compromise) by means of standard educational requirements. Influenced by the universalist values of the dominant elite, members of the dominant ethnic group appear to accept diaspora colleagues (even though they may be perceived as competitors) in much the same way that dominant ethnic occupational competitors did in a stagnant traditional society like nineteenth-century Morocco.

Proletarian Diasporas

The proposition just offered concerning the position of mobilized diaspora members in successfully modernized societies—despite the numerous exceptions which spring to mind[57]—is important for understanding the critical differences between the position of the mobilized and the proletarian diaspora. Before exploring this dichotomy, qualification is necessary. At all times and places, large portions of mobilized diasporas, like members of proletarian diasporas, have occupied disadvantageous roles in the occupational structure. The *luftmenschen* of the Jewish Pale were far from exceptional. A large proportion of even the relatively prosperous Armenian community of Istanbul was occupied in such menial work as porterage. But even the worst-off members of these diasporas had before them the symbol of upward mobility provided by their co-ethnics: "the Jewish journeyman by no means considered himself permanently a wage earner. As he saw it, were he compelled to suffer the insults of his master one day, the next he himself might become an employer, the master of his own shop. For such changes in status were fairly common practice."[58] Lacking such an upwardly mobile reference group, proletarian diasporas have, on the contrary, consisted of a nearly undifferentiated mass of unskilled labor.[59]

Lack of even the prospect of access to advantageous *occupational roles* is accompanied by low *communication skills.* Only 67.9 per cent of one group of Algerians studied recently in France could read or write in the dominant language, which is hardly surprising since 68.3 per cent could not read or write Arabic. Oral communication is almost as difficult; in Switzerland pidgin Italian has become known as the "slave language" because it is the only vehicle for communication among the diverse proletarian diaspora workers as well as between them and their dominant ethnic employers.[60] Here is a typical case of what Joshua Fishman calls "diglossia," i.e., the division of linguistic codes between those perceived (by both the dominant ethnic group and the proletarian diaspora) as appropriate for "high" purposes and those reserved for "low" purposes.[61] Clearly their low communication skills reinforce the low perceived status of the proletarian diaspora members in addition to lowering their performance. Moreover, communication limitations make it difficult for a proletarian diaspora to maintain an identifying *myth.* Even the predominantly Polish and Italian proletarian diasporas in France in the 1940s learned to speak French very imperfectly. Because of this linguistic obstacle, combined with less tangible communications barriers, a high proportion abandoned the practice of their Catholic religion, even though it is the faith of the dominant ethnic group. For Moslem workers in Western Europe, religious tradition apparently serves more as an added barrier to assimilation (especially through intermarriage) than as an identifying myth.

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[57] See footnote 33 above.

[58] Mendelsohn, *Class Struggle in the Pale*, p. 9.

[59] Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 310; John A. Jackson, *The Irish in Britain* (London: Routledge and Paul, 1963), pp. 79, 81. It is true that at times specific proletarian diasporas have tended to take unskilled jobs in particular economic branches, but these are almost always characterized by greater job turnover and geographical mobility than roles occupied by the dominant ethnic group, and by less status mobility.

[60] Castles and Kosack, *Immigrant Workers*, pp. 182, 191.

[61] Joshua Fishman, *Sociolinguistics* (Rowley: Newbury House, 1970), p. 78.

Given the circumstances of the proletarian diasporas, it is difficult to envisage their relations with dominant ethnic elites in terms of exchange theory. One viewpoint is that the appropriate framework of analysis is strict conflict theory (usually Marxist-Leninist), based on the assumption that the dominant ethnic elites are able to manipulate values in such a way that the proletarian diasporas lose absolutely as well as relatively.[62] In purely material terms, this contention has been strongly debated.[63] Neither side of the debate appears to have looked at the crushing *material* circumstances in the areas of, say, Turkey or Morocco where the diasporas originate. The enormous *cultural* and *psychic* impoverishment of the proletarian diasporas can, however, scarcely be questioned. Equally important in any conclusion concerning the undesirability of the process of formation of proletarian diasporas in modernized societies is the matter of relative deprivation. The degraded condition of the diasporas can hardly fail to arouse destructive animosities between them and the dominant ethnic groups when the cultural and physical appearance gap between the groups is also wide.

(9) In polities where economic and social modernization has proceeded rapidly and evenly, proletarian diasporas tend to become progressively more distant culturally and in physical appearance from the dominant ethnic group, and to suffer more discrimination. American readers are familiar with the concept of successive waves of immigrants taking over the least desirable housing and starting at the bottom of the occupational ladder. Unquestionably this process, in the United States, has entailed increasingly greater perceived cultural differences between proletarian diasporas and the dominant ethnic group. What is not so often recognized is that the modernized European polities have experienced a very similar succession of proletarian diasporas. After the first centuries of the Roman imperium, slave diasporas did not constitute a major source of labor in Europe (or for that matter in Islamic and other major civilizations of the medieval and early modern eras). Modernization began, therefore, with local, homogeneous unskilled labor supplies:

> The standard stable partnership is between a poor region with regular emigration and an active town. . . . The origins of the new citizens in a lively town like Metz or Constance for example (the latter from 1367 to 1517) could equally well be marked on a map. In each case it would disclose a wide area associated with the life of the town . . . [that] spoke its dialect . . . . [The town] left the lowly tasks to new arrivals [from this region]. Like our over-pressured economies today, it needed North Africans or Puerto Ricans at its service, a proletariat which it quickly used up and had quickly to renew. The existence of this wretched and lowly proletariat is a feature of any large town.[64]

By 1788 "foreigners," i.e., French-speakers like the Auvergnat water-carriers and Savoyard sawyers, performed the menial tasks of Paris. Most labor was still recruited from northern and eastern regions with *dialects* as well as standard speech similar to Parisian, however. A little later, the less desirable urban roles (and those in migratory agricultural labor) were assumed by Bretons (often Celtic-speaking) and persons from countries adjoining France.[65] As modernization (and prosperity) increased, however, these quasi-native elements resisted the painful dislocation involved in long-distance migration. By the twentieth century, southern Italians and Poles were, consequently, moving into the less desirable roles of the Parisian occupational structure. Together these groups comprised 52 per cent of all foreigners in France by 1936, and 53 per cent a decade later.[66] It was not until the 1950s "postindustrial" period that *bidonvilles* for non-European workers became noticeable. Half a million non-Europeans entered France during 1955–62 alone. By the 1970s over a million North Africans were in France, compared to ninety thousand in 1936.[67]

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[62] Castles and Kosack, *Immigrant Workers*, especially p. 476.

[63] Charles P. Kindleberger, *Europe's Postwar Growth: The Role of Labor Supply* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 204 ff.; Pierre Grandjeat, "Les Migrations de Travailleurs en Europe," *Cahiers de l'Institut International d'Etudes Sociales*, I, Cahier 1 (Paris, 1966), pp. 62 ff.; Arnold M. Rose, *Migrants in Europe* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 150 ff.

[64] Braudel, *Capitalism*, pp. 380–81. Braudel's generalization is supported by the ingeniously compiled statistics presented by Roger Mols, *Introduction à la Démographie Historique des Villes d'Europe du XIVe au XVIIIe Siècle* (Louvain: Duculot, 1955), II, 379 ff. Cf. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970), p. 10: "The classic heterogeneity of great cities has been limited to the elite part of the population . . . not, as in the United States, the masses."

[65] Braudel, *Capitalism*, pp. 380–81; Louis Chevalier, *La Formation de la Population Parisienne du XIXe Siècle* (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1949), pp. 21, 165, 210.

[66] Alain Girard and Jean Stoelzel, "Français et Immigrés," *Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques*, Cahier No. 19 (Paris, 1953), p. 19.

In some respects the British experience was less gradual because reliance on the culturally distinct Irish for mobile, heavy labor began in the early nineteenth century, declined for nearly a century after the first industrial booms were over, then turned sharply upward during World War II. As late as 1966, there were 350,000 Irish workers as compared to 500,000 from the Commonwealth (mostly non-white).[68] Although friction between natives and nonwhite immigrants was evident sooner in Britian, France, contrary to characteristically optimistic forecasts, was not immune. As recently as 1969 one French observer concluded that:

> Sure of our own nationality, which has resisted all kinds of attacks and has so valiantly digested all kinds of bastardization, we have developed as one of our national characteristics a sort of tolerant, individualistic and chauvinistic indifference to foreigners, which will persist in this thoroughly bourgeois era because it is essentially based on self-assurance.[69]

The signs of latent animosity, related to cultural distance, should have been apparent by then. For example, in the late 1940s, a French sample ranked North Africans (who at that time were mostly French citizens) with Germans as "least liked." Moreover, on the operationally critical question of whom respondents would most object to as sons-in-law, 70 per cent (as compared to 45 per cent for Germans) indicated North Africans.[70] With astonishing rapidity this latent hostility became manifest between 1968 and 1975, with North Africans engaging in radical labor activities and French extremists lynching Algerians.[71]

Some writers have stressed the postcolonial aspects of the succession of proletarian diasporas. While it is true that France and Great Britain have drawn on former colonies, a very similar progression has occurred in West Germany, despite German lack of a colonial empire.[72] The first cycle of replacement of local, German workers in unskilled labor (during the late nineteenth century) did draw on culturally—although not legally—alien Poles from eastern Prussia, but Poles from the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires were also attracted. By 1910 virtually the same proportion (four per cent) of the German labor force was foreign as in West Germany in 1965. Nevertheless, as in France and Britain, a striking change in the ethnic makeup of this four per cent has occurred. By 1973 more than half of the immigrant workers had come from such culturally distant countries as Yugoslavia and Greece, including nearly 30 per cent from Moslem Turkey.[73]

Politics has played an important part in promoting the succession of proletarian diasporas in successfully modernizing polities, just as it has been significant in the succession of mobilized diasporas in the slower or unsuccessful multiethnic polities. Within the international framework, preservation of a stable equilibrium since 1945 has been a crucially necessary condition for the recruitment of labor from progressively more remote regions. From the standpoint of internal politics, the progression has been largely the result of *nondecisions.* Certainly Western European governments have facilitated migration and in a few instances (Franco-Algerian agreements) have actively promoted it. In general, however, it has been undirected market forces which have shaped the nature of labor migration. In spheres where polities have the capacity to initiate policies, failure to act may be just as political as positive action.

The feasibility of controlling the succession of proletarian diasporas—at least up to the present—is demonstrated by the experience of the Soviet-bloc polities. Since the late 1960s the economy of the German Democratic Republic has exerted almost as strong an attraction on foreign unskilled labor as that of the German Federal Republic. Considerable reservoirs of underutilized labor exist in Poland and the Balkan Soviet-bloc countries. Nevertheless, foreign employment in East Germany has been limited to the magnitude of several tens of thousands, ordinarily workers recruited for specific contract projects.[74] The situation within the multiethnic USSR (which may well determine GDR policy on migration as well) is more critical. Rapid industrialization with prodigal use of labor, low productivity in agriculture, and a sharply declining reproduction rate among European ethnic groups is straining the resources of the Soviet dominant ethnic areas. In contrast,

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[67] Castles and Kosack, *Immigrant Workers*, pp. 296, 432.

[68] Rose, *Migrants*, p. 24.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[70] Girard and Stoelzel, "Français et Immigrés," pp. 37, 41.

[71] Edward R. F. Sheehan, "Europe's Hired Poor," *The New York Times Magazine*, December 9, 1973; cf. *The New York Times*, May 2, 1973, and Jean-Paul Sartre's editorial article in *The New York Times*, March 11, 1973.

[72] The poor excuse for a colonial empire which the Second Reich cherished produced no significant labor export; in a sense, of course, the Ostarbeiter compelled to work in Germany during World War II constituted a temporary proletarian diaspora.

[73] Castles and Kosack, *Immigrant Workers*, p. 19; Kindleberger, *Europe's Postwar Growth*, p. 177; Rose, *Migrants*, p. 24; *The New York Times*, November 24, 1973.

[74] *The New York Times*, July 11, 1972, on increased Polish and Rumanian export of contract labor to *West* Germany, despite *East* German opposition.

Soviet regions most distant geographically and culturally (the Moslem-culture republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus) have very high reproduction rates and underutilized labor forces. Nevertheless, there has been no migration of unskilled labor from these regions to the cities of Russia and the Ukraine, which continue to recruit predominantly from the adjacent Slavic rural regions. Moreover, while the subject is treated with great reticence in Soviet publications, there are some indications that this restraint represents a definite policy decision.[75]

(10) There is a reciprocal relation between modernization and diasporas: (a) In polities where modernization is rapid and even, mobilized diasporas tend to become vestigial and their members are advantaged; whereas proletarian diasporas become increasingly important and their members are deprived. (b) In multiethnic polities where modernization is retarded, mobilized diasporas are temporarily advantaged as a group, but are successively discarded and their members are deprived; whereas proletarian diasporas are vestigial, and their members are no more deprived than the lower strata of the dominant ethnic group. This lengthy proposition can be derived from Propositions 7, 8, and 9. It also sums up the conclusions of this article. That *both* tempos of modernization lead to severe discrimination against ethnic groups may seem like another of the bitter ironies of history. But the ten propositions I have advanced are not intended to be commandments. The saving note, if there is one, is recognition of the autonomy of politics which *might* be able to create frameworks in which both patterns of discrimination are avoidable.

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[75] John A. Armstrong, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union," in *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, ed. Erich Goldhagen (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 7.

Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon"*

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New Thoughts on Political Television

In the United States, candidates for national office depend upon television to transform candidacy into incumbency. In 1968, the Democrats spent 61 per cent of their presidential campaign funds on broadcasting; the Republicans spent half.[1] But surprisingly, the public relies more heavily on political television than do the candidates. In 1972 two-thirds of the American people said that television was the best way to follow candidates for national office and more than half got their "clearest understanding of the candidates and issues in national elections" from TV.[2]

Of course, for the national candidate, reliance on electronic media declines once the election has been decided. But the public takes no such holiday. In fact, since 1963, the year that CBS and NBC both extended their evening news from fifteen minutes to half an hour, television has remained the public's preeminent source of political information and news. By 1972, a full 64 per cent of the general public felt that television provided "most of (their) news about what's going on in the world today."[3]

This dependence upon television for political information of all types has triggered some wild speculation about the political implications of television campaigns and television news, especially network news. Every president since Kennedy has written about the impact of public affairs television on the landscape of American politics.[4]

But, until recently, political scientists have not been so willing as presidents to commit to paper their thoughts about the effects of public affairs television, especially television journalism. At base, this reluctance to study noncampaign television was the consequence of an unproved assumption—that both campaign television and public affairs television were incapable of affecting viewers. Relying on the scholarly work of the 1940s and 1950s, political scientists assumed that television journalism, like television campaigning, was just another source of information that could be selectively *attended to*, *perceived*, or *retained*. In short, having established early in the game that television campaigns rarely influence voting turnout or voting choice directly,[5] American political science paid little, if any, attention to more exotic theories about noncampaign television and politics. And, at one point, the profession seemed committed to a general theory of minimal effects. In

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* I thank M. Kent Jennings at the University of Michigan for helping in this research when others were cool to the whole endeavor. Richard Hofstetter, at Ohio State, deserves credit for straightening me out from time to time. Philip Burgess, also at Ohio State, was my principal aid in every facet of this study and I owe him a lot.

[1] Herbert Alexander, *Political Financing* (Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing, 1972), p. 10.

[2] The Roper Organization, *What People Think of Television and Other Mass Media: 1959–1972* (New York: Television Information Office, 1973), pp. 7–10.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[4] John Kennedy, "A Force That Has Changed the Political Scene," *TV Guide*, 1959, cited in Edward Chester's *Radio, Television and American Politics* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1969), p. 107. Richard Nixon, *Six Crises* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962), chapter 2. Lyndon Johnson is not quite so explicit in his memoirs but he clearly links the public's "misunderstanding" of Tet to television journalism. He also suggests that television coverage at the Chicago convention in 1968 was a critical event in the political history of the 'sixties. See *Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 384, p. 543.

[5] The literature here is legion. For a discussion of the impact of TV on turnout see Angus Campbell, "Has Television Reshaped Politics?" *The Columbia Journalism* Review, 1 (Fall, 1962), 10–13. Herbert Simon and Frederick Stern, "The Effect of Television upon Voting Turnout in Iowa in the 1952 Presidential Election," *American Political Science Review*, 49 (June, 1955), 470–477, William Glaser, "Television and Voting Turnout," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29 (Spring, 1965), 71–86. All these studies consistently show little or no effect on turnout when television campaigning is the independent variable. For a look into the question of TV and voter preference see Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, William Miller, "Television and the Election," *Scientific American*, 188 (May, 1953), 46–48; Department of Marketing, Miami University, *The Influence of Television on the Elections of 1952*, (Oxford, Ohio: Miami University, Oxford Research Associates, 1954); Kurt and Gladys Lang, *Politics and Television* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1968); Sidney Kraus, *The Great Debates* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962); Jay Blumler and David McQuail, *Television in Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi, *Polls, Television, and the New Politics* (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler, 1970); Paul Dawson and James Zinser, "Broadcast Expenditures and Electoral Outcomes in the 1970 Congressional Elections," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 35 (Fall, 1971), 398–402. All these books and articles, except the Dawson and Zinser piece, reach similar conclusions. Television campaigns do not appreciably alter voting preferences or the outcome of general elections.

1956 one political scientist, Eugene Burdick, had to leave the APSA altogether to find a reputable social scientist who might break with the theory of television and noneffects. Burdick was unable to locate a political scientist who would venture a piece about the possibility of public affairs television affecting elections and voters at some time in the future.[6]

Throughout the early 'sixties, most political scientists clung to the theory of minimal consequences, a theory which relegates television, and all mass media, to a position of relative impotence. The proponents of this theory argued that television campaigns rarely produce any attitudinal or behavioral changes, nor does television journalism.[7] Perhaps V. O. Key summarized best the position of professional political science as it existed in the 'fifties and early 'sixties:

> Neither radio nor television has been able to grow into an independent source of political information or interpretation. In the main, these instruments have been brought into the pattern of older news media; they are by and large transmitters rather than originators of political intelligence. As such, radio and television have not become institutions of political influence in their own right.[8]

The late 'sixties strained this position, as they did many of the widely held positions within the profession. The "TV War" in Vietnam, the portrayals of violence in urban America, the televised student "revolution," all made any extrapolation from television voting studies of the 'fifties and early 'sixties seem out of date, almost naive. Several political scientists began to forge hypothetical links between television journalism, public opinion, and political behavior. Television journalism, not television campaigning, became a new focus. And at the turn of the decade, a spate of articles by political scientists appeared, each expressing anxiety about the discipline's inability to find any political significance in public affairs television. Stressing either the extraordinary size and composition of the TV news audience,[9] the unique format of the television news item,[10] the unusual qualities of video presentation,[11] or the high credibility of the networks,[12] these essays all suggested that television journalism is *sui generis* and that TV news produces effects far beyond those yet measured (or even considered) in television campaign research. These essays did more than stress the uniqueness of television news; they also suggested that television news produces fundamental changes in American public opinion. Wamsley and Pride, for example, argued that TV news may render the society less legitimate by denigrating symbols of authority.[13] Paul Weaver wrote that the television news format fosters "detachment (at best) or cynical rejection (at worst) toward the political institutions of the nation."[14] Perhaps the most dramatic hypothesis drawn by a political scientist was proposed by Byron Shafer, who asserted that television journalism was the principal creator of a new political cleavage, if not of a new political era:

> For a long time there were two basic issues in national politics: foreign policy . . . , and economics. . . . Now there is a third: Law and Order—shorthand for street crime, race, protest tactics, and "revolution." It has been forty years since American politics generated an issue so intense that it could change partisan loyalities for vast numbers of citizens . . . . Where did it come from?
>
> We suggest that the essential midwives in the birth of this issue are Messrs. Cronkite, Brinkley, and their brethren—television newsmen. . . .[15]

These hypothetical links between television journalism and political ethos are not really new. Kurt and Gladys Lang argued as early as 1955 that public affairs television could change the "political climate" and thus, indirectly, influence voters. But these notions were virtually ignored by professional political scientists during the twenty years following the first television campaign, the 1952 contest between Eisenhower and Stevenson.[16]

Now we, as a profession, have seriously begun to reconsider the theories of minimal effects which have passed from one generation of graduate students to the next since World War II. Of course, to reconsider an old theory is human; to confirm a new one is divine. Unfortunately, until now political scientists have had to reconsider without much data. In essence, political scientists have observed increased concern over sociopolitical decay and a decline in political trust and confidence. They have also observed a concomitant rise in public reliance upon an expanding television journalism. All these phenomena are real. Wilson, among others, has documented the growing concern with law and order;[17] Converse and Miller have documented the recent decay in efficacy and political trust;[18] Roper has demonstrated that television continues to outpace all other media as a source of national political information.[19] Moreover, our dependency upon television news is *increasing*.[20] But the real question involves the assumed linkage between these phenomena. Do the arrows really exist? Has public affairs television fostered cynicism, feelings of inefficacy, or Scammon's Social Issue? Does television journalism, even as Robert Dahl suggests, promote a growing American political malaise?[21] Does public affairs television affect the national political ethos? Has it substantially influenced a national election? The experimental and correlational data which appear below indicate that the answer for all these questions is yes—a somewhat equivocal yes, perhaps, but a yes.

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[6] For a description of the exchange between Burdick and the Langs see *Politics and Television*, pp. 17–19.

[7] Kurt and Gladys Lang, *Voting and Non-Voting* (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing, 1968), p. 4.

[8] V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 372.

[9] Gary Wamsley and Richard Pride, "Television Network News: Rethinking the Iceberg Problem," *Western Political Quarterly*, 25 (September, 1972), 434–450.

[10] Paul Weaver, "Is Television News Biased?" *Public Interest*, 26 (Winter, 1972), 57–74.

[11] Mendelsohn and Crespi, chapter 5.

[12] Wamsley and Pride "Television Network News," pp. 437–438.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 449.

[14] Weaver, "Is Television News Biased?," p. 74.

[15] Byron Shafer and Richard Larson, "Did TV Create the Social Issue?" *Columbia Journalism Review*, 11 (September/October, 1972), 10–17, at p. 10. Also see Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward, McCann, Geoghegan, 1970), p. 162.

[16] The only piece dealing directly with television to appear in the *American Political Science Review* during the years 1952–1972 was published in 1955. Its principal author, Herbert Simon, is a political scientist, but virtually none of the most prominent scholars in television research and, for that matter, media are political scientists.

Methodology

Two types of data were used to test for the impact of public affairs television on American public opinion. The first set of data was collected in a series of laboratory investigations conducted during the first week of December, 1971. An additional set of data was borrowed from the five national election studies conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan between 1952 and 1968. The SRC data, adopted following the experiments, serve to corroborate and expand some of the most important experimentally based findings. The survey data also provide the opportunity to extrapolate the experimental findings to the general public with at least some degree of confidence.

Two Experimental Designs. Separate experiments were orginally designed to test for two types of effects. The first set of experiments was conducted to assess the impact of the CBS documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon," upon individual opinions about the military, the national administration and the media. The second set of experiments was conducted to assess the impact of "The Selling of the Pentagon" on those same institutions, when presenting "The Selling of the Pentagon" with a set of contradictory remarks. These remarks, which came at the end of the presentation, came to be known as the "coda," of which more will be said later.

In short, there were two sets of experiments here, one set for testing effects of program, the other set for testing effects of coda. The elaborate Solomon-Four Group design was adopted to evaluate program effects.[22] The traditional Thurstone design (pretest–post-test, control group)—a less rigorous but less expensive design—was used to evaluate the impact of the coda.[23]

The Solomon design includes *two* control groups as well as *two* experimental groups. In theory, this design provides unusually great power for controlling virtually all the exogenous factors which can cloud the findings in any experimental research. It was adopted for precisely this reason. Unfortunately, the theoretical advantages were, in this case, ultimately overshadowed by some procedural realities.[24]

The Solomon design required four separate groups of subjects. The Thurstone design called for two groups. All told there were six groups of subjects, four groups that were experimental, two that were controls. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the six groups and each subject was asked to report to an assembly hall on his or her assigned evening. Pretests were administered to some—but not to all—of the participants in November, 1971. (Because of the designs adopted, three groups were not pretested. See note 24.) The actual experiments were conducted during the first two weeks of December. Post-tests were administered to the experimental groups immediately following presentation of "The Selling of the Pentagon." Control groups were tested just prior to exposure.

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[17] James Q. Wilson, "The Urban Unease: Community vs. City," *Public Interest*, 12 (Summer, 1968), 25–39, at p. 26.

[18] Philip Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," University of Michigan, mimeo, 1970; Arthur Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government," paper presented to the American Political Science Association, 1972.

[19] Burns Roper, *What People Think of Television and Other Mass Media*, p. 2.

[20] Data cited in *TV Guide*, July 7, 1973. Data compiled for ABC News by Nielsen.

[21] It was Robert Dahl who first linked the words "television" and "malaise," "The City in the Future of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (December, 1967), p. 967.

[22] Richard Solomon, "An Extension of Control Group Design," *Psychological Bulletin*, 2 (March, 1949), 137–150.

[23] See Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley, "Experimental Designs and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research in Teaching," in *Handbook of Research in Teaching*, ed. Nathaniel Gage (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963) chapter 5. This chapter explains, lucidly, the differences between the Solomon and Thurstone designs, offering a good description of the advantages and disadvantages of both.

[24] Having adopted the Solomon design, I was obliged to incorporate two groups of subjects who had received no pretesting whatever. (groups B and D in Table 1) The subjects were given only a "post-test" in December, 1971. For Group B, this meant filling out a questionnaire immediately upon seeing the documentary. For Group D, it meant filling out the December questionnaire without having filled out a questionnaire previously and without having seen the documentary. Although these arrangements had been made for Groups B and D, those who were not pretested were far less likely to arrive and participate than were those who had been questioned earlier. It appears that subjects who are recruited *but are not questioned* during the pretest period take the enterprise less seriously (the questionnaire lends credibility to the affair) and are less likely to attend. Whatever the explanation, the differences between those who were pretested and those who were not —differences in background, political beliefs, and likelihood of participation in the experiment—were so consistently large that the four-group analysis, as suggested by Solomon, had to be discarded. I rely here on the Thurstone design.

The pretest questionnaire was nine pages in length and tapped opinions about the behavior and credibility of (1) social and political institutions, (2) public officials (3) private citizens and (4) news organizations. Almost all of the questions were unique to the experiment and were designed specifically for it. But the pretest questionnaire also contained five items which assessed the subject's feelings about his ability to deal with and understand politics. These items were not unique; they were the five items originally used by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan in building the scale of political efficacy.[25] These five items were also included in the post-test questionnaire. As we proceed it will become clear that this inclusion was an extremely important one in developing the theory of videomalaise.

In all there were three questionnaires. Questionnaires one and two were nearly identical and were administered in November and December of 1971, respectively. The third questionnaire was two pages in length and was distributed by mail in February 1972 to all those who had participated in the experiment. The response rate for the February survey was 85 per cent.

Modes of Viewing. Subjects watched "The Selling" in three different modes. In the first mode, subjects saw only the documentary, 53 minutes in length, just as it had appeared on CBS the evening of February 23, 1971. Some of the subjects in mode I had been pretested; some had not. (Groups A and B in Table 1) In the second mode subjects watched the documentary and then one of two codas, this coda being a twelve minute videotape in which F. Edward Hebert, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, former Vice President Spiro Agnew, and the president of CBS News, Richard Salant, presented their interpretations of the program. (Group E in Table 1) This coda was an edited version of the remarks made by Agnew, Hebert, Melvin Laird, and Richard Salant during the rebroadcast of "The Selling," presented by CBS on March 23, 1971. Another group of subjects (Group F) saw the documentary and a second—artificial—coda, a coda in which three confederates paraphrased the remarks of Hebert, Agnew, and Salant. The control groups did not see the documentary until all members had completed a post-test questionnaire (T2); there were, recall, two control groups—one with pretest, one without (groups C and D in Table 1). Table 1 presents a summary of all six groups, including the mode of presentation for each group and the extent to which each group was tested.

Subjects. Subjects were recruited and paid through local civic, religious, and labor organizations. All came from a middle-sized midwestern city. Table 2 presents a demographic profile of the 223 subjects who participated. Note that these subjects differ substantially from those usually found in experiments in communication. But, because predisposition of the audience is so important in determining the effects of any communication, students appeared to be a poor reservoir from which to draw subjects.[26] Therefore subjects were recruited in

Table 1. Six Experimental and Control Groups Listed by Mode of Exposure and Extent of Testing

	Pretest (Nov. 1971)	Mode	Post-Test (Dec. 1971)	Follow-up (Feb. 1972)
Group A	Yes	Program only	Yes	Yes
Group B	No	Program only	Yes	Yes
Group C	Yes	Control	Yes	Yes
Group D	No	Control	Yes	Yes
Group E	Yes	Program & Coda (Actual)	Yes	Yes
Group F	Yes	Program & Artificial Coda (Fake)	Yes	Yes

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[25] For a discussion of the concept of efficacy see Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), pp. 515–519. The scale was used first in Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row-Peterson, 1954), p. 18.

[26] When this experiment was pretested with students in August, the students simply grew more negative toward the military and more positive toward CBS. None of the psychological tension that existed for the adults existed for

such a way that predispositions would show more variation, and less "liberalism" than that expected among college sophomores. These subjects also represented a substratum of the population that was similar, demographically, to Scammon's "real majority." In fact, all subjects lived within 150 miles of Scammon's sociopolitical capital, Dayton, Ohio. Table 3 offers a political profile of this group, a group that can be loosely defined as middle-American. While it is impossible to state precisely to what degree these subjects were representative of any larger audience, these people did constitute a more compelling collection of subjects than that usually found in experimental work in social science, especially in political science.

Table 2. Demographic Breakdown of all Participants

Mean Age	44	$N=219$
Mean Family Income	$12,000	$N=214$
Per cent White	98%	$N=221$
Religious Affiliation		
Catholic	37%	
Protestant	62%	
Other	1%	
Per cent Male	40%	$N=221$
Partisan Attachment		$N=150$[a]
Democrat	32%	
Independent	32%	
Republican	36%	

[a] Not ascertained for two groups of subjects.

Findings

Level of Prior Exposure, A Seminal Concern. Orginally, the experiments were conducted to test several hypotheses about the process of opinion change. Many of these hypotheses are not directly relevant here and a compilation of all hypotheses and all the experimental findings appears elsewhere.[27] Some of the experimental findings, however, are useful at this point for two reasons. First, they speak directly to the basic question of program effects or coda effects. Second, some of the experimental findings led directly to an analysis of the SRC national survey data which, in turn, led to the theory of videomalaise. But, the first finding

Table 3. Political Profile of all Subjects, November 1971, Selected Variables

	Strongly Agree	Agree	No Opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N
1. The United States is probably the most honest government in the world.	9%	41	18	27	5	(172)
2. The women's liberation movement has gone too far.	14%	41	20	21	4	(170)
3. Spiro Agnew has done a good job as Vice President.	11%	46	21	16	6	(173)

Mean "Reliability Scores," Selected Variables[a]

	Score	N
The United States Army	59	171
The Department of Defense (Pentagon)	57	171
CBS Television	71	171
NBC Television	72	173
Richard Nixon	71	172
Pravda	26	153
The Comumbus *Dispatch*	62	171
Roger Mudd	71	164
Walter Cronkite	77	172
Melvin Laird	62	163
John Wayne	55	160

[a] Subjects were asked to evaluate the reliability of each of these people or organizations. Scores have a possible range of 1 (least reliable) to 100 (most reliable).

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the students. The student response was theoretically unrewarding.

[27] Michael J. Robinson, "Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise; The Case of The Selling of the Pentagon" (Ann Arbor: Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1972.)

meriting attention is not, per se, experimentally derived or derived from the national survey data. This finding indicates that the pool of subjects was not unrepresentative of the wider audience and implies that these experiments were more than an empty exercise in laboratory technique.

During the experiments, just following exposure, subjects were asked if they had ever seen or heard about "The Selling of the Pentagon." Their responses, which appear in Table 4, demonstrate that the subjects had not been very aware of or sensitive to the documentary and the controversy surrounding it. Only 17 per cent of the entire pool had seen either the first or second showing of "The Selling." Another 12 per cent said they had heard something about the program and indicated in their response some familiarity with the program. But there was a good deal of confusion surrounding the controversy that made prior knowledge hard to assess. And 21 per cent of the subjects gave "information" about the program that was either erroneous or nonsensical. One woman said she knew about "The Selling," having seen it in paperback! Apparently, the controversies surrounding *The Selling of the Pentagon* and The Pentagon Papers case blended into one for some of the subjects.

Table 4. Prior Exposure to "The Selling of the Pentagon," All Subjects

Had Seen Nothing and Heard Nothing	49%
Had Seen Nothing and Heard Something Meaningless	21%
Had Seen Nothing and Heard Something Meaningful	12%
Had Seen Program Beforehand	17%
Had Heard About Program from Another Subject During the Week of Experiment	1%
	100%
N=	(223)

One could have predicted that only a small portion of the subjects would have seen the program beforehand, given the low Nielsen ratings for the original telecast and the retelecast. The *combined* Nielsen for both programs was a meagre 19.8.[28] Assuming some overlap between the first audience and the second, this Nielsen figure is very close to the percentage of our subjects who had actually seen the show on television.)

It was, of course, essential to this experiment that only a small percentage of our subjects had seen the program beforehand. Previous viewers were not only "contaminated" subjects, they were also very unrepresentative sociologically and politically, in comparison with the remainder of the subject pool.[29] These contaminees had to be *removed* from any of the actual analysis and they were. Fortunately, they represented a small minority of the pool.

Program Effects

I had hypothesized that "The Selling" in its original mode would (1) change *beliefs* (cognitions) about the behavior of the American military, rendering those beliefs less positive and (2) change affections toward the military, making them less positive as well. In both field experiments and laboratory studies, recent television documentaries have been shown to produce such opinion changes, changes that were generally in keeping with the theme and intent of the broadcast. Using survey techniques and a quasi-experimental design, William Alper and Thomas Leidy demonstrated that "The National Citizenship Test," another CBS production, affected the level of information and opinions about the Bill of Rights among American high school students.[30] Stephen Fitzsimmons and Hobart Osburn, using laboratory techniques, also found that network documentaries increased information about and changed opinions concerning automation, birth control, Brazilian politics, farmers, and migrant workers.[31] There was, in short, ample literature to suggest that a serious documentary could shift opinions on some political issues.

Cognitive Opinion. The first hypothesis was confirmed. The program did change opinions about the manifest behavior of the armed services. Having witnessed the telecast in its original mode, Group A subjects perceived the military as: more likely to lie about the War in Vietnam, more likely to get involved in politics and more likely to seek special political advantage than these subjects had previously believed.[32] In fact, subjects changed their opinions on all three items used to tap beliefs about military conduct. And opinions changed in the direction that CBS had obviously intended. Mean scores for two of the three cognitive items changed enough to meet the .05 level of significance which had been adopted at the outset. (Table 5) The control group, Group C, showed no significant change on any of these items.

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[28] Nielsen data obtained from CBS Research. The Nielsen figure represents the portion of the entire adult population, viewers and nonviewers, watching a designated program.

[29] Those previously exposed were very different in demography and politics from those not previously exposed. In all cases they were more "liberal" and more antimilitary. I assume the differences were not caused by the exposure—that the differences indicate that those who take the time and devote the energy to watch such a documentary were negatively predisposed toward the institution being attacked. In short, those who dislike the military would tend to ferret out an unflattering presentation, especially when these people were given a second opportunity by CBS to watch the attack. The data support this interpretation.

[30] S. William Alper and Thomas Leidy, "The Impact of Information Transmission Through Television," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 33 (Winter 1969–1970), 556–562.

[31] Stephen Fitzsimmons and Hobart Osburn, "The Impact of Social Issues and Public Affairs Television Documentaries," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 32 (Fall, 1968), 379–397.

The experimentally induced change may not be dramatic, albeit significant. However, these changes are noteworthy for three reasons. First, they were changes not simply in group levels of information, but changes in beliefs about institutional behavior. In the other research involving network documentaries, change in level of information had been considered the basic test of effect.[33] Second, our changes were in the direction of "disloyalty," i.e., change in beliefs about governmental misconduct. In this case, viewers were supposed to become more suspicious of the behavior of a legitimate American institution, the military. Third, this group was not especially predisposed toward suspicion of the military. Given what we know about the role of predisposition in determining the impact of any communication,[34] these shifts in beliefs about behavior are more than meaningful, they are notable. The program moved some portion of our middle Americans toward holding an image of the American armed service that was more sinister and misbehaving.

Affective Opinion. Affective opinions were not meaningfully altered by "The Selling," at least not in its original mode of presentation. Subjects were asked to rate several units and persons within the Department of Defense in terms of reliability. There was also a thermometer reading for the "Military" and General George Patton. None of these items moved significantly following exposure. Table 6 shows just how stable these affective ratings remained over time, for experimentals and controls.

Evaluative Opinion. One other item indicates that "The Selling" was not quite so effective as CBS might have preferred. Subjects were asked to what degree they agreed with this statement: "The military-industrial complex has become too powerful in the United States." Responses were scored from one to five, with one signifying strong agreement, five indicating strong disagreement. The mean was 2.9 at T1; the mean was 2.8 at T2. This difference was not statistically significant and was actually less in absolute size than that which occurred within the control group. One interesting sidelight is that the modal response to this question about the military-industrial complex at both T1 and T2 was "no opinion," suggesting that the colorful phrase "military-industrial complex" lacks color, or even meaning, for a good bulk of this audience, and perhaps for the wider audience as well. At any rate, the program in its original mode failed to force these subjects to reconsider their basic feeling for the military establishment.

Coda Effects. One other set of experimental findings bears on our discussion of malaise. I had hypothesized that the original format (no coda) would be the most effective mode of presentation and that the program, when followed by a partially declamatory coda, would lose its punch. This hypothesis, adapted from experimental findings in

Table 5. Mean Scores for Cognitive Variables, For Those Not Previously Exposed

	Group A			Group C			Group E			Group F			Groups A, E, F		
	(Experimentals)			(Controls)			(Actual Coda)			(Fake Coda)			(Experimentals)		
	Nov.	(*N*)	Dec.	Nov.	(*N*)	Dec.	Nov.	(*N*)	Dec.	Nov.	(*N*)	Dec.	Nov.	(*N*)	Dec.
"In the United States the military has stayed out of politics." (range = 1.5)	3.5	(33)	3.7	3.7	(22)	3.8	3.5	(37)	4.0*	3.6	(25)	4.0*	3.5	(95)	3.0*
"The Army lies about Vietnam whenever lying serves its purpose." (range = 1–9)	4.7	(33)	4.1*	4.8	(24)	4.8	4.9	(37)	4.9	4.3	(25)	4.4	4.7	(95)	4.5
The Defense Department's ranking among six organizations in terms of lobbying activity. (range = 1–6)	3.7	(31)	2.9*	3.3	(22)	3.4	2.8	(35)	2.6	3.7	(25)	3.7	3.3	(91)	3.0*

* Correlated *t*-test significant at .05 level.

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[32] This same relationship existed for groups E and F. And, in this case, the post-test only group, Group B, also underwent the predicted changes. In this report, however, for the sake of simplicity, and because coda effects require an entirely separate discussion, I focus on groups A and C. Also see note 24.

[33] William Alper and Thomas Leidy, "The Impact of Information," p. 556; Stephen Fitzsimmons and Hobart Osburn, "The Impact of Social Issues," p. 382.

[34] The literature here is voluminous. For a good summary see Chester Insko's *Theories of Attitude Change* (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1967).

Table 6. Mean Score For Affective Variables, For Those Not Previously Exposed

	Group A			Group C			Group E			Group F			Groups A, E, E		
	(Program Only)			(Control)			(Actual Coda)			(Fake Coda)			(All Experimentals)		
	Nov.	(*N*)	Dec.	Nov.	(*N*)	Dec.	Nov.	(*N*)	Dec.	Nov.	(*N*)	Dec.	Nov.	(*N*)	Dec.
Target Reliability:															
Army	60	(32)	61	59	(22)	65	65	(36)	63	59	(24)	64	62	(92)	63
DOD	57	(33)	57	61	(22)	63	64	(36)	56*	54	(24)	60	59	(93)	58
Melvin Laird	66	(29)	61	65	(20)	64	68	(35)	65	58	(22)	66*	65	(86)	64
Thermometer:															
Military	76	(33)	74	70	(23)	66	73	(36)	68*	71	(23)	69	74	(92)	70*
George Patton	72	(32)	72	69	(20)	71	71	(36)	74	73	(22)	80*	72	(90)	75
Source Reliability:															
Roger Mudd	62	(31)	68	74	(20)	77	79	(34)	76	68	(24)	65	70	(89)	70
CBS TV	69	(30)	68	70	(22)	76	75	(37)	70	68	(25)	62	70	(92)	67*
Thermometer:															
TV News	76	(33)	74	73	(24)	73	78	(34)	73*	80	(23)	74*	77	(90)	74*
Government Personnel Reliability:															
Richard Nixon	76	(33)	77	76	(24)	75	82	(36)	76*	60	(25)	75*			
Spiro Agnew	72	(31)	72	70	(23)	67	73	(36)	68*	63	(25)	70*			
"Military Industrial Complex is too powerful," Mean agreement, range = 1–5	2.9	(33)	2.8	2.7	(23)	2.5	2.7	(36)	2.6	2.6	(24)	2.6			

* Correlated t-test significant at .05 level.

social psychology,[35] received qualified support from the present experiments as well.

Findings from the experiments in which codas were employed tended to corroborate the notion of a dissipating effect. The data in Table 5 suggest that both codas blunted the impact of the program, if one looks *only* at the items used to measure changes in cognitive opinions. Focusing upon the three specific items used to assess beliefs about the manifest behavior of the military—the three items which appear in Table 5—one finds that the original program produced significant changes in the predicted direction in two items out of three. But, when accompanied by either coda, the program produced significant shifts in opinion in only one item out of three. Looking from a second perspective one also finds that the aggregate shift in opinion (measured by the difference in means for all three items combined) is larger in the original mode of presentation than in the other two modes combined. All this suggests that the codas did diminish the program's effectiveness and, more generally, that "instant analysis," the ever-recurring nemesis in the minds of Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew, does tend to limit the effectiveness of a political appeal on television. (Of course, in this case the roles were reversed. The networks spoke and the administration provided the instant analysis.) But there are inconsistencies in these data. In fact, the True Coda seems to magnify the differences between T1 and T2, at least on some affective items.

There are a number of interpretations of the "inconsistencies" in Table 6. One interpretation might be that the actual coda—with a sitting vice-president—was perceived as beyond the acceptable bounds of political debate. The imbroglio, which included an incumbent vice-president, may have triggered an across the board depreciation in opinion about all those involved in the debate. (This interpretation implies that the administration—any administration—would be wise to choose an *unofficial* spokesman when it wishes to challenge the veracity or the conclusion of a network presentation, thereby allowing the Vice-President and President to remain aloof from the dispute.[36]) But, whatever the interpretation one chooses for the variations in Table 6, the crucial point from our current perspective is the total lack of variation among all three modes of presentation when one considers the impact of "The Selling of the Pentagon" upon the subjects' perceptions of their own ability to cope with politics. In this respect, all three modes of presentation produced virtually identical effects.

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[35] Eleanor and Nathan Maccoby, A. K. Romney, J. Stacy Adams, "Social Reinforcement in Attitude Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 63 (1961), 109–115.

[36] These intermodal differences can well be interpreted differently. Because these differences are not crucial here, the alternate explanations have been omitted. For a thorough discussion, see Michael Robinson, "Instant Analysis and the Effectiveness of Television Programming: Spiro Agnew vs CBS," forthcoming, *Journal of Communition*, 1976.

Effects on Perceived Efficacy. It was originally hypothesized that "The Selling" would frustrate subjects, forcing them to turn inward and doubt their own ability to comprehend and cope with politics. The efficacy scale was included to test this hypothesis. And, in all modes of presentation, "The Selling of the Pentagon" did decrease the level of perceived political efficacy within the experimental groups. Table 7 contains mean efficacy scores for each of the three experimental groups before and after exposure. Note that the control group, Group C, shows no reduction in efficacy whatever. In fact, the control *increased* its mean efficacy score, though not significantly. And when comparing the experimental groups with the control group at T2, the differences are also significant at the .01 level. Although this experimental effect did dissipate somewhat over time, no other between-group differences were as consistent or as robust as these. And if one examines the individual items constituting the efficacy index, these differences are even more intriguing because most of the change occurred for those items which appear to tap most directly the issue of political self-confidence: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does," and "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on." In short, the program frustrated viewers, regardless of mode of presentation. And a close reading of the data suggests that subjects, in every mode, were at least as willing to doubt their own capacity to comprehend politics as they were to question the legitimacy of the institutions involved. In fact, it appears as if they were actually more willing to deprecate themselves. This may be a common mechanism for coping with political information that fails to fit the predispositions of the viewer, listener, or reader. On balance, "The Selling" apparently produced a psychological tension within subjects which they chose to reduce by questioning their own ability to cope with or comprehend politics.

Broader Questions. Although Converse demonstrates in "Change and the American Electorate" that the efficacy scale no longer works as a scale,[37] Converse does suggest that the decrease in the efficacy index represents one of the most significant changes within the contemporary electorate. I agree. And in this controlled environment, "The Selling of the Pentagon" produced precisely this same change. Findings from the experimental environment, however, cannot be readily extrapolated to the general public for a host of reasons.[38] Our experimental findings were indicators of potential, not actual effects. But given that the impact of "The Selling" on political efficacy was manifest in all the experimental groups, regardless of mode, the whole issue of public affairs television warranted further consideration.

If "The Selling," with its dogfight among the Defense Department, CBS, and the Administration, could reduce a viewer's level of political self-

Table 7. Political Efficacy Scores For Only Those Not Previously Exposed

		Group A		Group C		Group E		Group F	
		(No Coda)		(Control)		(Actual Coda)		(Fake Coda)	
		Nov.	Dec.	Nov.	Dec.	Nov.	Dec.	Nov.	Dec.
Efficacy Score:									
(Lowest)	0	0%	9%	4%	4%	5%	5%	0%	8%
	1	16	18	13	13	16	22	24	28
	2	32	21	13	13	16	27	24	12
	3	19	27	46	39	30	27	20	36
	4	29	21	17	33	24	14	20	12
(Highest)	5	3	3	8	8	8	5	12	4
	99%[a]	99%[a]	99%[a]	101%	100%	99%[a]	100%	100%	100%
(*N*)		(31)	(33)	(24)	(24)	(37)	(37)	(25)	(25)
Mean =		2.7	2.4*	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.4*	2.7	2.3*

* Correlated t-test significant at .05 level.

[a] Totals do not equal 100% due to rounding.

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[37] Philip Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," University of Michigan, mimeo., 1971, p. 96.

[38] For a thorough discussion of problems involved in extrapolating from the laboratory to the population at large see Elliot Aronson and J. M. Carlsmith, "Experimentation in Social Psychology," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2nd edition, vol. II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968).

confidence, or increase a viewer's sense of cynicism, one could imagine that public affairs television, especially television news, with its own vivid depictions of conflict between social and political institutions, might produce a similar effect. Consequently, with the experimental findings in hand, I hypothesized that those who had come to depend upon television for their political information would, as consequence, exhibit a greater sense of inefficacy, and for that matter, a greater sense of cynicism and distrust—sentiments which, in combination, might be considered the attitudinal components of contemporary political malaise.

Television and Political Malaise: Survey Evidence. The procedures used to test these hypotheses were straightforward. Based on the SRC election studies for 1960, 1964, and 1968, those respondents who stated that they had relied upon television during these campaigns were separated from those who relied upon some other medium.[39] (The 1968 data are divided into three levels of dependence: (a) those relying solely on TV for information, (b) those relying principally on TV, (c) those relying on some other medium.) This "television variable" was then cross-tabulated with the respondents' efficacy scores, and subsequently, with several other "political" opinions.

Political Efficacy. Reliance on public affairs television is, in fact, associated with lower scores on the efficacy index. Table 8 indicates that since 1960, but not before, there has been a significant

Table 8. Relationship Between Reliance on Television News and Respondent's Efficacy Score

		1960		1964		1968[a]		
		Primary Source of Political Information						
		TV	Other Media	TV	Other Media	Only TV	TV	Other Media
Efficacy Score:								
Low (0–1)		31%	18%	43%	30%	60%	42%	34%
High (2–4)		69	82	57	70	40	58	66
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(640)	(392)	(983)	(563)	(116)	(614)	(383)
Education Level:	Efficacy:							
Low	Low	48%	36%	65%	60%	82%	74%	64%
(8th grade or less)	High	52	64	35	40	18	26	36
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N	(203)	(92)	(299)	(104)	(38)	(128)	(70)
Moderate	Low	29%	19%	38%	31%	48%	41%	36%
(9th grade–12)	High	71	81	62	69	52	59	64
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N	(257)	(148)	(514)	(270)	(56)	(278)	(147)
High	Low	15%	6%	17%	19%	46%	26%	24%
(Some college)	High	85	94	83	81	55	74	76
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N	(129)	(98)	(104)	(80)	(11)	(93)	(67)
Very High	Low	12%	4%	22%	7%	25%	18%	14%
(College or beyond)	High	88	96	78	93	75	82	86
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N	(50)	(54)	(58)	(100)	(4)	(100)	(86)

[a] The 1968 SRC data were coded so as to permit a refinement in the TV variable. Subjects could be classified as (a) totally dependent upon television, (b) primarily dependent upon television and (c) not dependent upon television. Note that the findings fit perfectly with the theory—the greater the dependency, the lower the level of efficacy.

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[39] Unfortunately, the SRC data were not collected with the needs of this study in mind. And perhaps, as an indication of the low level of importance assigned to mass media, the SRC election studies never contained a thorough or

difference in the level of perceived political efficacy between those who rely upon television for political information and those who do not.

The more skeptical reader will already have decided that Table 8 has been misinterpreted. There are, after all, at least two other—and less bizarre—explanations for the association between feelings of efficacy and television reliance: (a) that those who rely on television for political information are of lower educational status and that, as a matter of course, those who are of low educational status are less efficacious from the start; or (b) that those who "suffer" from feelings of inefficacy, at any social status, are more likely to move toward television for their political information because television somehow satisfies special psychopolitical needs, whatever they may be. Both of these alternative explanations for Table 8 are reasonable; but neither is overwhelmingly persuasive, when examined closely.

There *is* a moderate and negative relationship between TV dependency and educational attainment. But, if the relationship between TV dependency and efficacy were, in fact, spurious, as the first alternative explanation implies, the relationship would die when respondents with similar levels of education are compared. But holding constant the level of education does not change the negative relationship between TV dependency and perceived efficacy. This relationship held in 1960, 1964, and 1968, despite controls for education, class, or income. And, interestingly enough, by 1968 the relationship had become stronger and less vulnerable to controls than at any other previous time (each of the contingencies in 1968 is statistically significant at the .05 level.) Unfortunately, the 1972 SRC election study did not include the items required to update this finding. Nevertheless, the correlation between dependency and inefficacy is not to be discarded too facilely.

Of course, the mere imposition of one, or several, intervening variables does not speak directly to the second alternative explanation offered above—an explanation which implies that inefficacy causes dependency and that the relationship, as I have stated it, is backward. Admittedly, with the data at our disposal, it would be impossible to test this second interpretation. Even so, there are two things to be said about the theory in which feelings of inefficacy are considered the cause of television reliance. First, two-thirds of our samples relied more upon television for following politics than they relied upon any other medium. To argue that television attracts malcontents or the abnormal is to argue that the majority of the public is extraordinary, a premise which is, in itself, extraordinary. Second, and more important, if, as this interpretation implies, the entire public believes itself to be extraordinarily inefficacious, the public did not feel so inefficacious in 1952, 1956, or 1960. There has been a substantial and undeniable *growth* in felt inefficacy. If television merely attracted the inefficacious, and the relationship were that simple, we would still be obliged to explain the *increase* in inefficacy. Even if one could demonstrate that inefficacy does lead to greater TV dependency, this second explanation might still lose its initial persuasiveness. For, if, in fact, those who do possess some latent predisposition toward political inefficacy or misanthropy or cynicism do come to rely on television, and if in the course of that reliance those predispositions are activated, then we do have a television effect. More accurately, perhaps, we have an *interaction* between the televised message and the individual's predispositions.

Whatever the interpretation, Table 8 contains some surprising information. After all, survey research has traditionally found little correlation between exposure to public affairs television and any particular, public opinion. For example, despite intuitions to the contrary, among those who, in 1968, depended upon television for their political information, 38.2 per cent believed that "we did the right thing" getting into Vietnam. Among those depending upon other sources of information, 38.6 per cent felt the same way—a difference of less than one-half of one per cent. This "finding" is not uncharacteristic of the entire period during which we fought in Vietnam. There simply was no measurable relationship between media reliance and opinions about the war during the 1960s.[40]

But the nonrelationship between TV dependence and substantive, contemporary political issues like American involvement in Vietnam can be misleading. The television variable *does* help when one considers issues that are more fundamental, in this case issues like political self-confidence.

The findings in Table 8 actually fit nicely with our experimental findings. A dose of television journalism in the experimental case produced a decrease in political self-esteem. And within the general public, reliance upon television for political information coincided with lower scores in political efficacy. In short, national survey data tended to corroborate one of the most important of the experimental results, that exposure to public affairs television seemed to have a deleteri-

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even credible series of media questions. I was forced to use the following item: "Of all these ways of following the campaign, which one would you say you got the most information from—newspapers, radio, television, magazines?" The item was not precisely what I would have preferred, given the reference to "campaign information." Nevertheless, it was the only available option, poor syntax and all.

[40] Michael J. Robinson, *Public Affairs Television*, p. 148.

ous effect on one's sense of political self-esteem.

But the relationship between television and perceived efficacy may be only a part of a larger theory, one in which television journalism can be linked to other fundamental beliefs about people, society, politics, and government. And, in our case, survey data can be used to expand a theory as well as corroborate a finding.

Television and the American Political Ethos: The Case of 1968

From our perspective, 1968 provided an excellent case study for examining the political implications of the American television news system. Not only was 1968 a year with a number of extraordinary political occurrences, virtually all of which were televised via network television, it was also a year in which the Survey Research Center chose to ask questions that could be used to categorize, more systematically than before, the extent to which members of the public relied upon television for monitoring political developments. And although one might choose to argue that findings from 1968 exaggerate the impact of television journalism, the data from that period suggest that there was not only a relationship between exposure to television dependency and feelings of political malaise but also that there was a relationship between dependency and political behavior.

Misanthropy. The reliance upon television journalism in 1968 was associated with both social and political misanthropy. For example, those who relied upon television were somewhat less trusting of their fellow man than those who did not. Among those who followed politics in 1968 solely through television, 61 per cent believed that one "can't be too careful in dealing with people;" among those relying primarily upon television, 34 per cent adopted this misanthropic position. A similar pattern existed in the 1964 survey. Moreover, controls for education and income do not destroy this relationship, although in both cases the strongest relationships exist among those with moderate levels of income or education.

These findings suggest that television journalism can foster social distrust, especially among those in the lower-middle class. Reliance on television, according to these calculations, promotes images of society which are disproportionately sinister. These findings on misanthropy are *not* unique to our research. George Gerbner and Larry Gross have recently demonstrated and demonstrated again a similar relationship. In their research, Gerbner and Gross find that those who watch great amounts of television—entertainment and news alike—are more distrustful, cynical and misanthropic than those who watch little or no television.[41] Virtually all their findings hold up under controls for level of education, age, income and race.

This generalized cynicism apparently has a political component as well. When our respondents were asked whether they believed that, once elected, congressmen "lose touch with the people pretty quickly," a similar pattern of political skepticism emerged. A full 69 per cent of the white respondents relying solely upon television accepted the statement; 56 per cent of the white respondents relying principally upon television chose that response; only 45 per cent of the remaining respondents felt that way. Again the relationship holds up under controls for income and education level, and again the greatest differences occurred within those strata that can most appropriately be termed middle-American (Table 9).

The Social Issue in 1968. If one regards white attitudes towards blacks and white attitudes toward lawlessness as principal components in Scammon and Wattenberg's Social Issue, it appears that public affairs television and the Social Issue were functionally related during the 1968 campaign. Among white respondents, dependence upon video journalism increases one's propensity to disapprove of the speed of the civil rights movement. As one moves across the continuum, from those totally dependent upon television to those not at all dependent upon television, the rate of disapproval for civil rights activity decreases by 18 per cent (Table 10). Once again, controls do not nullify this monotonic relationship. Even among those respondents with college degrees, attitudes toward the civil rights movement were dependent, in part, upon level of television dependency. And among those respondents who are here defined as moderate in education or income, the relationship is especially vivid. There are, to be sure, other interpretations of Table 9; but I believe that reliance upon public affairs television did, in 1968, foster the belief that the civil rights movement had gotten out of hand.

This same media relationship appeared when considering opinions about the degree of violence existing within the civil rights movement. White respondents dependent upon television were more willing than white respondents dependent on some other medium to regard black political action as "mostly violent." Although the relationship was less compelling than that which exists in Table 10, the same monotonic pattern emerged—the greater the affinity for television, the greater the hostility toward civil rights activity. On balance, it appears that white frustration with black activism and black politics did, in 1968, go hand in hand with TV dependency.

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[41] George Gerbner and Larry Gross, "The Social Reality of Television Drama," Annenberg School of Communication, University of Pennsylvania, unpublished mimeo, 1973; *idem*, "Television As Enculturation," Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania, unpublished mimeo, 1975.

Television and the Vote in 1968. In 1956, the Langs asserted that television could, "by creating a political climate, a sense of urgency, an image of parties and candidates, etc., . . . influence votes."[42] Once again, if one uses the 1968 election as a case, their hypothesis, as curious as it may seem, has merit.

Although it would be impossible to make any definitive conclusion about the effect of network journalism on voting behavior in 1968, there are findings which coincide with a conventional wisdom—a wisdom which holds that, in 1968, George Wallace and Richard Nixon enjoyed greater electoral support because of a network-induced videomalaise.

This theory of a TV-vote is relatively unambiguous. Television journalism produced political frustrations and discontents—i.e., television created the Social Issue. George Wallace and Richard Nixon provided images of themselves that were concurrent with majority sentiments about the Social Issue and, consequently, television journalism won votes for Wallace and Nixon.

Using essentially the same procedures as before, we can produce evidence which suggests that the second link in our theory is plausible—that television reliance did influence voting in the 1968 presidential election. More specifically, television journalism produced votes for George Wallace and votes for Richard Nixon.

Among Independents and Democrats, there was a relationship between television dependency and vote: those more reliant on TV generally were more likely to vote for Wallace or Nixon (Table

Table 9. Relationship Between Reliance on TV News and the Belief that Congressmen Quickly Lose Touch With People, Whites Only

Congressmen Lose Touch (1968)	Those Relying Solely on Television	Those Relying Primarily on Television	Those Relying on Other Media
Agree	68%	56%	45%
Disagree	32	44	55
	100%	100%	100%
N	(109)	(594)	(366)
Education:			
Low (8th grade or less)			
% Agree	76%	72%	56%
N	(34)	(122)	(66)
Moderate (9th grade–12)			
% Agree	65%	56%	44%
N	(54)	(272)	(140)
High (some college)			
% Agree	60%	48%	52%
N	(10)	(92)	(67)
Very High (college or beyond)			
% Agree		42%	31%
N	[a]	(52)	(84)
Family Income:			
Low (Less than $6,000)			
% Agree	74%	67%	46%
N	(51)	(208)	(95)
Moderate (Less than $10,000)			
% Agree	60%	54%	48%
N	(30)	(197)	(117)
High (Less than $15,000)			
% Agree	57%	42%	46%
N	(14)	(131)	(81)
Very High ($15,000 and over)			
% Agree	62%	49%	38%
N	(8)	(51)	(68)

[a] Less than five cases.

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[42] Lang and Lang, *Politics and Television*, p. 19.

Table 10. The Relationship Between Reliance on TV News and the Belief That the Civil Rights Movement is Going Too Fast, 1968, Whites Only.

	Those Relying Solely on Television	Those Relying Primarily on Television	Those Relying on Other Media
% Believing Civil Rights Moving too Fast	81%	70%	63%
N	(110)	(588)	(366)
% Believing Civil Rights Moving too Fast			
Education Level:			
Low (8th grade or less)	78%	74%	66%
N	(37)	(121)	(65)
Moderate (9th grade–12th)	87%	78%	72%
N	(53)	(271)	(138)
High (some college)	80%	63%	61%
N	(10)	(90)	(67)
Very High (college or beyond)		50%	48%
N	[a]	(93)	(87)
% Believing Civil Rights Moving too fast			
Low (Less than $6,000)	80%	72%	66%
N	(51)	(215)	(94)
Moderate (Less than $10,000)	83%	72%	69%
N	(29)	(197)	(117)
High (Less than $15,000)	87%	70%	59%
N	(15)	(129)	(83)
Very High ($15,000 and over)	50%	60%	51%
N	(7)	(50)	(65)

[a] Less than five cases.

11). The relationship is not a very strong one. Among Republicans, the relationship is spurious, washing away with controls. But among Democrats, especially Democrats within the lower and middle socioeconomic strata, where one finds two-thirds of the Democratic identifiers, the relationships holds, even with controls for education or income (Table 12).

One might expect a better indication of television's impact among those who were non-partisan in 1968. For if there were a TV-vote in 1968, it should have shown itself more vividly

Table 11. Relationship Between Television Dependency and Presidential Vote, 1968, Whites Only

Partisan identification	Democrats			Independents			Republicans		
	Primary Source of Political Information								
	NOT TV	TV MOST	TV ONLY	NOT TV	TV MOST	TV ONLY	NOT TV	TV MOST	TV ONLY
Voted for:									
Humphrey	73%	65%	61%	33%	20%	13%	4%	9%	0%
Nixon	16	21	21	55	63	60	89	84	100
Wallace	10	15	18	12	17	27	7	7	0
	99%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%
(*N*)	(116)	(199)	(28)	(92)	(127)	(15)	(98)	(131)	(22)

among Independents, those who did not possess the psychological anchor of partisan identification. The data in Table 11 also suggest that the Independents were the most vulnerable of all to a TV effect. Among white Independent voters, reliance upon television was associated with greater support for Wallace and greater support for Nixon. Independents relying solely on television gave Wallace 27 per cent of their vote; among those relying principally on television the figure was 17 per cent; among those Independents relying on some other medium for political information, Wallace received only 12 per cent of the vote. This relationship did not disappear when we held constant the level of education or income of the respondent (Table 13). Once again, when cell sizes permit any insights whatever, the greatest variation occurred among respondents of moderate social status.

None of these behavioral findings in Tables 11 through 13 are earth-shaking. Voting preferences are, to be sure, not extraordinarily different across our TV variable. Certainly there are inconsistencies in the data, and, at the very least, one should argue that TV dependency interacts with partisan identification and socioeconomic status in order to affect vote. Nonetheless, despite the caveats and qualifications, these patterns are intriguing and fall well within the bounds of our theory. And, as a final defense of these "voting" data—data which support the notion that television helped produced votes for George Wallace in 1968—one might well look to the relationship between television dependency and attitudinal support for Wallace. Given that the weak correlation between dependency and vote may reflect the unusually discrete characteristic of a presidential vote, and given that attitudes are not so discrete as voting preference (that there is a greater potential variation in attitude than in vote) one would predict from our theory that attitude toward Wallace should correlate—and correlate more strongly—with TV dependency than with vote. This is exactly what we do find! Among Democrats, Republicans and Independents, there is a significant, and vivid correlation between dependency and Wallace's national thermometer ratings.[43]

Table 12. Relationship Between Television Dependency and Presidential Vote, 1968

		White Democrats Only		
		Those Relying Solely on Television	Those Relying Primarily on Television	Those Relying on Other Media
Family income less than $6,000 per annum	Humphrey	54%	59%	72%
	Nixon	23	22	22
	Wallace	23	19	6
		100%	100%	100%
		(13)	(68)	(32)
Family Income less than $10,000 per annum	Humphrey	80%	61%	74%
	Nixon	10	25	14
	Wallace	10	14	12
		100%	100%	100%
		(10)	(69)	(42)
8th grade education or less	Humphrey	50%	64%	64%
	Nixon	20	12	19
	Wallace	30	24	16
		100%	100%	99%
		(10)	(50)	(31)
12th grade education or less	Humphrey	67%	62%	77%
	Nixon	20	24	15
	Wallace	13	14	8
		100%	100%	100%
		(15)	(100)	(47)

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[43] Michael J. Robinson and Clifford Zukin, "Television and the Wallace Vote in 1968: Are There Lessons For 1976?" abstract, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 38 (Fall, 1974),

Table 13. Relationship Between Television Dependency and Presidential Vote, 1968

		White Independents		
Income Level:	Vote	Those Relying Solely on Television	Those Relying Primarily on Television	Those Relying on Other Media
Low	% Humphrey	25%	14%	21%
	% Nixon	25	69	50
	% Wallace	50	17	29
		100%	100%	100%
		(4)	(35)	(14)
Moderate	% Humphrey	0	16	28
	% Nixon	67	64	55
	% Wallace	33	20	17
		100%	100%	100%
		(6)	(44)	(29)
High	% Humphrey	[a]	27%	39%
	% Nixon		58	52
	% Wallace		15	9
			100%	100%
			(33)	(23)
Very High	% Humphrey	[a]	29	36
	% Nixon		57	64
	% Wallace		14	0
			100%	100%
			(14)	(25)
Education Level:				
Low	% Humphrey	[a]	27%	0%
	% Nixon		73	56
	% Wallace		0	44
			100%	100%
			(11)	(9)
Moderate	% Humphrey	0%	14%	32%
	% Nixon	57	66	59
	% Wallace	43	20	9
		100%	100%	100%
		(7)	(59)	(34)
High	% Humphrey	[a]	23%	41%
	% Nixon		55	46
	% Wallace		23	14
			101%	101%
			(31)	(22)
Very High	% Humphrey	[a]	28%	38%
	% Nixon		60	62
	% Wallace		12	0
			100%	100%
			(25)	(24)

[a] Less than four cases.

All in all, one might argue that television journalism between 1964 and 1968 did more than alter individual perceptions about American politics: television actually changed some votes, the bulk of those votes going to Wallace or to Nixon. Given the closeness of the outcome, *television journalism, not television campaigning*, may have been a straw that helped to break Hubert Humphrey's back. At a minimum, television journalism helped make George Wallace "viable" as a third party candidate.

On Strength of Relationship. The survey data have taken us around a circle. Dependence upon video journalism is associated with (a) social distrust (b) political cynicism (c) political inefficacy (d) partisan disloyalty (e) and third party viability. The relationships are not big or bold. But they do not die with controls; sometimes they grow. On balance, I believe that these relationships are not only meaningful they are also understated. Understatement occurs because the index used to gauge television reliance is a weak one, weak in giving only very gross calibrations of the individual's dependence upon television and telling us next to nothing about the individual's actual exposure to television. But more important, the variable used here is inherently weak. The truth is that almost everyone depends on television news to some degree. We all swim in the same electronic sea. Some of us are wetter than others perhaps. But we are all a little wet. So it is impossible to separate out the effect on part of us because that effect is in all of us. We, as political scientists, frequently see ourselves as spectators, not participants in social phenomena. Sometimes that status is warranted. But the perceptions that we each hold have been peppered by television too. So we should expect the differences between those citizens admittedly relying on TV and those who see only *some* TV to be artificially small and understated. The surprising thing is that the TV variable, shabby as it is, works.

But even if one accepts the fact that there is correlation in these variables, we are still far from producing definitive evidence; correlation is not causality. But the experiments with "The Selling" strongly suggest that causation lives in these data, and that television journalism does cause frustration, cynicism, self-doubt, and malaise. The associations among the survey variables gain credibility because they ride atop the experiments that demonstrated the causality.

On the Meaning of Relationship: Medium or Message

Even if one believes that television journalism causes malaise, there is one other issue to resolve—the McLuhan issue. Nothing demonstrated to this point implies that these "effects" are to be attributed directly to the medium. These effects may merely be attributable to the message—in this case the messages of the 'sixties. Philip Converse, who documented the coming of the new political ethos, argues that *events* produced the change.[44] Presumably this would be the general belief within our profession. But I believe that the events theory needs supplementing—that there is a McLuhanian strain running through these findings. Unfortunately, neither our experimental nor our correlational data can address this directly. The experiments with "The Selling of the Pentagon" are of little value in this dispute. The experiments demonstrated that events—facts and information—could produce effects; but the experiments, as designed, could not have been used to demonstrate those events, when shown on television, were more effective than would have been the case with other media.

The survey data also have limited value here. Although it is true that those who were reliant upon television were most dysphoric, this does not, per se, demonstrate that the medium was the causal factor. But, given the unique qualities of the medium, one could make such a case. In fact it is probably necessary to do so. For the theory which places events, per se, at the center of the changing American ethos seems to be an insufficient explanation of the 1960s and even the 1970s. Instead, I offer a quasi-McLuhanian interpretation of videomalaise—one in which the unique qualities of television journalism, as well as the events of the period, must be considered in any theory of political change. After all, events must be communicated to be events, as trees falling on desert islands may attest. And it is the unique characteristics of any medium which serve to select, interpret, and disseminate these events. Therefore, I suggest that had all the traumatic events of the last dozen years transpired without television journalism (indeed, *would* they all have transpired without television journalism?) there would have been less change within the American electorate than has, in fact, occurred. And going beyond that, I suggest that had the same *amount* of information about those events been conveyed through any medium other than network journalism, the changes would still have been less pronounced.

But mine is not wholly a McLuhanian theory, to be sure. It suggests only that television is part of the message—not all of it—and that, given the uniqueness of its audience, mode, and content, television has been, for more than a decade, at the core of our growing political malaise. Television journalism may be, in short, the missing link in our

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445. Also, Michael J. Robinson and Clifford Zukin, "TV and the Wallace Vote," *Journal of Communication*, forthcoming, 1976.

[44] Philip Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," p. 97.

understanding of contemporary political change. But if so, why so?

An Explanation of Videomalaise

I suggest that six major interrelated factors explain the growth of videomalaise: (1) the abnormal size and shape of the television news audience, (2) the public perceptions of the credibility of the networks, (3) the interpretive character of television new coverage, (4) the negativist emphasis of television news reports, (5) the emphasis on conflict and violence in network reportage, (6) and the anti-institutional theme in network news programs.

In a nutshell, the highly credible television news organizations have been compelled to bombard the American television audience with interpretive, sensational, aggressive, and anti-institutional news items. This content reaches and holds a unique audience, larger and more volatile than that attracted by any other medium. Many of the members of this unique audience are inadvertent to it. These inadvertent viewers tend to lack political sophistication; they cannot cope well with the type of news and information that the networks provide. But because the networks are too credible to be dismissed in their messages, these viewers respond to the content by growing more cynical, more frustrated, more despairing; they become increasingly less enamored of their social and political institutions. Then, and somewhat ironically, these more vulnerable members of the audience transfer their estrangement, either through polls or the media, to those who are not, themselves, as politically unsophisticated. Eventually the entire society begins to show the symptoms of a growing political malaise.

The Audience

The Abnormal Size and Shape of the Television News Audience. Roper has documented the imperious development of television journalism as the first source of political information within the public. In the most recent poll (1974), television news was cited by 65 per cent of the population as the primary source of political information.[45] And in 1972, a full 66 per cent of the American public learned "most" about national candidates from television.[46] But size alone is not crucial to us. What is crucial is that television news reaches both those who generally monitor politics *and* those who would have virtually *no* news were it not for television. Television reaches that large stratum of society which will watch the news, but not read it. Television touches those millions who will sit through the news because of what follows or what comes before, but who would rarely expend the energy to read through printed information. Consequently, TV produces two audiences—the advertent (those who watch for the news) and the inadvertent audience (those who fall into the news). As such, the overall television news audience is unique in two respects: (1) It is the only audience for news in which socioeconomic status and degree of exposure are *negatively* correlated. Those who are less wealthy or less well educated, etc. are not only more likely to rely on television news, they are also more likely to watch television news.[47] In fact, those low in socioeconomic status watch more television news, in absolute terms, than do those of higher status. No other medium has ever produced this pattern of exposure. (2) The inadvertent audience within the audience is also less likely to have its information mediated through a cadre of opinion leaders. Therefore, television news has, in all likelihood, short-circuited the two-step flow of communication, at least for this large collectivity of inadvertent viewers.

These unique characteristics of the television news audience are crucial in understanding the effects of television journalism. Because the inadvertent viewers within the general audience are of lower socioeconomic status and educational attainment and because they come to the information without the benefit of mediation through opinion leaders, they are more vulnerable to almost any type of television effect—to any unique attribute of network news content. From the perspective of presidential politics, the inadvertent audience within the television audience might be used to explain the new phenomenon by which wholly incredible presidential candidates have become, after the primaries, credible nominees. More assuredly, the theory of an inadvertent audience can help explain one of the most titillating changes within the electorate to have taken place since the advent of serious television journalism—the obversion of the relationship between information flow and partisan stability. In direct contrast with the pretelevision era.[48] one now finds that voters with the least contact with mass media are the least predictable in their behavior.[49]

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[45] Burns Roper, *Trends in Public Attitudes Toward Television and Other Mass Media, 1959–1974*, Television Information Office, New York, 1975, p. 3.

[46] Burns, Roper, *What People Think*, p. 2.

[47] Robert Bower, *Television and the Public* (New York: Holt, 1973), pp. 129–141.

[48] Philip Converse, "Information Flow and the Stability of 'Partisan' Attitudes" in Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, Donald Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 136–158.

[49] During the 'sixties, survey research revealed that those exposed to the fewest media—those exposed only to television—were politically the *least* stable. Converse's theory was thereby overturned. See Edward Dreyer, "Media Use and Electoral Choices: Some Political Consequences of Information Exposure," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 35 (Winter, 1971–1972), 544–553.

The fact that those receiving only one source of political information, a source which is invariably television, are now least stable politically fits nicely with our notions about the inadvertent audience and subsequently, with our theory of videomalaise. As such, the special characteristics of the television news audience and especially the inadvertent audience explain a good deal about the unique effects which have been attributed to television in this research.

The High Credibility of the Networks

Besides its ubiquity, and perhaps because of it, television enjoys remarkably high credibility as an information source. Within each of the six experimental groups employed in our experiments Walter Cronkite was considered to be the most reliable source of information from among a list of twenty-five people and organizations "who report to the public from time to time," and among our subjects CBS was regarded a more reliable news source than *The New York Times*.

None of this is uncharacteristic of the nation. Quayle finds that Walter Cronkite is America's most credible human.[50] Harris found that in 1974 the American public felt greater confidence in television news than in any other American social institution of any type.[51] In 1974, Roper also found that 51 per cent of the American people believe that television is the most credible of all major sources of information.[52]

Credibility enters the equation because it is so closely and positively linked to persuasiveness.[53] Credibility implies persuasiveness. In social psychology, and among television critics, the relationship is virtually taken for granted. It was, after all, the high credibility of CBS, by far the most credible of the three networks for my subjects, which ignited the unprecedented reaction to "The Selling of the Pentagon" at the highest official levels.[54]

Summarizing factors 1 and 2, I contend: (a) that television journalism extends its informational net enormously, bringing in many who would otherwise be uninformed, (b) that television journalism has actually supplanted—and continues to supplant—other media for a large number of moderately and marginally informed members of society, and (c) that television journalism says it all *credibly*, hence persuasively.

But the special characteristics of the network news audience—its size, composition, and persuasibility—are not, in and of themselves, sufficient conditions for understanding the effects of television journalism. In order to complete the theory one must consider both the source and the content of the communication. And in our case, the source—the network news departments—produces a content that possesses several characteristics that contribute to the growth of a videomalaise. More specifically, by pursuing the economic and organizational needs, and to a lesser degree, the personal or partisan objectives of the membership, the network news departments have come to produce a content which is inferential, dramatic, negativistic, contentious, and disestablishmentarian. These characteristics, when combined with the unique dimensions of the television audience (remember, too, that these characteristics of content, are, to some extent, created to achieve and maintain this unique audience), lead to a clearer understanding of the theory of videomalaise.

The Content

The Interpretive Character of Television News Coverage. It is generally conceded that electronic journalism is qualitatively different from print journalism in its structure because, as Reuven Frank of NBC wrote, "Print exists in space, broadcasting in time."[55] Frank also believed that "the television news program must be put together with the assumption that each item will be of some interest to everyone who watches."[56] This opinion is shared, apparently, by news executives throughout the networks.[57]

These attitudes beget news items which are "interesting" to the audience. But, in pursuit of interest, news departments at the networks emphasize the *interpretive* news report. Dennis Lowry has found that nearly one half (49 per cent) of the network news sentences are "unlabeled inference" and that inferential sentences, labeled or unlabeled, for all networks combined, represent over 50 per cent of the total.[58]

Paul Weaver explicitly maps out a structural explanation for television's propensity for the interpretive. According to Weaver, television journalism must be *thematic*.[59] "There is," writes Weaver, "the television news form." He argues that "a television news story cannot assume . . . discursive structure. Its principal need is for a clear, continuous narrative line sustained throughout the story—something with a beginning, a middle, and an end that will create, maintain, and if possible increase the viewer's interest . . . it needs a *theme* which can be sustained throughout the story."[60]

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[50] See Marvin Barret, ed., *The Politics of Broadcasting, 1971–1972* (New York: Thoms Crowell, 1973), p. 49.

[51] Louis Harris, *Confidence and Concern: Citizens View American Government* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 33.

[52] Burns Roper, "Trends in Public Attitudes. . . . ," op. cit., p. 4.

[53] Carl Hovland and Walter Weiss, "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 15 (Winter, 1951), 635–650. For a good, if dated, summary of the influence of source literature, see Joseph Klapper's *The Effects of Mass Communication* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), especially pp. 99–104.

[54] See "CBS and Congress, 'The Selling of the Pentagon'," *Educational Broadcasting Review* (Winter, 1971–1972), pp. 43–107.

[55] Reuven Frank, "An Anatomy of Television News," *Television Quarterly*, 9 (Winter, 1970), 15–28, at p. 18.

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] See Theodore Peterson, Jay Jensen, and William L. Rivers, *The Mass Media and Modern Society* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Press, 1965).

[58] Dennis Lowry, "Agnew and the Network TV News: Before/After Content Analysis," *Journalism Quarterly*, 48 (Summer, 1971), 205–210.

In their landmark works on television and reality, the Langs found that in pursuit of an interpretive theme, television journalists forget or distort reality. In 1951, television journalists, in search of an interesting story, misrepresented public reactions to General McArthur by depicting his parade in Chicago as a wildly successful, heroic tribute. The Langs and their on-the-scene respondents found the parade to be a monumental flop.[61] In a second case, the Langs discovered that in trying to "interpret" the 1952 conventions, the network journalists found conflict where there was none and covered floor fights which had never occurred—all to keep an interesting theme going.[62] Recently, Edward Epstein has drawn dozens of modern cases in which the need for thematic reporting has distorted news coverage. For example, TV journalists frequently cover California, but invariably with a *theme*—that California is bizarre. These thematic reports, according to Epstein, fit with the organization's economic and bureaucratic needs, but not necessarily with reality. Epstein argues persuasively that, as a consequence of its own organizational needs, the television news department gives us a story which reports "news from nowhere."[63] But for us the important point is that the television news story is inherently interpretive because it is inherently thematic. And, given the special and the traditional exigencies of network television, the interpretive TV story is more likely to be negativistic, contentious, or anti-institutional (or some combination of the three) than is the same "story" told in print. It is also more likely to be overdone.

The Negativistic Emphasis in Television Reports

American journalism apparently operates under a principle similar to Gresham's Law—the bad drives out the good, and the negative supersedes the positive. In American television journalism this tendency is even more acute.

Denis Lowry had demonstrated that television has a marked propensity for placing the "bad" news up front in the telecast, usually with some type of audio-visual aid.[64] Edith Efron's controversial content analysis also finds a preponderance of negativism within the television news program.[65] And Efron is not alone. A more recent, and far more rigorous, investigation of the network news program also reveals that among items which can be reliably categorized, the majority are negativistic.[66] Even personal scrutiny suggests a network predilection for the contentious and the negative. Sometimes "nastiness" merely appears as a news item, with little, or no, backgrounding—only the disputation receives coverage. In October 1973, for example, CBS News chose to replay, three times in one news day, a verbal and physical altercation between the UN ambassadors from Chile and Saudi Arabia. In none of these showings was the origin of the disagreement meaningfully discussed; only the incident was televised.

Merrill Panitt notes that the penchant for the journalistic negativism is greater in the United States than in other western countries; he also believes that this is especially true for American television journalism: "Our television news programs . . . are concerned with what is *wrong* with our government structure, our leaders, our prisons, schools, roads, automobiles, race relations, traffic systems, pollution laws, every facet of our society. In Europe, there is much less emphasis on exposing what is wrong, much more satisfaction with the status quo."[67] Whether one compares American television news with other television news systems, or with other American media, one finds an extraordinary emphasis on negativistic reportage.

The Emphasis on Conflict and Violence

Closely related to the electronic media's penchant for negativity is their predilection for violence and conflict. Anthony Greenwald's unpublished data show television to be three times more likely than local newspapers to cover noncriminal violence.[68] Benjamin Singer found the propensity for violence in American television news reporting to be substantially greater than that discovered in Canadian reportage. In comparing CBS and CBC news broadcasts during April and May of 1970, Singer discovered that CBS devoted 64 per cent of its news time to "aggressive items" while CBC devoted only 32 per cent of its news time to such stories.[69] Singer also discovered that CBS had employed more than twice as many "aggressive items" as the CBC during this same period, even after making allowances for war news from Vietnam.[70] In short, the predilection for action found within American journalism seems to exist at least as pervasively within television as within the other media, probably more so.

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[59] Paul Weaver, "Is Television News Biased?" pp. 57–74.

[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 67–69.

[61] Lang and Lang, *Politics and Television*, p. 52.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

[63] See Edward J. Epstein, *News from Nowhere* (New York: Random House, 1973), especially chap. 5.

[64] Dennis T. Lowry, "Gresham's Law and Network TV News Selection," *Journal of Broadcasting*, 15 (Fall, 1971), 397–408.

[65] Edith Efron, *The News Twisters* (Los Angeles: Nash, 1971), *passim*.

[66] Richard Hofstetter, "Television News Elections Project," Ohio State University mimeo., 1974.

[67] Merrill Panitt, "American Out of Focus," *TV Guide*, January 15, 1972, pp. 6–12. This article was first in a five-part series.

[68] Anthony G. Greenwald, "Do Crime and Violence in the Mass News Media Modify Behavior?" unpublished mimeo., Ohio State University, 1971, p. 22.

The Anti- institutional Theme in Network News Program

Besides manifesting an affinity for conflict and violence, the networks tend to engage in a type of journalistic "Naderism." This is evident in Efron's work on the network coverage of the 1968 presidential campaign. Having analyzed all three nightly presentations during the seven weeks prior to election day, Efron set forth her theory of network bias—a bias toward the "Democratic-Liberal-Left axis of opinion."[71] Efron's universe of words sampled, her coding categories, her unit of analysis, and her general procedures are suspect and have been widely criticized.[72] Nonetheless, her findings are not unreasonable, especially when reinterpreted. If, for example, one regards the clearly unbalanced network treatment of "the white middle class" (the ratio of negative to positive references for this group was fourteen to one) to be anti-institutional, instead of anti-Republican as Efron suggests, the Efron findings make more sense. Below is a table which lists all ten "issues" discussed in Efron's *The News Twisters*. In the first column appear all the issues treated favorably, in the second column all issues treated unfavorably. These data do not necessarily confirm Efron's theory of favoritism for the Democratic-liberal-left axis. Instead these data seem to reflect a bias that is somewhat anti-institutional and disestablishmentarian. Note that the "Liberals" were treated just as unfavorably as the "Conservatives;" both groups, according to Efron's techniques, take the short end of a 4-to-1 word count. In essence, Efron's data seem to indicate that television journalism likes practically nothing and nobody, certainly nothing and nobody in the establishment. Again, Efron's scholarship is suspect. But, using far more rigorous techniques, Hofstetter found traces of the same anti-institutional themes in the 1972 campaign.[73]

Table 14. The Ten Efron Issues, Listed by Treatment Received on Television

Favorable Treatment	Unfavorable Treatment
"Black Militants"	"US Policy in Vietnam"
"Left"	"US Policy concerning bombing"
"Viet Cong"	"Liberals"
	"Conservatives"
	"White Middle Class"
	"Demonstrators"
	"Violent Radicals"

It seems reasonable to assume that these anti-institutional themes reach the audience with one essential message: none of our national policies work, none of our institutions respond, none of our political organizations succeed.

One other characteristic of content is closely linked to the disestablishmentarian dimension. The networks tend to imply in their content and their style of delivery that things were once better than they are now, that the government and the society and its members performed or behaved better in the good old days. Again, given the special vulnerability of the inadvertent audience, and the credibility of the source, one would well expect that these viewers would grow increasingly more frustrated with themselves as political entities and with their institutions.

But one must not forget that the content of network reportage is not *sui generis* in all respects.

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[69] Benjamin Singer, "Violence, Protest, and War in Television News: The U.S. and Canada Compared," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (Winter, 1970–1971), 611–616, at p. 613. Unfortunately, Singer's analysis is confounded by the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State killings, both of which occurred during the weeks he chose to do his study.

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 615.

[71] Edith Efron, *The News Twisters*, p. 47.

[72] The networks and academia have met *TNT*, as Efron's book has been glibly nicknamed, with skepticism. Charles Winick in "Critique of the Methodology of Edith Efron's 'The News Twisters' " CBS Xerox, October, 1971, has criticzed the universe sampled, the unit of analysis, the lack of checks for coding and the lack of contextual interpretation. International Research Associates Incorporated has replicated Efron's work, using only the CBS programs employed in the original analysis. IRA found less "bias" than did Efron. And IRA also pointed out what it regarded as unjustified or unsupported techniques in the Efron study. See International Research Associates, "An Analysis of Thirty-Six Telecasts of 'The CBS Evening News With Walter Cronkite,' Broadcasts from September 16 to November 4, 1968," mimeo., New York, February, 1972. My own feeling is that Efron's work is shoddy but not inaccurate and that criticisms of her method are too broad. Indeed, were Winick's every demand met there would probably be *no* example of a good content analysis. Paul Weaver has investigated Efron's own data and estimated that if one would throw out all questionable coding decisions, the imbalance would remain. This does not, however, convince me about her interpretations of the imbalance.

[73] Richard Hofstetter, "Television News Election Project," chap. 6. Hofstetter found virtually no politically partisan bias in the 1972 campaign coverage.

Television journalism is part of American journalism. The propensities for negativism, contentiousness, anti-institutionalism may be stronger for television journalism than for the print or audial media, but those propensities exist in all our media. In general, bad news is news; good news is no news. Television news is qualitatively different from other types of news, but in some respects, all the media are qualitatively similar. In areas where the media are the same qualitatively, they differ in intensity, with television generally proving to be most intense. And television reaches millions who would ordinarily go without the information and who lack the sophistication to deal with this journalistic content, be it traditional American journalism or its televisual hybrid.[74] Nor can one forget that the effectiveness of the audio-visual mode of presentation, although we have not dealt with this factor in this research, is real and demonstrable and that television news relies most heavily—and increasingly more heavily—upon those very aids which have proved effective in producing behavioral responses.[75]

Television journalism is, at base, everything that American journalism is, and more. Television journalism reaches an audience more susceptible than any other to the images generally associated with our whole system of mass communication. As consequence, public affairs television has touched a segment of the population which once received its political information from a local precinct worker or friend or relative. Under those conditions, this segment of the society was a repository of passivity, a source of political stability and quiescence. With television this segment of society has become an available reservoir of dysphoria and instability. The new dysphoria—the new instability—born within the ranks of the inadvertent viewers works its way through the polls and all forms of media to touch us all.

In summary, television journalism disseminates news and information far more widely than does any other news source, bringing political information to people in the society who might never have bothered to obtain this information before television arrived, and who might still not bother, were it not for TV news. Events get conveyed and given the credibility of the network news program, "events" are believed. But events are frequently conveyed by television news through an inferential structure[76] that often injects a negativistic, contentious, or anti-institutional bias. These biases, frequently dramatized by film portrayals of violence and aggression, evoke images of American politics and social life which are inordinately sinister and despairing. The inadvertent viewer, through television, witnesses these images of the society, regarding them as essentially evil and indicative of sociopolitical decay. Unable or unwilling to reject the network reports, the inadvertent viewer may turn against the group most directly responsible for the conflict, against the social and political institutions involved, or against himself, feeling unable to deal with a political system "like this."

"The Selling of the Pentagon," a concentrated adaptation of the evening news programs, probably produced this type of reaction for those "few" million who fell into either the original audience or the audience for the "rerun." The network involved, CBS, was the most credible of the three. The events depicted were believable and probably believed. The message was substantially negative and disestablishmentarian and immeshed at least two American institutions—CBS and the military—in a full-scale imbroglio. In the real world the result was probably similar to that which existed in the laboratory—immediate decrease in political self-esteem and a perceptible black eye for some of the institutions involved.

The nightly news broadcasts represent a less concentrated dose of television reportage than that found in "The Selling." But the same types of messages appear in both. And the nightlies bombard the inadvertent audience and the advertent audience as well with surprising regularity. On balance, it is not surprising that the evening news programs could produce effects similar to those achieved by "The Selling." Nor is it surprising that public dependency on network news can cause a perceptible shift in political ethos—a shift toward malaise.

Prognosis

These trends are not inexorable. Either television journalism could change its foci and style or the public could acquire the political sophistication required to cope more effectively with video journalism. But the Watergate scandals probably reduce the already limited likelihood of restructuring electronic journalism. The journalistic profession as a whole is probably too pleased with itself at this moment to alter its behavior in the near future. Television management is, itself, unlikely to demand any structural changes in public affairs television.

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[74] Edgar Litt shows that "the people" (i.e., the working class), do not receive adequate civic education to cope with the facts about the basic process of politics in the United States. Only the middle-class schools teach politics as group conflict. The working-class child is taught about politics at a more *idealistic* level. Given that these children become the heaviest users of TV news, this inadequacy could insure political frustration among this stratum. "Civic Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (February, 1963), 69–75.

[75] Alan Booth, "The Recall of News Items," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (Winter, 1970–1971), 605–610.

[76] This phrase belongs to the Langs, *Politics and Television*, p. 134.

Of course, the public continues to increase its aggregate level of education. This implies that the inadvertent audience will grow smaller and its membership will be less sensitive to the images provided by television journalism. But even assuming constancy in television journalism and greater public political "development," what does videomalaise portend? In decreasing order of probability, the three most likely outcomes are: (1) a growing political instability among voters (2) a withering of the two major American parties (3) the flowering of a broad-based, anti-democratic third party. One might well argue that all three scenarios are possible. The most recent SRC data on partisan attachments within the society indicate that phases one and two are already well-established.[77] Even phase three may not be beyond the realm of plausible.

Once again the Langs appear prophetic. In the 'sixties they asserted that public affairs television elicits "defensive reaction against confusion, against reality that is overpowering, against the unfamiliar and the frightening, where 'remote' events and invisible powers seem to determine the destiny of the individual who can do nothing about it."[78] And, according to the Langs, television does so by its "emphasis on crisis and conflict in lieu of clarifying normal decision-making processes."[79] It would appear that the mid-'sixties and the early 'seventies saw just such a set of reactions as the Langs had forecast. Television probably did serve as midwife in these changes. Ironically, the men and women of television news may have unwittingly fostered political malaise when, in 1963, they adopted, in the public interest, the thirty-minute news program (one hour and thirty minutes per night when combined with local news).

At minimum one might use the television news system to understand one of the great opinional discrepancies of our time. Television journalism may help explain why, in 1973, 45 per cent of the American people considered themselves to be doing "very well," but only 3 per cent believed that the country, as a whole, was doing so.[80] Or one might use these data to explain the erosion of the Kennedy-Johnson coalition, a coalition which vanquished its Republican opponents in 1964 but which barely survived the campaign of 1968, let alone 1972. One might argue that Richard Nixon won his original "deviating" election in 1968, not with the aid of Frank Shakespeare, Roger Ailes, and Harry Treleavan, but with that of Frank Reynolds, Roger Mudd, and Harry Reasoner. This conclusion is probably as anathematic to the people in television news as it is ironic to us. The networks believe that, in the shadow of Richard Nixon's resignation, they are now, more than ever, the soul of the republic.[81] The networks also believe that "effects" are not their concern; they must report the news as it happens. Somewhat surprisingly, they even doubt that they have had any effects on our ethos—especially effects that are dysfunctional to the political process.

The networks argue, for example, that the televised Ervin and Rodino hearings, throughout the several phases of the impeachment inquiry, actually increased the level of political efficacy and the level of political trust. One might remember that the findings reported here are, in fact, based upon data that were collected during a time when Watergate was merely an apartment complex in northwest Washington. One might also argue that the late 'sixties and early 'seventies were an aberrational epoch—that videomalaise will occur only under those special circumstances which prevailed between 1963 and 1972—that a theory of videomalaise was "accurate" once but is already "obsolete."[82]

I cannot, at this moment, refute that premise. But, I find this premise of obsolescence less than persuasive; the opposite seems true. It is, in fact, the middle 'seventies and Watergate which are unique. Not only is there some likelihood that politics will return to the issues of the late 'sixties—the social issues—there is, indeed, reason to believe that network journalism, with its unchanged organizational imperatives, will move us in that direction, almost as an inevitability. An economic depression, or a near depression, would certainly define the political issues of the 'seventies in economic terms. But without an economic collapse or a hot war, network television may be potent enough to define as a matter of course the political environment—*to make the issues of our times those issues which best accommodate the medium. Television may, however unintentionally, come to define our politics as a byproduct of its own organizational and idiosyncratic needs.*

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[77] According to a recent SRC Survey, 36 per cent of the public now identifies with the Democrats, 21 per cent with the Republicans, and a full 43 per cent with neither. See Warren Miller and Arthur Miller, "Political Realignment in 1972, Party Loyalties and Issue Preferences," University of Michigan, mimeo., 1974, p. 1.

[78] Lang and Lang, *Politics and Television*, p. 307.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] *Time*, November 19, 1973, p. 25.

[81] I had the opportunity to speak formally and informally with a high-ranking member from each of the four major networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, PBS) immediately following the Nixon resignation. They were vociferous and unanimous in their rejection of the theory about videomalaise. Generally, they regarded it as irrelevant, given the role of American journalism in the policy process. They also regarded the theory as inaccurate, and more so now than at any time within the last decade.

[82] The word was used by NBC news executive, Robert Northshield.

There is a sense of irony in all this. The network personnel probably do not wish to see our political ethos or our political issues defined so as to undermine their own liberal predilections toward public policy. (The most recent study of the people in network journalism reveals a moderate-to-liberal orientation among the producers and the directors, as well as the correspondents.[83]) But the theory of videomalaise is rife with irony. It is, after all, more than a little ironic that, during the 1960s, the most vitriolic attacks ever hurled against the network news organizations came from the very party and political leadership that were, at the time, the unintended beneficiaries of videomalaise. Of course there is an ironic end to their story too. But the theory of videomalaise may offer more than ironies about leadership; it may also offer some insights into the future.

Ever since 1968—but certainly not before that time—George Corley Wallace has grown noticeably reticent in his opinions about network journalism. Given the protracted struggle between Governor Wallace and the networks during the mid-'sixties, and given the political differences between the governor and the network news organizations, one might, without the benefit of our theory of videopolitics, ask why the diminution in criticism? One might, without our theory, be forced to argue that Wallace has merely decided to avoid an unnecessary conflict or that he wishes to demonstrate his commitment to freedom of the press. But *with* the theory one can conclude that Governor Wallace has not so much changed his opinions about network journalists or even the first amendment. One might better conclude that the governor sits in Montgomery and contemplates the future of a center-seeking Alabamian who understands videomalaise.

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[83] Edward J. Epstein, *News From Nowhere*, chap. 7, "Values."

A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana*

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Introduction

In much of the thinking and writing about nonmodernized areas of the world, it is assumed (more often implicitly than explicitly) that the masses have little political knowledge and that they are generally ignorant of the political process, the national leadership, political organizations, the national territory and its people.[1] This has led to concern in some quarters that the "information gap" might lead to instability or be utilized by people with different value systems and ideologies to foster unrest and endanger world peace.[2] For others, political ignorance has been seen as a blessing which allows the national governments of recently independent states some breathing space—time to organize, to build institutions, to establish development projects—without pressure from the populace.[3] In the Ivory Coast an official of the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) cites mass political ignorance as a justification for autocracy: "Democracy is a system of government for virtuous people. It seldom works even in very mature countries. Why should we expect it to work here? We must be realistic. Our people are ignorant of the problems we face. They cannot be left to choose the solutions to our overwhelming problems but must approve the alternatives debated by an elite."[4] Some leaders have played on the presumption of ignorance to line their own pockets. Others have seen it as justification for the rule of an "enlightened" elite without reference to the masses.

Writers have also been concerned about the role of political information in creating the "good citizen." It is usually assumed that the good citizen is the informed citizen[5] and presumably that the uninformed individual is a "bad citizen."[6] That was certainly the presumption in Ghana after the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah—that the populace had not understood what was happening and had thus either been taken in by Nkrumah and the

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* For their kind assistance and hospitality I am indebted to the University of Ghana, the Institute of African Studies, to the Department of Political Science, its chairman at the time, Professor Victor T. Le Vine and its staff. These individuals and many others in the University, the community and the Government made my work possible. Most importantly, I wish to express my appreciation for the kindness, patience and cooperation of the villagers in the areas in which I worked. Their enthusiasm, aid and wisdom made my work exciting and rewarding. I also wish to acknowledge the generous support of a Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Grant during 1969–70, research support from the Graduate Schools at the University of Wisconsin, and the tireless aid of my research assistants, Mark Huddleston and Linn Hammergren. I am particularly indebted to Murray Edelman, Edward Friedman, Deane Neubauer, James C. Scott, and M. Crawford Young for their valuable comments and suggestions. None of these individuals or institutions are responsible, of course, for the final product.

[1] Some writers are a little more explicit. Peter Lloyd suggests that the West African masses are apathetic toward government because they have little education and ". . . scant experience of the world beyond their own small communities. . . ." *Africa in Social Change*, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 220. In discussing political interest in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gershon Collier states: "As a matter of fact, the vast majority of the people were totally oblivious of what was happening. . . ." *Sierra Leone: Experiment in Democracy in an African Nation* (New York: New York University Press, 1970), p. 97.

[2] Ithiel de Sola Pool, in his article "The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments," argues that in most developing nations there are two countries, that of the masses and that of the intelligentsia. The problem is to bring them together. He suggests that "the link will be made somehow with or without us. If it is made by ideological political movements it will be made by revolutions and it will be made in turmoil and struggle by people killing each other. There is a better way now of making this link and that is through social science research." *Background*, 10 (August, 1966), 115–116. The implication is that the masses will succumb to either approach and that it would thus be "better" to move quickly with the non-revolutionary approach which is somehow inherent in the social sciences.

[3] An argument put most forcefully by Samuel Huntington in "Political Development and Political Decay," in *Political Modernization*, ed. Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1967).

[4] This argument was made by the president of the constitutional committee of the Territorial Assembly in 1959, but is in keeping with both the policy and the operation of the PDCI since that time. Quoted in Aristide R. Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 253–54.

[5] Lane and Sears noted that in democracies it is assumed that citizens undertake the burden of being informed about political affairs so that they can carry out their civic duties effectively. Similar assumptions are made in other systems. Whether or not the citizen is in fact well informed is an empirical question. See Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, *Public Opinion* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), chapter 6.

[6] Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960) chap. 20, discuss assumptions about the informed citizen and electoral behavior.

Convention People's Party or was ill prepared to counter its acts and arguments.[7] This was among the reasons for the creation of a Centre for Civic Education (CCE), which was expected to teach proper citizenship and to explain the rights and the responsibilities of the populace in order to pave the way for the return to civilian rule.[8]

It is often assumed that political information and civic knowledge create a foundation for attachment to the political system.[9] This was another stimulus to the establishment of the CCE in Ghana. The National Liberation Council (NLC) and the leaders of the Centre hoped to build a strong commitment to the new political order they envisioned in the post-Nkrumah era.[10]

The general conceptualization of the masses as politically ignorant is not surprising. Many of the nonmodernized nations of the world have only recently become independent of foreign occupation, and some have territorial boundaries of rather recent origin, particularly in Africa. Furthermore, the ability to communicate political information is often hampered by poor roads, difficult terrain, extreme climates, limited economic resources, and few opportunities for the average person to travel. One would expect these problems to create important constraints on the flow of information.[11] Educational opportunities are also limited in most of the Third World. Since studies in the United States suggest that education is highly correlated with political information,[12] we could reasonably expect a comparatively low level of political information in countries with lower levels of literacy. In fact, we know that in spite of the relatively high level of education in the United States as well as extensive communications networks and intense public-oriented election campaigns, the level of political knowledge in the United States is surprisingly low.[13] It seems reasonable that in countries with a less educated citizenry, poorer communication, limited modernization, and few government services, the level of ignorance about government would be higher than that in the United States.

On the other hand, the assumption that the masses are politically ignorant may be somewhat off the mark. There are no doubt functional equivalents of formal education—the extensive use of the radio, for example.[14] My own experience in rural Africa in the mid-'sixties suggested that the rural populace was surprisingly well informed—even in remote areas. Although my early observations were subjective, I was struck both by the level of information about national politics and by the degree of understanding of complex political issues.

This paper is an attempt to examine these questions more systematically—to study the extent, impact, and implications of political information using survey data gathered during work on national integration in Ghana (see Appendix for discussion of the sample). I focus on three types of national political information: (1) identification of major political actors and organizations, (2) knowledge of the territory encompassed by the nation, and (3) identification of the people officially categorized as Ghanaians. Another major interest is to identify and examine variables which affect level of information. The relationship between information and a number of variables including education, occupation, income, mobility, and exposure to the media, will be examined. These variables will be analyzed in both bivariate and multivariate contexts. Finally, I shall examine some of the consequences for the political process of different levels of political information. What effect does political information have on participation, integration, stability, cynicism, and other political attitudes and actions? Does the informed citizen feel more competent to affect politics? Does he or she benefit from the political system to a greater extent than do less informed individuals? Is the informed citizen more compliant than the uninformed by virtue of receiving government cues regarding desired behavior? Is the informed populace more supportive of the national political apparatus? What are the costs of an uninformed public?

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[7] This argument was made by a number of the leaders of the coup. See for example, A. A. Afrifa, *The Ghana Coup* (London: Frank Cass, 1967).

[8] See Fred M. Hayward, "Ghana's Experiment with Civic Education" *Africa Report*, 16 (May, 1971), 24–27.

[9] Lane and Sears argue that while this is a basic assumption about the effect of civic knowledge, it is wrong. They suggest that attachments come in other ways—from childhood experiences, satisfaction, fear of deviance, and a variety of rewards (*Public Opinion*, p. 61).

[10] At the time of the establishment of the Centre for Civic Education General Ankrah, Chairman of the NLC, suggested that "we are fully convinced that, with the initiation of nationwide civic education as the solid bedrock in our society, we can confidently look forward to a new civilian government in which elections will be held in a clean and free atmosphere without any victimization, violence and personal vindictiveness; in which the government will realize its limitations and in which the rights and privileges of the people shall be guaranteed." Speech at the inauguration of the Centre for Civic Education, June 7, 1967. There were other expectations of the founders of the C.C.E., including the hope that it would prove a useful vehicle for election of a particular kind of politician in the forthcoming election and provide its leader, Dr. Busia, with public exposure prior to elections. See Yaw Opong Saffu, "Politics in a Military Regime: The Case of Ghana" (Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1973) esp. chap. 3.

[11] The relationship of communication to development has been discussed by many writers. Lucian W. Pye, for example, writes about the general tendency of nonwestern systems to be hampered by communications difficulties in "The NonWestern Political Process," *The Journal of Politics*, 20 (August, 1958), 468–486. In his superb sketch of Balgat, Turkey, Daniel Lerner analyzes the impact of communications on development in a single community and suggests its implications for developing areas as a whole. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962).

[12] Donald J. Devine, *The Attentive Public* (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1970), pp. 58–59.

[13] Hazel Gaudet Erskine has done us the great service of bringing together data from a wide variety of polls taken in the United States over the years. She shows very clearly how poorly Americans are informed about politics. See her "The Polls: The Informed Public," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Winter, 1962), 669–677; "The Polls: Textbook Knowledge" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Spring, 1963), 133–141; and "The Polls: Exposure to Domestic Information" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Fall, 1963), 491–500.

[14] Frantz Fanon discussed the educational aspects of radio in Algeria as a means of mobilizing the masses during the Algerian Revolution. See his *A Dying Colonialism*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1965), chap. 2.

In the course of this study I examine conventional wisdom concerning the ignorance of the masses about national politics and call into question some common assumptions. We will see that the differences usually assumed between the level of political knowledge in developed versus underdeveloped societies are not as great as often hypothesized. In fact, my data suggest that in some areas of national political information the masses in nonmodernized societies are more politically aware than their counterparts in modernized societies. Such findings indicate a need to reexamine the assumption that the United States and other Western nations are at the high end of the continuum of public information. The results of this study suggest that we need to pay more attention to the salience of politics in different societies when we do comparative studies. I also show that there is no necessary link between education (literacy) and political information and suggest a number of functional equivalents to formal education. In the last section of this paper I discuss several propositions about the informed citizenry, in particular the notions that: the informed citizen is more likely to be the compliant citizen; the informed public is likely to benefit (or expect to benefit) from government more than the less informed; satisfaction among the informed public is more a function of reception of cues from government and public officials than the result of instrumental rewards.

Information about the Nation and National Politics

Fundamental to knowledge about national politics is some conception of the existence of the national entity. Of the total sample of 376, only two per cent (i.e., 8 respondents) either did not know whether or not they lived in Ghana or asserted that they did not live in Ghana. Since only the urban sample was on a major road and since one of the villages was not on a road at all, this is an amazingly low percentage, especially when one considers that similar responses have been encountered in the United States in the not very distant past.[15] Only .5 per cent of the sample (or two respondents) asserted that the interview was not taking place in Ghana. Both of these respondents were living in the Volta Region which had been totally annexed to Ghana just prior to independence in 1957.[16] One of the two respondents noted that some of the people "in town" said that the area was a part of Ghana, but he doubted it. This view was clearly not shared by the vast majority of his neighbors.

Among the 98 per cent of the populace surveyed who were aware that they lived in Ghana, how much more extensive was their information about the nation? Let us first examine the level of information about national political figures and organizations.

Political Knowledge. Knowledge about major political figures, political organizations, and recent political events is indicative of the impact of national politics on individual citizens. Part of the process of gaining political knowledge involves access to information. Political knowledge at minimum reflects exposure to information about politics. Being informed also implies at least interest in politics—an interest strong enough to permit one to remember the information to which one is exposed. While the informed citizen may have a strong interest in these events, the degree of interest is measured only minimally by the knowledge itself.

Respondents were asked: Who was Prime Minister when Ghana attained Independence? Who is Prime Minister now [i.e., in 1970]? Who ran the government before the last elections [1969]? Ninety per cent of the respondents correctly named Kwame Nkrumah as the first Prime Minister, 87 per cent could name the Prime Minister in 1970, Kofi Busia, who had been in office for about six months at the time of the survey,[17] and 81 per cent identified the military regime, the National Liberation Council (NLC), or one of its leaders as the former government. In the urban sample all respondents answered these questions correctly.

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[15] In his study, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, "Philip Converse notes that "even in the modern United States, there are scattered pockets of population that are rather vague about national identity. We encounter respondents, for example, who when asked if they were born in the United States, answer 'No. I was born in Georgia,' in what is clearly ignorance rather than a throwback to secession or kittenish state pride." Converse in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 258.

[16] This territory had been part of German Togoland which was occupied by the English and French during World War I. Part of the territory (now the Volta Region) remained under British Mandate until a plebiscite in 1956 which resulted in merger with Ghana just prior to its independence in 1957.

[17] This compares with the following results in the United States in August 1948. Ninety-one per cent of the respondents could name Harry Truman as the Democratic can-

Respondents were asked several questions about the elections held in mid-1969, including the political party of the Prime Minister (1970). Seventy per cent gave the formal name of the party (Progress Party, or P.P. for short), 3 per cent gave nicknames for the party ("Sure", Party Papa), 4 per cent named the National Alliance of Liberals (N.A.L.) which was the major opposition party, and 23 per cent didn't know. Respondents were also asked to name as many of the political organizations competing in the election as they could. As Table 1 shows, the same percentage of respondents (70 per cent) knew the name of the major opposition party, N.A.L., as knew the name of the party which was then in power. The elections themselves resulted in a major victory for the Progress Party which won 105 of the 140 seats to only 29 seats for N.A.L. The other three parties won five seats, and one independent was elected.[18]

Table 1. Name Other Political Parties in 1969 Elections

	Yes	No
National Alliance of Liberals	70%	30%
People's Action Party	26%	74%
All People's Republican Party	14%	86%
United Nationalist Party	31%	69%
Other Misc.	6%	94%

($N = 115$)[a]

[a] The total sample was 376 but some of the information questions were asked of approximately a third of the sample chosen randomly and thus the smaller N for some of the tables like this one.

Respondents were asked if they could name their representative in Parliament. Fifty-four per cent could correctly name their representative, (see Table 2) and an additional 4 per cent identified their representative on the basis of the town or village in which he lived. What is particularly striking in terms of comparative political knowledge is that the Ghanaian responses are slightly higher than the per cent who could name their representative in the United States in 1970 (53 per cent),[19] and much higher than responses to similar questions posed in the U.S. in 1947 and 1966, when only 38 and 46 per cent respectively, could name their representative in Congress.[20]

Table 2. Identify Representative in Parliament (1970)

Knows clearly	54%
Identifies by town or village	4%
Names wrong person	14%
Don't Know	29%
	101%

($N = 115$)

There were clearly limits to the extent of knowledge about those in high government offices. Only 28 per cent of the sample could name one or more cabinet ministers (see Table 3). To be sure, these men were in the public limelight much less than the Prime Minister and often had positions which impinged little if at all on the life of the respondents (e.g., foreign affairs).

Table 3. Name Cabinet Ministers

Names five or more	1%
Names 3–4	3%
Names 2	8%
Names 1	16%
None	73%
	101%

($N = 115$)

To assess the extent of individual respondents' political knowledge and to simplify later analysis, a political knowledge scale was established using the items discussed in this section.[21] It is striking that fully 18 per cent of the sample gave correct responses to all of the questions, and 26 per cent of the respondents could answer all but one question. At the other end of the scale, only 3 per cent of the sample could not answer any of the questions (see

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didate for president. In 1947, 98% said that they had heard of him and had a reasonably correct idea who he was. See Hazel Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls: The Informed Public," p. 670.

[18] Election results are cited in *Birth of the Second Republic*, ed. Moses Danquah (Accra: Editorial & Publishing Services, circa 1969).

[19] Cited in the *Gallup Opinion Index* Report No. 58, April 1970 (Princeton: Gallup International Inc., 1970), p. 20.

[20] Hazel Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls: Textbook Knowledge," p. 138 and *Gallup Opinion Index*, April 1970, p. 20.

[21] The seven items in the scale were: Who was Prime Minister when Ghana attained independence? Who is Prime Minister now? Do you know his political party? Who ran the government before the last election? What parties opposed the Progress Party in the election? Who is your representative in Parliament? Can you name any Ministers in the government? Respondents scored only one point for one or more Ministers. The scale is a summated rating scale coded as (1) for a correct answer and (0) for an incorrect answer. Thus, a score of seven would mean that the respondent correctly identified all of the items, a zero that none had been correctly identified, and so on.

Table 4). This information suggests that Ghanaians have a rather high level of general knowledge about the major organizations and individuals involved in national politics. Furthermore, when one compares selected responses in Ghana with similar or related survey information levels in the United States, Ghanaians demonstrate comparable levels of political knowledge.[22] This is particularly remarkable when one considers the tremendous communications difficulties in Ghana.

Table 4. Level of Political Knowledge

		Number of responses correct	Percentage correct
Levels of Knowledge	Low	0	3%
		1	3%
		2	5%
	Medium	3	13%
		4	14%
		5	18%
	High	6	26%
		7	18%
			100%

(*N* = 115)

Identification of National Territory. The second political information variable examined was the extent to which respondents were aware of the territory encompassed within the boundaries of Ghana. These responses help us determine whether there is a territorial conception of the state and if so, how accurate it is. Gustav Jahoda, among others, has noted that the understanding of one's environment begins with objects in the immediate vicinity and expands to encompass larger and larger areas.[23] One aspect of the environment is the national political entity and the territory it encompasses. Unlike most of the nations in the West, Ghana (like most of the rest of Africa) has had its geographic boundaries established relatively recently—in the case of the eastern boundary of Ghana as recently as 1956. For some respondents the notion of an entity called Ghana was an abstract one without concrete form beyond the knowledge that they personally resided in Ghana. As noted, 98 per cent of the sample said they were in Ghana. Where respondents have a territorial conception of the state, its parameters become an important question. Is the conception limited to the respondent's own geographic area as in the case of one man in the Volta Region who suggested that he lived in Ghana but that the region on the West side of the Volta River was the Gold Coast (the pre-independence name of Ghana)? Is it more encompassing than that? What are its limits? How accurate is the conception of the state? A number of respondents suggested that the boundaries included Nigeria. While knowledge of the territorial limits of the nation is not important in terms of the daily survival of most individuals, it does reflect their view about the extent of national power and indirectly, about who may benefit from the activity of government.

Respondents were asked: Would you tell me in general terms what are the boundaries of Ghana? (e.g., where does it begin?). What is clear from the responses is that more than fifty per cent of the respondents have no idea about the territorial limits of Ghana. I was not concerned with geographer's definitions of boundaries but rather with some kind of indication that the respondent knew roughly where it was. In some cases answers were not very precise—identification being made in terms of a town, a people, or language group. The responses concerning the Ghana–Upper Volta border are indicative. While 12 per cent of the respondents had a reasonably clear idea of the border, another 7 per cent identified it on the basis of a town on the border—in most cases the town of Paga. An additional one per cent identified Upper Volta on the basis of language—usually the change from English to French; 80 per cent could not identify this border. The data on the other two borders show that 30 per cent of the respondents had at least a minimal conception of the Ghana-Togo border, and 20 per cent the Ivory Coast frontier.

If we look at the extent to which the respondents had correct conceptions of the territorial limits of Ghana, we find (Table 5) that only 12 per cent can correctly name all of the boundaries in a fairly clear fashion. On the other hand, almost 48 per cent had some idea about the territorial limits of the country in at least one area. Fifty-two per cent of the sample were unable to identify correctly any of the boundaries of the country, even in an ambiguous fashion.[24] Clearly the level of ignorance of Ghanaians in this area of political information is much greater than it was about national political figures, organizations, and events. This is probably partly explained by lack of education and by the limited need of most citizens to know boundaries in the course of their daily lives.

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[22] Ghanaians would not be expected to have comparable knowledge about formal institutions or the constitution, since those aspects of national politics in Ghana have changed rather frequently in the period since independence unlike the case in the United States.

[23] In this study the focus was on learning whether respondents had a correct view of Ghana's territory rather than in looking at stages in the process of learning about the nation. However, the limits on formal education and the isolation of many areas create conditions which put many adults in positions similar to the school children discussed by Gustav Jahoda in "The Development of Children's Ideas about Country and Nationality; Part I: The Conceptual Framework," *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, 33 (Feb., 1963), 47–60, esp. p. 48.

[24] Eleven per cent of the respondents identified places or divisions other than what could be reasonably construed

Table 5. Identification of Ghana's Boundaries (correctly)

Three–four identified clearly	12%
Two clearly	5%
One clearly	13%
Identify one or more by town/people clearly	7%
Identify one more, more ambiguously	11%
None identified	52%
	100%
	(*N*=376)

Identification of Ghanaian Ethnic/Cultural Groups. The third aspect of political information examined in this study relates to the ability of respondents to identify ethnic-cultural groups which are Ghanaians. This knowledge has implications for the recognition of government authority and the legitimacy of government services, taxation, and other obligations to the state. Conceptions of "citizenship" affect notions about the legitimacy of both office holders and government programs. It is quite clear that if some segments of the nation do not regard at least some Ewes, for example, as Ghanaians, Ewes in leadership positions are likely to have difficulty asserting their authority. Furthermore, if the Dagomba are not regarded as true Ghanaians, there may be opposition to government expenditures on education, roads, and other services in Dagomba areas.

Respondents were asked: "What people are Ghanaians?" Their responses were noted, and the interviewer then asked if any of the people on a predetermined list, but not already mentioned spontaneously, were Ghanaian. The list included Ashanti, Dagomba, Ewe, Fanti, Ga, Hausa, Mossi, Yoruba. The first five ethnic groups are Ghanaians, while the Hausa and Yoruba are Nigerians. The status of the Mossi is somewhat ambiguous since large numbers live in Ghana. They are usually regarded as Upper Voltans in official circles, but even there the level of disagreement is high. The results can be seen in Table 6.

There is strikingly little ambiguity in the responses to this question. The greatest ambiguity is shown in responses about the Mossi: 20 per cent of the respondents did not know whether or not the Mossi were Ghanaians. Of the options presented, this is perhaps the most ambiguous case because strong historic ties link most of the Northern Ghanaians and the Mossi.[25] Furthermore, large groups of Mossi live in Ghana or migrate to Ghana especially to work on the cocoa farms. In all of the other cases more than half of the respondents either accept or reject the notion that a particular group is Ghanaian. Approximately eighty per cent or more of the respondents recognized the Ashanti, Ewe, Fanti, and Ga as Ghanaians.[26] More than fifty per cent of the respondents viewed the Hausa, Yoruba, and Mossi as non-Ghanaian, which corresponded to the government view. Just prior to this survey, the government had embarked on a policy of expelling aliens without valid residence permits—an action which affected thousands of Hausa, Yoruba, and Mossi, many of whom had lived in Ghana all of their lives.[27] This action may have fostered or increased the feeling that these

Table 6. Identification of Ethnic/Cultural Groups as Ghanaian

	Ashanti	Dagomba	Ewe	Fanti	Ga	Hausa	Yoruba	Mossi
Spontaneously yes	48%	34%	39%	24%	25%	9%	1%	4%
Yes when mentioned	39%	31%	49%	55%	54%	24%	21%	21%
Rejects when mentioned	6%	16%	3%	8%	5%	55%	61%	53%
Don't Know	6%	18%	8%	13%	16%	12%	17%	20%
Inapplicable	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1%
	99%	99%	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%

(*N*=376)

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as the official boundaries of the country. About five per cent of the sample identified wrong boundaries within Ghana, another five per cent, boundaries outside of Ghana and one per cent, incorrect boundaries both inside and outside Ghana's present borders.

[25] The Mossi are mostly from Upper Volta, but they are very closely related to a number of Northern Ghanaian ethnic groups including the Dagomba.

[26] In terms of self-identification as Ghanaians, of the ethnic groups represented in the sample in reasonably large numbers, 98 per cent or better identified their own ethnic group as Ghanaian.

[27] Some of the Hausa and Yoruba traders in particular had lived in the North for several generations and had little or no idea about the location of their "home" in Nigeria. Most of the Mossi were migrant laborers who came to Ghana seasonally to work on the cocoa harvest or as laborers in other areas.

ethnic groups were non-Ghanaian. Given the general popularity of the government action, however, and the widespread agreement with the demarcation (except among Ewes who saw it as a threat), the results would probably have been little altered had this survey been carried out six months earlier. Even though some Ewe (who were classified as Togolese) were deported, the Ewe were regarded as Ghanaian by almost ninety per cent of respondents while only three per cent felt they were not Ghanaian. This is particularly poignant in the face of some anti-Ewe sentiment at the time of the survey (based on the contention that there were too many Ewe in political and administrative positions) and the feelings of some Ewe that they were being persecuted.

If we examine the composite scores of respondents in terms of their ability to identify specific ethnic groups as Ghanaian or non-Ghanaian (as generally defined by the government), we find that almost one-fourth of the respondents give correct responses to all seven options and another 28 per cent knew all but one (see Table 7). Of the ethnic groups shown in Table 6, Mossi was omitted from the scale, since the government officials interviewed were quite ambiguous about the status of many Mossi in Ghana. I was usually told that some were Ghanaian and some were not. When asked why this did not apply to the Hausa or Yoruba I was usually told that they had maintained their loyalties to Nigeria—that they had not become integrated into the Ghanaian communities in which they lived. They did not marry Ghanaians, they continued to wear Nigerian dress, and they spoke of Nigeria as their home.

In summary, most of the Ghanaians interviewed had a rather clear conception of the citizenship of people within the state—a conception that reflects the official position. Few Ghanaians have an ethnocentric view of the state since 70 per cent of the respondents correctly identified at least five of the seven ethnic groups noted as Ghanaian or non-Ghanaian, while only two per cent could identify none (see Table 7).

Table 7. Ethnic Identification

		Number of correct responses	Percentage correct
	Low	0	2%
		1	3%
		2	3%
Levels of Knowledge	Medium	3	7%
		4	15%
		5	21%
	High	6	28%
		7	22%
			101%
			($N=376$)

Determinants of Political Information

In this section we will examine the relationships between political information and a number of demographic variables—including residence, economic position, mobility, age, and sex—which might affect level of political information. The relationship between level of political information and source of information (radio, newspapers, political leaders, traditional authorities and friends) will then be examined.

Demographic Variables. A number of demographic variables (shown in Table 8) were predicted to have strong associations with political information on the basis both of previous research findings (primarily in the United States) and my own earlier work in Africa.

Table 8. Bivariate Relationships Between Information Variables and Demographic Variables[a]

	Political Knowledge	Identification of Boundaries	Identification of Ethnic Groups
Education	.34***	.56***	.24***
Occupation	.32***	.30***	.19***
Age	−.31***	−.14**	−.22***
Mobility	.23**	.21***	.14**
Size town	.30***	.10*	.26***
Sex (f, m)	−.42***	−.29***	−.22***
Urban	.28**	.04	.29***
Economic position	.13	.18***	.05
Ethnic Group			
Northern	.13	−.27***	.25***
Ewe	−.27**	.12*	−.27***
Southern	.11	.12*	−.01
	($N=115$)	($N=376$)	($N=376$)

* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level
*** Significant at the .001 level
[a] (All correlations are Pearson's *r* unless otherwise noted.)

When these variables are partialled using multiple regression analysis,[28] the associations with occupation, size of town, economic position, and ethnic groups[29] decreased markedly. Education, age, mobility, sex, and urban residence[30] have relationships which continue to be statistically significant, but are generally not as strong as had been anticipated. Let us look at these variables in greater detail.

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[28] The dependent variables (the three information scales) are interval data. For each respondent, the score is the sum of correct responses to the respective questions about political knowledge, boundaries, and Ghanaian ethnic groups.

[29] Occupation was ranked on the basis of the degree of technical competence required, and size of town was de-

We would expect education to have a strong association with political information. This relationship is suggested in a great deal of the work on information in the United States.[31] It also seems reasonable as a general proposition to assume that educated individuals in any country will have more information about the nation and the political process. This is not necessarily a function of being taught about "civics" in school since many schools in Africa do not include such material. The effect of education is more likely to be a consequence of literacy, which increases access to information. I suspect that it is also due in part, as Hyman and Sheatsley suggest,[32] to the fact that students are encouraged to be aware and critical of the world around them.

In the Ghanaian case, there are relatively strong bivariate correlations (Pearson's *r*) between education and the three types of information identified in the three scales. The correlation is strongest ($r = .56$) with the identification of boundaries which, of the three scales, is most likely to be a consequence of formal education as opposed to what Lane and Sears called life knowledge.

One striking finding is that when all the other demographic variables are controlled in a multiple regressional analysis, the correlations with education, while still significant, drop markedly, suggesting that other variables serve as functional equivalents of formal education in imparting political information (see Table 9). The data also suggest that too much importance may have been attributed in the literature to the role of formal education in the socialization process. What is usually measured in Western nations is the effects of increasing amounts of education. In the underdeveloped areas of the world we have the opportunity to compare educated individuals with those who do not have formal education but who *are educated* as a result of their life experiences. Our inability to focus on those without formal education in the West, largely because it is almost impossible to get a large sample of individuals without formal education, may lead us to attribute to formal education changes which really result from other experiences. In addition to normal life experiences in Africa (and much of the underdeveloped world), there is also the effect of the oral transmission of history and tradition.

Age has a moderate negative correlation, ($r = -.31$) with political information, indicating that younger individuals tend to be better informed than their elders.[33] We would expect part of this relationship to be accounted for by education, especially since the number of school places per capita were very limited, until relatively recently, even in Ghana which was a pioneer in mass education in Africa.[34] This expectation is borne out when we look at the partial correlations from the regression analysis. The correlations here drop markedly, and only the relationship between political knowledge and age remains significant. Thus, while there is still evidence of greater political information among younger Ghanaians (eighteen years of age and older), the extent of the difference in level by age cohort is not very great.

In his very interesting sketch of Balgat, Turkey, Daniel Lerner[35] stressed the role of mobility in changing the level of national consciousness. "Balgat Revisited" was a very different place from Balgat of the past, in large part because a road had been built through it, bringing it into close contact with national political life. One would expect that experience outside one's home town (in the Ghanaian case measured by whether the respondent had ever lived in another village or town) would broaden horizons if only because of contacts with other people and different life styles. It was thus expected that geographic mobility would have a strong correlation with the information variables in Ghana. Although the bivariate correlations are significant they are much lower than expected (other indices of mobility such as length of residence in town or village, are even lower). When other demographic variables were controlled, only

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termined by population. Economic position was estimated by the interviewers on the basis of an established set of criteria. Accurate measures of economic position are difficult to obtain in much of Africa since there is general suspicion that any information volunteered will be used to assess taxes or other levies. Ethnic groups were coded non-northern, northern, etc. The largest group in the northern sample was Dagomba. The largest southern ethnic groups in the sample were Akuapem, Shai, Ashanti, and Fanti.

[30] Education was coded on the basis of amount of schooling, ranging from none through college. Age was coded by age cohort. Sex was coded female–male. Urban was coded rural–urban. Mobility was operationalized on the basis of whether or not respondents have lived in other villages or towns for a year or more. A positive response was taken as an indication of mobility.

[31] For example: Lane and Sears, *Public Opinion*, p. 62; Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "The Current Status of American Public Opinion" in *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, ed. Daniel Katz et al., (New York: Dryden Press, 1954), pp. 35–36; Donald Devine, *The Attentive Public*, pp. 58–59.

[32] Hyman and Sheatsley, pp. 35–37.

[33] In *Public Opinion*, p. 612, Lane and Sears report the same pattern in the United States.

[34] In 1965, Ghana ranked sixth in level of literacy in independent Africa south of the Sahara, although in the middle decile range in terms of percentage literate. See Donald G. Morrison et al., eds., *Black Africa; A Comparative Handbook* (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 70.

[35] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, chap. 1.

the relationship between mobility and identification of Ghana's boundaries remains significant at the .05 level or better, and that correlation is very low indeed ($r = .14$). While this does not falsify the assertion that mobility affects the level of information, it certainly calls for a careful reexamination of this relationship.

Most studies of women and politics have shown that women are less interested in politics than men.[36] The data from Table 8 tends to support this assumption. We also know, however, that in most cases once socioeconomic variables (in particular, education) are partialled out, the difference by sex largely disappears. In the Ghanaian case, controlling for the other demographic variables somewhat reduces the relationship between sex and level of political information. Nonetheless, the correlation is strong enough ($r = .27$) to suggest that women in Ghana are generally less well informed than men even when they are of comparable socioeconomic position.[37]

In most of Africa, urban centers are much more closely tied in with national political life and the outputs of government than are rural areas. They are generally multiethnic, have very mobile populations and are often centers of education. It was anticipated that the correlations between political information and urban residence would be relatively high. There is a moderate bivariate association ($r = .28$ and .29 respectively) between urban residence and both knowledge and identification of ethnic groups (see Table 8). Such information is more likely to be imparted in an urban than a rural context. There is, however, almost no relationship between urban residence and knowledge of the geographic area of the country. When the demographic variables are controlled, the associations between urbanization and information become even weaker (Table 9).

The demographic variables taken together account for 37 per cent of the variance for political knowledge with a multiple correlation coefficient of .60. They "explain" 39 per cent of the variance in the scores for identification of boundaries ($R = .63$). Demographic variables have the weakest collective association with the identification of Ghanaian ethnic groups, accounting for only 22 per cent of the variance with a multiple correlation coefficient of .47.

Table 9. Partial Correlation Coefficients of Demographic Variables and Information Scales

	Political Knowledge	Identification of Boundaries	Identification of Ethnic Groups
Education	.18	.39***	.18***
Occupation	.06	.00	.01
Age	−.21*	−.11*	−.05
Mobility	.13	.14**	.03
Size town	−.09	.01	.04
Sex	−.27**	−.21***	−.14**
Economic position	−.02	.01	.01
Urban	.20*	.01	.10*
Ethnic Group			
Northern	−.06	−.09	−.01
Ewe	−.10	.02	−.11*
Southern	−.03	−.03	−.07
	$R = .60$	$R = .63$	$R = .47$
	$R^2 = .37$	$R^2 = .39$	$R^2 = .22$
	Signif. level $= < .0001$ ($N = 115$)	Signif $= < .0001$ ($N = 376$)	Signif $= < .001$ ($N = 376$)

* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level
*** Significant at the .001 level.

Sources of Information. In the previous section some of the demographic characteristics of the informed citizen were discussed. Let us now examine the sources of information, asking: Where do people get most of their information? Does it result from personal contacts, the media, government officials, or other sources? What are the dominant sources? Are they national or local in character, personal or impersonal? Of particular importance, what is the relationship between presumed primary sources for the distribution of information about the national political system and the extent to which correct information is imparted?

In terms of the size of the potential audience, we would expect the mass media, in particular the radio, to be one of the major sources of political information. The radio provides, as Frantz Fanon has noted,[38] a means of circumventing the widespread illiteracy which has limited the utility of printed matter. The invention of the transistor coupled with battery power has made the radio both cheap and mobile. Radios are found in almost every village in Ghana. In fact, Ghana has the sixth highest number of radios per 100,000 people in Africa.[39]

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[36] See for example, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 388; Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), pp. 272–76; Elihu Katz and Paul L. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), p. 271.

[37] This corresponds with findings of Campbell et al. in *The American Voter*, p. 485, that in the southern United States women tended to be less politically involved than men, as reflected in voter turnout. In general, however, we find that sex differences are mitigated or disappear when socioeconomic factors are controlled.

[39] Morrison et al., *Black Africa*, p. 78.

I expected newspapers to be a very important source of information in Ghana, both because of the relatively high level of literacy (approximately forty per cent) compared with other African states and the common practice of having a literate person read the newspaper to groups of nonliterates. This phenomenon is common throughout Africa, and one source has estimated that the average copy of a newspaper is read by or for seventy different people.[40] While this figure is probably unusually high, it is not unreasonable to assume that each copy is read by or to at least a dozen people. Expectations about the media were borne out by survey results which showed that 30 per cent of the respondents said that they followed political affairs by listening to the radio only, 3 per cent read newspapers only, and 33 per cent used both, making a total of 63 per cent who were exposed to at least one of these media.

In an attempt to identify the range of sources of political information and the relative dependency on each, respondents were asked: "How do you find out about politics in Ghana?" Multiple responses were possible (see Table 10). While we did not, unfortunately, ask respondents for their major source of information, the responses can reasonably be taken as an indication of the relative importance of each source in that those mentioned came to mind when respondents were asked how they learned about politics.

Table 10. Sources of Political Information[a]

Friends	16%
Chief or elders	8%
Political leaders	9%
Travelers	12%
Mass media	43%[b]
Other	8%
None	12%

($N = 117$)

[a] Total per cent adds up to more than 100 since some respondents listed two sources (either media counted as one).

[b] This total is smaller than that quoted in the text (63%) because respondents listed sources of information generally and may have left out the mass media here while responding yes to a direct question about the media as reported earlier.

The mass media were the most frequently mentioned (43 per cent) source of information. If we add to that total the 9 per cent who depend on political officials (e.g., party leaders, national government officials) we find that more than half of the respondents stated that national figures or individuals working with the nationally owned and controlled media were the source of their information. Only 8 per cent listed traditional leaders (such as chiefs or elders) as the source of their information, suggesting both the limited role of many traditional leaders in informing the populace about national affairs, and the fact that their sources of regular national political information are often little better than those of the average citizen. On the other hand, traditional chiefs in particular, have had generally good access to the national government in Ghana.

Somewhat surprisingly, twelve per cent of the respondents mentioned travelers as their sources. This response came primarily from the two most isolated villages, suggesting the importance of personal contact with informed individuals—contacts which in isolated areas were provided largely by travelers. It should be noted that the designation traveler does not include individuals in the other categories who might also travel, but refers to "strangers" and traders. In many villages the exchange of information with travelers is highly institutionalized. Travelers who stop in a village are expected to greet the chief (usually in the presence of some elders). This meeting normally includes an exchange of news. An elder or the chiefdom speaker recites what has transpired in the village recently, and the traveler in turn is expected to tell them about what was happening elsewhere.

Respondents were asked if they had been taught about government in school. Seventeen per cent (slightly less than half of those with some education) said that they had had some political education in the schools. The low level of political education indicated by these responses is somewhat surprising given the efforts of various governments to raise the level of political awareness, but is certainly indicative of their lack of success.

Respondents regarded the sources noted above as important and influential contributors to their knowledge of Ghanaian politics. Is there a relationship between individual sources and the extent to which individuals are informed about major political actors and the national government? While it is difficult to know precisely what was imparted from contacts with different types of sources of political information, we can gain some idea by examining the relationship between the sources cited by the respondent and the accuracy of the respondent's political information. The bivariate relationships between sources of information[41] and level of correct information (shown in Table 11) give us some idea of the accuracy by type of information. It is clear that with the exception of identification of boundaries, there is very little relationship between sources of information and level of information. While information may be imparted by these contacts, either it is not accurate or it is related to subjects other than major political organizations and actors, the nature of the state, or its people.

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[40] Reported by one distributor of the *East African Standard* in Kenya as quoted in William Hatchen, *Muffled Drums: The News Media in Africa* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1971), p. 211.

[41] The sources of information were coded no (0) yes (1). The political information scales were coded from low to high scores.

Table 11. Bivariate Relationships Between Information Variables and Sources of Political Information

	Political Knowledge	Identification of Boundaries	Identification of Ethnic Groups
Radio	.13	.14	.23*
Newspaper	.20	.46***	.21*
School Civics	.28	.47***	.14
Friends	−.20	−.02	−.07
Chief	−.29	.15	−.15
Leaders	.00	.21*	−.06
Others	.14	−.28**	−.10
	(N=27)[a]	(N=116)	(N=116)

[a] Because the political knowledge question and the source of information question were on different schedules asked of only one third of the sample, the number of respondents who answered both schedules was very small.

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

*** Significant at the .001 level.

Utilizing multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship between various sources and the boundary and ethnic identification scales,[42] (see Table 12) we can see that only 9 per cent (R=.31) of the variance in level of political information is explained by these sources for the identification of ethnic groups and 45 per per cent (R=.67) is explained for the identification of boundaries. In the latter case, the partials suggest that newspaper reading and civics classes in schools are the major contributors to information about boundaries. We would expect this particular type of political information to be most highly affected by formal or "book" learning.

Table 12. Partial Correlation Coefficients of Information Variables and Sources of Political Information

	Identification of Boundaries	Identification of Ethnic Groups
Radio	−.04	.12
Newspaper	.42***	.09
School Civics	.37***	.07
Friends	−.02	−.10
Chief	.26**	−.11
Leaders	.19*	−.04
Others	−.20*	−.08
	R=.67	R=.31
	R^2=.45	R^2=.09
	Signif= <.0001	Signif=.141
	(N=116)	(N=116)

* Significant at the .05 level

** Significant at the .01 level

*** Significant at the .001 level.

Examination of level of information indicates only a limited association between source of information and accuracy or level of information, with the exception of knowledge of the general geographic outlines of the nation (which is attributed primarily to formal education). The findings suggest that the sources of political information are generally diffuse, highly idiosyncratic (in terms of such things as travel, nature of education, and interest) and not tied to specific types of contacts or single information sources like the radio or traditional leaders.

Political Information, Political Attitudes and Political Actions

We have looked at the extent to which Ghanaians are informed about various aspects of politics and the state and have seen that in many areas Ghanaians are quite well informed about political affairs. What, if any, relationship exists between political information and political attitudes and activity? Are informed citizens more active? Do they feel more competent politically than the poorly informed? Are they more supportive of the system? In short, does political information have an effect on the political system, or is it unrelated to political attitudes and acts? In order to get at these questions the three information scales were correlated with a number of variables tapping a variety of political dimensions.

Moderate to strong associations can be seen in Table 13 between political information and a number of variables which suggest support for the political system. There are moderate relationships between the information scales and national political integration[43] and between two of the infor-

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[42] The N for the political knowledge scale is too small (N=27) to permit confidence in the results of multiple regression analysis running sources against the political knowledge scale.

[43] The information variables are treated as independent variables in this section. Since most of the dependent variables are not based on interval data, a lower-order correlation, Gamma, is used. The integration scale was based on responses to the following questions: Do you feel that what the national government does is important? When government does something with which you disagree, do you feel responsible? Does the government stand for methods and ideals you value? Given your conception of the ideal poli-

Table 13. Correlations Between Political Information Scales, Selected Attitudinal Variables and Voting

	Information Scales		
	Political Knowledge	ID Bounds	ID Ethnic
Political Integration	.47*	.21**	.44*
No conflict between traditional and national authority	.73**	.05	.37***
Political competence	.18	.29**	.32***
Government helpful	.16	.32**	.21*
Present government better	.36*	.38***	.10
Prefer national control of local government	.38**	.07	.49*
One party state opposed	.54*	.34*	.27*
Opposition useful	.26	−.05	.30***
Politicians look after themselves	.52*	.19	−.05
Voted in last election	.16	.01	−.03
	(N=115)	(N=376)	(N=376)

(Correlations are Gammas)
* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level
*** Significant at the .001 level

mation scales and feelings that national and traditional allegiances are not in conflict.[44] There are significant relationships between two of the information variables, political competence[45] and, the feeling that government has been generally helpful.[46] The political knowledge and identification of boundaries scales also have a moderate association with regime support (as opposed to system)—that is, the current regime (at the time of the survey, Busia's Progress Party Government) was felt to be better than previous governments. The question was: How does the present government differ from previous governments? Finally, there is a clear association between both the political knowledge and ethnic identification scales on the one hand and a desire for national control of local governments on the other. The question was: Should local government be controlled by national government? While a preference for national control of local government is only tangentially related to system support, it does indicate that relative to other political authorities, the national government is preferred as the administrator or agent in local political affairs.[47]

These associations suggest that the informed citizen is more likely to feel politically competent, to identify with the national government, and to believe that the national government makes a positive contribution to his or her life. These findings also suggest that the strategy of the Ghanaian government, which was designed to increase citizen knowledge through civic information dissemination programs in the hope of raising citizen commitment and competence, may well have been efficacious.

Given the significant relationship between level of information and positive attitudes about the national government, is there a corresponding relationship between political information and political activity? The only participation variable on which individual data were gathered was voting. Thus our conclusions regarding information and political activity must be regarded as somewhat incomplete. Nonetheless, since voting is usually the major operational variable for measuring participation in much of political science literature, it is not without precedent to focus on voting as an indicator of political participation.[48] Sixty-seven per cent of the respondents said they had voted.

It was hypothesized that the relationship between voting and political information (especially political knowledge) would be strong, i.e., that those who were informed would be the most likely to register to vote, follow political events, and feel that it was important to express their preferences

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tical system, are we getting closer to this ideal government? Each respondent was scored zero through four. For a more detailed discussion of the scale, coding, and methods see Fred Hayward, "Correlates of National Political Integration: The Case of Ghana," *Comparative Political Studies*, 7 (July, 1974), 165–192.

[44] The question asked respondents was: Does loyalty to the nation conflict with your loyalty to your ethnic or traditional group, your chief or local leaders?

[45] The political competence scale is based on the following questions: 1) Suppose a law was being considered by government that you thought unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do? 2) In such a case, is it likely that you would actually try to do something about it? 3) Have you ever done anything like that? This scale (like the other scales used here) is a summated rating scale with respondents scored on the basis of "correct" responses or those indicating the presence or absence of the particular characteristic, in this case responses reflecting a sense of competence. Scores ranged from zero to three.

[46] Respondents were asked: Have you dealt with any of the following agencies, their officials or representatives? (list followed). Have you found them helpful? This item is based on responses to the last question.

[47] The major reason cited for the preference for national control was extensive corruption at the local level. While the national government was certainly not immune to this phenomenon, its record was better than that of most local councils. There was also a feeling among respondents that the national government had more resources which would be made available to local areas by such a shift in control.

[48] Lester Milbrath, in his summary study of participation, notes that participation as measured by voting is the most thoroughly researched of all political behavior, partly because of its frequency and the ease of quantification. As Milbrath notes, however, many other aspects of participation warrant further study. See Lester Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), esp. chap. 1.

by voting. The election which had preceded the survey by a little more than six months had been hotly contested so that issues and preferences were expected to have meaning at the local level. Open-ended interviews in the villages confirmed that they had. Let us look at the voting process in Ghana.

Voting is not mandatory in Ghana, nor is there a law requiring voter registration by all citizens. Furthermore, going to the polls often requires considerable effort. It is not unusual for villagers to have to walk two to five miles to reach the polling places and in many cases they then have to wait hours in long lines (often in the hot sun) before they can vote. These problems were not unique to this election, but a regular feature of voting in Ghana. Among the most frequent reasons given by respondents for nonvoting were lack of knowledge, the distance to the polling station, long lines, or the weather. For these reasons, it was felt that the less-informed citizen would be less likely to go to the trouble of voting than the well-informed person. As can be seen in Table 13 this assumption was not correct, since there is practically no relationship between voting and any of the information variables. While a slight relationship (Gamma = .16) exists between political knowledge and voting it is too small to be meaningful and is not statistically significant. Thus while political information has an effect on attitudes about support for the system, it does not have a corresponding effect on participation as reflected in voting.

Several factors may explain the lack of relationship between voting and political information. The communal nature of much of rural African society may result in strong pressures for individuals to vote, whether they are informed or not, especially when exhortations by party organizers further encourage them to go to the polls. In addition, the holiday atmosphere in many areas on election day makes voting an event not to be missed. The actual process of voting for some people may well be secondary to the chance to relax, socialize, listen to music, dance, and greet friends from neighboring villages who have been brought together by the occasion of an election.

The data also suggest that there are significant relationships between political information and democratic norms as exemplified by opposition to a one-party state and (in the case of the ethnic identification scale) by feelings that a political opposition was useful.[49] This finding suggests that those who were aware of the diversity of ethnic groups in Ghana also felt that it was important that there be mechanisms for expressing opposition to government policies. In some respects, these data could also be interpreted as a further demonstration of system support, since the government in power at the time of the survey was democratic. Furthermore, the Ministry of Information and especially the Centre for Civic Education had been emphasizing the importance of democratic values and contrasting these values with the excesses of the Convention People's Party under the one-party state. This is not to suggest that free speech, fear of repression, and political competition are merely functions of government propaganda. During the work in Ghana, I was continually struck by the frequent and unsolicited statements from respondents about their appreciation of the freedoms which existed at that time, as opposed to the fear engendered during the worst years of repression and detention under Nkrumah. The comments by some workers interviewed in Northern Ghana are a typical example. "In the past we could not meet like this. If you had come before [under the Nkrumah regime] we would have gone into the bush. Now we know we have the right to meet. Before, the government was the work of one man. Now we know our rights."[50]

Finally, these data suggest some potentially serious costs to those in power that arise from having a well-informed public. Where wrongdoing, inefficiency, inequities, and other problems exist, they will come to the attention of informed citizens. If public officials do not live up to public ideals about proper behavior, knowledge of such activities can lead to cynicism, alienation, and conflict. Although Ghanaians generally supported the national political system, they gave evidence of some cynicism which under adverse conditions could increase in scale and import. Respondents were asked whether they agreed, disagreed or had no opinion about the statement: Most politicians are looking out for themselves above all else. Seventy-three per cent of the total sample thought that this was the case, while only twenty-four per cent said no. Respondents who were better informed tended to be more cynical than those who were less informed. The correlation between the political knowledge scale and cynicism about political leaders is .52. There is little association with other information variables. It is likely that these responses represent more than a disposition to mistrust the motives of politicians since the historical precedent for cynicism is certainly evident. Ghanaians have experienced corruption for a very long time. There have been a number of trials for corruption, bribery, misuse of office and public funds. A very high proportion of those charged were found guilty, and although the bringing of charges grew out of the military coup, the charges themselves were usually very well substantiated. Cynicism not only has a basis in fact, it also has important political consequences both in expressing a recognition of the divergence from the ideal and in suggesting that the honest, public-spirited politician may have difficulty being believed or trusted.

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[49] The questions were: What purposes does an opposition party serve? (coded as indicating "useful," "not useful"). Do you think the country would be run differently if there were a one-party state? (coded as "better," "same," "worse").

[50] Interviewer notes made by the author, northern Ghana, March 1970.

Conclusion

Contrary to conventional wisdom which suggests that the masses in Africa (and much of the rest of the underdeveloped world) are politically ignorant, the majority of Ghanaians (to the extent that this sample is typical) are politically aware. These findings suggest that widely held assumptions about the political ignorance of the masses in underdeveloped areas in general should be seriously questioned if not rejected.

The relatively high level of political information in Ghana is particularly striking when we recall that Ghana became a political entity fairly recently as a result of European occupation and division of Africa in the late 1800s. Indeed, its current geographic and ethnic demarcation was completed only in the mid-1950s just prior to independence. As in most of Africa, this geographic entity was delimited with little knowledge of or concern for existing societies and political units. A number of important traditional societies were divided by national boundaries. Furthermore, the spread of information was hampered by poor roads, inefficient systems of communication, limited educational opportunities, foreign control of the political process until 1957, limited political participation prior to that time, and frequent and fundamental changes in the structure of the political process during the last twenty years.[51]

Political Information: Modernized vs. Nonmodernized Societies. An understanding of the implications of the relatively high level of political information in Ghana (and, I suspect, of much of the rest of Africa) warrants a reexamination of some of the assumptions about the characteristics of the informed public. One of these assumptions is the comparative one that since the level of political information is low in the United States and Western Europe.[52] in spite of modern efficient communications systems, high levels of education, great geographic mobility, and so on, it is only reasonable to assume that relatively nonmodernized societies will be even less informed. In lamenting the low level of political information in the United States and Western Europe, David Sears makes this point when he notes, "One possible implication is that, unsatisfactory as it is [i.e., the low level of information in the United States], this level represents some kind of upper limit of public attentiveness in relatively peaceful mass democracies."[53] One assumes that any deviation from a relatively peaceful condition or from democratic norms would only lower the level of information in the United States. Hyman and Sheatsley, writing in the 'fifties, noted: "In almost every instance where the polls have tested public information, at least twenty per cent of the population have revealed complete ignorance."[54] In the Ghanaian data, where there are comparable figures, the level of information in Ghana is similar to, or in one case slightly higher than, that in the United States. In spite of the higher level of education in the United States, sophisticated communications systems, high geographic mobility, and other factors which facillitate the flow of information, the level of information in the United States *does not* appear to represent an upper limit on public attentiveness.

These findings suggest that we need to be less ethnocentric in assessing comparative political phenomena and in defining the high end of continua in terms of Western industrialized nations. They demonstrate the need to pay particular attention to political systems in the *Third World* since their experiences are often very different from our own. The findings also suggest that it would be useful to do more thinking about the implications and meaning of different types of political information. What kind of information is useful for what purposes? Perhaps the findings about knowledge of one's representative in the United States are indicative of the historical evolution and growth of presidential power in the twentieth century coupled with the decline in the power of Congress. It may be that political contacts are not as important in Western nations as they are in the

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[51] After a brief period of open party competition at the time of independence, the regime became a virtual one-party state under Nkrumah with harsh political control of the opposition. In 1966, a coup d'état brought in the government of the National Liberation Council. In 1969 government was returned to civilian rule, competitive elections were held and a Progress Party Government formed. There was another coup in 1972 ushering in a period of military rule.

[52] Almond and Verba compared the level of information in the United States with that in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico in terms of respondents' ability to name party leaders and ministers. Respondents in the United States were highest in both categories. *The Civic Culture*, pp. 95–96.

[53] David O. Sears, "Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2nd. ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), V, 328.

[54] Hyman and Sheatsley, "The Current Status of American Public Opinion," p. 36.

Third World—if only because the margins between subsistence and starvation are much narrower. Or, perhaps there is a greater basis for political community in nations like Ghana than in highly industrialized and technological societies like the United States because the populace in the Third World nations is less atomized, alienated, rootless, and privatized.

Exposure to Information and Level of Information. We know there is greater exposure to political information in modernized than in nonmodernized societies. We know from studies in the United States[55] that low exposure to information usually is reflected in very low levels of political information. If this finding is generalizable outside the the United States, where exposure is comparatively lower levels of information in Ghana, where exposure of the general populace is limited, than in the United States, where exposure is comparatively much greater. Since this does not seem to be the case, further exploration is necessary.

The difference may well be explained by the greater salience of politics for Ghanaians than for respondents in the West. The most important reason for the greater salience of national politics is probably the growing awareness that, for better or worse, the national government is going to play *the* major role in economic development. As such, it is the likely source of, or impediment to, more schools, water systems, hospitals and dispensaries, roads, electricity, improved agriculture, industrial growth, and other important outputs that affect the lives of the populace. Therefore what is done in the name of government often "demands" attention.

Another explanation of the relatively high level of information in spite of limited exposure is that Ghanaians have not become saturated (or supersaturated) with information or dulled by attempts to impart information. In Ghana, unlike the United States, individuals are not massively assaulted by information sources vying for their attention. Not only is less information presented, there are also fewer competing types of information and of entertainment (such as magazines, newspapers, movies, television) which can distract from the political message. For example, when national officials or politicians visit rural constituents the event is much more of an occasion than in the United States. It is not something which can be seen regularly on television, it is not crowded out by a favorite soap opera, country-western program, football game, or movie of the week. I certainly do not mean to suggest that all information imparted in Ghana is received. What I am suggesting is that the event creates a context in which the possibility of reception is increased because one has the attention of the individual. Attention does not guarantee knowledge.[56] It is *the importance* of politics to the individuals' well being that makes reception likely.

Compliance and the Informed Populace. Most governments disseminate information in the belief that the informed citizen will comply with the directives of the government. While in most societies, ignorance is not an excuse for noncompliance, few governments act as if that assertion were a sufficient deterrent to noncompliance. It is usually assumed that if a citizen is informed, his or her response is more likely to be in accord with government directives than if the citizen is uninformed.

The potential difficulties posed by uninformed individuals are indicated by the experience of government officials in one isolated Ghanaian village. The population of this village was basically oblivious of the national government. When a government official arrived on a motorcycle to urge them to expand their agricultural production, they were polite, but mystified. They listened to the official with respect since he was clearly important (he had come on a machine). They agreed that they would follow his advice, poured libations to celebrate the plan to increase their plantings, and once he left continued as before. In this case the cost of noncompliance to the success of the government's plan was small. Had the government decided to force the villagers to increase production it would have been greater. In cases like the control of cocoa diseases, the government of Ghana has been willing to use force. For the most part the threat is sufficient if other methods fail. There is a pool of information about the government in most cocoa areas which allows individuals to interpret and predict government actions. In the isolated village, however, there was no equivalent pool of information, and the cost of threats to use force might have brought tragic and unintended results. While the informed citizen is by no means necessarily the compliant citizen, it seems likely that compliance will be greater among the informed on issues which are perceived as vital to the government (and thus subject to serious sanctions for noncompliance).

Although we usually assume that information is "neutral," that individuals may accept or reject attitudes and messages intended for them, my findings suggest that the informed citizen may well also be inclined to be compliant. As we have seen in the last section, those individuals with high levels of information tended to be more closely tied to government. They were more likely to have high levels of integration, feel competent politically, and have positive attachments to the regime in power than were those with low levels of information. Clearly, along with information about government, some cues were imparted about how one should act and about rewards for such action. While the cognitions and attitudes tapped in the survey are not measures of compliance, it seems reasonable to assume that those who are well informed are more likely to act in accord with government wishes than those with little or no information at all.

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[55] Sears, "Political Behavior," pp. 315–458; David O. Sears and Richard E. Whitney, *Political Persuasion* (Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1973), p. 7.

[56] Devine, *The Attentive Public*, p. 35.

The Ignorant Masses—Targets for Subversion. Much of the concern about the "ignorant masses" stems from the fear that the masses of Africa, Asia, and the Americas will be subverted by evil forces out to serve their own ends.[57] As Katz and Lazarsfeld have noted, those who held this view saw ". . . an atomistic mass of millions of readers, listeners and movie-goers prepared to receive the Message; and secondly, they pictured every Message as a direct and powerful stimulus to action which would elicit immediate response."[58] John Mecklin, writing about his experience with the United States Information Service and about the Vietnamese, suggests that "the knowledge of an illiterate man is limited to what he has himself experienced or heard. His mind is untrained and therefore atrophies like the shriveled leg of a polio victim. . . . His power of reason, the greatest of nature's gifts to mankind, develops only slightly beyond the level of an American six-year old."[59] The masses are thus potentially easy pawns for those who would use them.

The notion of a *tabula rasa* contradicts what we know about much of the world[60] and what has been presented here about Ghana. It is hard to believe that the turmoil in Asia would have made individuals less politically aware or that life experiences would not have expanded their minds. What we do know is that the masses in Ghana are far from ignorant—in fact, in some areas they are better informed than the masses in the West. It is thus not likely to be ignorance that would result in their subversion.

An equally important flaw in the ignorance subversion model is the assumption that messages imparted will be received as a basis for action. Most evidence on the effects of propaganda and information suggests that the public is very resistant to such efforts.[61] It seems much more likely that people become receptive to ideas about changing the existing political system because it has failed. The notion of the gullibility of the ignorant masses assumes that there is no substitute for formal education (i.e., that experience with government officials, corruption, and repression do not count) and that people are unable to make judgments about who has been helping them or what might be of benefit. The masses of the African nations in which I have worked do not live in a vacuum—though they might be without formal schooling. Their attitudes about the national government are much more likely to reflect experience and information than ignorance.

The Informed Citizen as the "Good Citizen." Much of the concern about the level of political information has emanated from the belief that the informed citizen is the "good citizen," and the uninformed citizen, at least by implication, is the bad citizen. As Hyman and Sheatsley put it: "In the absence of information, the public would be expected to have little competence for national decisions and to fall easy prey to emotional symbols, and to a great extent this is true."[62] They suggest that "an ideal public would certainly be familiar with the name and duties of its office holders and would be well informed about their actions."[63] Most of those who examine the level of political information have expressed concern about the amount of political ignorance in both modernized and non-modernized societies. Some have gone as far as to suggest that the uninformed should not be allowed to participate in political affairs[64]—others that the fact that most do not is beneficial.[65]

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[57] One can see this theme in John Mecklin, *Mission in Torment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), and Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments."

[58] Katz and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence*, p. 16.

[59] Mecklin, *Mission in Torment*, p. 76. While Mecklin seems to feel that this inability to reason aided the Viet Cong it did not help the USIS, primarily, he suggests, because the Diem government was so corrupt. One wonders why this corruption was clear to an atrophied mind when the Viet Cong horrors he mentions were not.

[60] This sense of mass awareness is beautifully portrayed in John Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1968) and in Carlo Levi's novel *Christ Stopped at Eboli* (New York: Noonday, 1947). Even in studies like that of Almond and Verba which show that the level of political ignorance in many areas is surprisingly high, it is clear that respondents do have ideas about politics, political values, and goals. Their areas of ignorance are much more likely to reflect lack of interest and the low salience of politics than a need for external stimulation or organization.

[61] See for example, Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, Harold H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953); Katz and Lazarsfeld, *The People's Choice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

[62] Hyman and Sheatsley, "The Current Status of American Public Opinion," p. 37.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[64] This is certainly the implication of the PDCI official's statement quoted in the introduction.

[65] Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee suggest in *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a*

Most of the concern about the level of public information about politics has been focused on representative government and the impact of mass participation and competition on stability and rational decision making. As noted earlier, however, noncompetitive governments are also very concerned with the dispersion of information felt to be important to the citizenry. In both the competitive and noncompetitive state it is assumed that the informed citizen will be the good citizen in the sense that information will be used to reach intelligent rational decisions. Without defining "intelligent" or "rational" decisions, let us look at some possibilities and implications of what it means to be an informed citizen in the Ghanaian context. At the time of the survey, Ghana had a competitive political system. Elections had been held recently, most parliamentary seats were actively contested by a number of political parties, and there was general consensus that (with a few minor exceptions) the election had been fair. A number of agencies were involved in the dissemination of information including the Ministry of Information, the Centre for Civic Education, the public and private media, the parties, a variety of pressure groups, and interested citizens.

The data which have been presented suggest several possible interpretations of the meaning of "informed citizen," as well as some interesting possible implications of an informed citizenry under differing conditions. None of these possibilities is presented as definitive, since a great deal more research is needed on the relationship between political information, attitudes and actions.

A good deal of evidence suggests that the informed citizen in Ghana is inclined to feel both politically competent and generally satisfied with the political system and government policy. We have seen that high levels of information are associated with a sense of political competence, high levels of national integration, opposition to the one-party state, confidence that national government and traditional societies are not fundamentally in conflict, and preference for the incumbent regime over previous ones. Where governments are responsive to the needs of the populace, where there is general feeling that government is doing as much as it can given its resources,[66] where there seems to be an opportunity for various segments of the nation to be fairly represented in government, we would expect the kinds of responses we found in Ghana. It should be added that at the time of the survey the government did meet, or could reasonably be expected to meet these expectations. One also suspects that the general feeling of satisfaction reflected a period of grace extended to the new government by a populace weary of the Nkrumah regime.

Another interpretation of these data might suggest that the general level of satisfaction reflected in the more informed respondents was not a consequence of citizen reaction to government policies, but rather illustrates that the informed benefit (or expect to benefit) more than others because they know how to deal with government and gain the greatest possible benefits from its services. If this model is correct, we would anticipate that informed respondents would be economically better off. As we have seen earlier, there is very little association between level of information and economic position. The economic situation in Ghana does not permit the government to distribute economic benefits in a way that would significantly increase *income* for the informed masses. On the other hand, there are many other benefits, like education for one's children, which would not be reflected in economic position.

Finally, satisfaction among the informed public might be a consequence of reception of government cues that the masses should be satisfied.[67] It may be that the positive orientations toward the government are reflections of the response to authority, rather than the result either of government policy or of feelings that the political system has responded to popular desires and demands as much as possible. Certainly this interpretation would explain the lack of significant associations between income and information and voting and information, as well as the moderate association between information and the feeling that the national government and its agencies was helpful.

My own view is that all three of these factors are operative in Ghana. All of them are compatible with the data. At the time of the survey the great expectations about the prospects for both democratic government and economic development clearly contributed to a feeling or expectation of government responsiveness to the citizenry. Governmental responsiveness was also the message be-

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Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954) that reduced participation of the uninterested benefits the system by aiding stability and also provides maneuvering room for political change—change often possible primarily because of indifference. (See especially pp. 314–15.)

[66] Seventy-one per cent of the respondents agreed with that statement, 23 per cent disagreed, and 6 per cent said that they did not know.

[67] In his superb study of politics and symbolism, Murray Edelman suggests that "... individuals' positions on public issues are mobilizable rather than fixed; that government activities are themselves potent influence upon change and mobilization of public attitudes; and that the significant 'outputs' of political activities are not particular public policies labeled as political goals, but rather the creation of political followings and supports: i.e., the evocation of arousal or quiescence in mass publics." See *Politics as Symbolic Action* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co. 1971), p. 4.

ing proclaimed by the government and especially the semi-independent Centre for Civic Education.[68] Most respondents clearly felt that they would benefit more under the new regime than under the previous regimes. Those who were politically aware were likely to feel these prospects more keenly. Finally, the message of the government, the parties, most civic leaders, and so on, was that the prospects were good for Ghana in 1970. Thus many who had no tangible evidence that this was the case may nonetheless have felt that it was true.

One other interesting finding warrants further comment: the relationship between information and cynicism about politicians. As noted in the last section, the higher the level of political knowledge, the higher the level of cynicism about politicians in Ghana—despite the generally high level of political satisfaction. It is certainly to be expected that where politicians are self-interested, corrupt, ineffective and unresponsive, the informed will be aware of this and be cynical about them. The level of cynicism in Ghana in 1970 may reflect experiences of this sort in the past, or reservations about the good intentions of politicians in the new government. In either case, the relatively strong association between high levels of information and cynicism even in the context of general satisfaction with the national government indicates several important consequences of an informed public. Where the public is not as satisfied as it was in Ghana we would expect the level of cynicism to be very high or to increase. This in turn could lead to instability, alienation, and noncompliance. Governments might respond by trying to reduce the amount of information reaching the citizen. In the short run such actions could only be ineffective, since the knowledge leading to cynicism had already been imparted. More important, it is unlikely that any such actions in Africa would be very effective either in the short or long run. Greatly reducing the amount of information is likely to raise public suspicion about what is going on. In any case, given the large number of states in Africa, their diverging ideologies, the range of radio transmissions, and the difficulty of controlling information crossing borders, it is unlikely that any African nation could succeed in eliminating the transmission of information contrary to that which it wishes its populace to receive. Furthermore, few nations have the equipment or have made a major effort to control outside sources of information. It is true that almost every African nation has censored or controlled local media at various times. In some states laws have been passed against rumors and lies. Ethiopia has even jammed broadcasts from Somalia. Nonetheless, these efforts have had little effect in controlling the flow of information.

This suggests that in African nations (like Ghana) with relatively high levels of information, the populace will be aware of the nature and effectiveness of their governments. Those governments which benefit few of their citizens, while being able to cue some of the citizenry about the "necessity" and "patriotic duty" of support, will pay a high cost for an informed citizenry. In spite of the advances in the nature of weaponry in the modern age, it seems unlikely that those who govern can escape the consequences of an informed and potentially active populace. While the consequences may be minimal in the short run, the long-term results may well be revolutionary.

Appendix: The Sample

This paper is based on material gathered in Ghana by the author during a study of national integration in 1970. Approximately three hundred eighty people were interviewed in a survey conducted in six communities varying in population from several hundred to fifty thousand. Five of the communities were rural, one urban. Two of the samples were in the Northern Region, one in the Volta Region, and three in the Eastern Region. The samples in each village were randomly selected and comprised approximately eight per cent of the adult population. The sample was drawn from randomly selected households after each household in the village/town had been numbered. Two individuals, eighteen years or older, selected by means of a table of random numbers, were interviewed in each of the households in the sample.

The communities studied, it should be emphasized, were not selected randomly. This is a "purposive" sample. Each community was chosen because it had characteristics that I felt reflected a variety of conditions which need to be confronted in studying national integration. On the other hand, care was taken to ensure that these communities also generally represented conditions in Ghana as a whole.[69] The rural villages were all primarily agricultural, relatively stable communities. The urban sample was an administration, trading, and educational center with some light industry. Each rural community was between 10 and 30 miles from a large city, although none was situated on a major road, and the smallest village sampled (250 population) had no road until a few days before the survey.

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[68] For further discussion, see Fred M. Hayward, "Ghana's Experiment with Civic Education."

[69] The demographic characteristics of these communities very closely approximated the national distribution as illustrated by the 1960 census. For example, the occupational breakdown for the sample indicates close similarity with the national figures. The distribution for the sample was: agriculture, 56%; artisan, 3%; technical, 6%; industrial, 4%; business and trade, 12%; professional, 6%; student, 3%; housewife, 10%; other, 1%. This corresponds closely to the overall occupational breakdown for the whole of Ghana in 1960, which (when adjusted to the categories used here) was: agriculture, 49%; artisan, 5%; technical, 4%; industrial, 4%; business and trade, 12%; professional, 2%; student 2%; housewife, 19%; other, 3%; *1960 Population Census of Ghana* (Accra: Government of Ghana, 1962), vol. 1.

The interviews averaged 45 minutes in length. Some took more than an hour and a few as little as 30 minutes. The interviews were structured, although approximately five per cent of the questions were openended. Interviews were carried out in the local language by interviewers trained at the University of Ghana at Legon. All but one of the six interviewers had had previous interviewing experience, and most were familiar with social science interviewing techniques and had previously used quantitative material. Most of the questions used in this paper were asked of all respondents in the sample. Some of the questions, including, those on political knowledge, however, were given to approximately one-third of each sample, which explains the lower *N* shown for some of the data presented. This was done to limit the length of the interview so that it could be completed in one sitting while at the same time allowing a broad enough scope to explore a wide range of interests.

Comment: Further Reassessment of "Conventional Wisdom:" Political Knowledge and Voting Behavior in Rural Kenya*

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In his article, "A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public,"[1] Fred Hayward questions the validity of one of the more pervasive assumptions about political behavior in the new states—that the members of these polities, particularly residents of rural areas, are generally uninformed about the political process, and are consequently incapable of meaningful and rational participation in their countries' political life. Presenting survey data from six Ghanaian communities, Hayward argues that the publics of the new states are much better informed about the political process than heretofore supposed. Indeed, on some dimensions, these publics may be even better informed than the publics of polities regarded as more developed.

Hayward's finding is significant, for it suggests that the members of peasant societies may be far more integrated into the national political systems of their countries than is usually assumed. Peasants residing on the periphery of these societies may in fact be "citizens" of the new nations emerging within their societies' boundaries despite the parochial and traditional settings in which they live. They may be reasonably well linked to central government institutions. They may have well-defined sets of expectations as to how the members of these institutions should behave. And they may participate in the political process in a highly rational manner given their interests as they define them, and the opportunities for such participation which occur in their communities.

Though important and highly suggestive, Hayward's findings, and the argument it supports, need to be buttressed by additional evidence and research, as Hayward himself notes. Hayward's measures of political knowledge are relatively sparse.[2] Most frustrating from the standpoint of this writer is the absence of a more extensive discussion of the relationship between political knowledge and political behavior among his respondents. Hayward explores the relationship in respect to only one aspect of one type of behavior, the frequency of voting in parliamentary elections, and reports that contrary to his expectation, the correlation between political knowledge and whether his respondents voted was very low (.16).

Had Hayward also investigated *how* his respondents had voted, and *why*, he might have discovered that the existence of informed publics on the periphery of the new states is complemented by rational political behavior on the part of these publics, behavior which appears in turn to affect the behavior of those who purport to be political leaders. This possibility can be demonstrated with data obtained from a series of surveys conducted by Professor John J. Okumu and myself in thirteen parliamentary constituencies in rural Kenya in May, 1974[3]—data which confirm Hayward's finding that peasants are highly knowledgeable about some aspects of the political process, and that the "conventional wisdom" needs to be reassessed.

Like Hayward's Ghanaian respondents, a very high proportion of the Kenyan respondents—89 per cent—correctly volunteered the name of their member of parliament when asked who he was.[4] Since our respondents were not queried on the other items through which Hayward measured political knowledge in Ghana, we cannot replicate his summary scale. Given our other findings, we expect the distribution on such a scale would have been similar had this line of questioning been pursued. Equally significant, are the data obtained regarding the role expectations Kenyans hold of their MPs.

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* I am indebted to John J. Okumu of the University of Dar es Salaam for his advice and collaboration on the field research on which this note is based. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments of three colleagues at the University of Iowa: Michael Lewis-Beck, Douglas Madsen, and Donald McCrone. Data for this discussion are derived from a comparative study on the relationships between legislators and their constituents in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey, sponsored by the Comparative Legislative Research Center of the University of Iowa.

[1] Fred M. Hayward, "A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana," *American Political Science Review*, 70 (June, 1976), pp. 433–451.

[2] Hayward presents little or no data on how the members of his sample conceived of the most significant issues which dominated Ghanaian political life at the time of his study, nor of their conceptions of national political institutions and the roles played by various actors in these institutions, nor of the activities through which Ghanaians participate in the political process. Given the vagaries of the research climate in which he worked, most of these omissions may be the result of Hayward's prudence rather than oversight.

[3] An additional survey was conducted in an urban constituency, the findings from which are not our main concern. In all, three hundred adult citizens were sampled in each of the constituencies for a total N of 4,128. Sampling procedures consisted of a random selection of thirty sampling plots a quarter mile in diameter in each constituency followed by the selection of ten respondents within each plot according to quota criteria.

[4] The range across the thirteen rural constituencies was 65 to 99 per cent, while the figure for the one urban con-

When asked which of seven activities they regarded as the most important for their MPs to perform, an overwhelming proportion of the respondents in the thirteen constituencies cited activities which constitute linkages between the publics on the periphery of the political systems of the new states and the central government[5] (see Table 1).

Table 1. Most important activity which Kenyan MPs should perform

Linkage Activities	
Explain government policies to constituents:	7%
Tell government what people in district want:	29
Obtain projects and benefits for the district:	25
Visit district frequently:	11
Non-Linkage Activities	
Take active part in the debates of the National Assembly and pass bills:	5%
Help constituents with their personal problems:	6
Help solve conflicts in the community:	2
TOTAL LINKAGE	71%
TOTAL NON-LINKAGE	13
No answer and don't know	16
N=	(3,828)

The strong belief that MPs should communicate the views of their constituents to the central government and strive to obtain resources for their districts, when coupled with the relatively low incidence of no answers, suggests that the publics of peasant societies not only have a general knowledge of the political process as argued by Hayward, but also a well-defined conception of the roles their political leaders should play.[6] Even more important, these role expectations appear to have been the basis for the respondents' evaluations of their MPs, and their voting decisions when these leaders sought re-election in October, 1974.

The relationship between the respondents' role expectations and their voting decisions is presented in Figure 1 in the form of a causal model explaining the vote received by the eleven MPs of the thirteen representing our sample constituencies who stood for re-election. To construct the model, the percentage of the vote received by these incumbent legislators was regressed on the number of candidates who stood for election in their districts in October, 1974, and on an aggregate evaluation score of the MPs' performance derived from the district surveys. The evaluation scores were computed by taking the rating each respondent accorded his MP for that activity which he had previously said was the most important for his MP to perform. These activities were rated on a three point scale of "Very Active," "Somewhat Active," and "Not Active." The aggregate evaluation score for each district is thus the percentage of respondents in the district who rated their MP as "Very Active" on the activity they regarded as most important.

Upon computing the correlations and path coefficients for the model, we found support for the expectation that the respondents' ability to evaluate MPs according to their role expectations would be related to their voting decisions. As shown by the figure, low evaluations of MP performance result in an increased number of candidates as more and more would-be challengers jump into the race. Virtually all of the challengers are local notables who are in a position to discern voter sentiment accurately, albeit unsystematically. The message to incumbent MPs is clear: either they carry out their duties in conformity with the role expectations of their constituents, or face a stiff challenge at the next election.[7]

The reader will note that the high correlation coefficient for the relationship between the vote received by incumbents and the evaluation scores washes out upon controlling for the number of

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stituency was 56 per cent. Given similar results from our Korean and Turkish surveys, we expect that Hayward would have also reported a higher level of political information on the part of his rural respondents, had he presented separate findings for his urban and rural communities.

[5] Similar results were found in all thirteen constituencies. Moreover, the MPs for these districts also reported that these were the activities on which they spent most of their time. For more on the congruence of the role expectations held by Kenyan constituents and their elected representatives, see Joel D. Barkan and John J. Okumu, "Political Linkage in Kenya," in *Political Parties and Linkage*, ed. Kay Lawson (forthcoming, 1976).

[6] Space does not permit a more extensive presentation of data which demonstrate the delegate roles Kenyan constituents expect their MP to play. Suffice to say Table 1 is but one indication of this expectation.

[7] A detailed discussion on how our respondents arrived at their evaluation of their MPs given their role expectations is beyond the scope of this essay. In brief, high evaluation scores were accorded to those MPs who were most successful at organizing self-help development projects in their constituencies (e.g., schools, health clinics, roads), and/or those who obtained central government assistance for these projects.


Number of "serious" candidates[b] (Aug.–Oct., 1974)
(−.68)[c]
−.64
Percent of total vote received by incumbent (October, 1974)
−.81
(−.81)[d]
.06
(.57)[e]
Incumbent's aggregate rating on evaluation index (May, 1974)

Multiple correlation	.68
Multiple correlation, adjusted for small n[f]	.64
$n=$	11
Significance	.09

[a] Beta weights for model appear without parentheses, while correlation coefficients (Pearson r) appear with parentheses.

[b] "Serious" candidates are those who ultimately received at least 5% of the vote.

[c] Significant at .011.

[d] Significant at .001.

[e] Significant at .034.

[f] J. P. Guilford, *Fundamental Statistics of Psychology and Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 400–401.

Figure 1. Regression model explaining vote received by incumbent Kenyan MPs in election of 1974[a]

candidates in the race. This is, of course, what should occur if the respondents' evaluations determined the size of the election fields, which in turn determined the levels of the incumbents' vote. This indirect effect of the aggregate evaluation scores on the incumbents' vote can be seen by computing the coefficient[8] for the path which is .52 (−.81 × −.64). The finding suggests that residents of the rural areas of developing countries not only evaluate their representatives according to some well-defined criteria of what these representatives should do, but also that their opinions are heard and sometimes heeded!

The foregoing analysis has been made to extend Hayward's argument about the significance of informed publics in the new states by shedding some additional light on the nature of voting behavior in one such society. Given these findings, and Hayward's, citizens living in the rural/traditional sector appear to be more integrated into the national political system, and to be more rational participants in that system than students of political development usually assume. But if these findings are valid, why has such a basic aspect of political life in these countries been so frequently ignored?

The answer lies partly with the paucity of field research on mass political behavior in peasant societies, particularly in Africa, and with the conceptual frameworks students of political development usually bring to bear on their subject. While the first is often a function of research opportunities beyond scholarly control, the second is a function of the questions asked. Given our preoccupation with the development of national political institutions, we usually ask how such institutions, and their personnel might more effectively penetrate the periphery and assimilate the residents of the periphery into the national political system.[9] Rarely do we ask how those on the periphery are already attempting to penetrate the center; rather we ask how national institutions might be created to accommodate increased participation when it occurs. Because central political institutions in these societies are often fragile, and cannot accommodate such participation, it is assumed that little occurs on the periphery that is conducive to the development of the national system. Put differently, we tend to view political development as a "top down" phenomenon which begins at the center of the new states, and which is initiated by "modern," i.e., Western-educated people. As the questionable assumptions of the "conventional wisdom" should make painfully clear, we have probably neglected an important part of the story. Perhaps it is time to examine political change more systematically from the "bottom up," by taking a careful look at what is happening on the boundaries *vis-à-vis* the center of these polities.[10]

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[8] For a recent discussion of effect coefficients see Michael Lewis-Beck and Lawrence B. Mohr, "Evaluating Effects of Independent Variables," *Political Methodology* (Winter, 1976).

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[9] To cite but two notable examples of this perspective which have set the course followed by others: Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), and Leonard Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[10] The literature on patron-client relationships in the new states is a start in this direction, though virtually none of this literature presents any data on the nature of the individual attitudes and behavior of those who are a party to such relationships. See John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 411–25; René Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972) 68–90; and James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972), 91–113.

Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy*

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Introduction

When presidential administrations change, uncertainty and tension rise within the American federal bureaucracy. New program priorities and emphases and the introduction of new personnel create some inevitable difficulties of adjustment under the best of circumstances. Politically appointed executives with typically short career spans and often limited experience in bureaucratic politics must learn to come to grips rapidly with the complexities of their jobs.[1] With astonishing quickness they must come to know whom they can trust among their career subordinates; who among them will be cooperative and loyal and who will not.

For their part, senior career executives must discover whether changes at the top of their agencies, divisions, and bureaus imply changes in policy direction and alterations in opportunities for exercising discretion. Further, the career executive must ask himself whether he can continue to function effectively if policy directions change sharply or if administrative relationships are altered drastically. If the answer to these questions is no, what solutions will he seek? Should he step down in order to allow his appointed superiors a freer hand in choosing more compatible subordinates?[2] Or will he attempt to employ the political leverage that comes with long years of experience in nurturing affected interest groups and appropriate congressional committees?[3] The ambience of political change is captured by an official in the Agriculture Department who, according to David Stanley, suggested that new political executives and career administrators" . . . go around sniffing each other like dogs."[4] The American system of government with its fragmented centers of authority provides unusual opportunities for administrators to undermine the initiatives of their political directors, though the risks of doing so are obvious.

All of these tensions within the American federal bureaucracy are exacerbated when a change in the White House is accompanied by a change in partisan control. This is especially true when the changeover is from Democratic to Republican control because of Republican suspicions that the career bureaucracy is heavily infiltrated by Democrats. Thus, the Eisenhower administration came into office determined to weed out large numbers of Democratic bureaucrats and to reclassify a number of administrative positions from civil service status to Schedule "C" or policy-appointive status.[5] The Eisenhower administration, in short, suspected the federal bureaucracy of disloyalty to its own policy preferences. If the administration's rhetoric in this regard ultimately outpaced the scope of its actions, nevertheless, President Eisenhower himself remarked after his first six months in office that, "You could see that there was a very, very great, almost revolutionary activity necessary

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* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois. We are grateful for financial support from the Ford Foundation and the National Science Foundation. Joel Aberbach also wishes to acknowlege assistance from the Institute of Public Policy Studies at The University of Michigan and Bert Rockman acknowledges assistance from a Faculty of Arts and Sciences Grant from the University of Pittsburgh. We also wish to thank Fred Greenstein for his very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript.

[1] For a discussion of the turnover rates of politically appointed executives contrasted with career administrators, see Eugene B. McGregor, Jr., "Politics and the Career Mobility of Bureaucrats," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March, 1974), 24. For a discussion of the adjustments required by newly appointed executives, see Marver H. Bernstein, *The Job of the Federal Executive* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 10–37.

[2] According to Marver Bernstein (p. 60), the select group of career administrators participating in the Round Table he conducted argued "that a political executive ought to have some freedom in changing career executives."

[3] For a general and insightful analysis of the problem of administrative control, see Norton Long, "Power and Administration," *Public Administration Review*, 9 (Autumn, 1949), 257–269.

[4] David T. Stanley, *Changing Administrations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 87.

[5] See Herman Miles Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the Change of Administration," *American Political Science Review*, 48 (March, 1954), 131–151, and Lewis Mainzer, *Political Bureaucracy* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1973), p. 107. In the context of the initial days of the Eisenhower administration, Somers adds (p. 136) that " . . . when the agency heads first arrived they brought with them a profound distrust of the inherited bureaucracy. A frequent complaint was 'I don't know whom I can trust.' "

to pick up where others had left off and to begin again because there were opposing policies and ideas coming in after twenty years of another type of philosophy."[6]

The Nixon administration also came to power suspicious of the existing bureaucracy. The tone of the administration's rhetoric stressed the philosophy of decentralization and substantial curtailment of some of the directions undertaken in the previous eight years of Democratic rule. Moreover, the rhetoric in this case was followed by action. The administration wanted to eviscerate, not merely consolidate, a number of programs advanced in the Johnson years including, for example, many of the programs associated with the "war on poverty." Suspicious of the responsiveness and loyalties of administrators, the Nixon administration's litmus test of loyalty often went beyond even the partisan affiliations of the administrators to rather exacting ideological standards of loyalty.[7]

Documents recently released reveal, in sometimes colorful terms, the high level of mistrust within the Nixon administration toward the federal bureaucracy. In a taped conversation of April 19, 1971, Richard Nixon, himself, lectured George Schultz, then Director of OMB, on the need to enforce bureaucratic discipline.

> You've got to get us some discipline, George. You've got to get it, and the only way you get it, is when a bureaucrat thumbs his nose, we're going to get him. . . . They've got to know, that if they do it, something's going to happen to them, where anything can happen. I know the Civil Service pressure. But you can do a lot there. There are many unpleasant places where Civil Service people can be sent. We just don't have any discipline in government. That's our trouble. Now I'm getting a little around the White House, uh, but we got to get it in these departments. . . . So whatever you—well, maybe he is in the regional office. Fine. Demote him or send him to the Guam regional office. There's a way. Get him the hell out.[8]

This suspiciousness, at least in part, was grounded in the belief that the career civil servants were politically hostile to the Nixon administration. In a manual prepared for political appointees by White House personnel and sarcastically dedicated to the United States Civil Service Commission, the administration's appointees were warned that the career service was politically stacked against the administration: "Because of the rape of the career service by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations . . . this Administration has been left a legacy of finding disloyalty and obstruction at high levels while those incumbents rest comfortably on career civil service status."[9]

Although the thrust of these hostile statements is directed at the career civil servants, the Nixon administration also became increasingly wary of some of its own appointees,[10] and as we will note later, there was some foundation for this attitude.

The conditions making for high levels of tension within the federal bureaucracy, then, were at high tide during the Nixon years. The purpose of this article is to examine clashes of political belief within the federal bureaucracy during the Nixon administration, to investigate the bases of conflicting beliefs, and to discuss the implications of our findings for the future conduct of administrative politics within the executive branch.

The Sample and Data

The data discussed here are drawn from the American segment of a comparative study of bureaucratic and political elites in nine countries.[11] Interviews were conducted in 1970 with 126 administrators from eighteen federal agencies within the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.[12] The administrators all came from agencies whose primary responsibilities are in the domestic policy areas; administrators in defense and foreign affairs agencies were excluded from the sample frame. Officials were stratified by position, and samples were drawn of those formally designated as "political executives" and of career civil servants under civil service jurisdiction with supergrade status (GS 16–18). The response rate was 87.5 per cent, i.e., we interviewed 126 of the 144 administrators contacted.

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[6] Eisenhower Press Conference Transcript, *The New York Times*, July 23, 1953, as quoted in Somers, p. 142.

[7] Witness, for example, the firing of liberal Republican Leon Panetta in early 1970 as Director of the Office of Civil Rights in HEW. It is interesting as well to contrast the administration's firing of Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel and five of his line subordinates with President Eisenhower's genteel handling of his Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, who vociferously opposed the Eisenhower budget in public.

[8] Transcript of April 19, 1971 meeting published in *The New York Times*, July 20, 1974, p. 14.

[9] U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, *Executive Session Hearings*, "Watergate and Related Activities—Use of Incumbency-Responsiveness Program," 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, 1973, Exhibit 35, V. 19, p. 9006. Further, in testimony before the Senate Select Committee, H. R. Haldeman, the White House Chief of Staff, argued that the Nixon administration was faced with ". . . the continuing problem of bureaucracy responsiveness, where decisions are made at the top, and get diverted on a highly political basis at a lower level to a direction other than the policy of the department would have indicated" (v. 18, 8181–8182). For similar views expressed by Harry S. Flemming of the Nixon staff, see "Government Commentary: Nixon vs. the Veteran Bureaucrats," *Business Week*, August 1, 1970, p. 31.

[10] For evidence of this, see, Lewis Beman, "President-Less Government in Washington," *Fortune* (January 1974), pp. 74–76 and 160–162; and John Herbers, "Nixon's Presidency: Centralized Control," *The New York Times*, March 6, 1973, Section I, pp. 1 and 20.

[11] The countries involved, in addition to the United States, are Britain, France, Italy, Morocco, The Netherlands, Sweden, West Germany, and Jamaica. Our colleagues on the larger project are Samuel J. Eldersveld, Thomas J. Anton, Ronald F. Inglehart, Robert D. Putnam, Archibald Singham, and John Waterbury.

[12] The agencies are: Agriculture, Commerce, HEW, HUD, Interior, Justice, Labor, Transportation, Treasury, GSA, OEO, FCC, FPC, FTC, ICC, SEC, SBA, and the VA.

Political executives were defined as persons holding "policy" positions at approximately the level of Assistant Secretary who were formally appointed by the President and passed with the advice of the Senate (PAS) or officials on Executive Level Schedule C or those holding NEA (Non-Career Executive Assignment) job designations with GS rankings of 16 or higher. Hierarchically, but depending upon the particular agency, the C and NEA officials ranged from the levels of Deputy Assistant Secretary to Bureau or Division Chief to Program Chief. The career civil servants all held Career Executive Assignment (CEA) status. In order to be considered in the sampling universe each supergrade CEA had to be the *top* career official within a particular administrative subunit. When two or more supergrade career officials held positions of parallel rank within a given subunit hierarchy, all were considered members of the sampling universe. Sixty-one political executives and sixty-five supergrade career civil servants were interviewed, with response rates of 80 and 96 per cent respectively.

To be eligible for the sample, officials had to be full-time in their jobs and occupy positions with administrative responsibility for some program or set of programs. In other words, officials serving in the offices of the Secretary, or Agency Director, or Agency Administrator, and executives serving in internal agency administration (Personnel, Public Information, etc.) were eliminated. Our goal was to interview political appointees and high-level career civil servants whose jobs clearly entailed a responsibility for policy making and implementation.

The interviews were designed to tap the political attitudes, values, and beliefs of the respondents.[13] A standard interview schedule was used in the study, but the questions were open-ended and discussions with the respondents were often wide-ranging. Our goal was to conduct the interview in a style resembling a conversation so as to put the respondent at his ease and elicit thoughtful and, where appropriate, complex answers to our questions. The vast majority of the interviews (121) were tape recorded and then fully transcribed. All interviews were coded by two highly trained coders for both the manifest responses and, in many instances, the latent features (i.e., indirect aspects) of the respondents' answers. This long and difficult process enabled us to capture much of the subtlety and nuance of the responses. Intercoder reliability coefficients (Tb's) were calculated for all ordinal items to measure agreement between the coders. Most divergencies were reconciled in meetings of the coders and study directors.

The Setting: Party Differences in the Federal Bureaucracy

Presidents and their administrative appointees hold power only briefly. Assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries, and others holding politically appointed positions come and go under the watchful eyes of career administrators. Conflicts between those who hold office temporarily and those who do so more permanently may be the exception rather than the rule. But conflicts at times are unavoidable, and the suspicions that help to generate them are particularly likely to heighten under Republican administrations because of the belief that the career bureaucracy is a bastion of Democratic sympathy and, hence, is politically undependable.

The suspicion that the career bureaucracy may be disinclined toward the objectives of Republican administrations has substantial grounding in fact. It is clear from Table 1, for instance, that the representation of Republicans in the senior career positions of the federal bureaucracy is quite low.[14] There is some reason to believe, further, that some of the administrators who identified themselves as Independents did so because of a sensitivity to questions dealing with partisanship, especially in 1970 at the time of the interviewing when many bureaucrats feared for their jobs. As we shall see later, Independents more frequently resemble Democrats than Republicans.

In any event, the belief that a Republican administration does not have natural political allies within the federal bureaucracy seems well-justified. Indeed, the proportion of Democratic "political appointees" in Table 1 is somewhat artifactual. The bulk of Democratic appointees are actually holdovers from the previous Democratic administration rather than appointments of the Nixon administration. Only two of the Democratic appointees in our sample actually were appointed during the Nixon administration. Most of the

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[13] We cannot fully describe the interview instrument and methods used in the study in the limited space available to us here. Details about the interviews and coding procedures can be found in Joel D. Aberbach, James D. Chesney, and Bert A. Rockman, "Exploring Elite Political Attitudes: Some Methodological Lessons," *Political Methodology*, 2 (Winter, 1975), 1–27.

[14] Bernard Mennis's study of career foreign service officers notes that only 5 per cent of the FSO's considered themselves to be Republicans. See Bernard Mennis, *American Foreign Policy Officials* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), p. 121.

Table 1. Party Affiliation by Job Status

	Party Affiliation[a]						
Formal Job Designation[b]	Republican		Independent		Democrat		Totals (*N*)
High Political Appointee (i.e., PAS designation)	81%	66%	6	10	13	24	100% (16)
Middle Level Appointee (i.e., Schedule C, MEA designation)	59%		12		29		100% (41)
Supergrade Career	17%		36		47		100% (58)
			Gamma = .58				*N* = 115

[a] Party affiliation was measured by asking the administrators whether they normally voted for one party or the other. Those who said that they did not normally vote for one party or the other were coded as Independents. A very small number of administrators (8) refused to answer the question, and one indicated that he typically did not vote and had no party leaning. One administrator indicated that he normally supported a minor party, and we were unable to ask the question of one other administrator. These account for the eleven "missing" responses. Seven of these "missing" responses are located within the career group.

[b] Because of the small number of PAS designated appointees in our sample, hereafter analyses involving the job status variable will distinguish only between appointees and career administrators.

Democratic holdovers, in fact, are experts and professionals in jobs which emphasize a high degree of professional expertise.[15] Indeed, had we split the sample so as to distinguish between administrators with a clear political appointment and those who, while appointed, are largely professionals and experts, the correlation between job status and party affiliation would be slightly higher.[16] Obviously, one possible source of tension derives from this marked relationship between administrative job status and party affiliation. Republican appointees confront an overwhelmingly non-Republican career bureaucracy.

Furthermore, as Table 2 indicates, Democrats and Independents disproportionately inhabit certain key agencies. Of the eighteen domestic agencies from which our sample was drawn, three agencies—HEW, HUD, and OEO—are involved primarily in programs with large expenditures for social services. In the main, the services performed by these agencies are directed toward constituencies that are heavily inclined toward the Democratic party in terms of electoral support. Moreover, the organized interest group clienteles affected by most of the programs of these three "social service" agencies are often professional associations and social cause organizations with informal, but substantial, ties with the Democratic party nationally. A Republican administration bent upon controlling the activities of these agencies faces not only the natural tendency of administrators to see things in terms of agency perspectives, but also the additional barrier of disproportionately low Republican representation within the social service agencies.

Table 2. Party Affiliation by Agency

	Party Affiliation			
Agency[a]	Republican	Independent	Democrat	Totals
Social Service Agencies (i.e., HEW, HUD, OEO)	24%	30	46	100% (33)
Other Agencies	46%	21	33	100% (82)
		Gamma = −.32		

[a] Hereafter, the Agency variable will be dichotomized in this manner.

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[15] Some of the middle appointee positions do not change hands regardless of the party in the White House because a portion of the jobs within this category stress professional expertise and experience. In other instances, the incumbents often have formidable political links with interest-group or congressional constituencies so that it is politically unprofitable for an administration to replace them. See David T. Stanley, *Changing Administrations*, pp. 136–137. On the other hand, the attempts of the Nixon administration to centralize appointment procedures through the White House even for jobs of this sort probably has decreased the proportion of Democrats remaining in formally appointive positions. See, for instance, John Herbers, "Nixon's Presidency: Expansion of Power," *The New York Times*, March 4, 1973, Section I, pp. 1, 47–48.

[16] The gamma coefficient between party affiliation and a slightly revised job status code is .65. This revised job status code distinguishes between appointees who are obviously political and those who are apparently nonpolitical.

It would not be surprising, therefore, to see differences in the outlooks of administrators across agency lines, political appointee versus career strata, and party affiliation. As our data will demonstrate, differences in party affiliation also permeate and further reinforce differences based upon agency and appointee-career distinctions.

We now investigate the influences of these variables upon the beliefs of American federal executives.

Clashing Beliefs in the Federal Bureaucracy

The main focus of this article deals with clashes in belief within the upper reaches of the Nixon administration bureaucracy in 1970. Our interviews covered a wide variety of attitudes and beliefs, but we will concentrate here on two of fundamental importance to domestic policy making and implementation.

In coding the study we constructed a summary measure of each respondent's position on a left-right dimension defined in terms of government provision of social services.[17] The coders examined the entire interview, especially questions which asked the interviewee to consider whether the government must play a greater role in the nation's economic affairs than it does now, to describe what kind of society would be desirable for the next generation and what practical changes would be necessary to achieve it, and to distinguish political liberalism from conservatism. The respondents were placed along a five point continuum ranging from support for a much greater government role in the provision of social services, to endorsement of the status quo, to support for much more private enterprise and individual initiative in welfare matters. While reading through the interviews and coding the administrators' responses along this scale was obviously not a simple task, our coders were in perfect agreement almost 50 per cent of the time and disagreed by more than one step along the scale only 12 per cent of the time.[18] The left-right social services dimension represents a fundamental issue in American politics and one which concerned the administration as it struggled to modify and control the social policies of the nation.

The second index we will examine is one which measures administrators' beliefs that there is equity in the representation of interests in the American political process. The discussion of the issue took place in a section of the interview devoted to assessing the pattern of influence over policy decisions in the United States and the necessity, if any, for increasing citizen participation in governmental affairs. Answers to the question "Do you think there are groups in American society whose interests are not sufficiently considered?" were coded initially with a combination code which provided (a) the administrator's direct response to the question, itself, and (b) the accompanying reason the administrator gave for his response. The combination codes were then reduced to an eight point continuum ranging from a response and justification that highly favored the status quo (e.g., a belief that all groups have their interests adequately considered, even though some groups will always consider themselves under-represented) to responses and justifications that strongly favored redistribution (e.g., some groups are under-represented while the highly organized, traditional interests are over-represented). The inter-coder reliability coefficient for this eight-point scale is Tb = .66. In our analysis, the eight-point scale was collapsed into a three-point continuum making for even higher reliability. In the middle of this continuum are respondents who believe that all groups are adequately considered, but who then attach qualifications to this statement by stressing factors such as the difference between equitable consideration and equitable solutions or the belief that while all groups are considered adequately some groups may be excessively considered. To one side of this middle set of respondents are those who believe unreservedly that all groups are considered adequately or that if they are not it is their own fault rather than a system defect which accounts for it. On the other side are those who believe that some groups fail to receive adequate consideration in the political process. Overall, almost two-thirds of the administrators fell into this latter category.

The importance of this variable, which we label "equity of representation," is that it indicates a predisposition on the part of administrators to support changes altering the ordinary ways in which government operates so as to represent groups not considered adequately through the complex maze of legislative and bureaucratic channels. The labyrinth that government often represents for the less organized sectors in society can be altered only if there is a perception that some groups cannot be heard effectively.

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[17] Placement on the left-right continuum was predicated on a respondent's support for, or opposition to, programs that allocate public funds for social services. The term social services was given a broad operational definition in this code. A respondent's views on traditional social welfare programs and more recent extensions of these bore heavily on where he was placed on the continuum. The respondent's discussions of proposals for more public goods and services aimed at improving the lot of the socially and economically disadvantaged were also relevant in determining his or her score on the left-right continuum.

[18] The summary coefficient of intercoder reliability for this measure is $T_b = .41$. For procedures used to reconcile coding discrepancies, and for a discussion of T_b as a very conservative measure of intercoder reliability see Aberbach et al., pp. 16–19 and 23.

Though the left-right social services continuum emphasizes substantive policy orientations, and the equity of representation continuum emphasizes procedural equality, the two variables are strongly correlated in the expected direction; gamma = .55. The strong relationship between them suggests that they represent fairly coherent elements of a political belief system. But the two variables are also conceptually and empirically distinct, and, as we shall see, their relationships to other variables differ somewhat.

The Left-Right Social Services Continuum. Table 3 indicates the relationships between the three variables discussed in the previous section—party affiliation, agency, and job status—and the left-right continuum on the role of government in social affairs. Before looking at the relationships themselves, it is worthwhile examining the marginals showing the distribution of the administrators along the left-right continuum. The distribution is skewed to the left, with a heavy emphasis among administrators on much more or at least some additional government involvement in the provision of social services, but the modal category is an endorsement of the present balance between governmental and non-governmental activities. The desire to roll back government involvement is a distinctly minority position. The overwhelming majority of high-level administrators support at least the current level of government effort in the provision of social services, although, of course, they may oppose particular policies or actions.

The general agreement that at least the current level of government provision of social services should be maintained and the disagreement about where to go from here can be seen in Table 3b, which displays the relationship between party affiliation and the left-right continuum, and in Table 3c, where agency is the independent variable. In 3b nearly half of the Democrats are in favor of much more government effort, and 24 per cent lean toward some additional activities. Only 11 per cent favor the present balance, and 5 per cent want to change the system drastically to allow a much greater emphasis on individual enterprise and ini-

Table 3. The Left-Right Social Services Continuum by Party Affiliation, Agency, and Job Status

	Left-Right Social Services Continuum					
	For Much More Government Provision of Social Services (Left)	For Some Additional Government Provision (Left-Center)	For Present Balance (Center)	For Less Government Provision (Right-Center)	For Much Less Government Provision of Social Services (Right)	Totals (*N*)
A. *Marginal Distribution for the Left-Right Social Services Continuum*	26%	18	30	16	10	100% (114)
B. *Party Affiliation*						
Republican	7%	9	43	25	16	100% (44)
Independent	24%	24	28	12	12	100% (25)
Democrat	49%	24	11	11	5	100% (37)
			Gamma = −.53			
C. *Agency*						
Social Service (HEW, HUD, OEO)	53%	18	21	6	3	101%[a] (34)
Other	15%	18	34	20	14	101%[a] (80)
			Gamma = .60			
C. *Job Status*						
Political Appointees (Pooled)	20%	13	35	20	11	99%[a] (54)
Career Supergrades	32%	22	25	12	10	101%[a] (60)
			Gamma = −.24			

[a] Totals do not equal 100% because of rounding.

tiative. The opposite is the case for the Republicans. A mere 7 per cent favor much more government involvement in the nation's provision of social services, and 41 per cent favor some or much *less* government activity in the social area. It should be noted, however, that the modal Republican response endorses the current balance. This endorsement often is stated with regret, and an acknowledgement that the current situation and the history of government involvement in the provision of social services requires that the government at least continue its current efforts. In a sense, there are two separate conflicts over the role of government in the provision of social services which are detailed in the data: one is between the Democrats and the Republicans, with the Democrats strongly supporting a much greater government role; the other is within the Republican party between those who endorse the current balance and those who want to shift to a smaller role for government and a greater emphasis on the individual in providing for his own welfare and security.

The relationship between the agency the administrator serves and his position on the left-right continuum (Table 3c) is, not surprisingly, also very strong. People in the social service agencies almost always endorse a greater government role in the provision of social services, while those in other agencies are more divided on the subject. Support for the current balance is the modal tendency for administrators in non–social service agencies, with responses quite evenly distributed around the center position.

The association between job status and position on the left-right continuum (Table 3d) is clearly the weakest of the three displayed in Table 3. Nevertheless, the modal response for appointees is support for the status quo, while the modal response for career civil servants calls for much more government provision of social services. A sizeable proportion, however, even of the political appointees of the Republican administration (33 per cent) believe that the government should provide either much more in the way of social services or at least some services in addition to those provided now.

Part of the reason for this support for change in the status quo by the political executives is made clear in Table 4, which depicts the relationship between party affiliation and the left-right continuum with job status controlled. While Democratic political appointees are not numerous, they are quite as liberal in their notions about the role of government in the provision of social services as are the Democratic career administrators. As the reader may recall from our earlier discussion, a majority of the Democratic political appointees are holdovers from the Johnson administration, most of them in NEA or C level positions requiring special expertise. A few appointees also are blacks clearly chosen to indicate concern for minority interests. These individuals, plus a few Independents, represent most of the support among political appointees for a more liberal role for government in providing social services to the populace.

A look at the relationship among career bureaucrats also aids in understanding the relatively modest correlation between job status and position on the left-right continuum. The number of Republican career bureaucrats in our sample is small, but they are further to the right on the left-right measure than any group we have looked at. Most of these career Republicans, however, are

Table 4. The Left-Right Social Services Continuum by Party Affiliation Controlling for Job Status

Political Appointees (Pooled)

Left-Right Social Services Continuum *Party Affiliation*	Left	Left-Center	Center	Right-Center	Right	Totals (*N*)
Republican	6%	9	50	23	12	100% (34)
Independent	50%	—	17	17	17	101%[a] (6)
Democrat	42%	33	—	17	8	100% (12)
			Gamma = −.44			

Career Supergrades

Left-Right Social Services Continuum *Party Affiliation*	Left	Left-Center	Center	Right-Center	Right	Totals (*N*)
Republican	10%	10	20	30	30	100% (10)
Independent	16%	32	32	10	10	100% (19)
Democrat	52%	20	16	8	4	100% (25)
			Gamma = −.56			

[a] Total does not equal 100% because of rounding.

not in the social service agencies and have little to do directly with the formulation or implementation of policy in the social services area.

Table 5 displays the relationship between party affiliation and the left-right continuum controlling for agency. The gamma coefficients are very high especially for the administrators in the social service agencies. More than 90 per cent of the Democrats in the social service agencies favor much more government involvement in the provision of social services.[19] This contrasts with only 11 per cent of the Republicans in the same agencies. In the non–social service agencies the relationship is substantial (Gamma = –.40), but not so strong as in the social service agencies. Democrats are still much more liberal than Republicans, but the contrasts are not quite so great.

A close examination of the table reveals that the Republicans in the social service agencies are more liberal than those in the non–social service agencies.[20] If one assumes that this contrast carries over when Republicans administering social services are contrasted with Republicans in the Executive Office of the President, then it is likely that Republicans in the social service agencies were engaged in unusually difficult struggles over policy with both the Democrats in their agencies and other forces in the administration. The *N*'s are small enough so that we must be cautious in interpreting these data, but the difficulties which HEW, HUD, and OEO experienced during the Nixon administration bear out this interpretation.

Beliefs About Representational Equity. The belief that the political system works with virtual perfection in assuring that all groups have their needs met is essentially conservative for it assumes that there is no need to reform representational procedures in government. During the 1960s a number of programs were developed in an effort to make government less complicated and more responsive to traditionally under-represented and less participative groups. These groups usually possess little knowledge of the paths of access to government and typically have little leverage they can bring to bear upon conventional processes of representation. Some of the "Great Society" programs of the 1960s—legal services, for example—were designed to grant economically and politically disadvantaged citizens the opportunity to employ the resources of government in order to equalize their standing before the courts. Other programs, such as Model Cities, were designed to grant citizens who normally have little political access the opportunity to participate in the development of community institutions and services that would be more responsive to their needs. Whether these and other programs have worked as intended is a debatable question, but they certainly have been controversial.

The normal constituency of a Republican administration includes few of the ostensibly under-represented groups in American society. Because of this, Republicans should be less likely to perceive representational inequities in the first place and, thus, less likely to support reforms aimed at equalizing the opportunities of citizens to influence government. Attempting to redress inequities in representation requires that these inequities be

Table 5. The Left-Right Social Services Continuum by Party Affiliation, Controlling for Agency

Social Services Agencies (HEW, HUD, OEO)

Left-Right Social Services Continuum *Party Affiliation*	Left	Left-Center	Center	Right-Center	Right	Totals (*N*)
Republican	11%	22	44	11	11	99%[a] (9)
Independent	33%	22	33	11	—	99%[a] (9)
Democrat	92%	8	—	—	—	100% (13)
			Gamma = –.82			

Non-Social Service Agencies

Left-Right Social Services Continuum *Party Affiliation*	Left	Left-Center	Center	Right-Center	Right	Totals (*N*)
Republican	6%	6	43	29	17	101%[a] (35)
Independent	19%	25	25	12	19	100% (16)
Democrat	25%	33	17	17	8	100% (24)
			Gamma = –.40			

[a] Totals do not equal 100% because of rounding.

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[19] Seventy-nine per cent of the Democrats in the social service agencies are career civil servants, compared to 59 per cent in the non–social service agencies. Remember that most of the Democrats in appointed positions are in the NEA and C classifications.

[20] The gamma coefficient for Republicans between agency and the left-right social services continuum is .42. It is .95 for Democrats, among whom the overwhelming majority of social services administrators are very liberal.

perceived. The likelihood of a Republican administration being less sensitized to issues of representational inequity was reinforced by the inclination of the Nixon administration to develop a constituency encompassing those who were resentful of the appearance of "special treatment" for the economically and politically disadvantaged sectors of the citizenry.[21] As an interest group spokesman put it, "Nixon has changed the whole context of the argument on national priorities. You don't hear many mayors talking about helping poor minorities."[22]

The data in Table 6 show, as expected, that Republican administrators are less disposed than Democratic or Independent administrators to view some groups as inadequately considered in the political process, although the relationship between party and the equity variable which has a strong procedural component is quite a bit weaker than the relationship with the more substantively oriented social services continuum. Similarly, the career executives more frequently than politically appointed executives believe that some groups fail to receive adequate consideration through the political process. But these relationships are overshadowed by the correlation between agency and beliefs about the equity of representation. The influences of agency are especially strong, with 83 per cent of the administrators in the social service agencies taking the position that some groups are not adequately considered in the political process compared to 59 per cent of the administrators of other agencies.

Several questions are raised by the findings presented in Table 6:

(1) Do party differences in beliefs about equity of representation persist across appointee-career lines?

(2) Do party differences in beliefs about equity of representation persist across agency lines as they have been drawn here?

(3) Are the job status (i.e., appointee-career) and agency variables independently important in accounting for beliefs about equity of representation?

When the relationship between party affiliation and beliefs about equity of representation is controlled for job status (Table 7), the correlation between party and representational equity remains unchanged for political appointees and is diminished, although the form of the relationship is essentially intact, for career executives.[23] Within

Table 6. Beliefs About Equity of Representation by Party Affiliation, Job Status, and Agency

	Beliefs About Equity of Representation			
	Small Groups Inadequately Considered	All Considered, but Qualifications	All Considered	Totals (*N*)
A. Marginal Distribution for Beliefs About Equity of Representation	65%	17	18	100% (107)
B. Party Affiliation				
Republican	50%	29	21	100% (38)
Independent	74%	4	22	100% (23)
Democrat	72%	14	14	100% (36)
		Gamma = −.28		
C. Job Status				
Political Appointees (Pooled)	57%	22	22	101%[a] (51)
Career Supergrades	73%	13	14	100% (56)
		Gamma = −.30		
D. Agency				
Social Service (HEW, HUD, OEO)	83%	14	3	100% (29)
Other	59%	18	23	100% (78)
		Gamma = .55		

[a] Total does not equal 100% because of rounding.

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[21] See, for instance, Kevin Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (Garden City: Anchor, 1970).

[22] As quoted in John Herbers, "Nixon's Presidency: A Nation is Changed," *The New York Times*, March 7, 1973, Section I pp. 1, 22.

[23] The correlation for the career executives diminishes principally because of the instability in the distribution of cases between the "all considered" and "all considered, but qualifications" categories.

Table 7. Beliefs About Equity of Representation by Party Affiliation, Controlling for Job-Status

Political Appointees (Pooled)

Beliefs About Equity of Representation				
Party Affiliation	Some Groups Inadequately Considered	All Considered, but Qualifications	All Considered	Totals (*N*)
Republican	38%	28	24	100% (29)
Independent	67%	—	33	100% (6)
Democrat	67%	25	8	100% (12)
		Gamma = −.28		

Career Supergrades

Beliefs About Equity of Representation				
Party Affiliation	Some Groups Inadequately Considered	All Considered, but Qualifications	All Considered	Totals (*N*)
Republican	60%	30	10	100% (10)
Independent	76%	6	18	100% (17)
Democrat	74%	9	17	100% (23)
		Gamma = −.10		

each partisan category, career bureaucrats are more likely than political appointees to perceive that some groups are without adequate representation. However, the party differences within each job status designation are still a bit stronger than those across job strata. Republican administrators, whether career or appointee, are the least likely to believe that some groups' interests are inadequately considered.

Unlike the job status variable, the agency an administrator works for has a sizeable independent impact upon his beliefs about equity of representation. Nevertheless, party affiliation also remains important *within each* agency type. As Table 8 illustrates, the compound effects of agency and party are especially important. About twice as many Democrats and Independents within the social service agencies as Republicans outside

Table 8. Beliefs About Equity of Representation by Party Affiliation, Controlling for Agency

Social Service Agencies (HEW, HUD, OEO)

Beliefs About Equity of Representation				
Party Affiliation	Some Groups Inadequately Considered	All Considered, but Qualifications	All Considered	Totals (*N*)
Republican	67%	22	11	100% (9)
Independent	88%	12	—	100% (8)
Democrat	89%	11	—	100% (9)
		Gamma = −.49		

Non–Social Service Agencies

Beliefs About Equity of Representation				
Party Affiliation	Some Groups Inadequately Considered	All Considered, but Qualifications	All Considered	Totals (*N*)
Republican	47%	30	23	100% (30)
Independent	67%	—	33	100% (15)
Democat	65%	15	19	99%[a] (26)
		Gamma = −.20		

[a] Total does not equal 100% because of rounding.

these agencies believe that some groups are not adequately considered in the political process. The party differences within each type of agency are also strong, especially for the social services administrators, despite the clear influence of agency upon administrators of all partisan persuasions. The differences, for example, between Republicans across each type of agency are about the same as the party differences within each agency type.

The beliefs about equity of representation represent predispositions. We do not know for sure precisely what influence they may have had upon the behavior of these administrators. However, they do reflect a receptivity to programs and procedures designed to mobilize or better represent the politically disadvantaged. The Nixon administration obviously confronted a substantial number of administrators without compatible predispositions when it became interested in retrenching or at least reevaluating some of the mobilizing experiments of the 1960s. These data indicate that Democrats and Independents, particularly within the social service agencies, were probably in the forefront of the opposition. But Republican administrators within the social service agencies also are clearly more disposed to the belief that some groups are inadequately considered than are Republican administrators from other agencies. The stronger interparty correlation found within the social service agencies reflects the near unanimity of the Democratic and Independent administrators to the view that some groups are left out, rather than strong acceptance of the view among Republican administrators within these agencies that all groups are considered. Even though there are strong inter-partisan differences within the social service agencies, the findings argue for a powerful agency effect upon all administrators. This, of course, may be due to the kinds of Republicans recruited into the social service agencies. They are, as we have noted above, somewhat less conservative than other Republican administrators in their orientation to the role of government in providing social service.

Organizational incentives and agency culture, however, can play a large role too. Unless they are very strongly predisposed to ignore the claims of their agency constituents or to see events through deeply conservative ideological lenses, Republican administrators are likely to be absorbed by the day-to-day problems with which their agencies deal. Perhaps, then, one of the major incentives for the Nixon administration's attempt to centralize control over the federal bureaucracy—and especially in the social service program areas—stemmed from a belief that while Democratic administrators were ideologically unsalvageable, even the Republicans in the social service agencies were absorbing more fully the ethos of their agencies than the policy goals of the White House.[24]

In short, our data here certainly suggest that there are considerable differences in outlooks about equity of representation *within* the federal bureaucracy. These disagreements are based upon both party and agency lines, and the joint effects of these two variables are especially strong. Despite the importance of partisan differences within the social service agencies, the clashes between the Nixon White House and its putative emissaries within the social service agencies may have been equally significant. While our data do not extend beyond the mid-point of the first term of the Nixon Administration, we suspect that the later replacements for the Republican appointees in the social service agencies began to resemble more closely the Republican administrators in other agencies.

Summary and Conclusions

This analysis examined two key political beliefs of high level American federal executives. We looked at the correlates of their views on the role of government in providing social services and their views regarding inequities in political representation. Both of these matters were relevant to the efforts of the Nixon administration to reorder national priorities and policies.

The findings across each of these issues generally converge. *Agency and party affiliation* were particularly important variables in accounting for differences in administrators' views. Democratic administrators in the social service agencies (i.e., HEW, HUD, OEO) were most oriented to a more active government role in the social services sector. Similarly, Democrats (joined by Independents) in the social service agencies most frequently saw inequities in the process of representation, whereas Republicans least believed such inequities existed.

The joint effects of party and agency are especially important in examining both issues. Democratic administrators in the social service agencies were the most liberal on the left-right social services continuum and Republicans in the non–social service agencies the most conservative. A similar, if somewhat weaker, partisan split is present for the equity of representation variable. The left-right continuum strikes closer to the heart of differences in partisan ideology than does equity of representation and, thus, the influence of party is especially powerful in predicting administrators' positions on the social services measure.

Our findings document a career bureaucracy with very little Republican representation but even more pointedly portray a social service bureaucracy dominated by administrators ideologically hostile to many of the directions pursued by the Nixon administration in the realm of social policy. Democratic administrators in the social service agencies were the most hostile to these directions, but even Republican administrators in these same agencies, at the time of our interviews, held attitudes that were not wholly sympathetic to the social service retrenchments sought by the Nixon administration. Neither were the Republican administrators in the social service agencies very sympathetic to the administration's attempts to decrease the government's attentiveness to the politically disadvantaged. Our data do not permit us to say whether the Republicans in the social service agencies started out more liberal than other Republicans or were socialized into their more liberal positions by experiences in the bureaucracy and the demands of their roles. Both are probably correct to some degree. But there is no question that the federal bureaucracy was not fertile soil in which to plant the most conservative of the Nixon administration's social policies.

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[24] As John Herbers has written of the Nixon Administration, "... the White House frequently does not trust the departments which have constituencies of their own." See, "Nixon's Presidency: Centralized Control," *The New York Times*, March 6, 1973, p. 20.

One important aspect of the broad syndrome of administration activities now known as "Watergate" had to do with the crude attempts by the Nixon administration to gain control over the government which it was elected to lead. The flagrant disregard of constitutional limitations in the administration's attempts to consolidate its perceived political mandate must not becloud our perspective on the larger problem of governance faced by an aggressively conservative Republican administration. Uncovering the misdeeds of the Nixon administration should not obscure the difficulties a Republican administration such as Nixon's faced with both a Democratic Congress and a bureaucracy unsympathetic to conservative social policies. Relations between the Nixon administration and the Congress quickly deteriorated because of differing policy perspectives and the rather disdainful attitudes of many White House people toward the legislative branch. While we have no direct data on the behavior of the administrators in our study, we know enough about their policy attitudes and about the tendency of bureaucrats in any administration to protect their programs to infer that the Nixon administration's suspicions about them were not wholly groundless. The setting for the Nixon administration was one which makes the quip that "even paranoids may have real enemies" seem appropriate, although the very aggressive behavior of the administration made a difficult situation much worse than it need have been.

A sharp electoral realignment that produces Republican Congresses along with Republican administrations can cut off the political leverage of the bureaucracy and, indeed, over time may produce a far larger proportion of Republicans in the career bureaucracy itself. For the foreseeable future, however, such a scenario is extremely inprobable. There is better reason to suspect that the White House will continue to reflect short term political changes and that the Congress and bureaucracy will be relatively immune to these dynamics. Thus, a forceful conservative Republican president may face even deeper ideological clashes with the bureaucracy in the future. The data summarized in Table 9 show that the strongest opposition to the ideological bent of the Nixon administration came from younger and middle-aged Democrats, rather than from those Democrats whose political chronology dates back to the New Deal era in American politics. Republicans, in general, tend to be relatively stable in the distribution of their attitudes across age categories, but the oldest Democrats are the most conservative. The younger and middle-aged Democrats clearly possess more ideological and reformist vitality than their elders. The evidence indicates that partisan-based ideological distinctiveness is growing rather than lessening.[25]

Table 9. Correlations Between the Left-Right Social Services Continuum and Party Affiliation, and Between Equity of Representation and Party Affiliation, Controlling for Age

	Left-Right Continuum by Party	Equity of Representation by Party
Age	Gamma Coefficients	Gamma Coefficients
30–46	−.71 (40)	−.34 (33)
47–56	−.53 (41)	−.46 (38)
57 and over	−.16 (24)	.05 (26)

Moreover, further expansion of governmental activities in the social service areas will expand the bureaucracies and activities that seem to attract administrators with the most liberal viewpoints. Unless a conservative Republican president does act sharply to curtail the activities of administrators in these agencies or to politicize the agencies through extensive changes in personnel, he can expect many of his social policies to be received coldly by administrators there. And yet, a president is limited in the extensiveness of the personnel changes he can make. The tendency of even his own appointees—unless they are persons of deep and forceful conservative convictions (e.g., Howard Phillips, the former Acting Director of OEO)—to be influenced by the ambience of their agencies is very real. As Frederick V. Malek, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget has observed: "In the agencies you are isolated from the President; you relate to the department and its problems."[26] Under the conditions that we have described, therefore, the incentives for an aggressively conservative Republican administration to centralize control in the White House are obviously very substantial.

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[25] Our assumption here, of course, is that the data represent a generational rather than a life cycle phenomenon. While longitudinal data would be necessary to establish definitively the validity of this assumption, the stability among the Republicans regardless of age and the differences between the Democrats lead us to a generational interpretation.

The potential problems a Democratic president faces with the bureaucracy, while not so severe as those of a Republican, are still difficult. If he pursues a more centrist course in social policy than the liberal administrators in the social service agencies desire, he may face serious difficulties in controlling their behavior. If, on the other hand, he pursues aggressively liberal social policies, he may have problems holding together his constituencies in Congress and the country. There is no question, though, that a Democratic president's clashes in belief with the bureaucracy will not ordinarily be so severe or potentially disruptive as those of a conservative Republican. A Democratic president, after all, does require the support of some key constituences whose interests are articulated through the social service bureaucracies.

The Watergate turmoil and the crisis of regime that it generated should not cause us to lose sight of continuing issues of governance and the future crises that may be associated with them. The problems of presidential accountability through the electoral process, of a bureaucracy ideologically unresponsive to conservative presidents, of an increasingly Gaullist "presidentialism"—an isolated, highly centralized presidency which reached new levels in the Nixon White House—are closely linked.[27] These problems are particularly acute when the legislative and executive branches are politically divided. Moreover, as Norton Long points out, it is not entirely clear that ". . . election is the *sine qua non* of representation. . . ."[28] The "mandate" view of presidential or even congressional authority must be offset by the possibility that the bureaucracy can speak for constituencies whose claims are largely ignored at the White House and on Capitol Hill. Still, the priorities and constituencies of elected leaders cannot be disregarded casually within the framework of democratic politics.

The problem remains, however, as to which elected leaders are to be followed. The framers of the Constitution designed a government of separate but shared powers. The rise of an immense bureaucracy with its own constituencies, not visualized in the original design, has further complicated a system that was not designed to give any branch of government or major actor a clear mandate to lead.

By seeing himself not as the preeminent contender for power, but as the holder of an exclusive mandate to command, Nixon sought to eliminate these complications. The system, however, makes the President a powerful but limited leader in a sea of departments, agencies, legislative committees, and courts. He can choose to bargain with other institutional actors and accommodate their interests, or he can try to maximize his control over policy and its implementation. The latter course, especially when the President threatens the interests of the other institutions or their constituencies, creates profound conflict within the government. Any aggressive president who wishes to promote political change faces a large array of frustrations, but these must be especially acute for a conservative who believes that the bureaucrats within his "own" branch of government are not loyal to him. In a government in which there are multiple lines of authority, the temptations for presidents to abuse their powers in an effort to gain control and for administrators to safeguard the interests of their particular agencies and to promote their own conceptions of proper public policy are always present. The framers of the Constitution, having given us little guidance here, have left these problems as part of their enduring legacy.

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[26] As quoted in Beman, "President-Less Government in Washington," p. 74.

[27] See, for instance, Richard P. Nathan, *The Plot That Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency* (New York: John Wiley, 1975).

[28] Norton Long, *The Polity* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962), p. 71.

Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974*

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The decline of party loyalties during the past decade is one of the most profound changes in postwar American politics. Political scientists, journalists, and politicians recognize this erosion, and President Ford has voiced concern at the growth of partisan independence. Many believe that the erosion of party loyalties is likely to continue, since an especially large proportion of young adults claims to be neither Republican nor Democratic.

But does the very low level of party loyalty among young Americans provide a basis for predicting a continued decline in American party loyalties? Since the early days of survey research, young adults have been more likely to identify as Independents than their elders, and, according to Angus Campbell and his colleagues, this high level of independence results from their youth. The young, they claim, have not yet learned to support a party; as they age, they are likely to become more partisan.[1]

As I hope to show in this article, these arguments about the relationship of age to strength of party identification cannot be supported by the best available data. The low level of partisan identification among young Americans appears to result from fundamental differences between the formative socialization of persons who entered the electorate during the postwar years and that of their elders. Through a time-series cohort analysis of eleven surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan between 1952 and 1974, I show that the overall decline in party identification results largely from generational change. High levels of partisan identification persist among persons who entered the electorate before World War II, but among persons entering the electorate more recently levels of identification are low. This analysis strongly suggests that the overall proportion of party identifiers will continue to decline, and allows us to examine one process through which party loyalties among mass electorates gradually are transformed.

The Decline of Party Identification During the Postwar Years

As can be seen in Tables 1 through 4, regardless of how we define attachment to a party, since 1964 the proportion of whites[2] who were identifiers has declined markedly.[3] Until 1964, the proportion of strong party identifiers did not fall below 35 per cent (see Table 1). By 1970, only 27 per cent were strong identifiers, and, by 1974, only 24 per cent were. Until 1964, about three out of four whites were identifiers (either strong or weak) (see Table 2), but this proportion dropped in each subsequent survey until by 1974 only 60 per cent identified with one of the major parties. During the same period the percentage of pure Independents rose from 8 per cent to 15 per cent (see Table 3). The mean level of party identification was 2.04 in 1964, but declined in each subsequent survey, and by 1974 had reached 1.67 (see Table 4).

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* I wish to thank John Aldrich, Paul Allen Beck, Bruce A. Campbell, T. Daniel Coggin, Charles F. Cnudde, Philip E. Converse, David J. Elkins, Ada W. Finifter, Victor Hanby, Robert W. Jackman, Warren E. Miller, Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., Kathleen Peroff, Frank A. Pinner, David W. Rohde, Joseph A. Schlesinger, W. Phillips Shively, and Brian Silver for their comments on earlier versions of this article. An anonymous referee for the *Review* made extensive and helpful suggestions. The Ford Foundation supported my research, but bears no responsibility for my conclusions. The Department of Political Science and the Computer Institute for Social Science Research, Michigan State University, also provided support. Carol Thompson assisted with the data analysis. I am especially grateful to Arthur H. Miller for providing me with the basic contingency table that enabled me to include the 1974 SRC-CPS data in the final version of this article.

The data for the SRC surveys conducted between 1952 and 1972 were provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, and the 1974 data are also now available through the Consortium. The Consortium bears no responsibility for my analyses and interpretations.

[1] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 161–165.

[2] Blacks have had markedly different political experiences from whites, and the assumptions I make about the development of party loyalties among whites do not apply to blacks. For a discussion of partisan change among blacks, see Paul R. Abramson, *Generational Change in American Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975), pp. 65–68.

[3] The measure of party identification used by the SRC classifies respondents as strong Democrats, weak Democrats, Independents who lean toward the Democrats, Independents with no party leanings, Independents who lean toward the Republicans, weak Republicans, and strong Republicans. Tables 1 and 2 follow the procedures used by Campbell et al. by "folding" this scale to combine strong partisans, and to combine strong and weak partisans. The

Table 1. Percentage of Whites Who Were Strong Party Identifiers from 1952 through 1974, by Years of Birth

Age in 1952: Years of Birth:	69–76 1876–1883	61–68 1884–1891	53–60 1892–1899	45–52 1900–1907	37–44 1908–1915	29–36 1916–1923	21–28 1924–1931	13–20 1932–1939	5–12 1940–1947	4 or younger 1948–1955	Total white electorate
Year of Survey:											
1952	49% (97)[a]	43% (141)	46% (211)	34% (236)	32% (289)	24% (320)	30% (249)				35% (1615)[b]
1956	57% (60)	53% (119)	43% (160)	36% (227)	35% (279)	32% (345)	27% (293)	28% (98)			36% (1610)
1958[c]	53% (73)	47% (118)	47% (167)	40% (219)	34% (304)	35% (318)	32% (275)	31% (155)			38% (1638)
1960[c]	†	48% (125)	42% (170)	35% (249)	40% (291)	28% (342)	34% (307)	34% (192)			36% (1739)
1962	†	50% (70)	37% (103)	55% (159)	36% (188)	30% (200)	30% (194)	21% (183)	†		35% (1168)
1964	†	50% (72)	47% (122)	49% (166)	37% (213)	33% (242)	32% (220)	28% (229)	25% (104)		36% (1394)
1966	†	44% (52)	37% (112)	36% (113)	31% (164)	25% (188)	23% (195)	19% (156)	17% (138)		27% (1131)
1968	†	†	45% (104)	41% (156)	34% (181)	19% (230)	26% (240)	22% (189)	11% (225)		27% (1387)
1970	†	†	36% (95)	32% (139)	35% (184)	31% (188)	23% (199)	19% (186)	21% (236)	18% (124)	27% (1395)
1972	†	†	41% (135)	34% (219)	35% (290)	27% (288)	24% (330)	15% (313)	14% (420)	12% (342)	24% (2397)
1974[c]	†	†	46% (96)	37% (201)	32% (264)	26% (276)	25% (277)	19% (239)	17% (368)	16% (436)	24% (2246)

[a] Numbers in parentheses are the totals upon which percentages are based.

[b] The *N* for the total white electorate is always somewhat larger than the sum of the *N*s of the cohorts, for the total is based upon all whites, regardless of age, including some for whom no information about age was available.

[c] Weighted *N*s.

† Because of the small *N*s the percentage of strong partisans has not been presented.

Table 2. Percentage of Whites Who Were Strong or Weak Party Identifiers from 1952 through 1974, by Years of Birth

Age in 1952: Years of Birth:	69–76 1876–1883	61–68 1884–1891	53–60 1892–1899	45–52 1900–1907	37–44 1908–1915	29–36 1916–1923	21–28 1924–1931	13–20 1932–1939	5–12 1940–1947	4 or younger 1948–1955	Total white electorate
Year of Survey:											
1952	80%[a]	76%	82%	72%	79%	71%	68%				75%
1956	82%	84%	72%	75%	76%	72%	68%	55%			73%
1958	82%	83%	81%	82%	79%	77%	69%	70%			77%
1960	†	82%	82%	80%	73%	73%	72%	74%			76%
1962	†	83%	83%	84%	76%	76%	67%	65%	†		75%
1964	†	88%	82%	84%	79%	73%	71%	69%	65%		75%
1966	†	79%	82%	70%	79%	70%	67%	67%	59%		71%
1968	†	†	83%	76%	75%	70%	66%	67%	44%		68%
1970	†	†	73%	72%	80%	72%	62%	61%	55%	48%	66%
1972	†	†	82%	73%	76%	71%	65%	56%	49%	45%	62%
1974	†	†	80%	72%	69%	65%	62%	55%	53%	50%	60%

[a] For the totals upon which these percentages are based, see Table 1.

† Because of the small *N*s, the percentage of strong and weak partisan identifiers has not been presented.

Table 3. Percentage of Whites Who Were Independents with no Party Leanings from 1952 through 1974, by Years of Birth

Age in 1952; Years of Birth:	69–76 1876–1883	61–68 1884–1891	53–60 1892–1899	45–52 1900–1907	37–44 1908–1915	29–36 1916–1923	21–28 1924–1931	13–20 1932–1939	5–12 1940–1947	4 or younger 1948–1955	Total white electorate
Year of Survey:											
1952	7%[a]	7%	6%	7%	4%	7%	6%				6%
1956	7%	7%	10%	10%	9%	9%	9%	13%			9%
1958	4%	6%	4%	7%	9%	6%	9%	12%			8%
1960	†	14%	6%	6%	15%	7%	7%	12%			9%
1962	†	4%	6%	4%	7%	9%	14%	8%	†		8%
1964	†	4%	7%	5%	8%	8%	7%	10%	12%		8%
1966	†	10%	10%	16%	8%	15%	9%	13%	15%		12%
1968	†	†	7%	10%	9%	12%	12%	10%	18%		11%
1970	†	†	11%	12%	10%	12%	13%	14%	14%	22%	13%
1972	†	†	7%	9%	9%	10%	13%	17%	17%	19%	13%
1974	†	†	9%	7%	11%	14%	10%	15%	17%	23%	15%

[a] For the totals upon which these percentages are based, see Table 1.

† Because of the small *N*s, the percentage of Independents with no party leanings has not been presented.

Table 4. Mean Partisan Strength of Whites from 1952 through 1974, by Years of Birth[a]

Age in 1952:	69–76	61–68	53–60	45–52	37–44	29–36	21–28	13–20	5–12	4 or younger	Total white electorate
Years of Birth:	1876–1883	1884–1891	1892–1899	1900–1907	1908–1915	1916–1923	1924–1931	1932–1939	1940–1947	1948–1955	
Year of Survey:											
1952	2.2[b]	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.9				2.03
1956	2.3	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7			1.97
1958	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.9			2.05
1960	†	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9			2.03
1962	†	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	†		1.99
1964	†	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8		2.04
1966	†	2.1	2.1	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6		1.85
1968	†	†	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.3		1.82
1970	†	†	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.79
1972	†	†	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.72
1974	†	†	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.67

[a] Mean partisan strength with strong partisans scored as 3, weak partisans as 2, Independents who lean toward a party as 1, and pure Independents and apoliticals scored as 0.

[b] For the totals upon which these means are based, see Table 1. (Actual totals are slightly smaller, because persons who supported minor parties have been excluded from these calculations.)

† Because of the small *N*s the mean score has not been presented.

Whether or not this trend presages a continued decline in levels of party identification cannot be answered definitively; as Otis Dudley Duncan reminds us, "There is nothing about a trend—supposing it to have been reliably ascertained for some specific period—that guarantees its own continuation."[4] But one can gain greater confidence about the future of a trend by studying age-group differences. "It is the inevitable fact of life," Herbert H. Hyman writes, "that the young will replace the old and will determine the future course of any trend. Thus if the young differ from the old, and were to continue to do so despite their own aging, some prediction can be ventured."[5] Even the most cursory examination of the data reveals replication of a well-established finding: young adults have weaker partisan attachments than their elders.[6] The problem is to explain that relationship, and, since I am using data originally analyzed by Campbell and his colleagues, their discussion will be my point of departure.

Age and Party Identification in the Mid-1950s

The authors of *The American Voter* demonstrated clearly that young adults have weaker party attachments than their elders.[7] Combined data collected in seven surveys between 1952 and 1957 showed that the percentage of strong identifiers increased steadily with age; the percentage of Independents (including those leaning toward either major party[8]) decreased. But Campbell and his colleagues not only presented their findings; they also recognized, and attempted to discriminate between, alternative explanations.

Age differences may result from generational effects, for "age may mark an historical epoch in which the person has matured or undergone some special variety of experience that has left an im-

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mean score measure of strength of partisanship follows the same logic, but assumes, for purposes of illustration, that the party identification scale can be treated as interval. My measure is similar to the index of partisan strength used by Philip E. Converse in "Of Time and Partisan Stability," *Comparative Political Studies*, 2 (July, 1969), 139–171, at 149–151, although his index scores ranged from zero through two.

The percentages reported in Tables 1 through 3 are based upon all respondents, except those for whom party identification was not ascertained. Persons who supported minor parties and those classified as apolitical are included in the numbers upon which percentages are based. As these two groups never made up more than three per cent of the total, similar results would be obtained if they were excluded from the analysis. In computing the mean strength of partisan identification for this study, apoliticals were scored as zero, but persons who supported minor parties were excluded from the analysis. The totals upon which the mean scores were calculated are therefore slightly smaller than those upon which the percentages were based.

[4] Otis Dudley Duncan, "Social Stratification and Mobility: Problems in the Measurement of Trend," in *Indicators of Social Change: Concepts and Measurements*, ed. Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore (New York: Russell Sage, 1968), pp. 675–719, at p. 679.

[5] Herbert H. Hyman, *Secondary Analysis of Sample Surveys: Principles, Procedures, and Potentialities* (New York: Wiley, 1972), p. 243.

[6] Throughout this analysis, respondents were divided into eight-year age cohorts, although I present data about younger cohorts before the full eight-year age group had entered the electorate. Ideally, a cohort analysis should divide respondents into the same age range as the number of years between surveys, allowing comparison of persons of the same age at different points in time by reading diagonally down and across the table. Practical considerations, however, dictate that the Ns for each cohort be substantial, and to divide respondents into two-year age groups would lead to small Ns as well as unreadable tables.

The 1952, 1968, 1970, 1972, and 1974 surveys recorded years of birth. For other surveys year of birth has been calculated from data about the respondent's age. The 1954 SRC survey employed arbitrary age categories, and could not be used in my time-series cohort analysis.

[7] Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 161.

[8] In this analysis, the Michigan authors did not differentiate between Independents who leaned toward a party and those who did not.

print on his attitudes and behaviors."[9] "The historical interpretation of our data," they reasoned, "would suggest that partisan feeling was more intense several decades ago than now. If older persons have more intense party loyalties than younger, *it is a reflection of the politics of an earlier American period*."[10] On the other hand, age differences may result from the differing position of people in the life cycle, for "age may serve as an index of the length of time that the individual has lived in a specified state or engaged in a specified behavior."[11]

In attempting to discriminate between these explanations, Campbell and his colleagues supported a life-cycle explanation. Because their test used cross-sectional data, however, they could not examine the partisanship of persons as they moved through the life cycle. Among persons who remain attached to the same party throughout their lives, the effects of age, length of attachment to a party, and time of entry into the electorate cannot be distinguished from each other. But for persons who have switched their partisanship, the effects of duration of attachment can be distinguished from those of age and era of maturation. If the life-cycle explanation were valid, Campbell and his colleagues reasoned, the tendency of the old to have stronger partisan loyalties than the young would be eliminated once duration of attachment were controlled. They tested the relationship between age and strength of party loyalties while controlling for the length of time respondents identified with their party; when the length of attachment was held constant, the young had somewhat stronger party attachments than their elders. "This pattern of relationships," they concluded, "fits very well a more general thesis that group identification is a function of the proportion of a person's life he has been associated with the group. The longer a person thinks of himself as belonging to a party, the stronger his sense of loyalty to it will become."[12]

But Campbell's test is not definitive, for few old persons had short-term party attachments, and only the simplest controls were applied.[13] More important, although older persons who had recently acquired their partisanship were likely to have weak party loyalties, the causality of this relationship could have been the opposite of that suggested by the Michigan authors: Weak party loyalties may cause, rather than result from, brief attachment to a party. Indeed, panel data suggest that weak partisans are more likely to convert to another party than are strong, and that once converted they are more likely to remain weak partisans than to support their new party strongly.[14]

Even without panel data, however, one can discriminate between alternative explanations of the relationship of age to strength of partisanship by comparing persons born during the same years but sampled at different times. Campbell and his colleagues did not find this kind of analysis attractive, for they had collected data for only five years. Their practice of combining the results of surveys conducted at different times precluded any tentative efforts to examine the effects of aging upon young adults who, during a five-year period, might have developed stronger party attachments. Now, however, we can conduct a far more extensive cohort analysis by examining age groups during a twenty-two year period.

Age and Party Identification Between 1952 and 1974

Let us begin by examining the relationship between age and strength of party identification in 1952. As can be seen in Table 1, the percentage of strong identifiers was lowest among persons born between 1916 and 1923 (ages 29–36), and next lowest among those born between 1924 and 1931 (ages 21–28). Table 2 indicates that these 21- to 28-year olds also had the lowest percentage of identifiers (both strong and weak). Slightly more than one white in twenty was a pure Independent, and there was no relationship between age and pure Independence (see Table 3). The mean strength of party identification was lower among the 1916–1923 and the 1924–1931 cohorts than among any of the older age groups (see Table 4). As Campbell's discussion suggests, there are two plausible explanations for the weakness of party loyalties among these young adults. A life-cycle explanation suggests that their weak party loyalties result from political inexperience, whereas a generational explanation suggests differences between their formative socialization and that of their elders.

If a life-cycle explanation for the weak party loyalties of the young were valid, their feelings of party identification would grow stronger with age. The cohort born between 1916 and 1923, which had the largest percentage of weak partisans, should develop stronger partisan attachment as it aged. So, too, the cohort born between 1924 and 1931 should develop stronger partisanship as persons in that age group gained more experience and more opportunities to grow attached to the party of their choice; this cohort had the largest percentage of Independents who leaned toward one of the major parties, and many of them might become loyal partisans as they aged. Even pure Independents might develop partisan attachments.[15] Thus the percentage of strong and weak party identifiers among the 1924–1931 cohort should increase during the subsequent two decades. We might expect the proportion of pure Independents to decline. And the mean level of party identification among the two youngest cohorts should grow as they aged and had more time to become attached to their political party.

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[9] Campbell et al., p. 161.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 163. For a similar analysis examining the relationship of age and strength of partisanship in Britain, see David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 55–58.

[13] The basic procedure was comparison of persons 44 years or younger with those 45 years or older. The authors, however, found only 27 persons 45 years old and older who had held their current identifications for less than four years, and only 40 who had held their current identification for between four and seven years.

[14] See Edward C. Dreyer, "Change and Stability in Party Identifications," *Journal of Politics*, 35 (August, 1973), 712–722.

A generational explanation is based upon different assumptions and predicts different relationships. It assumes that there is a formative period during which fairly enduring attitudes are learned; after that, attitudes tend to become relatively stable. While such assumptions are not valid for all political attitudes, there is considerable evidence, much of it presented by Campbell and his colleagues themselves, that they are valid for party loyalties.[16] Even before they enter the electorate, many persons have already learned party loyalties, but these loyalties are likely to be weak.[17] The most important experiences in changing a person's party loyalties probably occur between the time he enters the work force and the first few elections in which he participates. This is frequently a period of social and geographic mobility, often including marriage which further weakens parental ties. Although many persons will have party loyalties even before they vote, they have had few opportunities to reinforce those loyalties through political behavior. If social and political conditions contribute to the formation of strong party loyalties during this period, the relative level of partisan identification among the cohort will continue to be high. But if conditions during this formative period contribute to the development of weak party loyalties, party loyalties are likely to remain weak.

If the generational explanation is correct, most persons in the 1916–1923 cohort experienced formative socialization in the late 1930s and World War II, and by 1952 would be relatively resistant to partisan change; party identification among this cohort might well remain low as its members aged. Persons born between 1924 and 1931 experienced formative socialization during or after World War II, and in 1952 many would still be relatively open to partisan change. A generational explanation would not necessarily predict either a rise or a decline in levels of partisan identification, but, given the political and social conditions following 1952, party loyalties might remain low. During this period, party leadership was weak: Eisenhower provided little leadership for the Republicans, and both Johnson and Nixon developed personal campaign organizations that bypassed formal party structures.[18] The division of party responsibility between the President and Congress for much of this period may have dampened the development of strong party ties. Candidates, especially Republicans, played down their party and ran highly individualized campaigns. By stressing candidates at the expense of parties, television may have further weakened party loyalties. Television made political information cheaper, and the political party may have declined in importance as a means of reducing information costs. And, although there was rapid social change —massive migrations from the farms to the cities, the mass mobilization of blacks, the growth of higher education—neither party seemed able to capitalize upon those changes by offering programs to reinforce party loyalties.[19] Given these conditions, in spite of the predictions generated by the life-cycle explanation, party loyalties might fail to develop among the young as they gained more political experience.

These explanations can be tested by a time-series cohort analysis.[20] In the absence of panel data covering these twenty-two years, one cannot compare the same respondents sampled at different times; but cohorts sampled in 1952 can be compared with persons born during the same years sampled in subsequent surveys.[21] A life-cycle explanation predicts that levels of party identification will increase among the 1916–1923 and 1924–1931 cohorts as their mean age increases; a generational explanation predicts that levels of identification among these cohorts will remain low. To the extent that the youngest cohorts still have relatively flexible partisan loyalties, their level of party identification might, indeed, decline.

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[15] On the other hand, Independence might be a form of loyalty in and of itself. Pure Independents might become more committed to Independence as they gained political experience.

[16] See Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 125–128, and Butler and Stokes, *Political Change in Britain*, pp. 44–64. Also see William N. McPhee and Jack Ferguson, "Political Immunization," in *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections*, ed. William N. McPhee and William Glaser (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 155–179.

[17] A three-wave panel study of fourth, sixth, and eighth graders in the San Francisco Bay area conducted between December 1968 and May 1969 showed children to have relatively unstable partisan identifications compared to those of adults. (See Pauline Marie Vaillancourt and Richard G. Niemi, "Children's Party Choices," in *The Politics of Future Citizens*, ed. Richard G. Niemi [San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974], pp. 126–148.) For a further discussion of the strength of party identification among pre-adults, see David O. Sears, "Political Socialization," in *Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 2: Micropolitical Theory*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 93–153, at pp. 121–123.

[18] For a discussion of party leadership during the postwar years, see David S. Broder, *The Party's Over: The Failure of Politics in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). For another provocative discussion, see Walter Dean Burnham, "The End of American Party Politics," *Trans-action*, 7 (December, 1969), 12–22.

[19] Gerald Pomper, who also discusses the weak party identifications of young Americans, argues that they result from the political events of the last decade. See *Voters' Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behavior* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1975), pp. 23–24.

[20] As Karen Oppenheim Mason and her colleagues clearly show, any cohort analysis faces a basic methodo-

We can discriminate between these explanations by reading down each column of the tables. The data provide virtually no support for a life-cycle explanation. Only the first measure of partisanship shows any strengthening of party loyalties among the 1916–1923 cohort. There was a rise in the percentage of strong partisans between 1952 and 1964, but there was a decline after that, and in 1974 the percentage of strong partisans was only slightly higher than it had been when that cohort was twenty-two years younger. The remaining three measures, however, show lower levels of partisanship in 1974 than in 1952.

The pattern among the 1924–1931 cohort provides an even stronger refutation of the life-cycle explanation, for between 1952 and 1974 partisan strength declined on all four measures. Further compelling evidence against the life-cycle explanation is found in the change among the 1932–1939 cohort, part of which was sampled by the 1956 survey.[22] Although this cohort had aged eighteen years by 1974, partisan strength declined on three of the four measures, and the percentage of identifiers (strong and weak) was unchanged. The 1940–1947 cohort also showed no tendency to develop stronger partisan loyalties in the ten years after 1964; instead, partisan strength dropped markedly. The 1948–1955 cohort, first sampled in 1970 when some of its members had not yet been enfranchised, had weaker party identifications than did their elders on all four measures. While four years is not long enough to discriminate adequately between alternative explanations, it is noteworthy that low levels of identification persisted in both 1972 and 1974.

This analysis strongly suggests that the relatively weak party identifications among the young result from fundamental differences between their socialization and that of their elders. It provides virtually no evidence that this low level of identification is only temporary. Since this analysis is based upon eight independently conducted probability samples, and since the numbers upon which the percentages and means were calculated are fairly substantial, it is highly unlikely that the observed decline in partisanship among the cohorts born after 1923 resulted from sampling error. To reject the life-cycle explanation, however, one would need only to demonstrate that partisanship failed to *increase* among these cohorts. But if this analysis is

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logical problem: each of the three independent variables—age, period of survey, and years of birth—is a perfect function of the other two. Mason and her colleagues propose a model, employing Multiple Classification Analysis, that allows the analyst to estimate the effects of age, period, and cohort. (See Karen Oppenheim Mason, William M. Mason, H. H. Winsborough, and W. Kenneth Poole, "Some Methodological Issues in Cohort Analysis of Archival Data," *American Sociological Review*, 38 [April, 1973], 242–258). David Knoke and Michael Hout, using the Michigan SRC data, have applied the Mason et al. technique to the study of party identification. (See "Social and Demographic Factors in American Political Party Affiliations, 1952–1972," *American Sociological Review*, 39 [October, 1974], 700–713.) However, both the applicability of the Mason et al. model to attitudinal data and the use of this model by Knoke and Hout have been questioned in a recent paper by Norval D. Glenn, who argues that the model necessitates unwarrented assumptions. (See "Some Cautions Concerning Statistical Attempts to Separate Age, Period, and Cohort Effects," paper presented at the 71st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September, 1975).

While the methodological problems of cohort analysis may be unresolved, the theoretical expectations of the life-cycle explanation are so clear that the failure of partisanship to rise among cohorts as they age provides, at the very least, a basis for seriously questioning *The American Voter* formulation.

[21] All these surveys are based upon national probability samples, and, as the Ns have been reported, the reader can evaluate the probability of differences between age groups in Tables 1 through 3 resulting from sampling error. (As weighted Ns were used for 1958, 1960, and 1974, tests of significance are not valid for those years.) However, the best assurance that differences between cohorts are meaningful is the replication of age-group differences in numerous surveys based upon separately conducted samples. In this respect, too, the 1958, 1960, and 1974 data are less satisfactory. More than half the respondents in 1958 and 1960 originally were sampled as part of a panel study begun in 1956, and more than half of the respondents in 1974 originally were sampled as part of a panel study begun in 1972. Thus, the high consistency in levels of identification among cohorts in 1956, 1958, and 1960, and between cohorts in 1972 and 1974 partly results from sampling procedures.

One can also gain greater confidence that age group differences are meaningful by replicating this analysis with other data sets. To this end, I report upon a study by Norval D. Glenn who used Gallup data to conduct a similar analysis.

[22] Although levels of partisanship are reported for the 1932–1939 cohort in 1956 and 1958, the full eight-year cohort was not sampled until 1960. The full eight-year cohort born between 1940 and 1947 was not sampled until 1968. In 1970, the SRC began to sample eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year olds. Nevertheless, the full eight-year cohort born between 1948 and 1955 was not sampled until 1974. Respondents born in 1956 were not included in this youngest cohort, but since only ten respondents born during that year were included in the electorate sample, their levels of identification have not been reported.

not convincing enough, additional analyses, based upon totally independent data sets, also clearly refute the life-cycle explanation.

One study includes Norval D. Glenn and Ted Hefner's excellent cohort analysis of Gallup data collected from 1945 through 1969, and Glenn's updated analysis of 1971 Gallup surveys.[23] (Since Gallup surveys do not distinguish between strong and weak partisans, or between Independents who lean toward a party and those who do not, these data are roughly comparable to my analysis of the proportion who were strong or weak partisans.[24]) Glenn reports a decline in party identification during the 26-year period, from 78 per cent in 1945 to 70 per cent in 1971, most of the decline occurring after 1965. His analysis provides virtually no evidence that young adults became more partisan as they aged. Glenn and Hefner conclude that "the widely cited finding of Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes that older people have stronger party identification on the average than young adults reflects, largely or entirely, an intercohort rather than a life-stage difference."[25]

A panel study by M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi further demonstrates that in recent years young adults have not become more partisan as they aged.[26] Beginning in 1965 with a sample of high school seniors and their parents, they conducted a second wave of their study in 1973, collecting data on partisanship from over 1300 youths and 1100 parents in both waves. In 1965, 25 per cent of these youths had been strong party identifiers; by 1973 only 13 per cent were. In 1965, 64 per cent were strong or weak identifiers; by 1973 only 51 per cent were. Even the percentage of pure Independents rose slightly, from 13 per cent in 1965 to 16 per cent in 1973. In 1965 the mean strength of partisanship among these youths, according to my calculations,[27] was 1.76; by 1973 it dropped to 1.48. These changes, Jennings and Niemi concluded, were "startling." Because a life-cycle explanation clearly would lead one to expect the proportion of identifiers to rise among a cohort maturing from its late teens into its mid-twenties, the decline of party identification, they concluded, "provides a compelling argument for a generation effect."[28]

These panel data have also been used by Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg to compare directly the same individuals over time.[29] Among youths who were Democrats in 1965, only 59 per cent were Democrats eight years later, 7 per cent were Republicans, and 34 per cent were Independents (including Independents who leaned toward a party). Among those who began as Republicans, only 46 per cent remained Republican, 15 per cent were Democrats, and 39 per cent were Independents. But among those who began as Independents, 65 per cent remained Independents eight years later, while 18 per cent were Democrats and 16 per cent were Republicans. This direct panel comparison clearly demonstrates that the overall direction of change in recent years has been toward weakening identifications: young Independents were more likely to retain their Independence than were young partisans to retain their partisan loyalties.

Hidden Life-Cycle Effects?

Given my findings, the Glenn analyses, and the Jennings and Niemi data, can we conclude that the partisan loyalties of young Americans do not increase with age? I believe we can, but W. Phillips Shively makes several interesting counterarguments in a critique of an earlier version of this article.[30] First, as he notes, *The American Voter* data suggest fairly gradual increases in partisanship from year to year. According to data presented by Campbell et al., 24 per cent of the 21- to 24-year-olds were strong party identifiers, 53 per cent of cent of the 70 to 75-year-olds were. Thus, Shively argues, one would expect an increase of .58 per cent per year as cohorts aged. (Following the same logic, one would expect the combined percentage of strong and weak identifiers to increase .34 per cent per year.) Shively argues that this gradual increase might not be detected during only two decades. But during the course of twenty-two years, one would expect the percentage of strong partisans to rise by nearly 13 per cent, and the percentage of identifiers to rise by more than 7 per cent. Of course, only data collected during future years can determine whether my analysis (as well as Glenn's analysis that examined change over twenty-six years) failed to detect aging effects that have yet to emerge.

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[23] See Norval D. Glenn and Ted Hefner, "Further Evidence on Aging and Party Identification," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36 (Spring, 1972), 31–47; and Glenn, "Sources of Shift to Political Independence: Some Evidence from a Cohort Analysis," *Social Science Quarterly*, 53 (December, 1972) 494–519.

Since women tend to outlive men, the proportion of females in a cohort will increase as it ages. Glenn introduced a weighting factor to compensate for this tendency. As he reports, sex differences in levels of identification were small, and his weighting procedure had little effect on his results. The present analysis consistently controlled for sex, but since sex differences were small, no weighting factor was used.

[24] Glenn usually reports a slightly higher proportion of identifiers than that reported in Table 2 of this article. Glenn's analysis includes nonwhites, but this difference does not account for his tendency to find a larger proportion of identifiers. When blacks are included in the present study, the overall percentage of identifiers is affected only marginally.

[25] Glenn and Hefner, "Further Evidence," p. 44.

[26] M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: A Longitudinal Study of Two Generations," *American Political Science Review*, 69 (December, 1975), 1316–1335.

[27] These scores are based upon the same procedures used in Table 4, except that apoliticals were not included in these calculations.

[28] Jennings and Niemi, "Continuity and Change," p. 1325.

[29] Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, "Is Party Identification Stable?", in *Controversies in American Voting Behavior*, ed. Niemi and Weisberg (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976).

[30] W. Phillips Shively, "The Development of Aggregate Levels of Partisanship," mimeo, University of Minnesota, January, 1975. Shively was discussing a mimeographed version of this article written in May, 1974.

Shively's second point is more important: life-cycle effects may be present in the SRC data, but may have been "swamped" by other factors that cancel out the absolute strengthening of partisan loyalties. In the language of cohort analysis, "period effects" might be so strong that life-cycle effects would be difficult to detect. Aging effects, Shively argues, may occur even though the absolute level of partisanship among a cohort declines. Shively then correctly demonstrates that when one compares changes among cohorts over time with changes in partisanship for the electorate as a whole, the relative strength of identification among cohorts often rises as they age. This is apparent from the data I present. For example, the 1924–1931 cohort had lower than the overall level of strong partisanship in 1952, but by 1974 had the same identification level as the electorate as a whole. Even though the absolute level of identification among this cohort decreased, its relative level of partisanship compared with the electorate as a whole increased. But Shively's measurement procedures did not account for the changing composition of the electorate.[31] The overall level of partisanship among the electorate fell, as I will show below, largely because new cohorts with low identification levels entered the electorate, and because of attrition among older cohorts with high identification levels. When one compares each cohort across time with cohorts already in the electorate when the cohort was first sampled, the relative level of partisanship seldom rises. For example, compared with most older cohorts, the 1924–1931 cohort had relatively low identification levels in 1952; in 1974 it still had relatively low identification levels compared with three of the four remaining older cohorts in the table. In any event, the life-cycle explanation, as formulated in *The American Voter*, strongly suggests absolute increases in identification as cohorts age.

Findings Not Accounted for by the Generational Explanation

The data strongly suggest that generational differences account for the low levels of identification among Americans who have entered the electorate since World War II, but a generational explanation cannot account for all of the data I have presented. A generational explanation predicts considerable stability in the partisanship of older cohorts, but after 1964 partisanship began to erode even among older cohorts. Between 1964 and 1966, the percentage of party identifiers dropped in six of the eight cohorts, the percentage of pure Independents rose in seven, and the mean strength of partisanship dropped for all eight age groups. The most pronounced drop, occurring in all age groups, was in the percentage of strong identifiers.[32]

The data in Table 1 show two separate processes at work through 1964. Between 1952 and 1964, among the cohorts born before 1924, and entering the electorate before or during World War II, the proportion of strong identifiers grew. But the proportion of strong identifiers did not grow among cohorts entering the electorate after the War. A life-cycle explanation predicts the growing partisanship of the older cohorts, but it cannot account for the failure of the young to develop stronger party loyalties. The decline in strong partisanship between 1964 and 1966 was of similar magnitude among both the prewar[33] and postwar cohorts. Although a generational explanation might account for the erosion in identifications among the younger age groups, it cannot explain the decline in strong partisanship among the prewar cohorts, the youngest member of which was now over forty. But although there was some fluctuation in levels of strong partisanship during the next eight years, most cohorts had close to the same percentage of strong partisans in 1974 as in 1966. In 1974, each of the prewar cohorts had a level of strong partisanship that was as high or slightly higher than in 1952. But each of the postwar cohorts had a lower level of strong partisanship in 1974 than when it had first entered the electorate.

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[31] Although Shively does not use this label, his proposed measurement technique can be considered a "correction for trend" procedure. For a more detailed discussion of reasons such "corrections" must consider compositional effects, see Neal E. Cutler, "Toward a Generational Conception of Political Socialization," in *New Directions in Political Socialization*, ed. David C. Schwartz and Sandra Kenyon Schwartz (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 254–288, at pp. 272–273.

[32] As several studies have shown, the shift toward partisan independence was most marked in the South. See E. M. Schreiber, " 'Where the Ducks Are': Southern Strategy Versus Fourth Party," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 35 (Summer, 1971), 157–167; Glenn, "Sources of Shift"; and Paul Allen Beck, "Partisan Stability and Change in the American South: 1952–1972," paper presented at the 70th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September, 1974. But the shift away from partisan loyalties was also a nationwide trend. I have also avoided conducting this cohort analysis within regions for a basic methodological reason: cohort analysis assumes that when one traces an age group across time its social composition is unchanged. Migrations between regions in the United States are age-related, and the composition of a cohort within a region may change over time as a result of these migrations.

[33] Persons born before 1924 are labeled the prewar electorate, even though a small proportion entered the electorate during World War II.

Clearly there were strong period effects during these years, influences affecting persons of all ages. As Warren Miller has suggested, "The impact on the young is seen in their increasing tendency to eschew partisanship; for the old the impact of the same factors does not lead so much to diminution of partisan attachment as to prevention of any increase."[34]

The Impact of Generational Change on Overall Levels of Partisanship

Considerable evidence has been presented to show that the low levels of partisanship among young Americans do not result from their youth, but appear to result from generational differences. These differences, as we will now see, have a sizable impact on the overall level of partisanship, for the composition of the American electorate has changed considerably during the postwar years. In fact, the overall decline in party identification between 1952 and 1974 results largely from new cohorts entering the electorate after World War II and of older cohorts diminishing through death. Although older cohorts have fluctuated somewhat in their level of party identification, in most cases their identification levels in 1974 differed little from those of some twenty-two years earlier.

Among whites born before 1924, 36 per cent were strongly partisan in 1952, and by 1964, 41 per cent were; after 1964, the percentage dropped, and by 1974, 33 per cent were strongly partisan.[35] The percentage of strong and weak partisans follows a similar pattern. In 1952, 76 per cent of the prewar electorate were party identifiers; the proportion rose to 80 per cent in 1958, and remained at that level in 1964; by 1974 it declined to 70 per cent. The proportion of pure Independents among the electorate was 6 per cent in 1952, and reached 12 per cent in 1966; in 1974 it was 11 per cent. The mean level of party identification for the prewar electorate was 2.05 in 1952, and by 1964, 2.14. By 1974, it dropped to 1.90. With all four measures the decline in partisanship among the prewar electorate between 1952 and 1974 was far smaller than the decline among the electorate as a whole. Moreover, even to the extent that party identification did fall among the prewar electorate, that decline resulted largely from differential death rates, for the older prewar cohorts, which had high identification levels, diminished far more than the younger prewar cohorts.[36] In fact, regardless of which measure of partisanship we use, the overall decline in identification between 1952 and 1974 results largely from the ever-increasing number of persons entering the electorate after World War II and from the diminution through death of the older cohorts.

Glenn's cohort divisions allow us to approximate closely the prewar/postwar dichotomy.[37] Among persons born before 1925, 78 per cent were party identifiers in 1945, and that percentage was unchanged 26 years later. The overall percentage of identifiers among the electorate dropped eight per cent, entirely because of the entrance of persons born after 1924 into the electorate and the continual diminution of the older age groups. Jennings and Niemi do not present data on the overall decline of party identification among the electorate, but their data show considerable stability in the identifications of the parental generation.[38]

To a large extent the overall decline in party identification between 1952 and 1974 results from generational change, a process in which the political predispositions of the older generations tend to persist, although older generations gradually are replaced by new generations with different attitudes from those of their elders. But we must also examine period effects to account for the more rapid erosion of partisanship between 1964 and 1974. Those effects are quite pronounced in the decline of strong party identifiers, for even among the prewar electorate there was an eight per cent drop during those ten years. But, even if the prewar cohorts had retained their 1964 identification levels, the overall proportion of strong identifiers would have declined, since the proportion of strong identifiers dropped among younger cohorts as well. Moreover, the large cohorts born after World War II began entering the electorate, a process accelerated by enfranchising eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds. Persons born before 1924 made up 60 per cent of the white electorate in 1964, and only 39 per cent ten years later.

We may estimate roughly the importance of period effects between 1964 and 1974 by making a series of simple assumptions. If the prewar cohorts had retained their 1964 identification levels, while the postwar cohorts declined at the rates actually observed, 27 per cent of the electorate would have been strong party identifiers in 1974. The decline in strong identifiers would have been nine per cent, rather than the 12 per cent that actually occurred. If all the cohorts born before 1944 had retained their 1964 identification levels, 29 per cent of the electorate still would have been strong identifiers. There still would have been a seven per cent drop in the proportion of strong identifiers. In other words, the proportion of strong party identifiers would have declined without any erosion in party loyalties among persons who had entered the electorate by 1964, but that decline would have been less marked if period effects had not eroded strong partisanship among all age cohorts.

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[34] Personal communication, May 30, 1974.

[35] These figures include persons in cohorts older than those presented in the tables.

[36] The cohorts born before 1900, which had very high identification levels, made up 37 per cent of the prewar electorate in 1952, but only 15 per cent in 1974.

[37] Glenn reports the ages of his cohorts during the years they were surveyed. My reports about the years of birth of his cohorts are based upon my approximations. Since all persons sampled in 1945 were born before 1925, the overall identification level for that year is reported; with the 1971 data, the partisanship of persons born between 1885 and 1924 is reported.

[38] Jennings and Niemi, "Continuity, and Change," pp. 1323–1324; Niemi and Weisberg, "Is Party Identification Stable?"

Conclusions

These findings force us to reject or at least to modify the received proposition that weak party loyalties among young adults result from their youth. That proposition may be true in other societies, but there is no evidence that life-cycle effects account for the weak party loyalties of young Americans. In developing the life-cycle explanation, Campbell and his colleagues did not take politics adequately into account. Partisan loyalties might grow stronger throughout the life-cycle, *if* political conditions reinforce party ties; conditions in postwar America did not.

These findings call into question Philip Converse's more recent arguments about the way party loyalties develop. Developing an elegant and parsimonious model, Converse postulates a gradual increase in partisanship among generations and among the entire electorate.[39] In a mature party system, according to his model, identification levels would stabilize. Using *The Civic Culture* data to test his model, he finds considerable support for it. But the data presented here show partisan decay, not stability. Moreover, Converse's model assumes that partisan loyalties among individuals strengthen as they age, and these data provide no support for that assumption. Perhaps, as Ronald Inglehart and Avram Hochstein conclude, Converse's model may describe the development of party loyalties in periods of partisan stability, but cannot account for periods of rapid partisan change.[40]

We may also question Converse and his colleagues' discussion of the high level of Wallace voting among young Americans in 1968.[41] The young, they claim, voted for Wallace more often than their elders because they had weaker party loyalties; when controls for strength of party loyalties were introduced, the tendency of the young to vote for Wallace was eliminated.[42] Converse et al. assumed that the weak partisanship of young adults resulted from life-cycle differences, and concluded that high levels of Wallace voting among young Americans should not be seen as the beginning of a trend. But if the low level of identification of young Americans results largely from differences between their formative socialization and that of their elders, the potential of the American electorate to support new parties may be greater than Converse and his colleagues reasoned.

The findings in this article have far-reaching implications, especially if Campbell and his colleagues are correct in their arguments about the contribution of party loyalties to political stability. Persons with strong party loyalties, they argue, are more resistant to the appeals of new parties and of leaders outside the traditional party system.[43] While this conclusion has been challenged,[44] it still seems plausible. The very low level of partisan loyalties in America today does not necessarily presage dangers for American democracy, or even a breakdown of the two-party system. But weak party loyalties may set the stage for new party alignments.[45] New parties are more likely to succeed when many voters have weak loyalties to the established parties. And survey research itself may contribute to the further erosion of party ties, for political leaders are well aware of the decline in party identification and may be tempted to continue minimizing party appeals.

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[39] Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability."

[40] Inglehart and Hochstein, "Alignment and Dealignment of the Electorate in France and the United States, *Comparative Political Studies*, 5 (October, 1972), 343–372. Inglehart and Hochstein focus on the role of issues in eroding American party loyalties.

[41] See Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (December, 1969), 1083–1105, at 1103–1105.

[42] Converse et al., "Continuity and Change," p. 1104.

[43] These arguments are advanced in Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 120–145, and in several essays in another volume by these same authors, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966). Converse advances similar arguments in, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," and, with his colleagues, in "Continuity and Change."

[44] Most notably by W. Phillips Shively, "Party Identification, Party Choice, and Voting Stability: The Weimar Case," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (December, 1972), 1203–1225.

[45] For a discussion of possible new alignments, see Abramson, *Generational Change*, pp. 71–121.

Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case*

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"Autonomy," like the concepts "power" and "influence" which are closely related to it, has to be defined in terms of intentions as well as behavior. The knottiest problem of political science is probably to define these words; a single article about China is not likely to solve it.[1] But we must begin with this issue anyway, because it makes clear the assumptions that are not available to us. If the Chinese central newspaper *People's Daily* and the Shanghai paper *Wenhui pao* are at any time urging the same line on a policy, there is no way to infer just from that fact that either is dependent on the other. If they are urging different lines, then at least one of them is autonomous; but particularly in some periods, it would be difficult to say which. Since any study of power or autonomy must delve into the murky marsh of speculating about what one actor might have done if another had not expressed himself, we must in practice give any word of this sort a definition that is more loose than would be ideal. We will only talk here about similarities and differences between what happened in Shanghai and what happened in the central government at Peking, because that is all we can document.[2]

A fine example of our problem arises from the fact that this paper studies autonomy "during" the Cultural Revolution. But when did the Cultural Revolution end? One likely date would no doubt be the famous "congress of victory," the Party's Ninth, held in April 1969. In that month, the main communist newspaper in Hong Kong, the *Ta kung pao*, noted that "The world is anxiously waiting to know . . . where China goes from here, with the completion of the Cultural Revolution." But from Chengtu, at the same time, came an assurance that the congress marked "a new stage in the Cultural Revolution," not its "completion" as the Hong Kong paper had said. In that same month another local source in Honan quoted Chairman Mao to the effect that "it must not be thought that peace will come after the second or even the third cultural revolution." A more conservative Fukien report that April saw an imminent end to the movement and predicted confidently that the congress "will certainly lead us forward to seize all-round victory." In Shanghai, the conclusion was cautious and very hypothetical: Only the intensity of unknown future struggles could determine "whether or not the Cultural Revolution can be carried through to the end" at all. And what did Peking say? If "central" policy may be equated with a dictum of Chairman Mao, then in this case it was ambiguous. With his usual circumspection, Mao said, "We hope that the present congress will be one of unity and of victory and that after its conclusion, still greater victories will be won throughout the country."[3]

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* The author warmly thanks the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, the Center of International Studies of Princeton University, and the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of California, Berkeley, for support in this project. He is highly grateful for the comments of two anonymous reviewers. All errors and "misstatements" are the author's responsibility solely.

[1] A summary of theoretical debate on this subject can be found in *Power*, John R. Champlin, ed. (New York: Atherton Press, 1971).

[2] Many China specialists have debated the extent of centralization or decentralization in the People's Republic. This is one of the predominant issues of the field, although there is not space here even to list all the important statements on it. A particularly sophisticated debate is in the area of military politics. William W. Whitson, with Huang Chen-hsia, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Military Politics, 1927–71* (New York: Praeger, 1973), argues that the People's Liberation Army is divided into regionally based "loyalty groups." Critiques of this view are by William L. Parish, "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," *China Quarterly*, No. 56 (Oct–Dec., 1973), 667–99, and by David S. G. Goodman, "The Statistical Evidence for Yang Ch'eng-wu's Manipulation of the Military Elite," *China Quarterly*, No. 57 (Jan.–Mar., 1974), 148–55. A noncentralist view of Chinese planning is offered in Audrey Donnithorne, *China's Economic System* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967). This volume is currently being revised, and Nicholas Lardy has written a dissertation at the University of Michigan that questions some of Donnithorne's conclusions on the basis of budget data. A relatively centralist perspective is found in Victor C. Falkenheim, "County Administration in Fukien," *China Quarterly*, No. 59 (July–Sept., 1974), 518–43. An analytically sophisticated essay that offers five "policy-making arenas" for which this issue can be discussed is Michael C. Oksenberg, "Chinese Politics and the Public Health Issue," in *Medicine and Society in China*, John Z. Bowers and Elizabeth F. Purcell, eds., (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1974), pp. 128–61. The main purpose of the present article is not to come down on either side of this centralist-localist debate, but to emphasize that a discussion of politics in this type of situation is unlike an analysis of nesting administrative jurisdictions.

[3] Summarized in the *South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong, April 20, 1969, p. 10.

Precedents for Autonomy

It may be useful to begin with a brief list of past occasions when Shanghai has shown some local autonomy, either in the sense that it served as a distinct "power base" which its leaders might use on the stage of national politics or in the sense that government policies were concocted differently there than in other parts of China. Nominally, Shanghai acquired the status of a "directly ruled city" (*chih hsia shih*) under the Nationalist central government in 1928. But in fact ever since then, this name has only meant that Shanghai is a province-level unit. Beginning in May 1949, the city was governed by the leaders of the communist Third Field Army, whose Commander was Ch'en Yi and whose First Political Commissar was Jao Shu-shih. Ch'en became Mayor, and Jao became First Secretary of the Shanghai Party Committee. During this early period, the top leadership of the city was identical with that of East China generally, and of the field army. The new Central government let field armies rule quite independently in large regions of the country at this time.[4]

Various of the city's bureaucracies were gradually integrated into a national framework before the elimination of the East China Great Administrative Area in 1954. The first Five-Year Plan, which committed relatively little investment to Shanghai, had a more nationally centralizing effect in inland cities than on the coast in general.[5] During this period, Shanghai's performance in the centrally written plan for grain production, for instance, was worse than that of any other province; whereas its overfulfillment of the central plan on cotton was better than any other province's. Cotton was more profitable than grain, when grown in Shanghai's ten rural counties, and the local agricultural departments seem to have been essentially ignoring central directives on this matter.[6] By the end of this Plan in 1957, Shanghai still contained about one-fifth of China's whole industrial economy, because the turnover from capital there was quicker (for economic reasons, involving both the production and marketing processes) than in relatively nondeveloped parts of China. The Great Leap Forward of 1958 further increased local managerial autonomy in Shanghai as elsewhere.[7]

In the aftermath of the Leap, the city's autonomy in cultural policy became an important factor on the national scene. A debate on the Party's cultural line had long raged in Shanghai and elsewhere between radicals and quasi-liberals. It reached a climax in 1962, when the famous novelist Pa Chin made a speech against radical literary critics at the Second Shanghai Congress of Writers and Artists.[8] In the spring of the following year, Mayor K'o Ch'ing-shih fixed local policy in this dispute by appointing a leftist editor named Chang Ch'un-ch'iao to head the city's Party Propaganda Department. This appointment may be considered the first "power seizure" of the Cultural Revolution. It provided a friendly place for Chiang Ch'ing's experiments in revolutionary opera during the mid-1960s. Some of her productions were staged in Peking at that time; but they were received badly there, and local authorities called them tasteless, "like boiled water."[9] K'o, Chang, and critic Yao Wen-yüan in Shanghai were much more receptive. As Mao Tse-tung himself put it, "If there was revisionism in the Center, what would the regions do about it? I felt my view couldn't be accepted in Peking. Why wasn't the criticism of Wu Han started in Peking but in Shanghai? This was because there were no available men in Peking. Now the question of Peking is solved."[10]

Actions like Yao's famous criticism from Shanghai of Wu Han's play, *The Dismissal of Hai Jui*,[11] were certainly based on the local power configuration, and they were certainly directed against a different policy than the one that prevailed in Peking. But a conceptual problem arises here that must shape our analysis and conclusions mightily: Yao's article in the Shanghai *Wenhui pao* was also a national event, instigated by Mao Tse-tung himself, who must surely be considered a "central" leader even in 1965. This event was also based in local politics, and it was at odds with what most factions in Peking wanted. Was it evidence of Shanghai's "autonomy"? The Peking and Shanghai leaderships were traveling in divergent directions by 1965, even though neither regarded itself as essentially local.[12]

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[4] Kau Ying-mao, *The People's Liberation Army and China's Nation Building* (White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973), p. xxix; and Kau's forthcoming book on *Bureaucracy and Political Development in Communist China*.

[5] Audrey Donnithorne, *China's Economic System*, pp. 144–5. See also Nicholas R. Lardy, "Economic Planning in the People's Republic of China: Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington: GPO, 1975), pp. 94–115.

[6] Cf. the table in my "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955–69," *Elites in People's Republic of China*, Robert A. Scalapino, ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 312.

[7] I intend to refine this point in a future book about urban economic institutions in Shanghai. Donnithorne and Lardy, in the works cited above, agree that the city's managerial independence increased in 1958, although they disagree concerning its fiscal autonomy.

[8] White, "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955–69" pp. 334–8.

[9] Union Research Service, Hong Kong, XL, No. 26 (August 13, 1965), 185.

[10] *Mao*, Jerome Ch'en, ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 96–97. Mao's statement was made on October 25, 1966.

[11] *Wenhui pao* (Documentary News), Shanghai (hereafter WHP), November 10, 1965.

[12] There is no suggestion here that this kind of problem

Autonomy is not just a matter of what local authorities *can* do; it is also determined by what they *want* to do. In industrial policy—as contrasted with cultural policy—there was no evident disagreement between most Shanghai and central leaderships at this time. And the city's local institutions allowed a separation between high cadres dealing with economic matters and those who dealt with culture. Shanghai's senior deputy mayor, Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, dealt with economic affairs until early 1965, when he prepared to succeed Mayor K'o during the latter's last illness. Ts'ao presided as acting mayor at two major conferences on administrative and economic policies in February and March 1965, when he urged Shanghai's compliance with central directives to "organize a climax of industrial production," "increase capital," and develop more foreign trade.[13] Ts'ao was a centralizer in urban economic policy. This position did not at the time put him into any evident conflict with leaders who wanted a more radical cultural policy. Autonomy was no issue, as long as disagreements could be sublimated.

Early Cultural Revolution: Autonomy in Factions at Many Levels

Thus far we have been assessing the degree of political hierarchy between national and local levels of administration. The difficulties with this kind of analysis become evident in Shanghai examples from 1966, when both the city and the central government were split into contending groups. Relations between them certainly did not cease to exist, but they were structured by the divisions within each administrative level. Radicals in Shanghai universities and publishing houses, which felt the earthquakes of the early Cultural Revolution most severely, often took their lead from ideological friends in Peking—if not from the official Party or government there.[14] Many municipal institutions were paralyzed by mid-1966 directives from Peking, and organizations could now form quickly to oppose them both below and above the city level. The Central Committee's August Plenum sent down a list of "Sixteen Points" which confused and neutralized public security cadres at the province and urban district levels in Shanghai. This paralysis of control organs left the local Party open to attacks which in previous years would have been repressed without a chance of developing.[15] This was a sign of local autonomy "in" Shanghai but not at the municipal and district levels, which were being stymied to allow the rise of Red Guard groups.

Any discussion of local autonomy in this period must emphasize the Shanghai Garrison. Its Public Security units were given new, liberalized orders about how they should tolerate dissidents. In addition, the land, naval, and air units were also instructed to convene "talk about application meetings" (*chiang yung hui*) in October and November, to provide more communication between the Army and at least some cadre leaders. For the most part, this movement began in the suburbs of the city, near servicemen's barracks.[16] Army groups had been doing this kind of thing on a smaller scale since 1964, but the critical autumn of 1966 saw an upsurge in the movement which was related to the linking of some civilian hierarchies to military organization as a means of assuring China's unity.

Radical civilians in Shanghai—notably Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, who was a secretary of the city's Party committee since 1965—evinced independence from many local elements in the political kaleidoscope at this time. Chang flew from Peking to Ant'ing East (a railway stop halfway between Shanghai and Soochow) on November 11 to help resolve labor demands that were being pressed upon the Municipal Committee by the Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters. Apparently acting on his own initiative,[17] Chang undercut the Party committee's negotiating position by signing the petition of these workers in his capacity as a member of the central Cultural Revolution Small Group. In this kind of situation—when central and local politics were both split by disputes that crosscut administrative divisions—autonomy and coordination can only be discussed in terms of a very political and nonadministrative definition of the word "level"[18] Chang was representing a central faction from Peking against the Shanghai Party Committee—of which he was also a member. No attempt will be made here to give a blow-by-blow account of the famous January Revolution in the winter of 1966–67. Suffice it to

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—which is certainly obvious in Shanghai—cannot apply in principle to other provinces too. A Kao Kang in the Northeast, or later a Huang Yung-sheng from Canton, certainly might have national ideas. The author may sometimes fail to avoid being a Shanghai local chauvinist; but he tries.

[13] *Hsinmin wanpao* (New People's Evening News), Shanghai (hereafter HMWP), February 19 and March 30, 1965.

[14] Cf. White, "Shanghai's Polity in Cultural Revolution," *The City in Communist China*, John W. Lewis, ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 343.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 328–9.

[16] *Shanghai wanpao* (Shanghai Evening News), Shanghai (hereafter SHWP), October 11, 1911, notes a *chiang yung hui* at Ts'aoching Commune, organized by land soldiers. The same newspaper on November 16 describes another, organized by airmen; and on November 20, still another such meeting, convened by "a certain unit of the East Sea Fleet" whose quarters is at Woosung in the Shanghai suburbs.

[17] Cf. White, "Leadership in Shanghai," p. 350.

[18] For such a definition, cf. the attempt in "Shanghai's Polity in Cultural Revolution," pp. 368–9.

say that nearly every group in Shanghai, no matter how it was generated, seemed to have its own autonomous policies then. The January 6 editorial in the "liberated" Shanghai *Wenhui pao* quoted Mao as saying that "rebellion is justified." None of the nice distinctions that arose later between "left" and "right" rebellion were yet suggested. Instead, the cheque was quite blank:

> "This has gone too far" is the view held by those who favor revolution made in comfortable ways. This is revisionist. Violent attack is the only way to destroy all enemies . . . One either actively supports the revolutionary actions of the rebels, or one firmly opposes them. There is no middle road. Only true Marxists hold that "To rebel is justified."

As long as any group could lay claim to "true Marxism," this was a formula for autonomy everywhere.

Restoring Hierarchical Links Between Levels

The demise of Shanghai's Party organization apparently came as a shock even to those who engineered it. Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, Ch'en P'ei-hsien, and all the deputy mayors, as well as all the municipal Party secretaries (including Chang), were under attack by "big character posters" in Shanghai that January. When power was seized from almost all of them, the Party ceased to function in Shanghai. But as early as January 8, a "radical" newspaper, the *Shanghai Red Guard War Report*, was already urging that the Center be asked to reorganize the Municipal Party Committee. On January 12, at a meeting of 10,000 people to denounce the leaders of the local Communist Youth League, a "rebel" spokesman said that the League itself must be preserved, even if its personnel were overthrown.[19]

Leaders newly at the helm, no less than their followers, clearly had no idea in this period what form the new local government was supposed to take. Many elements in Shanghai had independent ideas on the subject. The quick rise and fall of the Shanghai People's Commune demonstrates this fact graphically. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was being severely criticized in posters during late January. An organization at Futan University was set up to "examine" him. Probably after some consultation with his friends in Peking, and under point 9 of the Sixteen Points of the previous August Plenum of the Central Committee, Chang on February 6 proclaimed the Shanghai Commune. This institution helped to confirm his own local leadership, and so helped to unify the city for future reintegration with a national government. The Commune was hailed as a "creative application of the thought of Mao Tse-tung." But Chairman Mao himself had second thoughts. In mid-February he invited Chang to Peking, and (according to a wall poster) pointed out that[20] "if the country sets up communes, then the Chinese People's Republic will have to change its name to the Chinese People's Commune. . . . The Chairman suggests that Shanghai should change a little."

The gaping institutional vacuum, which had been caused in Shanghai by the Party's fall, could not be quickly filled by any alternative organization. But the desire for a more hierarchical order in many quarters was such that the *Chiehfang jihpao* (of which Chang had been Managing Editor for a time after May 1964) began to advocate Army intervention to establish a new local rule under his hegemony.

> It is not possible for the People's Liberation Army to refrain from intervening. Some people use "nonintervention" as a pretext to suppress the masses in reality. This is absolutely impermissible. Their so-called "nonintervention" is false. The question is not whether to intervene or not, but which side to stand on. . . . The demand of all genuine proletarian revolutionaries for the Army's assistance must be met.[21]

Any study of central-local relations during most of the Cultural Revolution becomes a study of the People's Liberation Army itself, since in most areas (and less in Shanghai than elsewhere) the PLA was the main surviving hierarchy.[22]

In a televised speech on February 24, Chang dissolved the Shanghai Commune and proclaimed the establishment of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee. Their leaderships were identical. The most important figures in both had enjoyed careers, more than 15 years before, in the Third Field Army (except Yao Wen-yüan and Wang Hung-wen, the youngest ranking members). Chang Ch'un-ch'iao had long been a political commissar in that Army. Wang Shao-yung, Ma T'ien-shui, and Ch'en Lin-hu had been subordinates of Jao Shu-shih, the head political officer of the Third Army. Liao Cheng-kuo, Kao Chih-jung, Chi Ying-wu, and other soldiers on the Committee still remained commanders from that Army in 1968.[23] Many of the deposed leaders were of course also connected with the Third Army; but on the whole, the original ranks of the people who took over were as high as of those who fell.

This may have been some consolation to remaining authorities at the Center, because dissident organizations in Shanghai during January and

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[19] New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA), Shanghai, July 14, 1967.

[20] Cited in "Leadership in Shanghai," pp. 352–3.

[21] NCNA, Peking, January 25, 1967, rephrasing *Chiehfang jihpao* (Liberation Daily), Shanghai (hereafter CFJP), editorial.

[22] Cf. Harvey Nelsen, "Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution," *China Quarterly* No. 51 (July–Sept. 1972), pp. 444–74.

[23] Whitson, *The Chinese High Command* p. 253.

February launched many general attacks against central authority as such. One can easily imagine the reaction of any Peking man—no matter what his political preferences—to local statements like the following:

> Some of our comrades think that everything has been solved now that the Shanghai Municipal Committee has been overthrown, so that the "thoroughness" of the revolution can be called off. They fail to perceive the reality of the reactionary line that was passed into factories through the work of bureaus, ministries, and corporations from the Center. . . . Although our factories are organizationally under the Shanghai Municipal Committee, nevertheless the sections that manifested the reactionary road to capitalism are those which are under the direct control of the ministries, bureaus, and corporations of the Center. Most of the leading cadres of the [Central] First Ministry of Machine Building are Liu Shao-ch'i's men. They carry out stubbornly the line of Liu and Teng. They take advantage of conditions in subordinate organizations all over the country. . . .[24]

Autonomy at this time was not always leftist; sometimes it was also rightist. The "economistic" tendency of local People's Bank branches to authorize high wage payments to workers was the target of specific central criticism on January 22. Also, a Party circular prohibited any change in the status of collectively owned enterprises or cooperatives to become "state-owned".[25] A fixed scale of more generous wages prevailed in state factories than in collectives, and the central prohibition on change to a "higher" form of ownership demonstrates the Center's scant interest in having more "state factories"—which in fact were mostly local-run, and often were just as independent of high authorities as were local collectives.

Central authorities were clearly alarmed at the extent to which mid-level cadres had been dismissed in Shanghai during the crest of the Cultural Revolution. As early as January 16, Premier Chou is reported to have said that "we should not promote the style of workers taking over management as they have done in Shanghai."[26] Some—not all—local forces heeded or agreed with this complaint. By February 21, even the "radical" *Wenhui pao*, still speaking for the Provisional Committee of the Shanghai People's Commune which was about to be dissolved, argued that "the evil wind of 'dragging out every cadre and striking down every power holder' comes from the class enemy." Rather tenderly, the paper suggested that *some* cadres were revolutionary, and they should be supported: "They should not be discriminated against, just because they are cadres."

An anarchist bee had been let loose in January, and the rest of 1967 and most of 1968 were devoted to efforts by the Revolutionary Committee and Peking to subdue it. There was probably more real autonomy in Shanghai at this time than at any other since liberation. For that very reason, the newly installed province-level and central authorities were closer in their basic aims than ever before. They both saw a need to balance the revolution with more order than existed then. The Revolutionary Committee called on "mass organizations"—a term that included all the officially tolerable new groups that had sprung up in Shanghai—to reduce "the number of their working personnel not taking part in production." It was ordered that "all individuals must strictly observe State plans and State systems." Chinese police were traditionally supposed to prevent rebellions, and now in a new vocabulary it was announced that "all rebels on the public security, procuratorial, and judicial fronts should unite together" and "closely coordinate with the Chinese People's Liberation Army units stationed in Shanghai . . . vigorously strengthening the work of maintaining law and order."[27]

The central and provincial authorities of this time adopted two policies to reduce the amount of autonomy at lower levels. In the first place, the Revolutionary Committee declared illegitimate all organizations that were not based on production or exchange processes. In particular, "Red Guard organizations formed by students should stop recruiting workers and poor and lower-middle peasants."[28] Later, as we shall see, the Committee itself set up exactly such organizations for its own purposes; but in early 1967 it wanted them abolished. In the second place, the new regime hoped to coopt as many local leaders as possible. For this purpose it was necessary to nurture cooperation between "leaders of mass organizations" and "revolutionary leading cadres." These latter were in fact often not very revolutionary at all, but they had survived January and had the experience that was needed to reestablish a thorough government. Of these groups, the second was politically as important as the first. At the beginning of April, a conference of "revolutionary leading cadres" from urban districts and corporations was held in Shanghai to urge them to be serious about "understanding the immortal achievements of the revolutionary mass organizations." Although the surviving old cadres were flattered as the "core and mainstay of the revolutionary three-way alliance," they were also supposed "to recognize the important role of the leaders of revolutionary mass organizations."[29]

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[24] *Chitien chanpao* (Machinery and Electricity War Report), Shanghai, published by the Shanghai Revolutionary Rebellion Joint Committee of the First Ministry of Machine Building, February 2, 1967; in the Union Research Institute Library.

[25] *Tungfang hung* (The East is Red), Peking, January 22, 1967.

[26] *China News Summary*, Hong Kong, No. 154 (January 19, 1967) p. A8, based on the January 16 dispatch from Peking of an *Asahi shimbun* reporter.

[27] NCNA, Shanghai, February 27, 1967; tr. *Survey of the China Mainland Press*, Hong Kong (hereafter SCMP), No. 3890, p. 6.

[28] *Ibid.*

On the whole, this plan for cooperation worked fairly well. By September, the *People's Daily* was praising Shanghai as a national model of success in creating alliances of both old and new cadres.[30] But later that same month, Premier Chou expressed some concern that big-character posters then going up in Shanghai should be more restrained in their content, despite their basic constructiveness. He urged that these posters should "refrain from spreading gossip, rumors, and state secrets," and he was also eager that they should not purvey obscene news or be written in bad taste.[31] The Premier clearly thought his cautionary words about what should be done in Shanghai would have some effect there.

Center-Shanghai relations were intimate at this time because the two most important civilian leaders in the city, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and to an even greater extent Yao Wen-yüan, were spending much of their time in Peking dealing with national questions. When a Congress of Red Representatives of Shanghai Vocational Schools was planned in December 1967, Yao from his desk in Peking sent a long telegram of detailed instructions "not to allow the organization of the Red Guards to become lifeless."[32] As we shall see later, Yao also felt able to use his position as a member of the Cultural Revolution Small Group to send off telegraphic memos to almost anyone in the country, including Army commanders.

Although civilians were important for administration in both the central and Shanghai governments, the military hierarchy remained vital for unity. This was the case even when garrisons in different places did not implicitly follow the same policies. The major radical civilian figures at the national level clearly had better relations with military organs in Shanghai than in most parts of the country. These improved relations were in part an outgrowth of Chiang Ch'ing's theatrical work in Shanghai during the early 1960s, which involved her cooperation with East China military figures. This connection may even have influenced the local garrison's policy on "supporting the left" in Shanghai. Numerous soldiers arrived at units like the No. 3 Stevedoring Section of the Shanghai Port, or the Hsinchien Machine Works; but they usually came without guns, to perform a mediating function rather than a strictly military one.[33]

The "people's armed forces departments," about which very little is known, were important in forging links between ordinary civilians and soldiers throughout Shanghai to strengthen the city's new vertical government. Such departments existed at the municipal, urban district, and county levels. They were staffed by both PLA soldiers and civilians, and they presaged many later mixed institutions of this sort. In mid-1967 some radical groups began "bombarding the armed forces departments indiscriminately" in Shanghai, but this action brought a quick reprimand from the *Wenhui pao*.[34] To consolidate these departments and make them more effective, the Shanghai Garrison organized special full-time cadre schools for their personnel in 1967. Leftists were invited to be teachers there, possibly because of an official desire to counteract antiradical sentiments among some factory militia leaders who worked in these departments. Possibly for this reason, at least 1500 cadres had to go through the training more than once. It was reported from factories in Hsühui District that many cadres who took this training became members of enterprise revolutionary committees.[35]

Some high generals in the Nanking Military Region came under verbal fire because of their reluctance to use force in "supporting the left." The most strenuous of these criticisms was directed by Red Guards against airforce units connected with Gen. Yü Li-chin, then stationed in Peking, who had been a leader in the Nanking area's air units through the mid-1960s. According to one report, Yü on August 12, 1967, in the name of the Shanghai air garrison instructed units in Wusih to "attack" a civilian political group. This "plot" never materialized, because Yao Wen-yüan got wind of it and telephoned the local commander to prevent it. But Yü's apparent desire for order in his old home base made him more interventionist than the commander of the Nanking Military Region, Hsü Shih-yu.[36] Hsü himself, along with Tu P'ing, Yu T'ai-chung, and other Nanking generals, were also criticized by disgruntled groups which felt they should come to the aid of the leftists more often than they did. But Chairman Mao, through his representative K'ang Sheng on no less than three occasions, "put in a few words in favor of Hsü Shih-yu" and denied "rumors" that Hsü was in the wrong.[37] In fact, the restrained, civilian-oriented "support the left" policy of the Nanking Region was quite consistently applied. Its compatibility with civil policies in both Shanghai and Peking made the basis on which a hierarchical Shanghai government could be formed at that time.

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[29] NCNA, Shanghai, April 1, 1967.

[30] *Jenmin jihpao* (People's Daily), Peking (hereafter JMJP), editorial, September 18, 1967; tr. SCMP 4031, p. 10.

[31] *Wanshan hungp'ien* (Myriad Hills Turn Red), Peking, No. 1 (September 26, 1967); tr. SCMP 4057, p. 5.

[32] *Hungseh tsaofanche t'unghsün* (Red Rebel Bulletin), Kongmoon (Chiangmen), December 12, 1967; in URI library.

[33] NCNA, Shanghai, September 18, 1967.

[34] Shanghai Radio, June 27, 1967.

[35] NCNA, English, Peking, October 23, 1967.

[36] *Ts'ank' ao tzuliao* (Reference Materials), Canton, No. 1, July 1968; tr. SCMP 4222, pp. 1–3.

In June 1968, the land, air, and naval units of Shanghai held a joint conference to pledge united efforts toward ending autonomous factionalism in the civilian organs where they participated as propaganda and mediation forces. They swore to "defend to the death" not only Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, but also the central Cultural Revolution Small Group and Chiang Ch'ing.[38] The development of models and cults during late 1968 and 1969 is evident in Shanghai papers. They were publicized largely by soldiers. Often figures in the national hagiology were involved, such as Chiang Ch'ing, Men Ho and Li Wen-chung; but sometimes local Shanghai figures such as Hsü Tse-hua were also prominent.[39]

By 1968, the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee and public security offices within the military had gathered a good deal of evidence against leaders of autonomous dissident groups at low levels, including some Red Guard groups. Chang and his secretariat studied and judged these cases, and the PLA-run public security departments gave stiff sentences to counterrevolutionaries who were accused of "ransacking houses and refusing to make confessions."[40] An April 27 rally at "Cultural Revolution Square" had shades of 1789. This "public judgment meeting" was held "to suppress active counterrevolutionary culprits resolutely." It was attended by ten thousand people and given full television coverage so that everyone in the city could see it on public TV sets. Some of the defendants were committed to prison; others received death sentences which "were carried out immediately" to the accompaniment of shouts of "Long live Chairman Mao!"[41] Authorities from the Central government sometimes showed up to validate and witness decisions of this sort. K'ang Sheng, Mao's own main expert in security affairs, on May 2 attended a "Work Conference on Special Cases" that had been convened by the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, and he expressed support as well as some caution about the development of this policy in Shanghai when he said, "It doesn't matter when several persons die, but there are some points to note: The political influence of it may be bad . . . and more important cases may be mishandled or postponed." He urged that "attention must be given to the art of struggle as well as to tactics."[42]

Some examples of the dissidence which the Revolutionary Committee and local PLA chose to publicize in this way may have bordered on ordinary criminality. But much of the dissidence was political. At the end of 1968 many separatist groups in "*laotanan*" ('old-big-difficult') schools and factories still had a tendency to snub the workers' propaganda teams that had been sent down from the city government—even after revolutionary committees were formed in those units.[43] The exemplary cases that were dealt with in "public judgment meetings" only somewhat reduced this tendency to ignore higher authorities. Cooperation from autonomous group leaders below the municipal level was slowly restored.

In some units, such as the Shanghai First Tire Factory, soldiers associated with the propaganda teams found that they could at times make good liaison with leaders there who had been demobilized from the Army many years before.[44] In some cases, faction leaders could themselves be recruited to become members of propaganda teams. These teams were fairly free-form institutions, whose local personnel could be changed easily. They supplied forums for substantive agreements between local factions.[45]

Using these methods, the Revolutionary Committee was able to reduce low-level autonomy within the city and to restore some of the lines of communication that are essential to thorough government there. The means to make this change were quite constant after 1968, but the speed of the movement was slow and never very sure. Well into the 1970s, the city government still favored a very gradual withdrawal of worker propoganda administrators from universities. Newspaper articles emphasized that although many universities were by this time back in operation, the teams should not leave them, lest factionalism develop there again. The hierarchy of the city had mostly been reconstructed before this time; but any complete elimination of low-level autonomy would have been impossible—even if the city fathers had wished to go so far.[46]

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[37] *Wenko t'unghsün* (Cultural Revolution Bulletin), Canton, No. 13 (March 1968); tr. SCMP 4166, p. 14.

[38] WHP, June 30, 1968.

[39] *Ibid.*, and Radio Shanghai, November 2, 1969. Cf. also WHP, May 29, 1968, for an article entitled "Take Comrade Chiang Ch'ing as a Model in Carrying Out Revolutionary Mass Criticism and Repudiation to the End."

[40] WHP, April 11, 1968. Cf. also *Wenko t'unghsün*, No. 13 (March 1968); tr. SCMP 4167, p. 14.

[41] WHP, April 28, 1968.

[42] *Hung szu t'unghsün* (Red Headquarters Bulletin), Peking, No. 4–5 (July 1968).

[43] *Hsingtao jihpao* (Singtao Daily), Hong Kong, December 23, 1968.

[44] WHP, October 16, 1968.

[45] Cf. an investigation report from Shanghai that was reprinted in *Hungch'i* (Red Flag), Peking, March 13, 1969, and tr. in *Survey of China Mainland Magazines*, Hong Kong, No. 650, p. 32.

[46] WHP, April 4, 1972.

Autonomy in Industrial and Commerical Policy

High authorities could postpone dealing with independence in strictly economic decisions more easily than in the political sphere. They allowed more production decisions to be made by "democratic management" at low levels. The effects of the Cultural Revolution had a potential of permanence in no field more than in urban economic institutions. Not only did the Shanghai offices of various central ministries become targets of criticism; the economic "embassies" in Shanghai from other provinces also fared badly. By late 1967, fully seventy separate offices in the city, which were subordinate to various ministries and provinces elsewhere, had been "investigated" and closed down by Shanghai local groups. A radical source described these permanent delegations from other parts of China as being veritable spy stations, with weapons, radio transmitters, underground workshops and "a good deal of contraband goods and commodities in short supply."[47]

More dispassionate economic reports give clues about what this institutional change may have meant in policy terms. The closing of interprovincial trade offices did not lead to more autarky and "self-reliance" in Shanghai, as might be expected. On the contrary, this change allowed the commercial departments of provinces and lower-level units to negotiate more freely for an expanded trade under less centralized direction. One report from the Shanghai Second Commerce Bureau says that the importation of hogs from outside Shanghai's jurisdiction was sharply increased by August 1968 from its 1966 level.[48] International as well as domestic trade was affected by this trend. In late 1969, it was reported that the Shanghai Foreign Trade Bureau had been able to "make good use of backlog goods in the inventory to boost foreign trade and to meet home demand. . . . Instead of the foreign trade departments being independent [i.e. under nonlocal control] as in the days of Liu Shao-ch'i, these departments are now managed as are other departments."[49] The Cultural Revolution allowed new and somewhat free informal contracts to develop large-scale economic exchanges under relatively little hierarchical control.

In early 1969, the Chinese press began to ruminate sporadically the idea that China was entering a "great leap" or "flying leap" ("*ta yüeh*" or "*fei yüeh*"). The old 1958 slogans certainly seemed apt enough in this new period of managerial decentralization. But at the same time, some *post*-Leap recovery policies and slogans were also in evidence. As in 1961, agriculture was to be the "foundation" of the economy, and industry was the "leading factor."[50] There was even a particular shortage (of coal) in 1969, to add some spice of reality to these nostalgic reminiscences. In Shanghai, an "Emulate Peking" campaign was initiated to save coal.[51]

Shanghai purchasing stations announced in February 1969 that they were willing to receive factories' output "at any time." This increased marketing flexibility paralleled the demise of the central organs which might have enforced planned delivery schedules otherwise. It was announced that the total tonnage shipped from Shanghai to other parts of China in the first month of 1969 was double that of the same period one year earlier. "Together with industrial departments" the Shanghai commerce offices sent "joint investigation teams" to advertise, and buy, in other parts of the country.[52] The Spring Festival market of 1969 had a brisk trade on this basis, and the supplies of all foodstuffs were reported up from the previous year.[53] The Cultural Revolution was neither an economic depression in Shanghai nor a movement against capitalist style markets among collectively owned firms.

During this period, it was frankly maintained that plans get fulfilled fastest when they are most ambitious and unspecific. "Only when there is enough leeway allowed in drawing up a plan will it be possible to make the masses constantly maintain enthusiasm in production to a high degree."[54] Emulation proposals appeared to be among the more effective "plans" in heavy industry at this time, even though they were not administratively binding. When the Peking Iron and Steel Company proposed "grasping revolution and promoting production . . . in preparedness against war," the Shanghai No. 3 Steel Plant was encouraged to study the Peking documents, criticize the "complacency affecting some comrades," and organize emulation among its own workshops and shifts.[55] Even more than the previous emulation campaigns, these movements in 1969 seem to have been relatively cooperative and noncompetitive.[56] In such a context of economic enthusiasm and amity, what bureaucrat would dare send down a simple directive?

The most sophisticated formulation of the 1969–70 economic model was the critique by radical economists of the "profit principle" as a control of subordinate economic units by superordinate ones.

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[47] *Ch'engchien hung szu* (Urban Construction Red Headquarters), Canton, No. 8, January 1968; cf. SCMP 4127, p. 11. See also *Hung tienhsün* (Red Telegraph Report), No. 2 (March 1968) xx. SCMP 4143, p. 12–13.

[48] *Ts'aimao chanpao* (Finance and Trade War Report), Shanghai, August 14, 1968.

[49] Radio Shanghai, December 20, 1969.

[50] *South China Morning Post*, March 16, 1969, p. 8.

[51] WHP, June 30, 1968.

[52] NCNA, English, Shanghai, February 13, 1969.

[53] *Ibid.*, February 15, 1969.

[54] JMJP, February 28, 1969; an article about Shanghai.

[55] NCNA, English, Peking, September 17, 1969.

[56] Cf., for example, *ibid.*, September 19, 1969.

Most of these attacks were launched against Sun Yeh-fang (who was dubbed "China's Liberman" in parallel with Liu's honorary title as "China's Khrushchev"). The Shanghai No. 1 State Cotton Mill had a field day criticizing Sun, because in 1961 he had personally written an "Investigation Report" on that mill. Sun insisted that a capital-profit ratio should be computed for enterprises even in a socialist economy. He argued that some index of this sort was necessary to sum up the various desiderata of high output, good product quality, and an optimum capital-labor ratio. In some ways, Sun may at first seem to be a decentralizer: He wanted "small power" over production matters to be vested at the enterprise or factory level, and he called for "free transactions in fixed assets" and opposed transfers of capital in the form of grants under the state ownership system. In particular, he insisted that capital depreciation was underestimated unless invisible wear and tear were taken into account, and he apparently felt that pressure to raise labor productivity could be properly applied by the government only if information from this accounting reform were available. Sun's best critics were no amateur economists. They certainly did not come out against accounting as such, or against the need to manage finances. But they accused Sun, in effect, of using market indices to structure the most crucial decisions in writing plans. Sun's critics wanted the state to retain more initiative but less regular control over the economy than his formulae would allow, and they came out in favor of free grants of state capital to economic units for the purpose of implementing public ideas. They felt that profit was not, in any case, an index that could comprehend all the various results of the economic process which they wished to optimize. On the subject of depreciation, they made an interesting and classically Marxist critique of Sun's ideas, saying that invisible wear and tear needs to be accounted only in a capitalist economy, where competition forces a steady reduction of the input of labor relative to capital. They called Sun's depreciation policy a matter of "drinking poison to quench thirst," and they said that it was necessary only in a monopoly market situation.[57] Finally, and most important, they suggested (but did not say) that Sun's emphasis on profit was really a means of central control. Sun was in fact not a very convincing "capitalist." Cultural Revolution resistance to the idea of profitability was based on its use as a summary index that would help higher political levels acquire more power over economic enterprises at lower ones.

At various times in Shanghai's Cultural Revolution, especially after the Ninth Party Congress, this kind of local autonomy was elaborately defended. "Advanced small plants," with 300 to 400 workers each, "more or less poorly equipped," were commended by the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee for their achievements. Such small enterprises were in practice beneath any enforceable plan. They "started with indigenous methods and combined indigenous and modern methods" to develop some rather complicated products. The Hungsheng Magnetic Materials Plant, which had once been a masonry workshop, was converted at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution into an electric parts factory. "When the plant began trial-producing magnet sheets and magnetic core materials for the 'electronic brains' of computers, some people thought they were entitled to ask for equipment from the higher levels." But realism prevailed, and apparently the higher levels did very little to subsidize, control, or make money from such operations.[58]

By mid-1972, 380 "neighborhood factories" and 4000 "neighborhood teams" in Shanghai were officially listed as producers of over 10,000 kinds of small products ranging from screws to radios. At least some of the enterprises in this substantially unplanned economy were probably unregistered. Many of these small plants had been founded or reformed during the Great Leap. By 1972 their total production was valued at 340 per cent of what it had been in 1965. The Cultural Revolution allowed for the growth of small industries of a sort that earlier had been important in the economic growth of other countries such as Japan.[59]

Autonomy in Remaking a Local Party

It was not until March 1968 that a "Party group" (*tang hsiaotsu*) of five members was formed in the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee.[60] According to traditional Leninist doctrine, this kind of delay was never supposed to occur, since each nonparty organization was supposed to be guided by its Party members. The Municipal Revolutionary Committee only slowly saw its interest in restoring a Party hierarchy parallel to its own system of subordinate revolutionary committees. By late 1968, some of the lower revolutionary committees proved to be more recalcitrant—more autonomous—than even the old Party committees had been in forwarding information up to the city government. A directive of that time ordered that

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[57] This is a heavily interpreted version of *Kuangming jihpao* (Bright Daily), Peking, January 23, 1970; tr. SCMP 4595, pp. 65–75. This fascinating article, and others like it from the same period, deserve more criticism by professional economists. It should be evident that the most interesting Maoist economic ideas go considerably beyond the mere doctrine of enthusiasm.

[58] NCNA, Shanghai, May 18, 1970; and a similar article, *ibid.*, February 25, 1970.

[59] Cf. NCNA, Shanghai, April 25, 1972; and *ibid.*, April 30, 1972, announced that Shanghai's output in the first quarter of that year had been an all-time high. See also William W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change, 1868–1938* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).

[60] *Wenko fenglei* (Cultural Revolution Storm), Canton, No. 3, March 1968; tr. SCMP 4149, p. 14. The five were Chang, Yao, Ma T'ien-shui, Wang Shao-yung, and Hsü Ching-hsien. Wang Hung-wen was apparently still considered too junior.

> the revolutionary committees of all districts, counties, bureaus, institutions of higher learning, and revolutionary mass organizations must promptly report their situation to the Municipal Revolutionary Committee, seek advice from it, and report to it. . . . If a unit under our supervision does not seek advice before doing things, or does not make a report afterwards, then it is establishing an independent kingdom.

The Revolutionary Committee also specified that "each report should be limited to one thousand characters. . . . The content must be true, clear, and brief. . . . The style must be refined, vivid, and brisk."[61] These regulations were meant to maximize the ratio of specific information to abstract ideology in reports, on grounds that the Municipal Revolutionary Committee members reading them thought well of Chairman Mao's ideas already. But they did not have such sure control over the careers of functionaries in their subordinate organizations as the old Municipal Party Committee had previously enjoyed. Only a restoration of the Party could give them this important tool for policy coordination.

Shanghai by late 1968 had been designated as a national model both for building the local Party and for helping to write a new Party Constitution. "May 7 cadre schools" were developed from October onward, and the experiences and difficulties of the Nanshih District May 7 Cadre School filled Shanghai newspapers for many weeks.[62] At the same time, campaigns were also pressed for the "cleaning of class ranks" and the establishment of criteria under which some new cadres who were active during the Cultural Revolution became Party members and others were cast out because of their bourgeois or dissident backgrounds. There was a slow but steady decrease in the autonomy of local political groups whose independence had burgeoned during the early Cultural Revolution. This contrasted with the trend toward relatively dispersed power in the economic system.

Party rebuilding was for some people in Shanghai a rather fearsome prospect. "At the beginning, some units, not having given enough thought to the matter, did not make Party rectification a central task. . . . This task could not be squeezed into the schedule." To speed the organizational process, Chang and Yao had 200 investigators sent to 47 "pilot" units to run study classes and hold meetings concerning Party rebuilding in those places.[63] The first principle of Party reconstruction was that nonparty people should participate in it. *Wenhui pao*, as early as October 16, 1968, warned that if rectification were "carried out behind closed doors, some 'good old men' and 'middle of the roaders' may be admitted into the Party, and some bad men and opportunists, whose actions do not agree with their words, may infiltrate the Party." So leaders of mass organizations were invited to the meetings that set up provisional Party branches in various kinds of units, even though many of the participants were later not admitted to the Party itself.

Various possible ways of forming leading Party "nucleus groups" were discussed at this time. Some people in Shanghai reportedly said that these groups should be elected by their production units with all confirmed or previous Party members as candidates; some thought the groups should consist of all the Partymen on the unit's revolutionary committee; and others thought that all nominal Party members should elect the new Party leaders by ordinary ballot. Finally it was decided (after considerable advice on this topic from Yao Wen-yüan) that nucleus groups of the Party in various units should be "produced"—not elected—after open "consultations." In effect, this meant that higher-level officials would sit in at lower unit meetings to help choose the new local leaderships by means of consensus among Party members, with nonparty observers present at the creation, but with no need for any vote.[64] This schema was immediately important in local efforts to restore hierarchy and to reduce subgroup autonomy in Shanghai. It also became important on the national scene, because this abstract formula was adopted as a model for reconstituting the Party all over China.

The Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in mid-April, 1969, and "nucleus groups" officially became full-fledged cells in Shanghai shortly after that. The first Party branch under the new constitution in China was established in the Shanghai No. 17 Cotton Mill (the factory where Wang Hung-wen had been a policeman and organizer). The *Liberation Daily* called for emulation of this model by all units establishing their own branches. But even in this exemplary case, the relationship of the new branch to the mill's revolutionary committee was not at all clear:

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[61] WHP, editorial of September 25, 1968; cf. tr. SCMP 4288, pp. 12–13.

[62] On May 7 schools in Shanghai: cf. WHP, October 4, 9, and 10, 1968; JMJP, September 8, 1969; and Shanghai Radio, January 14, 1970.

[63] Transcript of a report to the Kwangtung Province Revolutionary Committee on the experience of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, in an undated pamphlet; tr. SCMP 4344 (January 23, 1969), p. 1–3.

[64] *Ibid.*

> The Party branch exercised an important role behind the revolutionary committee—and it had done so since 1967, before its official inception, acting as a vanguard for purging the Party in the open. . . . It is hoped that the revolutionary committee will function even more satisfactorily and will fulfill its historic task of criticism and repudiation.[65]

This enigmatic statement indicates that the new Party branches certainly did not supersede the revolutionary committees. But it also suggests that the revolutionary committees were not supposed to be regular administrative organs (as in practice many of them had turned out to be). In this model mill committee at Shanghai, a Mao Tse-tung Thought Study Class was set up for all the new branch secretaries and revolutionary committee members, so that they might restore the Party's political role through a gradual process of their own reeducation.[66] This procedure might lead to a purer kind of Party at the local level, but it would not necessarily produce a very forceful or hierarchical one.

Shanghai in National Politics

The vertical structure that emerged in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution differed in one important respect from the revised governments that were set up in almost all other provinces of China. Shanghai politics were reformed by civilians, but regular soldiers led in most other places. The first six revolutionary committees to be formed at the province level in China (from January to August, 1967) were dominated by men who had been military commissars. They were not professional commanders. Later, when revolutionary committees were formed in other provinces at a time of more emphasis on law and order than on revolution, professional commanders were chosen to head the new groups. No less than four of the six earliest-formed committees saw a later replacement of their original commissar-chairmen by new commander-chairmen. The main exception was Chang Ch'un-ch'iao in Shanghai. (Hsieh Fu-chih also retained his title in Peking, possibly with the help of Chou En-lai who long favored reliance on the political acuity of commissars.)[67]

Civilians were also dominant on the reconstructed Shanghai Party Committee, which was not established until January 1971 after a meeting that lasted six days. This was the first province-level Party committee to be headed by nonmilitary figures. Its standing committee had sixteen members, although only Chang, Yao, Wang Hung-wen, Ma T'ien-shui, Hsü Ching-hsien, Wang Hsiu-chen, and Chou Ch'un-lin were named in the newspapers. Of these, only the last is a commander. The city's atypicality was clear when the new Liaoning Party Committee, formed just three days later in a similar urban and industrial province, was clearly dominated by military men.[68]

To a surprising extent, Shanghai styles were propagated successfully to much of the country under quasi-military rule. For example in mid-1969, a campaign was mounted in Shanghai against the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius. Discussion meetings were held in the city, and to some extent this movement spread to other parts of the country. It was pointed out that "the repudiation of Confucianism meant the repudiation of that rank renegade Liu Shao-ch'i, and of revisionism."[69] In 1970, a "writing group" in Ch'uansha County was busy making polemics against Confucius, apparently in connection with activities of the May 7 cadre schools there.[70] The "new" cultural revolution, mooted during 1973–4, was in part the national continuation of a movement that had been simmering in Shanghai long before Lin Piao's demise. Most of the vocabulary now used for criticizing the Marshal was borrowed directly from Shanghai's continuing campaign against the Sage.

Shanghai has clearly been used as a testing ground by the national leadership on many occasions in recent years. During 1971 when Lin Piao's fall was widely rumored on the informal grapevine of China, but before it was officially announced, Shanghai papers placed emphasis on the Party's "Ninth Congress line." Lin's own prominence at that congress was of course not discussed. But apparently to gather more information about the effect of his purge on middle cadres, the Party committee members of Shanghai County were organized to study documents that emphasized Party unity. It seems clear that national leaders were uneasy and curious about what the local effects of Lin's flight and death would be; so at this time all county officials were urged to "listen humbly to dissenting views" and to "make reports more frequently."[71]

Shanghai was also used as a testing ground for restoration of the Communist Youth League. The first province-level congress of that organization in China after the Cultural Revolution was held at the city as late as February 12, 1973. Almost half the delegates to this congress claimed to be of working-class background, and another fifth were peasants. Three hundred Red Guard representatives also attended, but only as observers without any direct participation. The earlier Shanghai formula for reconstituting Party branches, under which the old organizations' memberships "produced" new leaderships after consultation under the eyes of nonorganization elements, was now extended to the reestablishment of other kinds of units.

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[65] Radio Shanghai, June 21, 1969.

[66] NCNA, Shanghai, June 13, 1970.

[67] Whitson, *The Chinese High Command*, p. 550.

[68] *China Quarterly*, "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," No. 46 (April–June 1970), p. 388.

[69] Radio Shanghai, July 4, 1969.

[70] JMJP, May 24, 1970.

[71] NCNA, Shanghai, October 31, 1971.

Shanghai's constitution-making function for the country as a whole became obvious at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973. Wang Hung-wen (then age 35) had been spending almost all his time in Peking, although his task there was not clear. At the Congress, both Wang and Chang were raised to memberships in the Standing Committee of the Politburo; and Wang came third after Mao and Chou on the formal lists of Party pecking order that are of such overwhelming interest to peeking Peking watchers. Except for Chou, Wang read the only report delivered at the Congress. He read it probably for the straightforward reason that the main item on the agenda of the Congress was approval of a new Party Constitution, which he had been busy helping to write. In addition, Wang—like Hsü Ching-hsien and Yao and a few other relatively young members of the Shanghai leadership—has evident intelligence and energy, as well as some claim to proletarian experience. All of this may well have recommended him to Mao Tse-tung and other old leaders. The major emphasis in Wang's speech at the Congress was based on Mao's 1966 dictum: "Great disorder across the land leads to great order. And so once again every seven or eight years, monsters and demons will jump out themselves. Determined by their own class nature, they are bound to jump out." The Party Constitution affirmed that socialist construction would take "a considerably long historical period." The civilian politicians' style of turning over all the rocks to find all the worms was definitely expected to become a necessary practice in China. The men who wrote this Constitution clearly feel that their critical, firm manner should prevade China's development process in the future.

Nearly two years later, in January 1975, the Fourth National People's Congress met in Peking. Only two reports were again delivered—one by Chou on government work, the second by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao on China's new State Constitution. Chang expressed the complex belief of organization radicals quite well when he said that "without ample democracy, it is impossible to have a high degree of centralism, and without a high degree of centralism, it is impossible to build socialism."[72] In a sense, Wang and Chang and their colleagues symbolize Shanghai's situation in China as a whole. In "real power" terms, the city is not strong compared to other places, in any short-run political sense. But it is a fountain of political ideas and administrative techniques that stir interest elsewhere, and it provides a steady flow of effective national politicians.

Conclusions

Shanghai's civilian peculiarity has linked it somewhat with the central government of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. What is the meaning of local autonomy in this kind of situation? Shanghai's Cultural Revolution leaders are well aware that they are now performing on a national stage. Their obvious country-wide evangelism, expressed in heroes, models, slogans, and constitutional suggestions, all makes little sense unless a role in national policy formulation is really open to them. In fact, they have long been influencing national policies. A kind of comprehensive patriotic intention typifies them better than the other characteristics by which they are usually described. Chang, Yao, and Wang have been called regionalists—but they spend most of their time in Peking. They have been called leftists—but their origins and past activities make clear that they are censors and policemen just as much; and that is a rather different description. Their main hope is apparently to be central politicians in the service of national purposes.

If we wish to find out about local government in most parts of China, we cannot make many generalizations from the obviously atypical case of Shanghai. That city is now more intertwined in the politics of the capital than are most province units. But a consideration of the "autonomy" of this unusual place leads to conclusions that can be comparative. This limiting case suggests a redefinition of the problem of autonomy, as it might be studied anywhere. Whether or not Shanghai's leaders have been potentially independent of central government power, they have clearly not been independent of their own national ideas. The multilevel, factionalized politics of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai, ranging over many issue areas, suggest that attributes like "autonomy," "power," or "dependence" cannot be ascribed to any objects just at random. These words can pertain only to some kinds of units. In particular, it is in many cases difficult to determine precisely whether or not they characterize administrative levels of a bureaucracy, or geographic parts of a country. Attributes like power and dependence do not in practice turn out to be behavioral variables unless there is a clear unity of will in the entities they describe, because their use presumes the possibility of knowing what subordinate units would have done if superordinate ones had not acted. That is a speculative and hypothetical business. In the study of real events outside of laboratories, the most obvious official parts of government structures (such as their departments or regions) often have no such clear unity of will at all, either because they are divided into factions, or else because their purposes are not strong enough to allow any reliable estimate of how they would act under conditions that do not exist. The really political units in such situations are often not the evident administrative ones, but are groups of a sort whose definition is beyond the scope of this paper.[73]

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[72] *Peking Review* 18:4 (January 24, 1975), p. 19.

In mid-September 1973, Shanghai began publishing a monthly journal called *Study and Criticism*, which seems to be a southern version of—and potentially a rival for—Peking's *Red Flag*. The new theoretical magazine emphasizes classic Marxist ideas about the importance of urban workers in the leadership of any socialist revolution. To call the policy behind this movement a merely "local" matter would be to ignore most of its substance, and all of its ambition. Even its origin "in Shanghai" is somewhat dubious, although Shanghai people certainly have participated importantly in this kind of national campaign during the Cultural Revolution. There have been times when the nationally advertised policies from both Shanghai and Peking were not in fact the policies followed most generally in the country at large. These two cities are not most of China. Their civilian leaderships have often differed in style and policy from the committees of military leaders and groups representatives that hold sway in most parts of the nation.

In the last analysis, what is "national" policy? To find it, should we read the *People's Daily*, the classic source? Should we instead read *Wenhui pao*, which has obviously been a better indicator of this policy on a few occasions? Or should we interview people from Kongmoon, and try to find out what the commanders are really thinking in Chengtu? A broad sense of Chinese national patriotism has clearly increased throughout the country under communist rule. Central initiatives and orders—which are partly generated in localities, as well as adapted for application there—meet with wide compliance in many parts of the country. But the abstract categories "national policy" and "local autonomy" are as difficult to exemplify precisely in China as they would be, say, in America, even though the project in either case is useful as a means to talk about what happens locally and comparatively.

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[73] One attempt to define the preliminary traits of an entity that might be described by words like "power" or "dependence" is White, "Shanghai's Polity in Cultural Revolution," esp. pp. 357–69.

Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War

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All through history, mind limps after reality.
Leon Trotsky

In a perceptive article in a recent issue of the *APSR*,[1] Professor Ole R. Holsti illustrates the many and strikingly similar ways in which the Right and the Left view international politics in relation to the cold war. The logic, structure, and rhetoric of their theories are the same, Holsti points out; only the roles of the villians are reversed—presumably to protect the innocent. At the conclusion of his comprehensive survey the author expresses frustration at being unable to validate the respective theories. Given the axiomatic, circular nature of the reasoning behind such attitudes, we are confronted with self-contained arguments that cannot be rationally analyzed or empirically tested. Of the Right-wing school of thought, Holsti states: "The real problem is that the protracted conflict theory does not appear capable of falsification."

It may be true that what cannot be empirically asserted cannot be refuted. Yet if one approaches the problem through the historical dimension, tracing the development of the conservative cold war argument over a substantial period of time, and through the mind of one of its original and learned strategists, some interesting findings may emerge to indicate that the Right-wing theory is considerably less static and more sophisticated than Holsti describes, and considerably less adequate and more vulnerable than its proponents assume. In an ultimate sense, Holsti is no doubt correct when he maintains that the theories of the conservative Right, like those of the radical Left, are "irrefutable" because they "appear to be essentially nonfalsifiable." I would suggest, however, that the basis for this impasse may lie in the lack of a historical perspective which would enable one to consider the adequacy of ideas both before and after events. In this paper I shall attempt to show that the theory of a major conservative spokesman has been incapable of explaining satisfactorily what it purports to explain—the nature of Soviet Communism, international politics, and the ideology of the cold war—and hence that theory must give way to a number of shifting and conflicting theories, all in search of a presumably constant reality. I shall also suggest that the Right not only resembles the Left in its thoughts on the cold war, as Holsti astutely demonstrates, but that in this instance it resembles the Left because historically its thoughts and assumptions have derived from the Left. In the following study we may find not only "strange bedfellows" but fellow-travelers returning to the same bed. Indeed, one of the ironies of the cold war is finding the conservative theorist in the awkward position of trying to prove the Left wrong by proving Marxist-Leninism right.

A serious shortcoming of Professor Holsti's otherwise insightful study is that it begins too late. In order to understand anti-communism in America, we must first understand ex-communism. For whatever may be the background of the New Left's theories on the cold war, that of the Old Left-New Right antedates the Russo-American confrontation that emerged after World War Two. The intellectual origins of the cold war, as opposed to the diplomatic, can be traced to a simple, though perhaps unanswerable, question: "What is Soviet Communism?" This question permeated the air of radical debate in the 'thirties, and many writers spent the best years of their lives struggling with the problem of definition, some even going to their graves convinced that they had found the answer. Leon Trotsky was sitting at his desk working out a "definitive" interpretation of Stalin's Russia when the assassin struck him fatally from behind. The scene is as prophetic as it is tragic: the brave "old man," the "veritable pharos," as Edmund Wilson once called him,[2] slumped over his blood-stained manuscript, a document of the historically damned, a sad testament to the failure of political theory to catch up with history.

One of Trotsky's leading intellectual disciples in America was James Burnham. For the past twenty-five years this polite, soft-spoken writer has been one of the most aggressive advocates of a cold war "initiative" on the part of the West. Throughout his political life, both as a brilliant "*literary Trotskisant*" of the *New International* in the 'thirties, and as a sagacious diplomatic theorist for William Buckley and the *National Review* since 1955, Burnham has attempted to form a comprehensive image of Russia and the alleged international communist movement. After he broke with Trotsky in 1940, he proceeded to draw upon a variety of social theories in order to illuminate the new realities of history; and as a *National Review* contributing editor he would write a steady column under the heading "The Protracted Conflict," the title of the book that Holsti analyzed in detail in his article, and the phrase used repeatedly in that article to categorize cold war theorists on the Right. Burnham's various theories, however, fell short of the task that he had set for himself—to develop an intellectually sophisticated cold war position and thereby free the modern mind from the fallacies of liberalism and Marxism, the philosophies of "western suicide."[3] Ironically, a quarter of a century later, faced with the liberal "conservative realism" of Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, and George Kennan, Burnham himself is forced to return to Trotsky's Hegelian-Marxist perspective, circa 1939, in order to reinterpret the "dual nature" of the Soviet Union and to obtain an answer to the growing demand for rapprochement and détente. Burnham's post-Marxist career not only dramatizes the tension between theory and history, it may also suggest to political scientists the curious relationship between intellectual history and the formation of diplomatic strategy.

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[1] Ole R. Holsti, "The Study of International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Theories of the Radical Right and the Radical Left," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March, 1974), 217–52.

[2] Edmund Wilson, *To The Finland Station* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1940), p. 432.

From Dialectics to Managerialism

A professor of philosophy at New York University in the 'thirties, James Burnham first gained notoriety as the author of *The Managerial Revolution*, published in 1941. The book has since become a minor classic in political sociology, and it has also been subjected to a number of theoretical criticisms. But for our purposes it is important to stress that the work was an attempt to explain, as the subtitle indicated, "What is Going On In The World," and particularly in the Soviet Union. Indeed the book had actually crystallized in Burnham's mind while he was debating Trotsky in the months immediately following the outbreak of World War Two. *The Managerial Revolution* is, among other things, both a refutation of Trotsky's interpretation of Soviet Russia and an attempt to demonstrate why there could not be a mass alternative to Stalinism. Before we proceed to a discussion of the book, Trotsky's philosophical position needs to be explained, for it is in large part essentially the position Burnham himself returns to a quarter of a century later to argue against détente.

Trotsky's views of Russia combined the notion of "Soviet Thermidore" with the notion of "bureaucratic collectivism," ideas he adopted and revised rather than originated. Accordingly, Trotsky held that Stalinism must be seen as a temporary "Bonapartist" political phenomenon, an "episodic relapse" that, like the Thermidorean phase of the French Revolution, would be undermined by its own "social contradictions" and ultimately destroyed by the proletariat as it rose again to resume the second act of the unfinished October Revolution. Neither Stalinism nor classical French Bonapartism represented counter-revolution, for neither phenomenon expressed a tendency to turn back the social revolution and restore former property relations. Yet as a reactionary stage within a continuing historical process, Stalinism signified a tendency on the part of the rising bourgeoisie to regenerate itself through the political means of the new bureaucracy. In the face of this danger of bourgeois restoration, Trotsky was nevertheless convinced that the Soviet Union must be defended: despite its "monstrous bureaucratic degeneration," the Soviet Union remained a genuine "workers' state," which, however "deformed" and "betrayed," had succeeded in preserving the collectivization of property, the historic "conquests" of the Russian Revolution and the "instruments" by which the "toilers" will liberate themselves from the "bureaucratic interval" of Stalinism.[4]

That Soviet communism could be repressive and nationalist on the one hand and still potentially radical and internationalist on the other was an argument that could no longer be accepted by Burnham, Max Eastman, Sidney Hook, and a number of other Old Left intellectuals who became, less than a decade later, militant cold warriors. Positions grew more intense with the nonaggression pact, the Russo-Finnish war, and the Soviet penetration of Poland in 1939–40. The subject of Soviet diplomatic behavior was now as baffling as the purges; but not to Trotsky, who called upon his dwindling followers to continue to resist Stalinism as "reactionary" and at the same time support Stalin's foreign policy in Eastern Europe as "progressive." As I have pointed out elsewhere,[5] this fantastic proposition was not offered solely on the basis of Russia's national security—the rationale used by Stalinists to excuse the nonaggression pact, and, curiously, used two decades later by some New Left historians to excuse Yalta. Rather, Trotsky was convinced that Stalinism could simultaneously be counterrevolutionary in Russia and revolutionary in Poland and the Ukraine, where the liquidation of landed estates demonstrated that Soviet expansion was not "imperialistic." More was at stake here than the Orwellian butchery of political language. For as the controversy developed, Trotsky realized that the entire edifice of his position depended upon the dialectical logic he employed both to affirm that the proletariat would break the "shell" of Stalinism and to deny that Russia's bureaucracy was an autonomous social stratum. He thus made every attempt to draw Burnham into a debate over "The ABC of Materialist Dialectics," to which the latter replied: "I stopped arguing about religion long ago." Undaunted, Trotsky remained convinced that the "dual" nature of Stalinism could only be understood if one maintained a dialectical interpretation of the contradictory forces of history:

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[3] James Burnham, *The Suicide of the West: An Essay on The Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism* (New York: John Day Co., 1964).

[4] Leon Trotsky, "The Soviet Union Today: The Workers State and the Question of Thermidore and Bonapartism," *New International*, 2 (July, 1935), 116–22; *The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going*, tr. Max Eastman (Merit Publishers ed.; New York, 1965), pp. 86–114, 231, 273–89, *passim*.

[5] John P. Diggins, "Getting Hegel Out of History: Max Eastman's Quarrel With Marxism," *American Historical Review*, 79 (Feb., 1974), 38–71.

> It is not surprising that the theoreticians of the opposition who reject dialectical thought capitulate lamentably before the contradictory nature of the USSR. However the contradiction between the social basis laid down by the revolution, and the character of the caste which arose out of the degeneration of the revolution is not only an irrefutable historical fact but also a motor force. In our struggle for the overthrow of the bureaucracy we base ourselves on this contradiction.[6]

This Trotskyist perspective would remain with Burnham *malgré lui*—in inverted form, to be sure. Years later he would return to it to show how liberals "capitulate lamentably before the contradictory nature of the USSR" in their inability to see that "peaceful coexistence" and "permanent struggle" are one in the same, strategies that negate one another only to better assert the "higher synthesis" of world revolution. The dream that eluded Trotsky is the nightmare that haunts Burnham.

Communism is an idea that is determined to be realized and destined to fail. Burnham's *The Managerial Revolution* tried to demonstrate the validity of the second half of that statement, presumably with the assumption that, once demonstrated, the first half would lose its mythic élan. To Burnham, Trotsky's inexorable alternatives—Russia must either move forward to socialism or revert to some form of capitalism—seemed a species of syllogism born of dialectic logic, and he proceeded to refute it with what might be called a neither-nor paradigm. The new trend of economic organization, which Burnham claimed had been developing in advanced western countries since 1914, demonstrated that capitalism was a moribund reality and socialism a mythical dream. The coming order would be neither the old bourgeois society of capitalism nor the new classless society of socialism. Instead it would be a managerial bureaucracy, a political-economy run by a new ruling elite which was assuming control over the economic sectors and thereby seizing the very power that once belonged to the capitalist class and was destined, in the Marxist view of history, to fall to the working class.[7]

The "Burnhamian Revolution," as Dwight Macdonald called it,[8] provoked considerable controversy in early 1942, and again after World War II, when many of Burnham's fatalistic prophecies about the defeat of democratic England and totalitarian Russia proved historically embarrassing. As a study in futurology, *The Managerial Revolution* is a flawed work. As an interpretation of the Soviet Union, however, it is an important statement. What every contemporary critic overlooked was that Burnham used Marxist social theory to explain the recent history and nature of Soviet communism. Bureaucracy had not been a problem in orthodox Marxist political thought, and technological elites had not been foreseen even by Lenin, who elevated party control to an Archimedean principle of power only to blind himself to the ultimate authoritarian consequences of his own creation. Burnham was not the first writer to discern in the emergence of bureaucracy a refutation of Marx's class analysis, nor was he the first to see the hidden oligarchical tendencies that are potential in all political organizations. But Burnham was the first to carry Marxism to its logical conclusion in order to turn it back upon itself. Unlike the anarchists, Burnham refused to claim that Bolshevism was the "plot" of a new ruling class, the creation of a displaced intelligentsia with a secret lust for power; and unlike the Trotskyists, he was certain that Stalinism represented far more than "The Revolution Betrayed." For managerialism, of which Stalinism was an expression, evolved logically from Marx's assumption that all power and authority derive from possession of the means of production. As a sociological phenomenon, managerial rule, technological authority, and bureaucratic domination could be traced back to the mode of production, the ownership of which Marx had regarded as the sole source of power and freedom. Burnham may have indiscriminately equated ownership with control; he may have narrowly identified economic power with political authority and class domination; and he may have falsely stressed property rather than income as the criterion of class membership. The point is, however, that it was perfectly Marxian to make all three assumptions.[9]

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[6] Leon Trotsky, *In Defense of Marxism (Against the Petty-bourgeois Opposition)* (New York), pp. 6, 53, 72.

[7] James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution: What is Happening In The World* (New York, 1941).

[8] Dwight Macdonald, "The Burnhamian Revolution," *Partisan Review*, 9 (Jan.–Feb., 1942), 76–84.

The real question is whether Burnham's managerial analysis satisfactorily explained the nature of Soviet communism. Any answer to this difficult question is fraught with irony. For in the Stalinist period, to which his analysis applied, the Russian managerial class, specifically the engineering profession, was the first to fall victim to the purges, as Alexander Solzhenitsyn observed in *The First Circle.* Yet in the post-Stalinist era scientific training appears to be, especially for present-day leaders like Leonid Brezhnev and Alexis Kosygin, "an important criterion on their way to power."[10] The road to power, however, is hardly the same thing as the power to rule. Whether the scientists and technicians constitute a new Soviet ruling class, and whether managerialism supersedes Marxism as the sociological key to Soviet behavior, remains problematic. It is still not clear whether the logic of occupational ascendancy, the role of ideals and ideology, or the personal factor in bureaucratic power struggles accounts for the vagaries of Soviet domestic politics and diplomatic postures. Even more seriously, it is unclear whether the theory of managerialism is itself theoretically coherent. The difficulty in applying Burnham's analysis to Soviet Russia is that it takes as a solution to a problem what is in reality the problem itself. In effect, Burnham substituted for Marx's historical determinism an even narrower version of technological determinism in order to explain the present and predict the future. He tried to go beyond Marx but he never took his eyes off the means of production, the fundamental causal agency in the Marxian analysis of social change, the foundation and the apex of power in the Burnhamian analysis of society and politics. As Marx mistook the decline of the old bourgeoisie as the end of the middle class, so too did Burnham mistake a historical event—the rise of managerialism—for a natural law.

In showing how the means of production had been absorbed by the new means of administration, and hence the new instruments of elitist domination, Burnham could successfully demonstrate that the democratic goals of communism would always be frustrated by the technological imperatives of modernization. This thesis was Burnham's answer to Trotsky's belief in the Fourth International as the reincarnation of the October Revolution. But having refuted Trotsky, Burnham had also to refute Jefferson. Once he questioned the possibility of socialism, it was necessary for him to carry his analysis further and question the possibility of democracy itself.

Intellectual History Used and Abused

The Machiavellians was published in 1943. It would be his last major theoretical work before he dropped his defeatist pose and became caught up in the polemical heat of the cold war. It was also the first thorough study by an American of the sociological writings of Gaetano Mosca, George Sorel, Roberto Michels, and Vilfredo Pareto. There are two curiosities about *The Machiavellians.* Previously American scholars had become interested in European elitist thought when they were trying to unravel the twisted intellectual roots of fascism.[11] Yet Burnham chose to call his Machiavellians "defenders of freedom." Moreover, the book appeared in the midst of the greatest ideological war in modern history, when most Americans fervently believed that the defeat of the fascist powers would be a victory for democracy. Yet Burnham set out to prove that democracy was a myth, an illusion, a fiction, and a lie.

The book's first several chapters are a brilliant *tour de force.* Here Burnham opens with a passage from the 1932 Democratic party platform, and then, turning back six centuries, proceeds to contrast the "formal" and "real" meanings of Dante's *De Monarchia* with Machiavelli's *The Prince.* Dante's treatise represented "politics as wish," pointless metaphysical distinctions and logical deductions drawn from a theology that had no relevance to the actual world of space, time, and events. The "real" purpose of *De Monarchia,* the immediate issue that brought the text into being, was the protracted conflict between the forces of the Papacy and the forces of Empire during the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. Like the designers of the 1932 Democratic Party platform, however, Dante was reluctant to acknowledge the *real* power struggle taking place before his eyes, and thus he failed to demonstrate how his abstract, idealistic goals for saving the Holy Roman Empire could be reached, since "being unreal, they cannot be reached." Machiavelli, in contrast, took as his data phenomena that were truly political, and his whole method of inquiry was nontranscendental, confined solely to the realm of real power relationships among men. Indeed Machiavelli was the first theoretician of *praxis,* the first political philosopher to give man ideas that can be acted upon and translated into social practice.

It was this "science of power" that was carried forward into the twentieth century by the neo-Machiavellians. Mosca, Michels, Pareto, and Sorel followed Machiavelli in divorcing ethics from knowledge, taking human nature as it is, rejecting all monistic and metaphysical theories of history, and investigating political behavior in the "antiformal" mode of refusing to accept at face value what men say, think, or write. In their works Burnham found all the intellectual ammunition he needed to wage his two-front war against socialism and democracy. One by one they come forward with their wisdom: Mosca, with his theory of the ruling class as an organized minority, his rejection of representative government as an empty fiction, and his empirical outline of the permanent stratification of society; Michels, with his "iron law of oligarchy," his thesis that direct democracy is impossible for "technical" and "mechanical" reasons; and his demonstration that ultimate sovereignty cannot be dispersed and that the masses psychologically depend upon autocratic leadership; Sorel, with his belief in the emotive and activating power of myth, his recognition of the necessity of violence to challenge institutions based on force, and his savage attack on the squalid fraud of 19th century bourgeois parliaments; and, above all, Pareto, with his principle of the "circulation of elites," his view of politics as primarily the arena of non-logical conduct, and his theory of "residues" and "derivations"—roughly, the constant habits or impulses of human behavior and the rationalizations or ideologies used to justify them.

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[9] See Ralf-Dehrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 136–44.

[10] Kendal E. Bailes, "The Politics of Technology: Stalin and Technocratic Thinking among Soviet Engineers," *American Historical Review,* 79 (April 1974), 445–69.

[11] John P. Diggins, *Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

That there exists a sharp separation between the rulers and the ruled, that governments operate on force and fraud, and that all political groups and institutions degenerate into hierarchies and elites were theorems Burnham fully endorsed. But his conclusion was far from pessimistic. If democracy, conceived in Lincolnesque terms as popular sovereignty and government *by* the people, was theoretically impossible, nevertheless liberty and freedom, as expressed in and through organized opposition, could still prevail. Mosca's principle of "juridical defense" demonstrated how the individual could be protected from arbitrary personal power, and both Mosca and Machiavelli demonstrated how liberty would emerge out of the continual clash of opposing factions, interest groups, and social forces. New threats to liberty, however, were arising everywhere. The war, Burnham pointed out in the last chapter, was a "stage in a world social revolution." New power alignments would evolve even though the elitist structure of power itself remains intact. The military might now join the technicians and managers as a new "Bonapartist" ruling class based on plebiscitary democracy. This trend could be checked if various elites were to resist the total concentration of power in the state. But—and here is the crux—to do so elites might have to defy a democratic public that can never be induced to think logically and scientifically. How then could elites, whose scientific skepticism alienates them from the masses, preserve liberty and at the same time sustain their own deference and power?

> A dilemma confronts any section of the elite that tries to act scientifically. The political life of the masses and the cohesion of society demand the acceptance of myths. A scientific attitude toward society does not permit the belief in the truth of the myths. But the leaders must profess, indeed foster, belief in the myths or the fabric of society will crack and they will be overthrown. In short, the leaders, if they themselves are scientific, must lie.[12]

In this argument for dishonesty honestly argued, Burnham was at least true to Plato and Machiavelli.[13]

The Machiavellians is doubtless a daring work in American political theory that effectively challenged the moral pieties of liberalism and the classless illusions of Marxism. Yet the perversity of brilliance in the work makes one wonder whether intellectually history is being used or abused. One of the major embarrassments is its shifting criterion of truth. Approaching knowledge as an antiformalist, Burnham denied the autonomy of political theory. He maintained that the "real" meaning of any political doctrine could only be understood against the background of time and place, and, above all, in light of the social forces that had produced it. Although he applied this criterion to Dante, he abandoned it when he moved into the twentieth century and discussed the neo-Machiavellians. Here we learn nothing of the social and political context of their writings, for Burnham treated their theories almost as universal principles, as though he had discovered the timeless "iron laws" of political geometry. The conspicuous feature of modern elitist theory, however, is that it arose out of a particular political culture; indeed, it developed predominantly in Italy, a country where liberal democracy had not been fully developed, a culture in which the moral cynicism of the intellectual class reflected the actual oligarchical power structure of the ruling class.

It is necessary to dwell a bit further on *The Machiavellians* because it came to be regarded as the theoretical and moral foundation of Burnham's later attitudes toward the cold war and of his interpretation of Soviet foreign policy. According to Burnham's reading of Machiavelli, a leader or political elite could justify the unlimited use of force, violence, and even political lying in international affairs, not merely as traditional power politics, but on ethical grounds. Burnham was convinced that Machiavelli had not eliminated ethics from politics but instead refuted Dante's otherworldly, transcendental ideals because they were unattainable. He did this, Burnham maintained, "in order to bring politics and ethics more closely into line, and to locate both of them firmly in the real world of space and time and history, which is the only world about which we can know anything."[14] We rub our eyes. For the "real world" is the domain of factual knowledge about which we can have no moral knowledge; indeed, ever since Hume philosophers have seriously questioned whether the slightest glimmer of ethical insight can be derived from a study of the objective world, whether knowledge apart from morality can determine choice. Most men want to feel there is a reasonable correspondence, a just measure of appropriateness, between what they think they know about the world and what they think "ought" to be done in the world. *The Machiavellians* failed to answer this need for ethical knowledge.

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[12] James Burnham, *The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom* (Chicago, Gateway edition, 1963), p. 304.

[13] For an interesting response to Burnham's argument, see Benedetto Croce, "Political Truths and Popular Myths," in *My Philosophy and other Essays on the Moral and Political Problems of Our Time* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 91–95.

The book also failed to answer the need for practical knowledge. Indeed, it is difficult to see how neo-Machiavellian thought helped illuminate the meaning of many contemporary historical events and movements. In *The Machiavellians* there is no attempt to confront the dynamics of historical change or the novel phenomenon of totalitarianism in general and Stalinism in particular; nor is there any effort to analyze the reasons for the hegemony of elites or explain why elites must deteriorate (if Pareto's "circulation of elites" explains the Soviet purges, then Yezhov must be judged "superior" to Bukharin). Similarly, there is no effort to develop a theory of human nature or to explain the persistence of irrationality in politics; nor is there any convincing reason given why elites, and only elites, would think scientifically and rationally. (The Founding Fathers, elitist themselves, did not trust government by elites because even the "best minds" were disposed to "self-delusion"; Mussolini, supposedly an admirer of Sorel, was hardly a model of "logical conduct"; Stalin, an admirer of Stalinism, was perhaps *too* logical.) Even more serious, *The Machiavellians* offers no penetrating causal interpretation of the struggle for power or any analytical perspective for anticipating the future course of history. (It is far more difficult, Mosca observed, to foresee exactly what will happen than merely to foresee what is never going to happen.) About all we can learn from *The Machiavellians* is that power struggles among men and nations will continue forever because man by nature is driven to struggle for power. Burnham did not explain this phenomenon, he assumed it, and in doing so he offered a tautology instead of a theory.

Obviously Burnham was using Machiavellianism as shock therapy for liberals and socialists, the fuzzy-minded intellectuals whose moral sentiments blinded them to power realities. In the neo-Machiavellians he believed he had found a "scientific" body of knowledge that illuminated the flux of events, and he was certain that a proper understanding of Machiavelli would demonstrate why it was necessary to exclude moral considerations from political inquiry. Yet the difficulty with Burnham's argument was not, as his critics would charge, that his own neo-Machiavellianism concealed value commitments that justified a ruthless, militant response to the Soviet Union. What renders Burnham's work questionable is his simple, one-sided interpretation of Machiavelli. "We find," Burnham wrote, "that Machiavelli uses language in a cognitive, scientific manner. That is, except where he is frankly urging his readers to action, he uses words not in order to express his emotions or attitudes, but in such a way that their meaning can be tested, can be understood in terms of the real world. We always know what he is talking about."[15] On the contrary, the author of *The Prince* and *The Discourses* used language in such ambiguous ways that Machiavellianism has many meanings. Some scholars, seeing more satire than science, cannot even take his prose literally, while others, especially political philosophers with ideological commitments, can easily make Machiavelli serve different political purposes. Hence the Marxist Antonio Gramsci hails *The Prince* as a call for the dictatorship of progressive forces against an obsolete feudal aristocracy (Burnham also leaned toward this view); the conservative natural law philosopher Leo Strauss regards Machiavelli as an anti-Christian "teacher of evil"; the existentialist Merleau-Ponty sees him as a modern humanist operating in a universe hushed in moral silence; and the liberal historian Sir Isaiah Berlin maintains that Machiavelli realized the "irreconcilability of equally dogmatic faiths, and the practical improbability of complete victory of one over the other," and thus inadvertently opened the path to "empiricism, pluralism, toleration, compromise."[16]

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[14] Burnham, *Machiavellians*, p. 44.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[16] Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince and Other Writings* (New York: International Publishers edition, 1959); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "A Note on Machiavelli," in *Signs* (Evanston, Illinois, 1964) pp. 211–223; Leo Strauss, *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1958); Isaiah Berlin, "The Question of Machiavelli," *New York Review of Books*, 17 (Nov. 4, 1971), 20–32.

The variety of these interpretations makes one wonder whether Burnham's politics rested on clear theoretical foundations. In his cold war phase, Burnham would pose as the "romantic Machiavellian" (Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s description[17]), the exponent of heroic *realpolitik* who would bring all American power to bear on the liberation of eastern Europe. Yet the cold war became anything but a cool, logical exercise in Machiavellian statecraft, which stresses the limited efficacy of force and aspires to the "pure" use of power, undefiled by motives of personal pride or political humiliation. Indeed, the cold war reintroduced on a grand scale that selfsame emotional ingredient that Machiavelli tried to eliminate from politics—the language of moral passion.

In truth, Burnham's mind and temperament was unsuited to the advice that Machiavelli offered. Although the Renaissance philosopher wanted to use the "new" science of politics to control the imponderables of politics, he also desired to sensitize the political leader to the discontinuities of historical experience and the ironies of political action. "Above all," Sheldon Wolin has written, Machiavelli's "political actor needed a temperament which could endure acting without assurance of certainty."[18] This anguished capacity to perform with "negative capability" (Keats's phrase), to confront the world of power and at the same time realize there are limits to man's knowledge of that world, scarcely describes Burnham's mechanistic approach to cold war politics where, as we shall see, the movement of power is predicted with geometric precision by a strategist who knows the "real world."

This curious discrepancy between Burnham's professed political theory and his actual political behavior, between Machiavelli's sense of skepticism and moderation and Burnham's absolute certainty about the course of history, raises a further question. If Machiavellianism does not supply the theoretical foundation of Burnham's subsequent cold war convictions, what does? Clearly the answer lies elsewhere. Were we to adopt Burnham's own antiformalist method of inquiry and use the categories of Pareto, we might say that Burnham's neo-Machiavellianism was the "derivation" of his anti-Stalinist "residue." Seen in this light, Burnham's new-founded theories may be regarded as expressions of a frustrated ex-Trotskyist, and his impassioned cold war convictions not those of a "scientist" but what Machiavelli himself might suspect as being the politics of *vendetta*.

Stalin's Advocate or Adversary?

But upon whom did Burnham seek revenge? To what political purpose did he write *The Machiavellians*? Was he warming up for a cold war that had yet to crystallize in 1943? Interpreting Burnham became even more puzzling in 1945, when he published his widely discussed "Lenin's Heir" in the *Partisan Review*. Here Burnham proposed the scandalous thesis that Stalin, far from betraying the revolution, had actually fulfilled it. Trotskyists and American liberals could not see this because they had always dismissed Stalin as an uncultured mediocrity who triumphed more by stealth than by skill. But once the intellectual disabuses himself of literary snobbery, Burnham contended, he may have to admit that Stalin was a "great man," and the source of his greatness lies not only in his role as military leader in the war but in a "creative political imagination" that had produced two profound changes in communist policy: first, "a multi-national Bolshevism" which now allows Russia to avoid the mistakes of the early Comintern and exploit the deeper currents of nationalism and national liberation; second, "a geopolitical vision" that enables him to orchestrate every isolated military move into a unified diplomatic offensive. Burnham cleverly dramatized this total movement in Platonic metaphors:

> Starting from the magnetic core of the Eurasian heartland, the Soviet power, like the reality of the One of Neo-Platonism overflowing in the descending series of emanative progression, flows outward, west into Europe, south into the Near East, east into China, already lapping the shores of the Atlantic, the Yellow and China Seas, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf. As the differentiated One, in its progression, descends through the stages of Mind, Soul and Matter, and then through its final return back to Itself; so does the Soviet power, emanating from the integrally totalitarian center, proceed outward by Absorption (the Baltics, Bessarabia, Bukovina, East Poland), Domination (Finland, the Balkans, Mongolia, North China, and tomorrow Germany), Orienting Influence (Italy, France, Turkey, Iran, central and south China . . .), until it is dissipated in MH ON, the outer material sphere, beyond the Eurasian boundaries, of momentary Appeasement and Infiltration (England, the United States).[19]

Burnham's article exploded like a tempest at Trotsky's wake. Former disciples Lionel Abel and Dwight Macdonald attacked Burnham for directing his animus against a fallen revolutionist with whose values he agrees while admiring a "successful butcher" whose behavior appalls him, and indeed for eliminating values altogether from historical inquiry by accepting what in fact happens rather than what one wants to happen.[20] The most interesting response was George Orwell's essay, "Second Thoughts on James Burnham," a classic in the literature of political criticism and historio-philosophical analysis, Orwell had been following Burnham's writings since *The Managerial Revolution.* With "Lenin's Heir" he now believed he possessed the key to Burnham's lofty indifference to democracy: the American writer is intoxidated by a fascination with power. His eyes are always fixed upward, blinded by the apex of political authority. So captivated, Burnham tries to hypnotize the reader by building up a "picture of terrifying, irresistible power" in which Stalin becomes an epochal hero embodying the march of destiny. This mental disease, moreover, distorts Burnham's understanding of history. "Power-worship blurs political judgment because it leads, almost unavoidably, to the belief that present trends will continue." Not only does he predict the future simply by extending the present forward, Burnham sees history itself as one continual apocalypse. "Nations, governments, classes, and social systems are constantly described as expanding, contracting, decaying, dissolving, toppling, crashing, crumbling, crystallizing and, in general, behaving in an unstable and melodramatic way." It is this cataclysmic vision, together with his Machiavellian power-fetish, that explains Burham's new-found admiration of Stalin. Whether engrossed by Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia, by managerialism or bureaucratic collectivism, "in each case he was obeying the same instinct: the instinct to bow down before the conquerer of the moment, to accept the existing trend as irreversible."[21]

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[17] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., review of Burnham's *The Struggle for the World*, *Nation*, 64 (April 5, 1947), 398–99.

[18] Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), p. 217.

[19] James Burnham, "Lenin's Heir," *Partisan Review*, 12 (Winter, 1945), 66–67.

Although he gave a penetrating analysis of Burnham's philosophy of history and power, Orwell was completely wrong about Burnham's political position. So too were Macdonald, who suggested, after pondering three possible interpretations of "Lenin's Heir," that Burnham was recommending "submission to Stalinism," and Abel, who in fact entitled his reply "Stalin's Advocate." Burnham fooled everyone by becoming Stalin's greatest adversary among the American intelligentsia. Years later he admitted in an interview with this author that he had written the article as a "put-on," an effort to challenge intellectuals to think of Stalin neither as Trotsky's "mere cipher" nor as Roosevelt's "genial Uncle Joe"—to think, in a word, the unthinkable. Indeed, six months before the article appeared Burnham was secretly at work on a study of Bolshevik diplomatic goals for the Office of Strategic Service, a study which was to be analyzed in preparation for the Yalta Conference. Parts of this study were incorporated into Burnham's next book, and when it appeared intellectuals would never again have to wonder whether they were reading Burnham correctly.[22]

The Struggle for the World was published in 1947. A marvelous exercise in pamphleteering, it reads like Lenin's *April Thesis* and Tom Paine's *Common Sense.* Typically, the opening sentence expresses Burnham's apocalyptic belief in Armageddon: "The Third World War began in April, 1944." Burnham was referring to a mutiny allegedly of Communist-directed Greek sailors in Alexandria, a clear sign that the Soviet Union now intended to turn the antifascist resistance against the West. It was the opening round of a total war that "may begin at any moment, today, tomorrow; it may even have begun before these sentences are published." The inevitability of war, Burnham insisted, was the consequence of the "transcendent power" now concentrated in atomic weapons, a new technological development that makes possible for the first time in modern history the domination of the world by a single state. The struggle will be fought to the complete triumph of either the United States or the Soviet Union, the only two remaining power centers. As to communism, Burnham defined it as "a world-wide, conspiratorial movement for the conquest of a monopoly power in the era of capitalist decline." He drew on Lenin's writings to embellish the definition, and, with similar knowledge of early Comintern history, he had no trouble demonstrating Soviet policy was identified with a world communist schema. Communism, in short, was a monolith. Moreover, the logic and direction of communism could be grasped through the concepts of geopolitics. Thus Burnham worked out an actual spherical diagram of the world as it existed in August, 1939, placing the Soviet Union at the center and drawing, around a dark inner circle, a series of concentric rings, each demarcating vividly the presence or influence of Soviet power. Lest the diagram imply a static image, Burnham cleverly used the language of physical motion and force to depict Soviet power as an endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries. The Soviet Union is the "inner, magnetic core," the "defensive ring" from which, offensively, "pressure pushes" extend forever outward in a "thrust" of "direct power from the Heartland." The metaphor was awesome, and it served to dramatize Burnham's argument that motion continues through a vacuum until it is resisted, that power must be answered with power.

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[20] Lionel Abel, "Stalin's Advocate," *Politics,* 2 (May 1945), 146–48; Dwight Macdonald, "Beat Me Daddy," *Partisan Review,* 12 (Spring, 1945), 181–87.

[21] George Orwell, "Second Thoughts on James Burnham" (1946), in *The Orwell Reader: Fiction, Essays, and Reportage* (New York: Harcourt, Brace 1956), pp. 335–54.

[22] Interview with Burnham, June 11, 1971. Twenty years later Burnham also revealed in writing that "Part I of *The Struggle for the World* was originally part of a secret study prepared for the Office of Strategic Services in the spring of 1944 and distributed at that time to the relevant Washington desks." Burnham, *The War We Are In: The Last Decade and the Next* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: 1967), p. 10.

Would America resist? Burnham was doubtful. Americans were too immature for the world of diplomacy and their leaders too irresolute. Yet the West will inevitably have to face the awful decision somewhere sometime. And to carry out Burnham's policy will be, he admitted, "a long, difficult and perhaps most terrible process." "The most hopeful route out of the crisis will be hard and painful and, most probably, bloody." It will be a struggle, "such that one or the other, or perhaps both, of the contestants must in the end be defeated." Nevertheless, Burnham could—by somehow mixing Toynbee with Machiavelli—conclude that the cold war is the challenge to which America must respond or accept its own decline and fall. Unlike Christian grace, which offers men another chance to repent and choose again, "History offers each of its great challenges only once. After only one failure, or refusal, the offer is withdrawn. Babylon, Athens, Thebes, Alexandria, Madrid, Vienna sink back, and do not rise again."[23]

The Struggle for the World appeared at a momentous turning point in modern American diplomatic history. It was published during the week in which President Truman announced his decision to come to the support of Greece and Turkey. Immediately Burnham's book was linked to what soon was referred to as the "Truman Doctrine." *Time* treated the publication as a news event in its "International" section, *Life* devoted thirteen pages to a condensation of the book's contents, and the liberal *Christian Century* angrily complained that Burnham's "stop Russia" policy was precisely what Congress had approved in supporting Truman's aid bill.[24] *The Struggle for the World*, however, proved a poor guide to both world events and American policy. Within a year after its publication two developments occurred that would eventually shatter the communist monolith: Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union and Tito's courageous defiance of Stalin, and the Chinese Communist's successful drive against the nationalists, which culminated in a victory that Stalin neither had foreseen nor tried to bring about. Burnham, however, could take little satisfaction in these developments, for the Truman administration had confirmed the worst of his fears. The Berlin airlift was a "decision not to decide," a timid effort to avoid a confrontation instead of sending an armed convoy through the blockade, a "minute risk" that would have won "enormous gain" by demonstrating to the world that the Communists could be beaten at their own game.[25] Burnham now began to reexamine the Truman policy that he had recently supported, and in *The Coming Defeat of Communism* (1950) he spelled out the defects of its defensive and hence defeatist nature. Instead of accepting the status quo and relying upon the Marshall Plan (which scarcely thwarted communist strength in Italy and France), Burnham advised America to take advantage of the nuclear balance of terror and exploit Soviet weaknesses by embarking upon an "offensive-subversive war" that will defeat the enemy through sustained propaganda, economic pressure on western countries trading with Russia and her satellites, and material and moral support to resistance movements behind the Iron Curtain.[26]

"Burnhamism" now became a phrase of fear and revulsion among the European Left. In England, the socialist R.H.S. Crossman denounced embittered ex-radicals like Burnham and Arthur Koestler, who allegedly accused western intellectuals of "cowardice" for flinching from the consequences of taking the "strategic initiative."[27] In France, the Communist Pierre Courtade, who had been *L'Humanité*'s American Correspondent, equated Burnham's idea of a managerial elite with the racial-imperialist ideas of the Nazi Alfred Rosenberg. Convinced that Burnham was the intellectual architect of American hegemony, Courtade published a novel supposedly based on Burnham's career, *Jimmy*, which was later translated by the Leningrad review, *Zvedza*. Here unsuspecting Frenchmen could read of the anti-communist "police state" apparatus of Governor Thomas Dewey and Judge Harold Medina, who were suppressing the voices of progressive Americans, represented by the black communist Paul Robeson, while allowing anti-Semitism and racism to run rampant in a country succumbing to "*l'hystérie burnhamienne*."[28]

In the United States, Burnham's hardened cold war position and his defense of McCarthy troubled the anti-Communist Left. In 1953 *Partisan Review* asked him to resign from its editorial board, and that same year a bitter dispute erupted within the American Committee for Cultural Freedom when Burnham wrote an introduction to Medford Evans's *The Secret Fight for the A-Bomb*, which charged American scientists with relaying classified data to Soviet agents. Notable ACCF physicists and chemists like Herman J. Muller, Robert Openheimer, Harold Urey, and Eugene Rabinovitch threatened to withdraw from the organization unless Burnham were forced to resign, while sociologists Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell, and David Riesman worked vigorously to resolve the rift. "These people are not Russia dupes," Bell wrote Sidney Hook, speaking of scientists he had recently met at MIT. "[Jerome] Wiesner is close to Schlesinger and A.D.A., but that is a far cry, of course, from being pro-Russian, unless one wants to apply Burnham's inverted Leninism of looking at the 'objective' consequences of their political positions."[29] Burnham went on to write his own version of scientific espionage in *The Web of Subversion*, published in 1954 and later reissued in 1961 as an "American Opinion" publication of the John Birch Society. Burnham chose to apply the method of "inverted Leninism" not only to scientists but to liberals in general, and as for being "close to Schlesinger," Burnham could extend the doctrine of guilt-by-association to corruption-by-marriage to explain why the historian is not to be trusted. "Schlesinger is married to the sister of John K. Fairbank," Burnham wrote in the *American Mercury*. "It would be a cruel thing to hold a man to blame for his brother-in-law. But Schlesinger has taken explicit political as well as personal responsibility for the *bona fides* of Fairbank—of whom it has been testified under oath that he was a member of the Communist Party, and who has been undeniably proved the active associate of Communists and pro-Communists."[30]

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[23] James Burnham, *The Struggle for the World* (New York: The John Day Co., 1947), p. 248, passim.

[24] "For That or Nothing," *Time*, 49 (March 24, 1947), 26–27; James Burnham, "Struggle For The World," *Life*, 22 (March 31, 1947), 59–68, 73–80; letters to the editor ran "about two to one against Burnham," which led to an entire editorial explaining *Life*'s differences with the author; see editorial, *Life*, 22 (April 21, 1947), 38. "Blueprint for Empire," *Christian Century*, 64 (May 21, 1947), 646–48; see also "The Truman-Burnham Parallel," *Christian Century*, 64 (June 4, 1947), 702–03.

[25] James Burnham, "Our Spineless Foreign Policy," *American Mercury*, 70 (Jan., 1950), 3–13.

[26] James Burnham, *The Coming Defeat of Communism* (New York: John Day Co., 1950).

[27] R. H. S. Crossman, "Reflections on the Cold War," *New Republic*, 124 (Apr. 9, 1951), 10–12.

[28] Pierre Courtade, "James Burnham, Le Nouveau Rosenberg de l'imperialisme Americain," *La Nouvelle Critique* (July–Aug., 1950), pp. 14–28; *Jimmy*, (Paris: Les Editeurs Français Reunis, 1951).

The battle between Burnham and Schlesinger had been building up for some time within the ACCF (from which the historian would resign in 1955, protesting that the organization had lost sight of cultural freedom and had become obsessed with anti-communism long after the threat of internal communism had passed).[31] In 1953 Schlesinger had written a savage review of Burnham's latest book—"a careless and hasty job, filled with confusion, contradiction, ignorance and misrepresentation." Burnham is a man "in permanent apocalypse," Schlesinger exploded, "a catstrophic thinker whose tiresome prophecies of doom can only dazzle once. He is the Bix Beiderbecke of our political journalism, only he has hit that high note once or twice too often."[32] Burnham's next book deserves to be examined closely, not so much for its high notes as its theoretical dissonance.

"Who Will Die for Containment?"

As with his other books, Burnham's *Containment or Liberation?* (1953) was timely, provocative, and deliberately unsettling. It appeared shortly after the 1952 campaign, which saw Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson and his advisor Schlesinger opposing the Eisenhower-Dulles policy of committing America to freeing peoples under Soviet domination. It also appeared during the exhausting stalemate of the Korean War and the height of McCarthyism, when the public was most susceptible to criticisms of American foreign policy. For once Burnham was in touch with the masses.

Ironically, it was the elite, the only class Burnham had once believed capable of logical thinking and rational behavior, that was responsible for America's disastrous foreign policy, and the architect of that policy was George Kennan. Burnham devoted several chapters to a close analysis of Kennan's famous "Mr. X" article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, and to his seminal treatise on realism versus idealism in international relations, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*. Burnham's critique was perceptive and, as it turned out, prescient. Looking back, it does appear that Kennan was unduly optimistic about the possibility of containment affecting real changes within the Kremlin. Exactly how containment would bring about a "gradual mellowing" of totalitarian power was never convincingly explained. Burnham also effectively challenged the liberals' assumption that communism is simply a "natural" response to a poor economic environment: there was no clear geographical correlation or historical pattern between communist strength and economic conditions. Communism is a "political apparatus," not a natural development, as Lenin's criticism of "spontaneity" proved again and again throughout the twentieth century. Burnham was at his best exposing the fallacies of containment. Yet, despite his astute and lucid critique, he himself became vague and problematic when he turned to liberation as the solution. He advocated recognizing governments-in-exile, recruiting and training national, paramilitary armies in preparation for an invasion, and developing opposition movements behind the enemy's lines. The key was resistance—the will to act decisively and struggle bravely. Greece and Finland had the will, and they remained free; Poland and Czechoslovakia did not, and they were swallowed up. The lesson? We can help the captive peoples restore the will to resist by demonstrating to Russia that America is ready to come to their support and is prepared for "whatever military action may be required" to assure the success of their struggle. Burnham never acknowledged that the success of Greece and Finland in remaining out of the Soviet orbit was due to Stalin's acquiescence to geopolitics as much as their own firmness. Nor did he, like Kennan, bother to explain how the Soviet ruling class could abandon a militant posture toward the West without giving up its own claim to power within the Russian bureaucracy. Indeed, why would the Soviet Union tolerate liberation? No ruling class relinquishes power to those who would destroy it. Both Marx and Machiavelli could agree to that truth. Was Burnham now a Wilsonian liberal speaking the language of "national self-determination" (used frequently in the book)? Or was he still an unconscious Trotskyist who continued to harbor illusions about the internal weaknesses of Stalinism and who saw his national liberation armies as the Fourth International redivivus? Whatever the answer, one thing seemed clear: Burnham was no longer the managerialist or the Machiavellian, for he had no consistent theory of power to liberate those from total power.[33]

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[29] Daniel Bell to Sidney Hook, Nov. 23, 1953, files, American Committee for Cultural Freedom, Tamiment Library, New York.

[30] James Burnham, "The Case Against Adlai Stevenson," *American Mercury*, 80 (Oct. 1952), 11–19.

[31] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to James T. Farrell, Mar. 14, 1955, files, ACCF.

[32] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Middle-Aged Man With a Horn," *New Republic*, 128 (Mar. 16, 1953), 16–17.

Nor did Burnham offer a consistent theory of political knowledge with which to interpret historical events. This is no place to plunge into a historiographical discussion of the debate over the orgins of the cold war. But it is obvious that at the heart of that debate is a fierce controversy over the *intent* of Soviet foreign policy. Was Stalin's policy aimed at Russia's national security or at world communist expansion? Burnham, of course, had no doubt it was the latter, but to prove Soviet designs for world conquest he had to abandon his recent neo-Machiavellianism and return once again to Marxism. For Machiavellianism led to a geopolitical perspective that traced the cold war to imperial Russia's limited, strategic ambitions in eastern Europe and the Balkans. This perspective, shared by conservative writers like Walter Lippmann and, to a certain extent, by conservative statesmen like Churchill and de Gaulle, Burnham was forced to reject in order to stress the ideological background of the cold war. In so doing he now attributed to ideas a power he had formerly denied them. Thus the Burnham who had warned readers in *The Machiavellians* against accepting at face value the documents and statements of political leaders—the fallacy of "formalism"—was now citing Lenin's pre–World War I writings as the operational code of Soviet foreign policy and Marx's *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 as the mental blueprint of the Soviet *Weltanschauung*—"You have a world to win." All this was highly dubious. True, ideology plays an important role in communist thinking. Yet it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain whether ideology determines the nature of action or action determines the meaning of ideology. Which text do we use? *What's To Be Done* (1902) revises *Capital* (1868), *State and Revolution* (1917) updates *Two Tactics of Social Democracy* (1905), and October 1917 breaks the whole organic unity of Marxist theory and practice, so that in *Left-Wing Communism* (1920) Lenin can flagrantly derevolutionize Leninism itself. Whatever may be the motivating force of Marxist theory in prerevolutionary situations, the irony is that Burnham attributed Soviet political successes to ideological determinism, while in reality Russia's political experience since 1917 has, as R.V. Daniels observes, "revolved around the most exaggerated voluntarism."[34]

A curious pattern of thought emerges in Burnham's attitudes toward the Soviet Union. In the late 'thirties, as we have seen, he used the categories of Marxian and managerial analysis to explain the failure of the Bolshevik Revolution. A few years later, in "Lenin's Heir," he used neo-Machiavellianism to demonstrate that Stalin "fulfilled" the revolution only by betraying Marxist ideas for power politics. Then a decade later, when it became clear that the *realpolitik* perspective led to a conservative interpretation of the cold war as a traditional clash of nation states struggling for contiguous spheres of influence, he was forced to reinvoke the power of ideology in order to dramatize the menace of communism. Burnham, in short moved back and forth between Machiavelli and Marx, between the idea of power and the power of an idea, changing his epistemology each time he wanted to explain reality.

Burnham also wanted to foretell as well as explain, and as a result *Containment or Liberation?* retained the same flaw that one sees in his earlier works—the instinct to predict the future by projecting the past. "If the communists succeed in consolidating what they have *already* conquered, then their complete world victory is certain. The threat does not come only from what the communists may do, but from what they have done. We do not have to bring in speculation about Soviet "intentions." The simple terrible fact is that if things go on as they now are, if for the time being they merely stabilize, then we have already lost." In Burnham's thoughts about diplomacy one cannot help but see a kind of residual Marxism, a tendency to think that any stable situation is inherently contradictory and contains the seeds of inevitable conflict. Thus the logic of containment led to two diametrically opposed alternatives. "At most, containment can be a temporary expedient, a transition. As the transition is completed, containment must move toward one or the other of the two major poles, toward appeasement or liberation." The United States cannot really contain Russia, Burnham insisted, for the "Soviet imperial state" is by definition "a totalitarian power which seeks world domination." Ultimately America will have to submit to communist expansion or "get rid of Soviet rule." The inexorability of the either-or alternative not only displays Burnham's weakness for melodrama, it also displays how closely his views corresponded with the Communist version of the cold war. Reading Burnham, we are in the same political universe as Lenin in 1917, a world of inevitable conflicts, apocalyptic confrontations, and ultimate moments of truth. Accepting communist rhetoric at face value, Burnham could continue to expound his mechanistic view of diplomacy as a chess board of predictable power moves in a vacuum of nonresistance.[35]

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[33] James Burnham, *Containment or Liberation? An Inquiry Into the Aims of United States Foreign Policy* (New York: John Day Co., 1953), pp. 19–49, *passim*.

[34] Robert V. Daniels, "Fate and Will in the Marxian Philosophy of History," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 21 (Oct.–Dec., 1960), 538–52; see also the same author's "What The Russians Mean," *Commentary*, 34 (Oct., 1962), 314–23; and Bernard P. Kiernan, "Ideology and Foreign Policy: A Reconsideration," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, 50 (Winter, 1974), 22–38.

The question of resistance brings us to the weakest link in the chain of Burnham's argument: the ethical link. Burnham's dilemma lay in formulating a theory of politics that could be realistic without being cynical, a political theory that made "power" its central concept and yet somehow allowed for the role of moral ideals in human affairs. He was unaware of the dilemma until the cold war, when it became apparent that Machiavellian geopolitics meant accepting the status quo. Hence the critique of containment had to be ethical as well as political. Burnham now spoke of the need for "honor" in American foreign policy, of being faithful to certain ideals without which liberation would be a mockery and a sham. "Spirit must direct matter toward a goal, and a firm resolution must sustain an unyielding effort through periods of failure, loss and sorrow." Burnham did not say whence this "spirit" would rise, but his political message was clear enough:

> It is perhaps the crucial defect of the policy of containment that it is incapable of meeting this moral and spiritual demand. Who will willingly suffer, sacrifice and die for containment? The very notion is ridiculous. The average man cannot even understand the policy of containment, much less become willing to die for it. Will the captives of the Kremlin risk death for a policy that starts abandoning them to the usurpers of their freedom?"[36]

The question was poignantly posed, but one can find no answer to it in the entire body of Burnham's writings. Who, one might ask, will fight for Michel's "iron law of oligarchy"? Who will storm the barricades for the cause of bureaucracy? Who will die for Pareto? In 1943, when Hitler had all but conquered western Europe, Burnham proceeded to prove that freedom was an illusion. In 1953, when Stalin had absorbed eastern Europe, he suddenly discovered the value of freedom without explaining how it could be realized. Sorel-like, he now asked East Europeans to fight for an ideal he once believed theoretically impossible, and he asked his own people to risk their lives in order to rescue Europe from Soviet domination—the very American people who had passively witnessed the destruction of East European nationhood in 1939.

Conservatives might forgive Burnham for offering his advice ten years too late, against Stalin rather than Hitler. But even conservatives cannot avoid noticing the theoretical incoherence in Burnham's cold war philosophy. In truth, Burnham's idea of liberation embraced two incompatible world views: the geopolitics of power and national interests on the one hand, and the "higher politics" of morality and national commitment on the other. The first view stresses the need for international security and stability, the second stresses the imperative of ethical demands as the test of national morality. The first is soberly conservative, preferring the known to the unknown, Machiavelli's world of power rather than Dante's world of ideals. The second is radically adventuous, fired by romantic notions of glory and honor (and perhaps fear of national humiliation). In *Containment or Liberation?* Burnham tried to accommodate both views, but ultimately the prudence of political realism yields to the pride of Wilsonian idealism, the mind surrenders to the will. The result of this theoretical schizophrenia was a confusion between what was possible and what was "honorable." As Machiavelli might have predicted, and as the East European uprisings of 1956 would demonstrate, the doctrine of liberation gravely implicated America in political tragedy.

Russia Through Trotsky's Eyes

The Hungarian revolt found Burnham helpless as he watched in silence the Soviet tanks rolling toward Budapest. Neither he nor the *National Re-*

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[35] Burnham, *Containment or Liberation?* pp. 217–18, 251.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42.

view dared suggest a counteroffensive by NATO forces. Even editor Buckley, the cold warrior *par excellence*, felt the soft glove of Schlesinger on his shoulder.[37] Chastened by the Budapest bloodbath, Burnham was nonetheless somewhat encouraged by the democratic aspirations of the Hungarian rebels, goals that he now realized could only be won by abandoning the doctrine of liberation. Accordingly, Burnham called for the withdrawal of Soviet and NATO troops from eastern and western Europe. This new policy for neutralizing Central and Eastern Europe, which Burnham referred to as "the Austrian solution," was similar to a proposal Walter Lippmann made as early as 1947, and one that George Kennan would advocate in 1958 as the strategy of mutual "disengagement." But Burnham could not sell the idea to the *National Review*. Frank S. Meyer and William Schlamm, two more ex-Communists on Buckley's board of consulting editors, maintained that Burnham's policy, based on the premise that atomic war is unthinkable, substituted gradual surrender for "aggressive pressure."[38] Burnham also failed to explain why disengagement would be acceptable to the Soviet Union. He believed his policy would be attractive to the Kremlin, now presumably convinced that it had lost control of the situation in Eastern Europe, and always prepared to take Lenin's tactic of one step backward. The Polish and Hungarian uprisings, however, were in large part responses to Khrushchev's 20th Party Congress speech denouncing Stalin, a dramatic speech that was not published in the USSR but gained widespread attention abroad and helped spark rising hopes in Eastern Europe. Burnham expected the Soviet Union to relax its grip on neighboring states just when that grip was slipping, and he never seemed to consider that Hungary's demands for party structural reform consisted of "western" democratic ideas that would challenge, and thereby threaten, the bureaucratic despotism of the Soviet state. In short, the logic of disengagement ignored the logic of totalitarianism—a strange oversight by the author of *The Managerial Revolution* and *The Machiavellians*.

Disgusted with the Eisenhower-Dulles posture of stalemate, Burnham responded favorably to the Kennedy administration. Initially he was impressed by the strategic sophistication and paramilitary plans of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and by the young President's "brave and lofty" words about defending Laos. Tactical reasons, however, dictated that Laos not be the place to embark upon this decisive new turn. Instead Cuba, where the rising "anti-Castro revolt does seem to have Mr. Kennedy's backing," is the beachhead where America could redeem herself. "What is crucial," Burnham told NR *readers* in April 1961, "is that we should *somewhere*, in *some* theatre or on *some* vital issue, make a stand of unconditional firmness: that we should strike a blow against the enemy." Ten days later Burnham's hopes were dashed with the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and he thereupon referred to Cuba as Khrushchev once spoke of Berlin—"a bone in our throat."[39]

In the early 'sixties Burnham toured Indochina and reported to the *NR* the disillusionment of Asians with America's feeble response to Cuba. He also recounted General Bill Donovan's "domino theory," which by the verbal ingenuity of metaphor explained why America's capitulation in Laos convinced the Communists that victory in Vietnam was possible. Burnham was certain that America possessed the power to win in Vietnam but lacked the will and courage. "What if," he asked *NR* readers, "the incredible chemical and biological weapons now available to Americans were turned against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese? If really massive combined forces were assembled from the U.S., Phillipines, Free China and Australia? If Chinese north-south communications were cut, as they can be without too much difficulty? If operations into the Chinese mainland were launched?" Would not such actions precipitate nuclear war between the two super powers? "Poppycock," scoffed Burnham: Khrushchev would not sacrifice Moscow to save either Saigon or Havana, which is all the more reason why the nuclear test ban treaty must be rejected. Moreover, Kennedy liberals, so squeamish about world opinion and so scrupulous about their own political purity, were blaming President Ngo Dinh Diem for their failures in Vietnam. True, the Diem government was not democratic, Burnham admitted, but "what sort of political cretins can they be who think South Vietnam could be ruled like England or Switzerland?" Curiously, on one issue Burnhamite conservatives and New Left radicals were in agreement: the struggle is against communism, not about democracy. In the cold war the Machiavellians and the Marxists found a consensus.[40]

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[37] During the crisis the *National Review* lost its vaunted sense of power politics and displayed the curse of liberalism—moral gestures. Buckley advocated issuing an "ultimatum" stating that the use of Soviet troops against "any of the East European peoples would constitute a *causus belli*. We believe that Moscow would have to back down from such an ultimatum." The use of the conditional "would" indicates that the *National Review* was hoping for the best while refusing to admit that the worst had already happened. If the Soviets do not back down? The United States, Buckley insisted, should withdraw its ambassador from Moscow and refuse to compete in the Olympic games! (Buckley, "Platonic Sorrows," *National Review*, 2 [Dec. 22, 1956], 45).

[38] James Burnham, "Sighting the Target," *National Review*, 2 (Dec. 29, 1956), 12; for Frank S. Meyer's criticism of Burnham, see the *National Review* columns gathered in his *The Conservative Mainstream* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969), pp. 319–27.

[39] See Burnham's *National Review* columns gathered in *The War We Are In: The Last Decade and the Next* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1967), pp. 126–31.

With the Johnson administration America was saved by geography. Only a man from Texas had the guts to spurn the liberal "isolationists" of the eastern establishment and escalate the Vietnam war through systematic aerial bombardment. Burnham delighted in describing what liberals despaired in discovering. "So far as foreign policy goes, Lyndon Johnson expresses the same temperament and policy as Barry Goldwater. The citizens who in 1964 voted for Goldwater are today, in general, the firmest supporters, outside of the professional military men, of Johnson's intervention in Asia." Equally encouraging was the performance of Defense Secretary McNamara, "a perfect exemplar of the top level of the new managerial class," who was attempting to integrate the industrial economy and the war machine through "program definition, cost-efficiency, systems analysis, centralized procurement, computerized inventory control, ultra-speed internal communications, etc." Burnham, the technological elitist, was deeply moved, and in the *NR* he wrote an intelligent defense of McNamara against his military and business critics on the Right and his intellectual and student critics on the Left. Soon, however, Burnham himself became a critic. All along he had doubted whether Johnson, a consummate politician, would be enlightened enough to rise above partisan, domestic issues and devote his energies primarily to foreign affairs. By 1967 it became clear that the Johnson administration would not ignore the antiwar pressures mounting across the country. Burnham now criticized McNamara for failing to step up the bombing by knocking out North Vietnam's seaports and destroying its irrigation systems and food supplies through "biological or chemical means."[41]

Burnham had no qualms in advising America to become aggressive and take the cold war offensive. For he believed that the Hungarian uprising proved that the Soviets could handle their "domestic matters" without fear of outside interference. This was the essence of "peaceful coexistence," a doctrine that preempted western interference only. The Communists, Burnham maintained, operate on the assumption of two zones: the "zone of peace," the land under communist rule, is off-limits, and any effort to disturb the status-quo is considered counter-revolutionary and Right-wing, to be crushed by whatever means necessary. The "zone of war" is the territory still free from communist domination, and within this zone any attempt that seeks to change or overthrow a government is "progressive," to be supported by "all freedom loving peoples." The United States had been duped into regarding Cuba and North Vietnam as "zones of peace," and hence America had naively announced to the world that its foreign policy does not aim to overthrow the governments of Castro and Ho Chi Minh. The Marxists, it seemed, also had their corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.[42]

Any judgment one makes of Burnham's theory of the two zones—which is a faithful restatement of the communist doctrine of coexistence—is bound to be a matter of political sentiment. The point, however, is to match "selective indignation" with objective selection. If the Soviets engaged in two zone diplomacy, clearly the West originated it with the Allied intervention during the Russian Revolution and Civil War in 1918–1920; and if the Soviets perfected it, the United States nontheless practiced it—witness, for example, the State Department's role in the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran and the CIA's involvement in subverting the Communist-supported Arbentz government in Guatemala. As for penetrating beyond the enemy's borders, the Soviets take the low ground with Communist spy networks, and America takes the high ground with U-2 reconnaissance flights deep into Russia's heartland. Burnham could rightly complain that the Soviets supported and exploited revolutionary uprisings in Greece, Angola, Cuba, and Zanzibar, but he could not prove that they had created them.[43] In giving the Soviets more credit than they deserved, Burnham's thoughts once again reflect the mirror image of the communist mentality. As an anti-Communist cold warrior, Burnham retained his Marxist vision of totality, the tendency to see all political phenomena as interrelated and emanating from a single source. Thus it is not surprising that both Burnham and the Communists had difficulty acknowledging indigneous nationalist movements, whatever their political nature, working-class or bourgeois. Burnham detected the long hand of Moscow in Communist activities in Africa, and Communists saw the long hand of Washington in counterrevolutionary movements in South America. Neither the Left nor Right, it seemed, could successfully take action independent of Russia or the United States. Whatever the validity of this worldview—the Indonesians who took it upon themselves to oust Sukarno apparently did not share it—two could play the game while professing clean hands. For on the question of democracy, Burnham himself succumbed to the two zone distinction. He accused liberals of being political "cretins" for refusing to understand that representative government and liberty are impossible in South Vietnam because of the lack of a democratic heritage. Yet the logic of this rationale applies to Russia and much of eastern Europe as well. The old fellow-travelers used to chide liberals that surely the Russians could not claim to have lost under communism what they never possessed under Czarism.[44] Similarly, Burnham's two-zone thinking enabled him to defend the antidemocratic coup of the Greek colonels in 1968, but not the democratically elected Marxist government of Salvatore Allende in Chile in 1972. Determined to see the Soviet Union liberated in the name of democracy, Burnham was willing to allow democracy to be liquidated in the name of the "free world." It was all a matter of "zones." (Orwell, Orwell, where art thou now?)

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[40] James Burnham, "Toujours, La Sale Guerre," National Review, 14 (Jan. 29, 1963), 60; "Who Gives a Whoop?" National Review, 14 (Apr. 7, 1963); "What Chance in Vietnam?" National Review, 15 (Oct. 8, 1963), 305.

[41] Burnham, *The War We Are In*, pp. 104–06; "Why Do They Hate Robert Strange McNamara?" *National Review*, 18 (Nov. 15, 1966), 1152–62; "Does Johnson Have a Foreign Policy?" *National Review*, 16 (Mar. 10, 1964), 190; McNamara's Non-War, *National Review*, 19 (Sept. 19, 1967), 1012–14.

[42] Burnham, *The War We Are In*, pp. 15–23.

[43] In *The Struggle for the World*, Burnham dramatized the Greek revolt of 1944 as a Soviet inspired maneuver and thus the actual beginning of the "Third World War." Regarding a mutiny in the Greek Navy, which he presumed had been instigated by the Moscow-controlled Greek Communist Party, Burnham wrote: "We do not know the details of what happened in the mutiny; but the details, important as they may be for future scholars, are unnecessary. We know enough to discover the political meaning of what happened, and for this details are sometimes an obstacle" (p. 1). A recent thorough and scholarly study of this affair, wherein "details" inform rather than "obstruct," presents a quite different picture of the "political meaning" of a resistance movement that Stalin himself would later allow to be crushed. See John O. Iatrides, *Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist "Second Round" 1944–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972).

But moral judgment, as desirable as it is dangerous in the study of international relations, will probably not get us very far in understanding the cold war. Far more essential is a plausible mode of analysis with which to interpret the meaning of historical events. In this respect, what ultimately challenged Burnham's theoretical perspective was the Sino-Soviet split. This development in the early 'sixties seemed to confirm what several writers had suspected—beneath the ideology of communism lay the deeper emotions of nationalism and the deeper impulses of power. Burnham did not deny that the Soviet state comprised a fusion of Russian and Communist elements, even though, as World War Two demonstrated, each element shifted in relative weight from time to time. What he denied was the ultimate historical significance of the Moscow-Peking rivalry. For the rift between European and Asiatic Marxist-Leninism created the impression that there now existed two distinct Communist postures: Russia's "soft" line of peaceful coexistence, and China's "hard" line of permanent revolutionary struggle. And this impression led to the assumption that the United States should support the policy of coexistence to demonstrate that the democratic West also desires peace. Burnham challenged these assumptions one by one.

The nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute is "verbal only," Burnham maintained. Peaceful coexistence versus revolutionary struggle is merely a debate "over how best to bury us." Burnham pointed to Zanzibar, Angola, and Yemen as evidence that Russia as well as China supported Communist revolutionary activity, and to Indonesia, where both Moscow and Peking supported Sukarno's "crush Malaysia" adventure. Moreover, the split is not between China and the Soviet Union but between Chinese and Russian Communists. Burnham acknowledged the ethnic, economic, and cultural differences between the two great powers. Nevertheless, the split is basically a factional quarrel, an organizational struggle for control and direction of the world Communist movement. From a Leninist perspective, the split could be viewed as an "intra-revolutionary dispute" that in many respects resembled the old rivalry between the Bolsheviks and the Social Revolutionaries; and the debate over the "hard" and "soft" lines echoes the disputes that marked the earlier Comintern shift from the Second to the Third period, from the strategy of consolidation based on the apparent stability of capitalism in the 1920s, to the strategy of revolutionary offensive that began on the eve of the depression. "Khrushchev and Mao take their stand foursquare on Lenin," Burnham insisted, and thus "the objective and the method of the struggle are according to the Communist mode."[45]

Those who did not share Burnham's vision of the cold war were not the radicals but the liberals. Burnham reserved his greatest scorn for writers who assumed "the Kennan-de Gaulle-Morgenthau-Lippmann approach" and mistakenly interpreted the Sino-Soviet split and Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" policy as evidence that communism had run its course. Kremlinologists of this school perceived communism in the traditional categories of national interest and security, substituting for ideological clashes historical counters that arise from concrete geographical settings. These same writers asked Americans to understand that the Soviets' security concerns are similar to those of pre-revolutionary Russian governments, and, by the same reasoning, that America's national interest and security were not at stake in Vietnam. Such theorists take geopolitics too seriously, complained Burnham, who once believed that *raison d'état* and *Realpolitik* were the only true perspective on the cold war.

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[44] David Caute, *The Fellow-Travelers: A Postscript to the Enlightenment* (New York: Macmillan, 1973).

[45] James Burnham, "Nikita Khrushchev; Maoist," *National Review*, 16 (July 28, 1964), 644; "Kennedy, Krushchev, and Mao," *National Review*, 15 (July 16, 1963), 17; "Bear-Baiting," *National Review*, 16 (Aug. 25, 1964), 718; *War We Are In*, pp. 53–61.

> "De Gaulle's theory and practice of international politics are based on the following conceptions: 1) the primary counters of the game are nations with deeply ingrained traits that change very slowly, if at all; 2) as a corollary, 'ideologies' (communism, fascism, Liberalism, etc.) are secondary and superficial; 3) the rules of the game are Machiavellian: significant moves express changing relations of power and interest, not ideological or moralistic abstractions about 'justice,' 'freedom,' 'peace,' or what not.

De Gaulle's error lay in following literally the advice Burnham put forth in *The Machiavellians*: power is everything, ideology nothing.[46]

With Pareto, Burnham had once attacked as fallacious the liberal assumption that people act as they do because of the beliefs they hold. Then with the impact of the cold war, as we have seen, he was compelled to attack liberals for failing to take beliefs and ideologies seriously. In the late 'fifties and sixties, with the shift to the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, and with the development of the Sino-Soviet split and de-Stalinization, Burnham turned the angle of his epistemological prism once again. He now called upon Kremlinologists to concentrate upon deeds rather than doctrine. "Suppose we ask the experts what this dispute is all about. Can you prove it? Yes, they will reply, and they will produce hundreds of Soviet statements proclaiming peaceful coexistence and hundreds of matching Chinese statements denouncing peaceful coexistence and calling for revolutionary struggle." All such statements are "notoriously unreliable," maintained Burnham. "Let's forget for a moment, what they say. What do they do?" he asked and proceeded to use Zanzibar, Yemen, and Indonesia as test cases.[47]

Burnham had little respect for American scholars of the Soviet Union. In the 'fifties he blasted the Russian Institutes at Columbia and Harvard, the "mass production . . . factories" of which "99 per cent of their publications have not the slightest intellectual, scientific, or political interest . . ." A rare exception in contemporary scholarship was Gerhart Niemeyer's *An Inquiry Into Soviet Mentality*. Niemeyer's book demonstrated that Communist behavior is not "rational" because it aspires beyond "the limits of normality in action"; that an "East-West dialogue" could not take place because of the Communist *weltanschauung*; and that "peace . . . is not possible with an adversary who rejects the very right of other societies to exist." Such conclusions were like an ice bath of diplomatic realism from which "nearly all Americans draw blindly back," observed Burnham, who praised Niemeyer for single-handedly "inquiring into the categorical presuppositions of our knowledge of Communist behavior."[48]

With what "categorical presuppositions" did Burnham now propose to explain Communist behavior? As noted earlier, Burnham's own perspectives shifted with each episode in his intellectual career—from managerialism to Machiavellianism to Marxist-Leninism. In the 'sixties many of the most prestigious American writers were articulating the Machiavellian, geopolitical viewpoint that Burnham had advocated in the 'forties. From the perspective of political "realism," Kennan, Morgenthau, and Lippmann interpreted the Sino-Soviet split as a nationalistic rivalry, and de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence as the triumph of experience over dogma. In response, Burnham moved on to another vision of reality to challenge American scholars: the Sino-Soviet split is essentially a conflict to decide the question that has always been the crux of international communism: Who shall be master of the international revolutionary movement? Thus, the riddles of Soviet behavior—that the Russians, for example, can "simultaneously want and not want coexistence" —must be understood by simple Marxist logic.

> What the Kennans, etc., say is true enough (this is what gives it plausibility), but true only in one historical dimension of a multi-dimensional reality. They fail, a Marxist would say, to comprehend dialectics: fail to realize that simultaneously in our age there is taking place an international competition of national states and empires (new and old), as in the past several centuries, *and also* an unprecedented revolutionary struggle that is world-wide and civilization-deep."

When Lippmann and Morgenthau tell us that American interest and security are not at stake in Vietnam, their "premise is based on a superficial, too mechanical idea of the national interests." And when they view the Sino-Soviet split as real and permanent, they are likewise reasoning mechanically rather than dialectically. To separate the strategy of peaceful coexistence from that of revolutionary struggle is to confine oneself to a one-dimensional perspective, an ahistorical perspective that fails to see the conflict as merely an extension of the "old legal-illegal dispute," reform versus revolution. Rather than a renunciation of communism, the split represents a phase of revisionism that will itself be revised in a revolutionary direction. "A true dialectician would see it as once more exemplifying the law of the unity of opposites. On a higher plane, the Russian thesis of coexistence and the Chinese antithesis of militancy fuse into a synthesis of true revolutionary struggle."[49]

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[46] Burnham, *War We Are In*, pp. 61–63, 195–97.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 56–58.

[48] James Burnham, "Their World and Ours," *National Review*, 2 (Nov. 3, 1956), 19–20.

Not until the end of the 'sixties did Burnham and the *NR* grudgingly admit a genuine rupture between China and Russia.[50] Meanwhile, in order to drive home the significance of the dialectical viewpoint, Burnham purported to convey in his columns the Communist vision of reality through the "eyes of the Kremlin." Striving for authenticity, he organized his columns as secret diplomatic dispatches to the CPUSSR:

> To: The Secretariat
> From: Intelligence Section
> Subject: Weekly Summary, International (excerpts)
>
> The present (or Geneva) period is characterized dialectically in the following manner: a) thesis—unprecedented freedom of maneuver for the camp of socialism; b) antithesis—unprecedented inertness on the part of the enemy . . .[51]

Obviously Burnham was convinced that the best way to understand Soviet communists was to see them as they saw themselves through the mediation of the Marxist-Leninist mind. Perhaps a student of R. G. Collingwood would appreciate Burnham's effort to "think himself into" historical action in order to discern the thought of his antagonist. But one wonders, for example, whether Burnham's Marxist-Leninist perspective could explain many of the cold war's erratic events and surprising turns. What would Lenin say of the sporadic uprisings in Yemen and Zanzibar? And Stalin, who never lifted a finger to help Mao or Tito, what would he say of Khrushchev's attempt to rescue Castro by planting missile sites in Cuba? And Khrushchev, who denounced the "crimes of Stalin," how would he react to the New Left's exoneration of Stalin's role in the cold war?

Burnham's demand that every Kremlinologist become a "true dialectician" is most revealing. He was convinced that the contradictions in Soviet diplomacy could be seen as more apparent than real only when writers overcome a mechanistic, linear view of historical development and appreciate the "unity" that lies behind "opposite" tendencies—the "higher plane" of historical understanding. From this privileged epistemological position, he criticized de Gaulle and Kennan for not understanding "the enemy's dual nature"—Russia's "synthesis" of Soviet nationalism and communist internationalism, of peaceful coexistence and revolutionary struggle.[52] There is an embarrassing irony in this criticism of the dichotomy of national interests and ideology, for it is precisely the indictment Trotsky leveled at Burnham himself a quarter century earlier. Trotsky had also been convinced that Russia was characterized by what he called, in his debates with Burnham and Max Eastman, a "dual nature," and he too believed that the "contradiction" between the Soviet Union's revolutionary ideology and Stalin's counterrevolutionary nationalism would resolve itself on the battlefield in a new fusion of war and liberation. But when Trotsky asked Burnham to accept the principle behind the paradox and support the USSR while opposing Stalinism, and when he called upon his American followers to discard the "banalities" of "common sense" and discipline themselves in the "dialectical training of the mind," Burnham replied, "I stopped arguing about religion long ago."[53] As a cold warrior, Burnham was now, twenty five years later, asking Kennan, Lippmann, and Morgenthau to take up again the "religion" of dialectical reasoning and to see Russia through Trotsky's eyes and thereby grasp the negation of peaceful coexistence ("socialism in one country") by the higher synthesis of "permanent revolution." With this demand, the epistemology of the cold war had come full circle, and we are still limping after reality.[54]

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[49] *Ibid.*, p. 19; *War We Are In*, pp. 56–63, 99.

[50] In 1960, Burnham edited and introduced a sympoisum, sponsored by The American-Asia Educational Exchange and published by the *National Review*, on the conservative response to the Sino-Soviet split. Here one may find well-reasoned, though subsequently disproved, arguments, particularly those by Stefan T. Possony and Karl A. Wittfogel, explaining why the split was more apparent than real and why China would be forced to remain subordinate to the Soviet Union. See Burnham, *Bear and Dragon: What Is The Relation Between Moscow and Peking?* (New York, 1960).

[51] Burnham, The *War We Are In*, pp. 29–33.

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–29.

[53] Burnham's debate with Trotsky is discussed in Diggins, "Getting Hegel Out of History," op. cit. pp. 65–71.

[54] For further discussion of the ex-communist intellectuals and the cold war, see this author's *Up From Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

Prediction Analysis in Political Research*

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Methods for empirical analysis of political theory should allow precise translation of the particular substantive proposition being investigated into an appropriate procedure for quantitative evaluation. An exact correspondence between substance and method might be established in either of two ways. First, the investigator can work backward from method to substance, constraining the theory to yield only substantive propositions that can be evaluated with the standard menu of special-purpose statistics. By this approach, available methods delimit what theories are considered. Alternatively, the investigator can select or, if necessary, design analytic methods appropriate to the particular substantive theory under investigation. We believe that the second approach places scientific priorities in the correct order: the form of the substantive theory should dictate data analysis.

This paper describes a general approach for (a) stating precisely any of a broad class of predictions relating qualitative (nominal or ordinal) variables and (b) evaluating the extent to which a particular substantive proposition correctly predicts the empirical relation.[1] First, we focus on bivariate propositions, examining language commonly used by political scientists to describe or predict bivariate relations, then developing a "prediction logic" formalization of that language. We then present a measure, $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$, for evaluating the extent to which a proposition stated in the prediction logic successfully predicts the dependent variable in a *population*. Since $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ yields a distinct measure for each logically distinct prediction logic proposition, it enables the investigator to translate a particular substantive proposition directly into appropriate methods of data analysis. Moreover, many well-known measures of association can be interpreted as special cases of $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ for specific prediction logic propositions. We next consider bivariate statistical inference procedures for *sample* data. These procedures apply to bivariate propositions specified *a priori* and also to propositions selected *ex post facto* to describe a relation observed in the data. Finally, we briefly outline the prediction logic and associated methods for evaluating the prediction success attained in a population by a multivariate prediction.[2] Numerous research examples illustrate applications of these methods in political science.

Bivariate Prediction Logic

To identify the basic logical structure underlying an important part of the natural language of prediction and description in political science, we begin by examining some elementary propositions taken from the research literature. We then formalize this structure and illustrate its application with more complex propositions.

Some Elementary Propositions. Verbal discussions of relations among qualitative variables in political science frequently can be expressed in statements postulating that certain conditions tend to be necessary, sufficient, or both necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of specified states of the predicted variable. Often, this form is quite evident. For example, Lipset has stated that

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* This research was conducted with support of grants GS-32161 and GS-33754 from the National Science Foundation. An earlier version of this paper appears in the *Proceedings of 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1973). FORTRAN IV programs that perform the analysis discussed in the paper may be obtained from the authors.

[1] For a more technically detailed presentation of our approach to bivariate prediction and analysis, see our papers "Prediction Logic: A Method for Empirical Evaluation of Formal Theory," *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 3 (January 1974), 163–185, and "Prediction Logic and Quasi-Independence in Empirical Evaluation of Formal Theory," *Ibid.*, pp. 197–209. See also William Buchanan, "Nominal and Ordinal Bivariate Statistics: The Practitioner's View," *American Journal of Political Science*, 18 (August 1974), 625–646.

[2] For an extensive presentation of these methods, see our forthcoming book *Prediction Analysis of Cross Classifications* (New York: Wiley [Probability and Mathematical Statistics Series: Applied Section]). See also Richard A. Bartlett, " Partition Analysis of Categorical Data," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1974).

. . . a "high" level of education . . . *comes close* to being a *necessary* [*condition* for democracy].[3]

Rosenthal has used the same form:

Only 2 of the 13 R.P.F. coalitions occurred in districts without Modéré incumbents, suggesting that the presence of such an incumbent *can be regarded* as a *necessary condition* for a R.P.F. alliance.[4]

If, for the moment, we ignore the "tends to" type of hedging qualifications such as "comes close," then these statements have the same logical form:

x is a necessary condition for y.

This proposition can be represented as the formal logic statement,

y implies x (or, symbolically, $y \rightarrow x$)

as can the following equivalent statements:

if y then x.

y only if x.

y is a sufficient condition for x.

These statements are all equivalent in elementary formal logic since they identify the same truth table shown in Table 1a.[5] As the circled entry indicates, the statement "If y then x" (and its logical equivalents) is falsified if and only if the event "y and not x" (written $y \& \bar{x}$) occurs. As illustrated in Table 1b, any truth table can be represented as a contingency table in which each falsifying event is shaded. The statement that x *is* a necessary condition for y is falsified by any observation in the shaded cell, even if only one such event occurs in a thousand observations.

Table 1. Truth Table in Two Equivalent Representations for the Elementary Proposition "x Is Necessary for y"

y	$\rightarrow$	x
T	T	T
T	Ⓕ	F
F	T	T
F	T	F

(a) Truth Table for $y \rightarrow x$

	x	$\bar{x}$
y		▨
$\bar{y}$		

(b) Contingency table representation of truth table for $y \rightarrow x$, where shaded cell is falsifying (error) event.

The propositions quoted above, however, also include a hedging qualification. Their basic form is

x *tends to* be a *necessary condition* for y.

For example, Lipset says that a high level of education "comes close" to being a necessary condition for democracy. Were this proposition used to predict the bivariate relation exhibited in a cross classification such as Table 1b, then the statement does not specify that exactly zero cases of the shaded event should occur. Rather it states that relatively few such events occur. That is, given the "tends to" qualification, the shading indicates that the $y \& \bar{x}$ cell represents an error or deviant event that may occur, albeit infrequently, without "falsifying" the proposition. This rationale is highly visible in Rosenthal's statement that the presence of a Modéré incumbent tends to be necessary for R.P.F. alliance formation, since that proposition was suggested by the observation that "only 2" deviant events for this proposition occur in the data shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Modéré Incumbency and Gaullist Participation in Electoral Coalitions, French Legislative Elections of 1951[a]

		Modéré Incumbency		
		Yes	No	n
Gaullists in Coalition	Yes	11	2	13
	No	35	47	82
	n	46	49	95

[a] The 95 observations represent those legislative districts where the *apparentement* system applied. Shaded cell is error cell.

Source: Rosenthal, "The Electoral Politics of Gaullists. . . ." Table 5, p. 485.

The statement "y is a sufficient condition for x" is, in formal logic, equivalent to the statement "x is a necessary condition for y." Similarly the statement "Having Gaullists in coalition tends to be sufficient for Modéré incumbency" identifies the same error event as Rosenthal's statement about Table 2. While temporal ordering suggests that it makes little sense to consider the presence of Gaullists in the current electoral coalition as a "cause" of Modéré incumbency, the two propositions may be regarded (from a prediction viewpoint) as equivalent since they identify the same set of error events. This paper does not attempt to distinguish cause from effect. The methods for evaluating bivariate predictions are designed to produce identical results for logically equivalent propositions.

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[3] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 40 (Anchor Edition); our emphasis.

[4] Howard Rosenthal, "The Electoral Politics of Gaullists in the Fourth French Republic: Ideology or Constituency Interest?" *The American Political Science Review*, 63 (June 1969), 476–487, at 484, our emphasis.

[5] For an introduction to elementary formal logic and truth tables, see John G. Kemeny, J. Laurie Snell and Gerald L. Thompson, *Introduction to Finite Mathematics*, 3rd edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974) or Patrick Suppes, *Introduction to Logic* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1957), Part I.

The biconditional proposition also appears in the political science literature. Rapoport's statement provides a clear example:

> A grand coalition . . . *is likely* to form *if and only if* the game is strictly superadditive.[6]

As before, if we ignore the "tends to" type of qualification, "is likely," then this proposition is stated in the form

x if and only if y.

In formal logic, this and all the following logically equivalent statements identify the same falsifying events that are shaded in Table 3:

$$x \leftrightarrow y$$

$$\bar{x} \leftrightarrow \bar{y}$$

If x then y, and if y then x.

$$(x \rightarrow y) \& (\bar{x} \rightarrow \bar{y})$$

x if y, and x only if y.

x is a necessary and sufficient condition for y.

Now recognizing the "is likely" qualification, Rapoport's statement is expressed directly in the prediction logic form:

x *tends to* be *necessary and sufficient* for y.

The shaded cells in Table 3 indicate the set of *error* or *deviant* events for this proposition.

Table 3. Error Events (Shaded) for a Biconditional Proposition

	x	$\bar{x}$
y		▨
$\bar{y}$	▨	

Recall that in formal logic a proposition can be stated unambiguously by identifying its domain and truth table. By direct formal analogy, a prediction logic proposition may be stated precisely by specifying its domain and the set of error events it identifies. For convenience, we will often state prediction logic propositions in symbolic form using the connectives "$\rightsquigarrow$" (read "predicts" or "tends to be sufficient for") as the analogue to formal implication, and "$\leftrightsquigarrow$" (read "tends to be necessary and sufficient for") as the analogue to the biconditional connective in formal logic. Similarly, we use symbols identical to those of formal logic for negation and conjunction (&), and use "or" for disjunction. Using these symbols, the following prediction logic statements identify the same set of error events shaded in Table 3, and therefore are logically equivalent predictions:

x tends to be necessary and sufficient for y.

$$x \leftrightsquigarrow y$$

$$\bar{x} \leftrightsquigarrow \bar{y}$$

Predict y if and only if x.

$$(x \rightsquigarrow y) \& (\bar{x} \rightsquigarrow \bar{y})$$

$$(y \rightsquigarrow x) \& (\bar{y} \rightsquigarrow \bar{x})$$

The prediction logic form of proposition is quite explicit in the examples quoted above. More commonly, however, the prediction logic form is left implicit in the investigator's language. For example, Francis reports:

> High general influencers tend to be high specific area influencers, and low general influencers low specific area influencers.[7]
>
> [Read: High general influence tends to be necessary and sufficient for high specific area influence.]
>
> Senators in their first or second session of service tend to be low specific area influencers.[8]
>
> [Read: If first or second session of service, then predict low specific area influence.]

Often, however, the language of description is less precise than that of prediction logic statements. Some investigators might have reported the data shown in Table 2 with a statement such as

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[6] Anatol Rapoport, *N-Person Game Theory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970), p. 269; first emphasis ours.

[7] Wayne L. Francis, "Influence and Interaction in a State Legislative Body," *The American Political Science Review*, 56 (December 1962), 953–960, at 954.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 955.

"R.P.F. alliances are less frequent when Modéré incumbents are present then when they are not."[9] Descriptively, this statement is correct. Nonetheless, it also is consistent with three distinct prediction logic propositions:

$$\begin{bmatrix}\text{Modéré}\\ \text{incumbency}\end{bmatrix} \text{ tends to be a } \left\{\begin{matrix}\text{necessary}\\ \text{sufficient}\\ \text{necessary and}\\ \text{sufficient}\end{matrix}\right\} \text{ condition for } \begin{bmatrix}\text{R.P.F.}\\ \text{alliance}\end{bmatrix}.$$

These alternative propositions are not equivalent, nor, as we show later, are they equally successful predictions for the data in Table 2. Wolfinger and Field, displaying sensitivity to such distinctions, were careful to rule out alternative prediction logic interpretations of their remarks concerning the data shown in Table 4a:

> . . . there is a recognizable "public regarding" structural syndrome in American cities. Most of the manager cities have . . . adopted nonpartison ballots and at-large elections. But the opposite is not true; there is no private-regarding syndrome. Instead, cities with mayors have, in fairly equal proportions, every conceivable combination of the other two structural variables.[10]

Although Wolfinger and Field's remark is based on the 6 × 2 cross-classification given in Table 4a, their proposition can be represented without loss, except for the "fairly equal proportions" phrase, by combining all but the first row of Table 4a to form the 2 × 2 cross-classification of Table 4b. The propositions defined by the set of error events in these two tables are logically equivalent, since an

Table 4. Prediction of City Council Election Characteristics from Form of City Executive[a]

(a)
Wolfinger & Field's Original Table

Election Type		Form of Executive		
		Mayor (x_1)	Manager (x_2)	n
Non-partisan, at-large	(y_1)	22	101	123
Non-partisan, ward	(y_2)	22	▨ 13	35
Non-partisan, combination	(y_3)	14	▨ 6	20
Partisan, at-large	(y_4)	14	▨ 16	30
Partisan, ward	(y_5)	28	▨ 4	32
Partisan, combination	(y_6)	21	▨ 2	23
n		124	145	269

(b)
Logically Equivalent Table for Predictions of
" 'Public Regarding' Syndrome"

Election Type	Form of Executive		
	Mayor (x_1)	Manager (x_2)	n
Non-partisan, at-large	22	101	123
Other	102	▨ 44	146
n	124	145	269

[a] Shading indicates error cells.

Source: Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethics and the Structure of City Government," Table 3, p. 314.

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[9] This proposition can be operationalized into a specific prediction logic proposition about the relative position of pairs of observations on the two variables. We describe this procedure later in the paper.

[10] Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," *The American Political Science Review*, 60 (June 1966), 306–326, at 313–314.

event is an error in the 2×2 table if and only if it is an error in the 6×2 table.

While the elementary propositions discussed above provide an introduction, a method limited to 2×2 tables would be only modestly useful. In order to consider complex propositions regarding large contingency tables reported in analyses of political behavior,[11] we need to define the prediction logic for the general $R \times C$ table.

A Prediction Logic for Specifying the Form of Bivariate Relation in an $R \times C$ Table. As in formal logic, define the variables to be specified sets of events that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive within the domain of the prediction. More explicitly, let Y and X be two independently measured variates specified as the finite sets of events $\{y_1, y_2, \cdots, y_i, \cdots, y_R\}$ and $\{x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_j, \cdots, x_C\}$, respectively, where R and $C \geq 2$. Suppose that the domain of a prediction logic proposition includes all events (y_i, x_j) in the cross-classification $Y \times X$.[12] Then, treating X as the independent variable, we may state the proposition's prediction for cases having $X = x_j$ in the form

$$\mathscr{P}_{.j}: x_j \rightsquigarrow \mathscr{S}(x_j)$$

where the set of predicted ("success") states, $\mathscr{S}(x_j)$, is a (not necessarily proper) subset of the Y states. This may be read "If $X = x_j$ then predict $\mathscr{S}(x_j)$" or "x_j tends to be sufficient for $\mathscr{S}(x_j)$." The event (y_i, x_j) belongs to the set of error events identified by $\mathscr{P}_{.j}$,

$$\mathscr{E}_{.j} = \{(y_i, x_j) | y_i \notin \mathscr{S}(x_j)\}$$

if and only if that event falsifies the formal logic statement that x_j implies $\mathscr{S}(x_j)$.

The prediction logic is defined through this formal correspondence between the set of error events, $\mathscr{E}_{.j}$, and the set of falsifying events if the proposition were stated, instead, in elementary formal logic. Any question about the logical structure of a proposition in prediction logic should be resolved by reference to the set of error events it identifies. To state propositions in a manner close to that of the natural language of prediction and description in political science, we adopt symbols for the prediction logic that are analogous to the sentential connectives of formal logic. As stated previously, the prediction logic uses "$\rightsquigarrow$" (predicts) as the analogue of "$\rightarrow$" (implies), and employs the same symbols as does formal logic for conjunction ("&"), disjunction ("or"), and negation ($\bar{x}$ or $\sim x$ for "not x"). For example, the prediction logic statement for Table 4a may be written as $x_1 \rightsquigarrow Y$ & $x_2 \rightsquigarrow y_1$, where Y represents y_1 or $y_2 \cdots$ or y_6. Thus, with the exception of the symbol for "predicts," prediction logic symbols are the same as symbols used in formal logic. In prediction logic, however, these symbols have a different meaning. They are a convenient way of specifying error events that should *seldom*, but not necessarily *never*, occur. For this reason, care must be exercised in making deductions from sentences stated in the prediction logic. For example, given $(w \rightarrow x)\&(x \rightarrow y)$, one can infer $w \rightarrow y$. In contrast, even though both the predictions $(w \rightsquigarrow x)$ and $(x \rightsquigarrow y)$ enjoy some success in a given population of data, this does not guarantee that the prediction $w \rightsquigarrow y$ also finds support in the same data.[13] Nonetheless, if appropriate caution in this regard is exercised, then the logical character of the prediction logic can suggest further interesting propositions for analysis.

Given the logical connectives, a proposition in the prediction logic whose domain is the cross-classification $Y \times X$ may be expressed in the form

$$\mathscr{P} = \mathscr{P}_{.1} \& \mathscr{P}_{.2} \& \cdots \& \mathscr{P}_{.j} \cdots \& \mathscr{P}_{.C}$$

Alternatively, this proposition may be defined solely in terms of the set of error events ("error structure") it identifies:

$$\mathscr{E}_{\mathscr{P}} = \{(y_i, x_j) | x_j \in X, y_i \notin \mathscr{S}(x_j)\} = \cup_j \mathscr{E}_{.j}$$

As in formal logic, it often is convenient to omit from the statement of a proposition $\mathscr{P}$ any component proposition $\mathscr{P}_{.j}$ that identifies no error (i.e., $\mathscr{S}(x_j) = Y$). For example, $(x \rightsquigarrow y)$ is shorthand for $(x \rightsquigarrow y)\&(\bar{x} \rightsquigarrow (y \text{ or } \bar{y}))$. Thus, Wolfinger and

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[11] For an extensive application of our methods to analyze propositions more complex than any examples considered in this paper, see James D. Laing and Richard J. Morrison, "Sequential Games of Status," *Behavioral Science*, 19 (May 1974), 177–196. Also, see Kenneth E. Friend, James D. Laing, and Richard J. Morrison, "Game-Theoretic Analyses of Coalition Behavior," a paper presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Palmer House, Chicago, Illinois, August 29–September 2, 1974. For an application in economics, see Pieter Korteweg, "The Inflation Problem: A Multi-Country Study of Inflation—The Dutch Case 1952–1972" (Rotterdam: Netherlands School of Economics Working Paper 741, 1974), a paper presented at Eastern Economic Association meetings, Albany, New York, October 25–27, 1974.

[12] For a discussion of our methods when certain cells are omitted from the proposition's domain and, hence, should be excluded from the analysis, see Hildebrand, Laing, and Rosenthal, "Prediction Logic and Quasi-Independence . . . . ," p. 203, and Hildebrand, Laing and Rosenthal, *Prediction Analysis of Cross Clasifications*, chap. 4. For an extensive application of these methods, see Laing and Morrison, "Sequential Games of Status,"

[13] See David K. Hildebrand, James D. Laing and Howard Rosenthal, "A Prediction Logic Approach to Causal Models of Qualitative Variates," *Sociological Methodology, 1976*, ed. D. Heise (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975), pp. 146–175.

Field's proposition can be expressed for the 6 × 2 cross-classification shown in Table 4a as $x_2 \rightsquigarrow y_1$. This proposition can also be stated without losing any essential information (but perhaps losing intuitive value) solely in terms of the error structure

$$\{(y_2, x_2), (y_3, x_2), (y_4, x_2), (y_5, x_2), (y_6, x_2)\}$$

Any prediction logic propositions are logically equivalent if they specify the same set of error events. For example, Wolfinger and Field's proposition for Table 4a, $x_2 \rightsquigarrow y_1$, is logically equivalent to

$$(Y \neq y_1) \rightsquigarrow x_1$$

There also is a slightly less obvious form of logical equivalence. If by combining or dividing states of variables, as illustrated by Tables 4a and 4b, one error structure can be transformed into another without affecting the counting of prediction successes and errors, then the two propositions identifying these error structures are logically equivalent. Such variable transformations are arbitrary since they have no predictive significance for the proposition under investigation.

Examples of More Complex Prediction Logic Propositions. In this section we illustrate applications of the prediction logic with more complex propositions that have appeared in this *Review*.

The first such example is from Riker and Zavoina:

> In general, learning theory suggests that, for these 140 pairs, if previous experience had led to success (i.e. voting for or against and winning), then the members of these pairs would repeat the previous choice. If previous experience had led to failure (i.e. voting for or against and losing), then *the prediction is not so clear*. However, if on previous experience in a pair, a player voted for and lost, it would seem to be a good indication to vote against on the second match, if only because he knows that voting for is not successful. On the other hand, if a player voted against another and lost on the first meeting, *there is almost no guide to action. . . . In such a case, there is no really good prediction* inasmuch as it is reasonable either to vote for as an experiment or to vote against on the basis of experience.[14]

The relevant data are portrayed in Table 5. The cells are shaded where the theory (actually a null model for its authors) expects few cases. Note that, like "necessary" or "sufficient" predictions in the 2 × 2 case, this theory is of limited *scope*. That is, it makes a nontautological prediction only for some of the independent variable categories. Specifically, no prediction is made for "voted against and lost." The example demonstrates why conventional measures of association cannot be used to assess prediction logic propositions. The conventional measures are fixed for a contingency table rather than adaptable to the specific prediction being made, and they typically represent the analysis of a prediction of full scope. A prediction with full scope for the data in Table 5 would be the simple persistence proposition: "vote for in current match if and only if vote for in previous match." The error cells for this proposition have heavy borders in Table 5.

In addition to variations in scope, predictions may vary in their *precision*. Consider Muller's prediction:

> I shall hypothesize that (1) APV [Approval of Political Violence] and IEPV [Intention to Engage in Political Violence] will show a strong degree of fit to a monotonic

Table 5. Voting in Experienced Pairs in a Three-Person Coalition Experiment.[a]

		Experience of Subject in Just Previous Match Involving Other Player in Pair				
		Voted For		Voted Against		n
		Won	Lost	Won	Lost	
Action of Subject in Current Match	Votes For	63	22	36	27	148
	Votes Against	31	26	50	25	132
	n	94	48	86	52	280

[a] Shaded cells represent error cells for Riker-Zavoina learning predictions; cells with large black borders represent error cells for persistence predictions.
Source: Riker and Zavonia, "Rational Behavior in Politics . . . ," Table 3, p. 60.

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[14] William H. Riker and William James Zavoina, "Rational Behavior in Politics: Evidence from a Three-Person Game," *The American Political Science Review*, 64 (March 1970), 48–60, at 58; our emphasis.

function and (2) cases which deviate from direct monotonicity will show higher rank-order on APV than on IEPV.[15]

Table 6. Intention to Engage in Political Violence and Approval of Political Violence[a]

IEPV (Intention to Engage in Political Violence)	APV (Approval of Political Violence) 0	1	2	3	4	5	*n*
0	97	89	43	9	2	2	242
1	5	75	45	17	4	2	148
2	0	5	39	8	11	2	65
3	0	0	3	13	8	4	28
4	0	0	1	1	3	4	9
5	0	0	0	0	2	5	7
n	102	169	131	48	30	19	499

[a] The triangle indicates the error set for Muller's *a priori* hypothesis.

Source: Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," Table 2, p. 936.

The relevant data are shown in Table 6. For strict monotonicity, all cases not on the main diagonal constitute errors. The error cells for the proposition with the qualifier about "cases which deviate" are depicted by the triangle in the table. The triangle shows that no [non-tautological] prediction is made for a "5" APV score (taking APV as the independent variable). For a score of "4" a prediction is made, but it is very imprecise; only a "5" IEPV score constitutes an error. As the APV scores decrease, the precision of the predictions increases until a unique IEPV value is predicted for the lowest score, "0." Another prediction with a triangular error set is provided by Eulau and Eyestone:

> Reversed development is an empirical fact of life . . . Although we assume that in general stages and phases follow each other in "progressive" order, an assumption that the results of Table [7] certainly do not falsify, no rigid assumptions need or should be made about the direction of change.[16]

The lower triangle in the table indicates those cells which would contradict "progressive" change. If we seek a quantitative evaluation of the extent to which "the results of Table 7 certainly do not falsify," we will have to take into account the varying precision of the predictions.

Forms more complex than triangles can also be specified in terms of error cells, and error events can be given different weights to represent different degrees of severity. An example of a precise theory generating a quiltwork pattern of error cells in a large table is furnished by Sawyer and MacRae's game-theoretic model predicting the number of candidates nominated by each of two parties in the Illinois General Assembly elections during the period 1902-1954.[17]

In each election district three legislative seats are to be filled. The problem facing each party is to decide how many candidates to nominate. Sawyer and MacRae assume each party restricts its alternatives to nominating one, two, or three candidates. Consequently, the situation can be represented as a two-person 3 × 3 game matrix in which the *d*th row indicates that the Democrats nominate *d* candidates, the *r*th column indicates that the Republicans nominate *r* candidates, and the entry in cell (*d*, *r*) is the number of seats won by each of the two parties given that they nominate *d* and *r* candidates, respectively. The *nine strategy pairs* generated by the 3 × 3 game represent the categories of the *dependent variable*.

Now Sawyer and MacRae further assume (1) each party's votes are distributed evenly across its candidates, and (2) each party has a perfect forecast of the two-party vote. Given these assumptions, for each pair of choices by the two parties about how many candidates to nominate, both parties can determine the number of seats won by each party. For example, if each party nominates two candidates and the Democrats win 30 per cent of the vote in a district, then the Democrats win one seat and the Republicans win two. Now as the Democratic percentage of the vote won is increased from zero to 100, just six distinct 3 × 3 game matrices result, one for each of the intervals shown as column headings in Table 8. This set of intervals is the *independent* variable.

In two-person game theory, two strategies are in equilibrium if neither player is motivated to change his strategy unilaterally. An analysis based solely on game theory would predict that the parties choose strategy pairs that are in equilibrium. This prediction identifies the double-hatched cells in Table 8 as errors.

Note that there is more than one equilibrium

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[15] Edward N. Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (September 1972), 936.

[16] Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," *The American Political Science Review*, 62 (March 1968), 124–143, at 129–130.

[17] Jack Sawyer and Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902–1954," *The American Political Science Review*, 56 (December 1962), 936–946.

Table 7. Policy Development of Cities in Developmental Sequence from 1958–61 to 1962–65[a]

Type of Development in 1958–61	Type of Development in 1962–65 Retarded	Emergent	Transitional	Maturing	Advanced	n
Retarded	6	9	0	0	1	16
Emergent	4	2	7	3	0	16
Transitional	1	3	14	5	1	24
Maturing	0	0	5	7	4	16
Advanced	0	0	0	0	10	10
n	11	14	26	15	16	82

	A priori					*Ex post*		
	$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$	U	Std. Value	$p<$	95% Confidence Interval	χ^2	p(16 d.f.)	p(4 d.f.)
$\mathscr{P}^{(1)}$	.527	.335	4.48	3×10^{-6}	$.335\leq\nabla_p\leq.718$	33.17	$.005<p<.01$	$p<.001$
$\mathscr{P}^{(2)}$	.635	.601	7.98	3×10^{-7}	$.496\leq\nabla_p\leq.774$	55.00	$p<.001$	$p<.001$
$\mathscr{P}^{(3)}$	.334	.789	4.67	3×10^{-6}	$.212\leq\nabla_p\leq.457$	36.08	$.001<p<.005$	$p<.001$
$\mathscr{P}^{(4)}$	.834	.441	12.46	3×10^{-7}	$.712\leq\nabla_p\leq.956$	55.83	$p<.001$	$p<.001$

[a] The lower triangle represents the error set for $\mathscr{P}^{(1)}$. The lower triangle and the shaded portion of the upper triangle represents the error set for $\mathscr{P}^{(2)}$. Both triangles represent the error set for $\mathscr{P}^{(3)}$. The shaded portions of both triangles represent the error set for $\mathscr{P}^{(4)}$.

Source: Eulau and Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils . . . ," Table 2, p. 130.

strategy pair identified by game theory in each of the six types of district; that is, there is more than one cell in each column of Table 8 that is identified as a prediction success for the equilibrium strategy proposition. Sawyer and MacRae introduce additional considerations—such as hedging against an error by the opposing party or against being wrong in predicting the vote division— to select just one equilibrium strategy pair in each type of district as being optimal. They predict that the parties will tend to select this single equilibrium pair in each type of district. This proposition identifies as error events all cells that are single *or* double-hatched in Table 8. The Sawyer and MacRae prediction commits exactly twice the number of prediction errors (418 vs. 209) committed by the equilibrium pair prediction. Note, however, that their prediction is more *precise* than the equilibrium pair proposition since they predict a single outcome for each type of district. In comparing the prediction success of the strictly game-theoretic predictions and their more differentiated predictions, allowances should be made for this difference in precision.

These examples suggest that prediction logic is a rather straightforward formalization of part of the natural language used by political scientists. We next indicate ways in which the logic can be used to analyze other types of propositions relating qualitative variables.

Prediction Logic with Differentially Weighted Errors, Actuarial Propositions, and Predictions of Relative Order. The prediction logic approach can be extended to allow for differentially weighted error events, to represent probabilistic predictions, and to operationalize predictions of relative order such as "The greater the X, the greater Y tends to be."

First, since some errors may be regarded as more serious or important than others, the error events can be differentially weighted. More specifically, each cell in the cross-classification may be assigned some finite weight $\omega_{ij}\geq0$. Nonetheless, the assignment of binary weights, $\omega_{ij}=1$ or 0, is frequently appropriate, especially when all variables in the proposition are nominal and, hence, no natural conception of distance is available.

Second, the propositions we have considered above may be interpreted, to borrow a term from game theory, as *pure* prediction strategies: if $X=x_j$ then *always* predict $\mathscr{P}(x_j)$. The prediction logic also can be used to represent probabilistic or

Table 8. Number of Candidates Nominated by Two Parties in Six Types of Election Districts, Illinois General Assembly Elections, 1902–1954[a]

Candidates:	Per Cent Vote in District for Democrats						
Dem., Rep.	0–25	25–40	40–50	50–60	60–75	75–100	*n*
1,1	▩	▩	▩	▩	▩	▩	
1,2	▩ 53	300	▧ 109	▩ 17	▩ 3	▩ 0	482
1,3	21	▧ 19	▩ 4	▩ 0	▩ 0	▩ 0	44
2,1	▩ 0	▩ 4	▩ 21	▧ 80	126	▩ 41	272
2,2	▩ 3	▩ 48	285	198	▩ 15	▩ 0	549
2,3	▧	▩	▩	▩	▩	▩	
3,1	▩ 0	▩ 0	▩ 0	▩ 0	▧ 1	4	5
3,2	▩	▩	▩	▩	▩	▧	
3,3	▧	▩	▩	▩	▩	▧	
n	77	371	419	295	145	45	1352

[a] Two error structures are shown in the table. Double hatching indicates error cells for the prediction that the joint strategy by the two parties is a pure strategy equilibrium pair. All hatched cells constitute error cells for the Sawyer and MacRae predictions.

Source: Sawyer and MacRae, "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting . . . ," p. 938. These investigators omitted ". . . 24 elections (many of them involving strong third parties) which display a nomination pattern other than one of . . . " the five rows containing data above. (*Ibid.*, p. 940).

actuarial propositions by admitting *mixed* prediction strategies: if $X = x_j$, then use the pure prediction strategy $\mathscr{P}_{.j}^{(1)}$ with probability $q_{.j}^{(1)}$, $\mathscr{P}_{.j}^{(2)}$ with probability $q_{.j}^{(2)}, \cdots$, and $\mathscr{P}_{.j}^{(T)}$ with probability $q_{.j}^{(T)}$, where

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} q_{.j}^{(t)} = 1$$

The use of mixed prediction strategies extends the scope of the methods described in this paper to include not only (using Coleman's term[18]) "sometimes-true" propositions stated as pure strategy predictions, but also explicitly probabilistic predictions of the sort found, say, in Mendelian genetics.

Third, the prediction logic can be used to operationalize predictions of relative order such as "The greater the X, the greater Y tends to be" (i.e., "Y tends to increase with X"). This proposition makes an imprecise prediction about the relation in the cross-classification of two ordinal variables. It predicts only that Y tends to increase with X. This proposition is analogous to the prediction for interval variables that the slope of the regression of Y on X is positive, without specifying the values for the intercept and slope.

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[18] James S. Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 516.

The proposition "Y tends to increase with X" can be operationalized as a prediction logic statement which predicts, for each *pair* of observations, if one observation has a greater X-value then it also has a greater Y-value. Let $X \times X$ in *extensive form* denote the Cartesian product set that includes all C^2 pairs of the X states:

$$\{(x_1, x_1), (x_1, x_2), \cdots, (x_1, x_C), (x_2, x_1), (x_2, x_2), \cdots, (x_C, x_1), \cdots, (x_C, x_C)\}$$

We shall use the more compact symbol X^{*2} to mean $X \times X$. The typical state $(x_j, x_{j'})$ indicates that, in a randomly drawn pair of observations, the first observation has $X = x_j$ and the second has $X = x_{j'}$. (The apostrophe simply indicates the column index of the second observation. For example, it is not required that $j' \neq j$). Now combine all states of X^{*2} for which the first observation has the greater X-value and denote this by $X_1 > X_2$. Using analogous procedures define the states $X_1 = X_2$ and $X_1 < X_2$. Then the relative order on the variable X within each observation pair can be described by the trichotomous variable $\{(X_1 > X_2), (X_1 = X_2), (X_1 < X_2)\}$ which we define as the *condensed ordinal form of* X^{*2}. Similarly, the condensed ordinal form of $Y \times Y = Y^{*2}$ is the variable $\{Y_1 > Y_2), (Y_1 = Y_2), (Y_1 < Y_2)\}$. Then the proposition for the cross-classification of Y and X that "Y tends to increase with X" can be operationalized as a prediction logic statement for observation pairs in the 3×3 cross-classification of Y^{*2} with X^{*2}, where both variables are in condensed ordinal form: for example,

$$X_1\{\gtreqless\}X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1\{\gtreqless\}Y_2.$$

This technique based on paired comparisons not only permits operational statements of such ordinal predictions as "Y tends to increase with X," but it also will be used later in this paper to provide common interpretation for various measures of ordinal association, thus permitting a unification of that literature.

Finally, it is useful to note here that the logic as defined above can be used to state *multivariate* propositions in logically equivalent *bivariate* form. In linear models for quantitative data, an algebraic combination of the independent variables is used to predict the dependent variable: for example, $y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 w + \beta_2 x$. Once the values of the parameters β_1 and β_2 are specified, then this proposition may be expressed in equivalent bivariate form as $y = \beta_0 + v$, where v is the value of the composite variable V defined by the linear combination, $\beta_1 w + \beta_2 x$. Analogously, if the variables are qualitative, then logical (rather than algebraic) combinations of the independent or dependent variables can be used to transform multivariate prediction logic propositions into equivalent bivariate form. For example, a multivariate prediction logic proposition that predicts Y from W and X may be transformed into a logically equivalent proposition that uses the composite variable V to predict Y, where $V = W \times X$ is the set of all paired combinations of W states and X states, $\{(w_k, x_j)\}$. This is illustrated by the Riker and Zavoina prediction quoted earlier for Table 5: in applying learning theory, they combine information about voting and winning into a composite independent variable.

The bivariate prediction logic defined in this section has a simple structure. Despite this, theories stated in the logic need not be simplistic. First of all, even if attention is restricted to pure strategy predictions with unweighted errors, there are 2^{RC} logically distinct prediction logic propositions that can be defined for the domain of an $R \times C$ cross-classification. This large variety not only includes propositions that predict just one event of the dependent variable for each independent variable event, analogous to the point predictions of regression models for quantitative variables. It also includes propositions predicting more than one dependent variable event for some values of the independent variable. This latter type of proposition is common, for example, in game-theoretic predictions of political behavior, as illustrated by the earlier discussion of Sawyer and MacRae's analysis of campaign strategy. We also have indicated how analysis based on prediction logic can be extended to permit differentially weighted errors, mixed prediction strategies, and alternative prediction domains such as the ordinal forms of $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$. It thus seems clear that prediction logic, while certainly not all-inclusive, nonetheless has a wide variety of scientific applications.

Measuring Bivariate Prediction Success

This section presents a measure of the prediction success of any bivariate prediction logic proposition when the cross-classification contains the entire population or, if the population is infinite, a sufficiently large sample that sampling considerations may be ignored. A later section considers statistical inference from samples. After discussing the most important of the design criteria underlying the bivariate measure, we present the measure and discuss its properties.

Design Criteria. Omitting the tautological proposition that identifies no error event, the method we seek for an $R \times C$ table should yield an easily interpreted, distinct measure for each of the $2^{RC}-1$ logically distinct propositions stated in the logic using pure prediction strategies and unweighted errors and for each of the infinitely many propositions that can be stated with differential weighting of error events or mixed prediction strategies.

In developing bivariate methods, we further require that the model should provide an identical measure for all logically equivalent propositions,[19] and should consider the scope and precision of the proposition under investigation as well as its prediction accuracy.

Previously established measures of bivariate association for qualitative variables do not satisfy these criteria, since each of these measures yields but one value for a given $R \times C$ distribution, at least once it is specified which of the two variables is being predicted. We show later that many of these measures can be interpreted as special cases of our model when it is used to focus on just one of the many prediction logic propositions.

Unlike traditional measures of association, Goodman's methods for analyzing contingency tables for quasi-independence and various multiplicative interactions among the cell frequencies[20] can be adjusted to assess different aspects of a bivariate relation. These methods provide no help, however, in solving the problem addressed in this paper. We have identified fundamental defects in recent attempts by Kang[21] and by Goodman and Kruskal[22] to use these methods, demonstrating that these techniques are inappropriate for the empirical evaluation of prediction logic propositions.[23]

Other approaches to contingency table analysis evaluate the extent to which observed cell frequencies conform to a theory that predicts the *probability* of the various events. Goodness-of-fit tests, maximum likelihood techniques, and various regression-type models[24] seek to evaluate the extent to which observed proportions are consistent with the proportions predicted by a model that, usually, is selected *ex post facto.* Rather than measuring, *ex post*, goodness-of-fit to aggregate proportions or developing a parsimonious way for describing the pattern of cell proportions observed in a contingency table, we seek methods for evaluating a proposition's success in predicting each observation's location on the dependent variable given its description on the independent variable.

Fortunately, a viable strategy for attacking this problem is provided by the general model for defining a proportionate-reduction-in-error (PRE) measure, as explicated by Costner.[25] We next extend this model to develop a distinct PRE measure for each distinct prediction logic proposition relating two qualitative variables, whether the proposition to be evaluated is selected *a priori* or *ex post.*

The Bivariate Measure, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$. The success of a proposition is to be evaluated in a population for which P_{ij} denotes the unconditional probability of the event (y_i, x_j), and $P_{i.}$ and $P_{.j}$, respectively, are the unconditional ("marginal") probabilities of the events y_i and x_j. Note that

$$\sum_{i,j} P_{ij} = \sum_{i} P_{i.} = \sum_{j} P_{.j} = 1$$

To satisfy Costner's criteria for a PRE measure, we must:

(1) Specify decision rules for predicting each observation's location on the dependent variable under two information conditions. In the first condition, *case-K*, each observation's location on the independent variable is known. In the second condition, *case-U*, it is unknown.
(2) Define prediction error.
(3) Define the measure as

$$1 - \frac{\text{expected prediction error under } \textit{case-K}}{\text{expected prediction error under } \textit{case-U}}$$

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[19] By this criterion, the measure will be identical for logically equivalent propositions, whether X is used to predict Y, or Y is used to predict X. However, for some research applications it may be useful to treat the variables asymmetrically in accordance with their roles as predictor and predicted. Methods for this are discussed in Hildebrand, Laing, and Rosenthal, *Prediction Analysis of Cross Classifications*, section 4.3.

[20] See, for example, Leo A. Goodman, "The Analysis of Cross-Classified Data; Independence, Quasi-Independence, and Interactions in Contingency Tables With or Without Missing Entries," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 63 (December, 1968), 1091–1131, and Leo A. Goodman, "How to Ransack Social Mobility Tables and Other Kinds of Cross-Classification Tables," *American Journal of Sociology*, 75 (July 1969), 1–40.

[21] Tai S. Kang, "Linking Form of a Hypothesis to Type of Statistics: an Application of Goodman's Z," *American Sociological Review*, 37 (July 1972), 357–365.

[22] Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Empirical Evaluation of Formal Theory," *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 3 (January 1974), 187–196.

[23] See David K. Hildebrand, James D. Laing, and Howard Rosenthal, "Prediction Logic and Quasi-Independence in Empirical Evaluation of Formal Theory," and Laing and Rosenthal, "Linking Form of Hypothesis to Type of Statistic: Comment," *American Sociological Review*, 39 (April 1974), 277–280.

[24] For discussions of these three respective techniques, see for example, Paul G. Hoel, Sidney C. Port, and Charles J. Stone, *Introduction to Statistical Theory* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), sections 3.5 and 3.4, and Henri Theil, "On the Estimation of Relationships Involving Qualitative Variables," *American Journal of Sociology*, 76 (July 1970), 103–154.

[25] Herbert L. Costner, "Criteria for Measures of Association," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (June, 1965), 341–353.

Assume that the proposition under investigation represents a pure prediction strategy identifying unweighted error events. (The argument extends naturally to allow for differentially weighted errors and mixed prediction strategies.) Defining prediction error as required by the second criterion, we say that a prediction error occurs if and only if an observation's location on the dependent variable does not belong to the predicted set.

The *case-K* rule simply is to apply the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ given the state of the independent variable. The decision rule, "predict $\mathscr{S}(x_j)$," is therefore applied to those observations having $X = x_j$. The conditional probability of a prediction error, given $X = x_j$, is

$$\sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{y_i|x_j} = \sum_i \omega_{ij}[P_{ij}/P_{.j}]$$

Then, summing across the independent variable states, the total prediction error rate under *case-K* equals

$$\sum_j P_{.j} \sum_i \omega_{ij}[P_{ij}/P_{.j}] = \sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{ij}$$

Under the *case-U* information condition, predictions must be made for each observation in ignorance of its actual location on the independent variable, x_j. Beyond this, Costner does not specify what information may be used. In developing PRE interpretations of various measures, Costner has used decision rules under *case-U* that require knowledge of the unconditional probabilities of the *dependent* variable "values:" e.g., for R^2, predict the mean value of Y, and for Goodman and Kruskal's λ_b, predict the modal Y class. While this approach is appropriate for measures based on prediction rules derived, *ex post facto*, from inspection of the distribution actually observed in the data, such procedures are inappropriate for evaluating propositions given *a priori*. A prediction rule that can only be applied once the observed distribution on the dependent variable is given is irrevocably *ex post*. If this information were used in defining a prediction rule for *case-U*, the effects of losing information about each observation's actual X-state would be confounded with those resulting from adding probabilistic knowledge of its Y-state.

Since our primary purpose is to develop methods for evaluating propositions specified *a priori*, we amplify Costner's PRE model by requiring that *no* information about the distribution on the dependent variable be used in making predictions under the *case-K* and *case-U* information conditions. (Of course, information about the Y probabilities must be used to measure error. The measurement of error is necessarily *ex post*. We only require that Y information not be used in making predictions.) Since information about the distribution on the dependent variable is not to be used in making predictions, we propose that the *case-K* predictions be simulated under *case-U* without information as to an individual observation's X-state.

In our model, under *case-U* the decision maker knows only the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ and the unconditional probabilities of the *independent* variable, $\{P_{.j}\}$. Selecting each observation at random, he predicts with probability $P_{.j}$ that its Y-state lies in the subset of Y-states, $\mathscr{S}(x_j)$. Since observations are drawn randomly, this prediction rule commits prediction error with the unconditional probability

$$\sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}$$

Summing across states of the independent variable, the total expected error rate in applying the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ under *case-U* is

$$\sum_j P_{.j} \sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.} = \sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{i.} P_{.j}$$

Using these error rates, define the PRE measure:

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{ij}}{\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{i.} P_{.j}} = 1 - \frac{\text{expected error for } \mathscr{P} \text{ in predicting } Y\text{, given } X}{\text{expected error for } \mathscr{P} \text{ in predicting } Y\text{, given random } X} \qquad (1)$$

Thus, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measures the PRE achieved by the prediction logic proposition $\mathscr{P}$ in predicting Y when the investigator uses that proposition knowing each observation's location on the independent variable with certainty rather than knowing only the unconditional probabilities of the various independent variable states.

Differential weighting of error events does not change the argument. Error rates are simply replaced with weighted error rates. Since the measure equals one minus a ratio of weighted errors, the value of $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ is not changed if all error weights are multiplied by any non-zero constant.

We stipulate that a prediction logic proposition is *admissible* for a population if and only if it identifies at least one error event (y_i, x_j) for which neither marginal is zero (i.e., $P_{i.} > 0$ *and* $P_{.j} > 0$). This ensures that the denominator of expression (1) is nonzero, hence the $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure is defined mathematically for every admissible proposition. Predictions based on inadmissible propositions are tautologies for the population, hence there is no error to be reduced. (Analogously R^2 is undefined if the dependent variable has zero variance).

In general, if $\mathscr{P}$ is an admissible proposition, then $-\infty < \nabla_{\mathscr{P}} \leq 1$. If $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ is positive, then it measures the PRE afforded by the proposition in the population. On the other hand, it is quite possible that a proposition selected *a priori* can do worse than the benchmark ("null") prediction under *case-U*. If so, then $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} < 0$, and the measure's absolute value in this case represents the proportionate increase (negative reduction) in prediction error. Note that if the two variables are statistically independent, then $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} = 0$. The converse does *not* hold: $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} = 0$ does *not* imply statistical independence in the entire table *nor* does it imply that $P_{ij} = P_{i.}P_{.j}$ in every error cell. Rather, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ is zero if and only if the *total* probability observed in the set of error cells as a whole equals the *total* probability in the set of error events under statistical independence.

As demonstrated above, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ is readily interpreted as the PRE achieved by a specific prediction logic proposition. The general model defined by expression (1) yields a distinct measure for each logically distinct pure strategy prediction with associated error weights, $\{\omega_{ij}\}$. Moreover, it is easy to show that $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ is identical for all logically equivalent propositions. Thus, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ is an easily interpreted measure that is custom-designed to the particular prediction logic proposition under investigation. We next extend the measure to evaluate propositions that make probabilistic predictions.

$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ with Actuarial Propositions. "Actuarial" propositions are an important type of mixed strategy proposition. An actuarial proposition $\mathscr{Q}$ states that, if $X = x_j$, then $Y = y_i$ with conditional probability q_{ij}, where

$$\sum_i q_{ij} = 1$$

for each $j = 1, C$. The PRE model may be used to evaluate the success of $\mathscr{Q}$ applied as a mixed strategy prediction. Under *case-K*, given an observation that is known to have $X = x_j$, then, with conditional probability q_{ij}, select the prediction $Y = y_i$. Under *case-U*, given each randomly drawn observation, first with probability $P_{.j}$, choose the conditional probability distribution $\mathbf{q}_{.j} = (q_{1j}, q_{2j}, \cdots q_{Rj})$. Then, given this choice, select with probability q_{ij} the prediction that $Y = y_i$. An observation is an error if it does not have the predicted Y-state. Then the PRE measure for the actuarial proposition $\mathscr{Q}$ is

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{Q}} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i,j}(1 - q_{ij})P_{ij}}{\sum_{i,j}(1 - q_{ij})P_{i.}P_{.j}} = 1 - \frac{\text{expected errors for } \mathscr{Q} \text{ in predicting } Y\text{, given } X}{\text{expected errors for } \mathscr{Q} \text{ in predicting } Y\text{, given random } X} \qquad (2)$$

Note that the expected error rates under the two information conditions are identical whether we use the actuarial proposition, $\mathscr{Q}$, or instead use a pure strategy prediction $\mathscr{P}$ with error weights $\{\omega_{ij} = (1 - q_{ij})\}$; hence $\mathscr{P}$ is the certainty equivalent of $\mathscr{Q}$: $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} = \nabla_{\mathscr{Q}}$.

An Operationalization of Prediction Scope and Precision. Undoubtedly the most direct index of a prediction's empirical success is its *case-K* error rate, since that measures the prediction's *accuracy*. It is implicitly assumed in the PRE model, however, that the prediction's accuracy should also be evaluated within a relative framework. Prediction accuracy may have been purchased at the price of prediction *scope* and *precision*. Nearly tautological predictions are seldom wrong.

Consider, first, the prediction's effective scope. Suppose, for example, that a proposition predicts the entire set of Y-states for all but one X-state, say x_1, and predicts a proper (and nonempty) subset of Y-states when $X = x_1$. Suppose, further, that $X = x_1$ for only .001 of the population. Then, given the limited scope of the prediction, the *maximum case-K* error rate possible in that population is .001. Clearly, this very low error rate should not be taken to indicate that the prediction is "successful." Rather, it indicates that the prediction is "nearly tautological."

We operationally define the scope of a proposition $\mathscr{P}$ to be the proportion of the population for which $\mathscr{P}$ makes nontautological predictions. Recall that a prediction logic proposition $\mathscr{P}$ can be expressed in terms of its component propositions $\mathscr{P}_{.j}$ which indicate the prediction when $X = x_j$. Each component proposition contributes to the effective scope of $\mathscr{P}$ only if $\mathscr{P}_{.j}$ identifies at least one error event. Then, by definition,

$$\text{scope of } \mathscr{P}_{.j} = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ if } \mathscr{E}(x_j) = \emptyset \\ P_{.j} \text{ otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then the overall scope of the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ can be computed by adding together the scope contributions of its component predictions.

By this meaure, both the Sawyer-MacRae and the game-theoretic propositions for Table 8 have maximum scope: 1.0. Despite being equal in scope, these two propositions differ with respect to the *precision* of their prediction. The first proposition predicts just one Y-state, while the second predicts two or more states of the dependent variable. One approach to measuring precision would be to count the number of dependent variable states that are error events for the proposition. This approach is unsatisfactory, since it is sensitive to arbitrary variable transformations that have no predictive significance for the proposition under investigation. As an alternative operational measure of the *precision* of the component proposition $\mathscr{P}_{.j}$, we use the (unconditional) probability of the set of dependent variable categories that $\mathscr{P}_{.j}$ identifies as errors:

$$\text{precision of } \mathscr{P}_{.j} = \sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}$$

Finally, we measure the overall *precision*, U, of the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ in the population as the sum of the precisions of its component predictions, weighted by their contributions to the proposition's effective scope:

$$\begin{aligned} U &= \text{precision of } \mathscr{P} \\ &= \sum_j (\text{scope of } \mathscr{P}_{.j}) \\ &\quad \cdot (\text{precision of } \mathscr{P}_{.j}) \\ &= \sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{i.} P_{.j} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the precision of the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ equals its error rate when it is applied, under *case-U*, to randomly selected observations. Then, by this operationalization, the bivariate measure may be interpreted as evaluating the observed error rate in relation to the prediction's precision.

More than one criterion should be used to evaluate a prediction's "success." Useful information is provided not only by $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$, but also by its components: *case-K* error ("inaccuracy") and *case-U* error ("precision"). Note further that the range of possible values for $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ varies with the extent to which the proposition *is differentiated*, that is, the extent to which it makes different predictions for different states of the independent variable. For example, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ must be zero if the proposition makes the same nontautological predictions for all states of the independent variable. (Analogously, if a regression model with zero slope fits the data, then the model is totally undifferentiated, and $R^2=0$.)

Moreover, a thorough analysis of a prediction's success also should consider the performance of each component prediction, and the success in predicting each state of the dependent variable. We next consider methods for such microanalysis of prediction success.

Decomposition of Prediction Success. The most elementary prediction logic proposition identifies just one cell, say (y_i, x_j), as an error event. The $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure for this elementary proposition equals a frequently appearing measure that Quetelet proposed around 1850:[26]

$$\nabla_{ij} = 1 - \frac{\omega_{ij} P_{ij}}{\omega_{ij} P_{i.} P_{.j}} = 1 - \frac{P_{ij}}{P_{i.} P_{.j}}$$

It is easy to show with simple algebra that $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ may be expressed as a weighted average of Quetelet measures for the error cells identified by the proposition $\mathscr{P}$:

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} = \sum_{i,j} \left[\frac{\omega_{ij} P_{i.} P_{.j}}{\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{i.} P_{.j}} \right] \nabla_{ij} \qquad (3)$$

This expression may be used to measure the contribution of various theoretical components to the overall success of the prediction. For example, the success of the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ when $X = x_j$ is

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}.j} = 1 - \frac{\sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{ij}}{P_{.j} \sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}} = \sum_i \left[\frac{\omega_{ij} P_{i.}}{\sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}} \right] \nabla_{ij}$$

The overall prediction success is a weighted average of the success achieved in the population by the component predictions,

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} = \sum_j \left[\frac{P_{.j} \sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}}{\sum_j P_{.j} \sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}} \right] \nabla_{\mathscr{P}.j} \qquad (4)$$

where the weight of each component prediction is the proportion of overall *case-U* error ("precision") for which it is responsible.

In addition, these decomposition procedures can be useful in comparing two propositions. For example, consider two prediction logic propositions, $\mathscr{P}$ and $\mathscr{P}'$, that identify unweighted error structures, $\{\omega_{ij}\}$ and $\{\omega'_{ij}\}$, for the same table. Let $\mathscr{E}^+$ denote the set of events identified as prediction errors by $\mathscr{P}'$ but not by $\mathscr{P}$. That is, $\mathscr{E}^+$ is the set of additional error events identified by $\mathscr{P}'$. Similarly, let $\mathscr{E}^-$ denote the set of events that are errors for $\mathscr{P}$ but not $\mathscr{P}'$. Then the overall prediction success of the alternative proposition $\mathscr{P}'$ may be expressed as a weighted combination of the PRE achieved in the sets of error cells $\mathscr{E}_{\mathscr{P}}$, $\mathscr{E}^+$ and $\mathscr{E}^-$:

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}'} = \frac{1}{U'} \left[U \nabla_{\mathscr{P}} + U^+ \nabla_{\mathscr{E}+} - U^- \nabla_{\mathscr{E}-} \right] \qquad (5)$$

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[26] Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross-Classifications II: Further Discussion and References," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 54 (March 1959), 123–163, at 133.

where

$$U' = \sum_{\mathscr{E}'} P_{i.}P_{.j}$$

$$U^{+} = \sum_{\mathscr{E}+} P_{i.}P_{.j}$$

$$U^{-} = \sum_{\mathscr{E}-} P_{i.}P_{.j}$$

Interpreting Measures of Association as Special Cases of $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$. Table 9 identifies the prediction domain, proposition, and error weights for which $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ equals each of various measures of bivariate association for qualitative variables. Given this formal equivalence, the prediction logic and $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure provide a unifying perspective that interprets each measure of association shown as being based on a specific prediction logic proposition.

All the measures belonging to the first row of Table 9(A) are based on a proposition that identifies only one error cell in a 2×2 table. Similarly, Yule's Q is limited to relative comparisons of observation pairs on two dichotomous variables, once the investigator eliminates all observation pairs that are tied on either dichotomy. Goodman and Kruskal's τ_b (and τ_a) is defined for the general $R \times C$ table of two nominal variables, and is based on the *ex post facto* actuarial proposition which, given each observation's state on the independent variable, predicts each of the dependent variable states with that state's conditional probability as observed in the data.

Of the measures for ordinal variables given in Table 9(B), all but the quadrant measure are based on predictions about relative comparisons. Unlike Goodman and Kruskal's or Costner's interpretations of gamma, our interpretations are based on *a priori* rather than *ex post* predictions.[27] Since, under any of these interpretations, gamma ignores observation pairs that are tied on at least one variable, it tends to exaggerate the degree of monotonicity in the original $Y \times X$ cross classification. Somer's d_{xy} (and d_{yx}) and Kim's d avoid this problem by focusing on predictions whose domain includes all observation pairs, whether or not they are tied on either variable. Finally, if no observation is tied with another on either variable, then Spearman's rho may be interpreted as a $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure defined for a 6×6 table that cross-classifies all ways in which *three* observations can be strongly ordered on Y and X.

Thus interpreted, each of the measures of association given in Table 9 is appropriate in a particular scientific context only if the prediction domain, prediction, and error weights underlying the

Table 9. Prediction Logic Propositions for which $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ Equals Various Measures of Bivariate Association[a]

Units of Analysis	Measure of Bivariate Association	Prediction Domain	Prediction	Error Events	Error Weights
(A) *NOMINAL VARIABLES:*					
Single Observations	Quetelet's measure and equivalents	$Y \times X$, Y and X dichotomous	$x \rightsquigarrow y$	$(\bar{y}, x)$	1
	Goodman and Kruskal's τ_b	$Y \times X$	Ex post actuarial proposition: If x_j, then predict y_i with probability $q_{ij} = P_{ij}/P_{.j}$ for $i = 1, R$, $j = 1, C$.	$\{(y_i, x_j)\}$, for which $q_{ij} \neq 1$, $i = 1, R$, and $j = 1, C$.	$\{(1 - q_{ij})\} = \{1 - (P_{ij}/P_{.j})\}$
Observation Pairs	Yule's Q	Extensive form of $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$, given $X_1 \neq X_2 \& Y_1 \neq Y_2$ (i.e., omitting ties), where Y and X are dichotomies	$(x, \bar{x}) \leftrightsquigarrow (y, \bar{y})$	$(\bar{y}, y) \& (x, \bar{x})$ $(y, \bar{y}) \& (\bar{x}, x)$	1 1

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[27] In effect, Goodman and Kruskal, and Costner, "Criteria for Measures of Association," look at the sign of γ before choosing a prediction rule. (See Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49 [December 1954], 732–764.) If $\gamma > 0$, then they use the prediction given in Table 9. On the other hand, if $\gamma < 0$, they use the prediction rule $X_1 > X_2 \leftrightsquigarrow Y_1 < Y_2$, interpreting the absolute value of gamma as the PRE afforded by this *ex post* prediction. If, in contrast, one specifies one of the *a priori* predictions in the table, $\gamma < 0$ simply indicates a proportionate *increase* in error resulting from an unsuccessful prediction.

(B) *ORDINAL VARIABLES:*

Single Observations	Quadrant measure	$Y \times X$, whese there exist median values y^0 and x^0 such that $\Pr(Y > y^0) = \Pr(Y \leq y^0) = \Pr(X > x^0) = \Pr(X \leq x^0) = \frac{1}{2}$	$X > x^0 \leftrightsquigarrow Y > y^0$	$(Y \leq y^0 \& X > x^0)$ $(Y > y^0 \& X \leq x^0)$	1 1
Observation Pairs	Goodman and Kruskal's γ	Condensed ordinal form of $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$, given either (a)$X_1 \neq X_2 \& Y_1 \neq Y_2$ (b)$Y_1 \neq Y_2$ (c)$X_1 \neq X_2$	(a) or (b): $X_1\{\lessgtr\}X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1\{\lessgtr\}Y_2$ (c): $X_1\{\lessgtr\}X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1\{\substack{\leq \\ \geq}\}Y_2$	$(Y_1 < Y_2 \& X_1 > X_2)$ $(Y_1 > Y_2 \& X_1 < X_2)$	1 1
	Somer's d_{xy}	Condensed ordinal form of $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$	$X_1 > X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 \geq Y_2$, $X_1 = X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 = Y_2$, $\& X_1 < X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 \leq Y_2$	$(Y_1 < Y_2 \& X_1 > X_2)$ $(Y_1 \neq Y_2 \& X_1 = X_2)$ $(Y_1 > Y_2 \& X_1 < X_2)$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ 1
	Kim's d	Condensed ordinal form of $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$	$X_1 > X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 > Y_2$ $X_1 = X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 = Y_2$ & $X_1 < X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 < Y_2$	$(Y_1 < Y_2 \& X_1 > X_2)$ $(Y_1 = Y_2 \& X_1 > X_2)$ $(Y_1 \neq Y_2 \& X_1 = X_2)$ $(Y_1 = Y_2 \& X_1 < X_2)$ $(Y_1 > Y_2 \& X_1 < X_2)$	1 $\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{1}{4}$ 1
	Kendall's τ_b^2	Condensed ordinal form of $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$	Ex post actuarial proposition: given state of X^{*2} predict each state of Y^{*2} with its conditional probability in $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$	$Y_1 > Y_2$ $Y_1 = Y_2$ $Y_1 < Y_2$	If prediction is $Y_1\{\gtreqless\}Y_2$, then use (>) (=) (<) 0 $\frac{1}{4}$ 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ 0 $\frac{1}{4}$ 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ 0
Observation Triples	Spearman's ρ_s	Condensed ordinal form of $Y^{*3} \times X^{*3}$, given observations are strongly ordered on each variable (no ties)	$X_i > X_j > X_k \rightsquigarrow [(Y_i > Y_j \& Y_i > Y_k)$ or $(Y_j > Y_i > Y_k)]$, where i, j, k index distinct observations in the triple	$(Y_i < Y_j \& Y_k) \&$ $(X_i > X_j > X_k)$ $(Y_k > Y_i > Y_j) \&$ $(X_i > X_j > X_{\bar{k}})$	1 1

[a] Measure to which reference applies is indicated in brackets.

[Quetelet's measure] Leo A. Goodman and William S. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross-Classification," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49 (Dec. 1954), 732–764.

Equivalents to Quetelet's measure:

[I] J. Durbin, "Appendix Note on a Statistical Question Raised in the Preceding Paper," *Population Studies*, 9 (July 1955), 101.

[Glass-Rogoff-Carlsson social mobility index] David V. Glass, *Social Mobility in Britain* (London: Routledge and Paul, 1954); Natalie Rogoff, *Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953); Gosta Carlsson, *Social Mobility and Class Structure* (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1958).

[Köppen's measure] Wladimir Köppen, "Die Aufeinanderfolge der unperiodischen Witterungserscheinunge nach den Grandasatzen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung," *Repertorium fur Meterologie* (Petrograd: Akademiia Nauk, 2 (1870–1), 189–238. Cited in Goodman, Leo A. and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross-Classifications, II: Further Discussions and References," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 54 (March, 1959), 123–163.

[Loevinger's coefficient of homogeneity applied to a two-item scale] Jane Loevinger, "A Systematic Approach to the Construction and Evaluation of Tests of Ability," *Psychological Monographs*, 61 (1947), No. 4.

[measure of causal strength—normalized] F. T. Schreier, *Human Motivation: Probability and Meaning* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), pp. 124f.

[y_{ii}] Saburo Yasuda, "A Methodological Inquiry into Social Mobility," *American Sociological Review*, 29 (Feb., 1964), 16–23.

measure satisfy the theoretical specifications or descriptive objectives of the investigator. The prediction logic and $\nabla_{\wp}$ measure not only provide a prediction framework within which these measures of bivariate association may be interpreted, but also apply to other predictions for which the standard measures are inappropriate.

To this point, we have assumed that the cell and marginal probabilities for the entire population were known. We next consider statistical inferences from samples.

Bivariate Statistical Inference

In applying the prediction logic to research using a random sample of a population, the investigator might specify a single proposition *a priori*, or, on the other hand, select the proposition *ex post*, after analyzing the data. Between these extremes, the investigator might have selected a small number of propositions *a priori*, choosing among them *ex post*. In this section, we dichotomize the range of inference problems into two classes: (a) a single, prespecified proposition; (b) *ex post* selection.[28]

Inference for a Single, *A Priori*, Proposition. For propositions stated for $Y \times X$ before the data are analyzed, we investigate here what is probably the usual sampling situation: simple random sampling, with population marginals unknown. Elsewhere we give results for two other sampling situations.[29] Application of the "delta"[30] method to a "natural" estimator of $\nabla_{\wp}$ allows us to show that its distribution is asymptotically normal and to calculate the asymptotic variance.

Let f_{ij} denote the observed fraction of the entire sample in cell (y_i, x_j), and denote the respective marginal fractions by $f_{i.}$ and $f_{.j}$. Then the estimator of $\nabla_{\wp}$ is

$$\hat{\nabla}_{\wp} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} f_{ij}}{\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} f_{i.} f_{.j}} \qquad (6)$$

The asymptotic variance is

$$\text{Var } \hat{\nabla}_{\wp} = \frac{\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij}^2 P_{ij} - \left[\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{ij}\right]^2 + \beta\left[\beta \sum_{i,j} (\pi_{i.} + \pi_{.j})^2 P_{ij} - 2 \sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} (\pi_{i.} + \pi_{.j}) P_{ij}\right]}{(n-1)U^2} \qquad (7)$$

In the variance expression, n denotes the total number of observations in the sample,

$$\beta = 1 - \nabla_{\wp}$$

$$\pi_{i.} = \sum_j \omega_{ij} P_{.j}$$

$$\pi_{.j} = \sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}$$

In estimating the variance the unknown true probabilities P_{ij}, $P_{i.}$ and $P_{.j}$ should be replaced by the respective estimates, f_{ij}, $f_{i.}$ and $f_{.j}$.

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[28] For further development and technical details of the statistical methods for evaluating *a priori* and *ex post* prediction logic propositions, see Hildebrand, Laing and Rosenthal, *Prediction Analysis of Cross Classifications*, chapter 6 and Stanley Wasserman, "An *Ex Post* Significance Test for a Pattern of Association Based on Prediction Logic" (M.S. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1973).

[29] Hildebrand, Laing and Rosenthal, "Prediction Logic: A Method for Empirical Evaluation of Formal Theory," and "Errata," *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* (in press).

[30] Harold Cramér, *Mathematical Methods of Statistics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1946), and S. S. Wilks, *Mathematical Statistics* (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 260.

[τ_b] Goodman and Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross-Classifications," pp. 759f. Interchanging the roles of X and Y in these conditions, τ_a also can be shown to be a $\nabla_{\wp}$ measure.

[Q] G. Udny Yule, "On the Methods of Measuring Association Between Two Attributes," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 75 (1912), 579–642.

[Quadrant measure] William H. Kruskal, "Ordinal Measures of Association," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 53 (Dec., 1958), 814–861: pp. 818–822.

[γ] Goodman and Kruskal "Measures of Association," p. 749.

[d_{xy}] Robert H. Somers, "A New Asymmetric Measure of Association for Ordinal Variables," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (December 1962), 799–811. Equivalently, by interchanging the roles of X and Y these conditions, d_{xy} also can be interpreted as $\nabla_{\wp}$ measure.

[d] Jae-On Kim, "Predictive Measures of Ordinal Association," *American Journal of Sociology*, 76 (January 1971), 891–907.

[τ_b^2] Thomas P. Wilson, "A Proportional-Reduction-in-Error Interpretation for Kendall's *Tau-b*," *Social Forces*, 47 (March 1969), 340–342.

[ρ_s] Kruskal, "Ordinal Measures of Association," pp. 823–827.

Fisher's exact test and extensive Monte Carlo studies indicate that these approximations are excellent when $n=100$ and are generally quite acceptable for small samples ($n=25$). As general rules-of-thumb, the normal approximation is adequate for testing purposes if $nU \geq 5$ and the marginals are not extremely skewed. Note that the criterion $nU \geq 5$ refers to the overall expected error rate in the set of all error cells as a whole; this criterion need *not* be satisfied in each error cell. An important implication of this criterion is that the investigator who has an *a priori* theory involving variables with large numbers of categories gains no statistical premium from collapsing categories.

In testing hypotheses and establishing confidence intervals, the approximation is improved if the *case-K* error rate is corrected for continuity. If the proposition being investigated is logically equivalent to a proposition that identifies exactly two diagonally opposed error cells in a 2×2 table, then the continuity correction factor is $k = 1/n$. Otherwise, $k = 1/2n$. This correction is used in defining the terms $\hat{\nabla}^{+}$ and $\hat{\nabla}^{-}$: If the *case-K* error rate is the maximum (or minimum) possible, given the sample marginals, then set $\hat{\nabla}^{+} = \hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}}$ (or $\hat{\nabla}^{-} = \hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}}$). Otherwise, $\hat{\nabla}^{+}(\hat{\nabla}^{-})$ is computed by adding (subtracting) the correction factor k to (from) the *case-K* error rate in the appropriate expression for $\hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}}$.

The hypothesis that $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} > c$, where $0 \leq c < 1$, achieves the α level of significance if $Z > Z_{\alpha}$, where Z_{α} is the critical value of the standardized normal deviate (one-tailed), and the test statistic, corrected for continuity is

$$Z = \frac{\hat{\nabla}^{+} - c}{(\mathrm{Var}\,\hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}})^{1/2}} \tag{8}$$

The $(1-\alpha)$ confidence interval, corrected for continuity, is

$$\hat{\nabla}^{+} - Z_{\alpha/2}(\mathrm{Var}\,\hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}})^{1/2} \leq \nabla_{\mathscr{P}} \leq \hat{\nabla}^{-} + Z_{\alpha/2}(\mathrm{Var}\,\hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}})^{1/2} \tag{9}$$

No corrections for continuity should be made in calculating Var $\hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}}$ or in computing the point estimate, $\hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}}$.

These results provide the basic methods for making statistical inferences about the success of a single prediction logic proposition that is stated *a priori*. We next discuss statistical methods in selecting a proposition, *ex post facto*, on the basis of the distribution observed in a sample.

***Ex Post* Inference.** The *ex post* methods of prediction analysis rest on the result that the ordinary chi-square statistic, χ^2 (appropriate to the sampling situation described in the preceding section), is a weighted combination of all the estimated ∇_{ij} values for a table. (However, chi-square is not a $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure since some of the weights are negative.) Consider all possible weighted combinations of ∇_{ij} values, which includes considering the values of $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ for all possible propositions, $\mathscr{P}$, and sets of error weights, $\mathscr{W} = \{\omega_{ij}\}$. For any weighted combination of ∇_{ij} values, we can calculate the sampling variance and, hence, the standardized value under the assumption of statistical independence. This assumption is equivalent to the assumption that all $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ values are zero. We have proved that the largest possible squared standardized value equals $((n-1)/n)\chi^2$. On the basis of this result it follows that *if χ^2 is not significant, then no $\mathscr{P}$ developed from ransacking the table will be significant.* A conservative procedure for testing some $\mathscr{P}$ selected *ex post* is to compute the standardized value of $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ under the null hypothesis of statistical independence and to test this value against the chi-square distribution with $(R-1)(C-1)$ degrees of freedom. (For the 2×2 table, there is a stronger result: a proposition $\mathscr{P}$ selected *ex post* has a significant $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ value if and only if chi-square is significant.)

Now if the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ is selected *ex post* from a restricted set of propositions specified *a priori*, use the following procedure. Given the marginals, there are only $(R-1)(C-1)$ linearly independent $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ values. For example from the values of the ∇_{ij} for $i < R, j < C$, and given the marginals, we can calculate the $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ value for any $\mathscr{P}$ and $\mathscr{W}$. If the set of propositions specified *a priori* in fact contains $(R-1)(C-1)$ linearly independent propositions, then the previous procedure applies. If the number of independent propositions is, say, $M < (R-1)(C-1)$ then a conservative procedure is to test the squared standardized value assuming statistical independence against a chi-square distribution with M degrees of freedom. The procedure becomes more conservative as M increases.

These results permit some counsels to researchers. Those who have been testing *a priori* theory on the basis of a chi-square test have been too conservative. In a 2×2 table they have been using a two-tail test where a one-tail test is appropriate; in larger tables, they also have paid too heavy a price in the $(R-1)(C-1)$ degrees of freedom used in testing. (This consideration far outweighs the differences in the estimated sampling variances under *a priori* and *ex post* conditions.) On the other hand, those who have interpreted a table *ex post* on the basis of a chi-square test are likely to have been insufficiently conservative. Since a specific squared standardized $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ estimate captures only a part (hopefully a large part) of the deviations from independence assessed by chi-square, in general it will meet a lower significance level than ordinary chi-square. The foregoing comparison of *a priori* and *ex post* testing procedures clearly indicates that substantial gain in statistical power accrues to the investigator who states predictions *a priori* rather than *ex post facto*. To illustrate this point and other aspects of using the prediction logic, we now return to the examples.

Bivariate Examples

Let us begin by considering the simple example shown earlier in Table 2: Modéré incumbency, the independent variable, is used to predict whether the Gaullists joined an electoral coalition. For comparative purposes, Table 10 lists the estimated and standardized values of $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ and the 95% confidence intervals for the "necessary," "sufficient," and "necessary and sufficient" hypotheses as if each were given *a priori*. Since we are dealing with a fourfold table, if one of these three $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ values exceeds zero, all do. If the "necessary" interpretation (or one of the other two) is assigned *ex post*, the chi-square statistic gives the appropriate significance level. Use of the "necessary" description of the table clearly rests on the greater "predictive significance" of that statement vis-à-vis the other two, rather than on "statistical significance."

Slightly different *ex post* procedures must be used with the data in Table 4a, which was used to illustrate the " 'public regarding' syndrome of the city manager cities." The estimated value of $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ is .44 ($U = .24$). If the hypothesis that the manager form is sufficient for nonpartisan, at-large elections was stated *a priori*, then Table 4a is logically equivalent to Table 4b, and we can proceed as with a 2 × 2 table. On the other hand, if this hypothesis was formed *ex post* from scanning the larger table, the relevant χ^2 value should be tested against the five degrees of freedom in the *un*collapsed table.

The "necessary," "sufficient," and "necessary and sufficient" statements for the collapsed Table 4b and their logical equivalents in 4a are all assigned the same *ex post* χ^2 value (72.58 for these data). The prediction "managers are necessary and sufficient for at-large, nonpartisan elections" appears to be a better description of the data than the "sufficient" prediction, since the former has greater estimated values for both $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ and U.

It is important to consider both U and $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$. In a study of the Maryland Court of Appeals, Sickels attempted to show, through an analysis of which judges wrote certain types of opinions, that consensus failed to exist on the court even though decisions were unanimous.[31] Finding that a pair of possibly maverick judges wrote distinct types of opinion, however, would not indicate that the court is not predominantly consensual. For the data in Table 11 and the proposition, "Hammond sustains the local board and Henderson does not," the value of $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ is a substantial .71, but U is only .12. Indeed, the data do not enable us to reject the statement that "consensus exists on the court except for Hammond and Henderson." Also, although the *a priori* significance level is $p < 3 \times 10^{-6}$, it seems likely that the hypothesis was developed *ex post*. Moreover, while there are only two degrees of freedom in the table used to report the data, this

Table 11. Judge Writing the Opinion and Decisions to Support Local Zoning Board in Maryland Court of Appeals[a]

Judge Writing Opinion	Decision Sustains Local Board	Decision Overturns Local Board	n
Hammond	9	②	11
Henderson	①	9	10
Other	37	31	68
n	47	42	89

[a] Circled numbers represent prediction errors.
Source: Sickels, "The Illusion of Judicial Consensus . . ."

Table 10. Success in Prediction of Gaullist Coalition-Joining (See Table 2)

Modéré incumbency is a _____ condition for Gaullist coalition participation.	Prediction Success, $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$	Prediction Precision, U	*A priori*			*Ex post*	
			Std. Value, Z	$p<$	95% Confidence Interval	χ^2 (1 d.f.)	p
necessary	.702	.07	3.31[a]	.0005	$.316 \leq \nabla_{\mathcal{P}} \leq 1.087$[b]	7.90	$.001 < p < .005$
sufficient	.119	.42	2.31[a]	.0104	$.031 \leq \nabla_{\mathcal{P}} \leq .201$	7.90	$.001 < p < .005$
necessary & sufficient	.203	.49	2.51[a]	.0060	$.063 \leq \nabla_{\mathcal{P}} \leq .343$	7.90	$.001 < p < .005$

[a] These different values reflect the variability of the asymptotic approximation when the marginals are skewed.
[b] This number, greater than the maximum possible value of $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$, results from application of the asymptotic theory to a situation where the total number of expected errors is small (6.71) and the estimated value of $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ is relatively large.

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[31] Robert J. Sickels, "The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals," *The American Political Science Review*, 59 (March 1965), 100–104.

table apparently was formed by collapsing a data set which described the written opinions of all justices. If so, then the proper *ex post* procedure for J justices requires $J-1$ degrees of freedom. For $J>6$, the *ex post* χ^2 of 10.67 is not significant at the .05 level.

The value of U can also be of interest when one assesses possible tradeoffs between prediction accuracy and prediction precision. The Eulau-Eyestone example provides an illustration. It concerns Table 7's cross-tabulation of the type of development in 1958–61 with that in 1962–65. As we suggested earlier, "progressive" development might be represented by the proposition that the distribution tends to lie in the upper right triangle ($\mathscr{P}^{(1)}$). On the other hand, if the process of development is sufficiently slow and "stages and phases follow one another," one's prediction might be that each city council would either stay in its 1958-61 development type or advance to the next more advanced type ($\mathscr{P}^{(2)}$). In contrast, if no changes took place, all cases would fall on the main diagonal ($\mathscr{P}^{(3)}$). Finally, recognizing that "reversed development is an empirical fact of life," one might predict that the development type of each city council did not tend to change more than to the adjacent type ($\mathscr{P}^{(4)}$). For illustrative purposes, assume that the data in Table 7 represent a random sample from some population. Table 7 shows the "estimated" $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ and U values and *a priori* and *ex post* significance levels for each of these propositions. Apparently $\mathscr{P}^{(1)}$ should be excluded from *ex post* consideration; its values for $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$, U, and χ^2 are all lower than the corresponding values for both $\mathscr{P}^{(2)}$ and $\mathscr{P}^{(4)}$. An *ex post* choice among the other three propositions is more difficult; as we move from $\mathscr{P}^{(3)}$ to $\mathscr{P}^{(2)}$ to $\mathscr{P}^{(4)}$ we gain in prediction accuracy but at the cost of reducing prediction precision.[32] It is interesting (and perhaps not intuitively obvious from inspecting the table) that the most accurate prediction is the one that allows for developmental regress as well as advance.

In contrast to the Eulau-Eyestone example, Muller's data concerning two political violence measures shown earlier in Table 6 are less ambiguous. His *a priori* upper-triangular prediction is strongly supported by the data ($\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}=.835$, $U=.21$, std. value $=22.18$, $p<3\times10^{-7}$). Note that the $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure shows far stronger support than does either Somer's symmetric d(.53) or R^2 (.47), the two measures reported by Muller. The discrepancy occurs because neither of these measures is designed to indicate agreement with an upper-triangular pattern. Incidentally, by using R^2, Muller opted for a "squared-distance" measure of error. Suppose we develop a set of error weights that places increasing weight on cells the more they deviate from the predicted relation. By one scheme, the first diagonal band of cells immediately below the main diagonal might be regarded as being one unit of "distance," the second band as two units and so on to the lower left cell (at a "distance" of 5). Then, squaring these quite arbitrary units of "distance" and normalizing so that the greatest error weight equals one, yields a matrix of error weights. For this set of error weights, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}=.945$, $U=.03$, std. value $=63.58$, $p<3\times10^{-7}$, indicating still stronger support for the hypothesis, although prediction precision is substantially less.

Of course, the assignment of scalar error weights is usually quite arbitrary, at least when the variables are qualitative. The investigator who is unwilling to make the strong assumptions necessary to justify such an assignment of error weights may, nonetheless, be willing to order the seriousness of various error events.

The methods can be used when the error weights are specified only as a complete weak order. Suppose, for example, that we were to specify that all events on or above the main diagonal of Muller's table are prediction successes: i.e., $\omega_{ij}=0$ if $j\geq i$. Further, suppose we identify five diagonal bands of cells, assigning equal weights to all error cells in the same band [$\omega_{ij}=\omega_u$ for all (i, j) below the main diagonal such that $u=i-j$, where $u=1, 5$] and order the bands according to their seriousness of error: $\omega_5\geq\omega_4\geq\omega_3\geq\omega_2\geq\omega_1>0$. Let ∇_u denote the unweighted $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure for the proposition identifying as errors only the set of all events in the band of cells u. Then from (3) it follows directly that if $\nabla_u\geq\nabla_{u'}$ for all $u\geq u'$, then the unweighted $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ must be less than or equal to the value of $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ for all sets of error weights consistent with the above constraints. Since, for Muller's data, $\nabla_5=\nabla_4=\nabla_3=1.00>\nabla_2=.96>\nabla_1=.73$, the weighted PRE is not less than $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}=.835$ for any weights consistent with the ordinal constraints given above. This result demonstrates that the decomposition of prediction success made possible by (3) can provide useful information even when the error weights are incompletely specified.

With both the Muller and Eulau-Eyestone examples, all propositions considered have error sets that consist of one or two triangles of error cells. Given this regularity, the relative accuracy and precision of the various propositions could to some degree be detected through inspection by an experienced researcher. In contrast, measures are indispensable where the pattern of error cells renders visual inspection impractical. This is the case for the Sawyer-MacRae example shown in Table 8.

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[32] The fact that it should be difficult to decide which proposition is "best" should not be surprising. For somewhat different reasons, for example, it may not be clear whether the "best" functional relation between two interval variables is linear, quadratic, logarithmic, etc.

The Sawyer-MacRae predictions commit 418 *case-K* errors. These errors may be partitioned as 209 errors in the cells identified as errors only by game theory and 209 in the *additional* error cells identified by Sawyer and MacRae's *ad hoc* considerations. The $\nabla_{\wp}$ values for these error sets are .69 and .03, respectively. Consequently, the *ad hoc* considerations add little prediction success to that achieved by game theory. It would be difficult to arrive at this conclusion with conventional measures.

For the game-theoretic prediction, $U = .50$, while for the *ad hoc* predictions, $U = .15$. Since the two error sets are disjoint, we can use (3) to express the value of $\nabla_{\wp}$ for Sawyer and MacRae's overall prediction as a weighted average of the values for the game-theoretic prediction and that based solely on *ad hoc* considerations:

$$\nabla_{\wp} = \frac{.50}{.50 + .15}.69 + \frac{.15}{.50 + .15}.03 = .54$$

The comparison of the $\nabla_{\wp}$ values for the overall and game-theoretic predictions is not nearly so dramatic as the 2:1 ratio of the raw errors, since $\nabla_{\wp}$ compensates for the greater precision of the overall prediction. The very low $\nabla_{\wp}$ value for the *ad hoc* component suggests that in this case the greater precision is not worth the loss in prediction accuracy.

This and the previous two examples demonstrate that, unlike many conventional (particularly multiplicative) measures, $\nabla_{\wp}$ is not excessively sensitive to zero marginals or cell entries. The Sawyer-MacRae data show no cases in four of the dependent variable categories and nine empty cells elsewhere in the table; nine of thirty-six cells are empty in the Muller example; eight of twenty-five cells are empty in the Eulau and Eyestone table. These zeros do not prevent us from assessing the various theories. Moreover, adding a few data cases in one of the zero cells would make only a minuscule change in $\nabla_{\wp}$. Similarly, $\nabla_{\wp}$ is not sensitive to small amounts of missing data. If we were to include 24 cases that Sawyer and MacRae excluded from the analysis, this would produce only a slight change in the values given above, since those results are based on 1352 cases.

Until now, we have focused on using the prediction logic and $\nabla_{\wp}$ to measure the agreement between the data and one or a few well specified propositions. Prediction analysis methods can also be useful for selecting a precise proposition *ex post* when only a much weaker prediction is possible *a priori.* Such a case arises in Goldberg's study of party identification.[33] He analyzes cross-tabulations between ordinal variables with 11 categories and a dichotomous dependent variable. The dependent variable indicates defection from or loyalty to parental party identification.[34] Goldberg's theory predicts that the proportion defecting will increase with the ordinal categories, but his theory is not strong enough to permit more specific predictions.

Throughout his analysis, Goldberg uses Goodman and Kruskal's τ_b measure. Because Goldberg found very low values for τ_b in his data (on the order of .05), his article is, in part, an apologia for the low explanatory power of his theory of rational voting.

Since τ_b is based on a prediction that has no relation to Goldberg's theory, it is irrelevant in this

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[33] Arthur S. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Partly Identification," *The American Political Science Review*, 63 (March 1969), 5–25.

[34] Although Goldberg's variables are ratio scales, he presents the data collapsed into ordinal categories. Also, Goldberg's independent and dependent variables are not measured independently as is required for application of $\nabla_{\wp}$. However, the confounding introduced by the latter aspect of his techniques should be minor.

Table 12. Defection from Father's Party Identification Vs. Intergenerational Strain[a]

	Score on Strain											
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	*n*
Defection	▨ 4	▨ 1	▨ 22	▨ 51	67	46	51	17	2	0	1	262
Loyalty	7	11	109	234	135	73	55	▨ 25	▨ 2	▨ 0	▨ 2	653
n	11	12	131	285	202	119	106	42	4	0	3	915

[a] Shading denotes error cells for *ex post* prediction discussed in text.

Respondents restricted to those who are either Republican or Democrat identifiers and who report their fathers as either Republican or Democrat identifiers.

Source: Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," Table 1, p. 9.

context. As shown earlier in Table 9a, this measure equals $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ for the mixed prediction strategy "if x_j, then predict y_i with probability $f_{ij}/f_{.j} \cdots$" the conditional frequency of y_i given x_j *observed in the data*. This mixed prediction strategy is chosen *ex post*, and is determined solely by the observed distribution, not by Goldberg's theory.[35]

For illustrative purposes we now take an alternative approach using a pure prediction strategy with unweighted errors. Letting j index the ordinal category of the independent variable, the following prediction is consistent with Goldberg's theory:

$$(j \leq a) \rightsquigarrow \text{(loyalty)},$$

$$(a < j < b) \rightsquigarrow \text{(loyalty or defection), and}$$

$$(b \leq j) \rightsquigarrow \text{(defection), where}$$

$$-1 \leq a < b \leq 12.$$

Generally, then, we will have a pattern beginning with error cells for defection, then (for $a<j<b$) no error cells, and finally error cells for loyalty. If, however, $a=b-1$, then the no-error-cell situation is eliminated; if $a=-1$, loyalty alone is never predicted; and if $b=11$, defection alone is never predicted. The parameters a and b are introduced to reflect not only that Goldberg's theory cannot indicate in advance the ordinal category for which one would shift from a loyalty prediction to a defection prediction but also that the ordinal variables may have little predictive value for a range ($a<j<b$) of categories.

Analyzing the data from the perspective of this set of predictions, we could select a significance level, then compute the standardized values for the error sets given by each of the 78 possible choices of values for a and b, and finally select, on substantive or subjective grounds, one of the propositions, if any, that is acceptable as "significant." Generally, however, inspection of the table will suggest a viable *ex post* proposition. For the data in Table 12, for example, if we set $a=3$ and $b=7$, we obtain $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}=.33$, significant at the .001 level. For the same table, $\tau_b=.055$. The difference is impressive and could easily change the weight placed on the findings. This difference results largely from recognizing that relatively accurate predictions occur only for the extreme categories of the independent variable. What we have found for this table applies to the entire Goldberg article. Our Table 13 gives $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$, a, and b for certain tables in Goldberg's article. These results do not confirm Goldberg's contention that his deviance variable shows a "somewhat stronger" relationship than his strain variable.[36] His claim holds if one accepts the predictions implicit in the use of τ_b. It does not hold for our *ex post* predictions. On the other hand, our results do confirm Goldberg on the point that deviance predicts better for "high" education than for "low."[37]

The preceding examples have illustrated how the prediction logic can be applied to bivariate data analysis. The fact that tables are bivariate is not always an indication of a simple descriptive hypothesis, as is most apparent in the Sawyer-MacRae case. Furthermore, the variables involved were often categorizations that needed considerable prior elaboration by the investigators. For example, Goldberg's independent variables were residuals from multiple regressions. Consequently, it appears that bivariate techniques will continue to be useful in data analysis. Nonetheless, the theoretical structures of political science are increasingly multivariate. To handle multivariate

Table 13. *Ex Post* Analysis of Goldberg's Ordinal Tables

Table	Independent Variable	n	a	b	$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$	U	τ_b	U for τ_b
I.	Strain	915	3	7	.330	.18	.055	.41
V.	Deviance	915	3	5	.230	.38	.064	.41
VIa.	Deviance (control on high education)	520	3	6	.303	.36	.113	.40
VIb.	Deviance (control on low education)	395	2	7	.180	.19	.034	.42

Source: Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," pp. 9, 12, 14.

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[35] Moreover, the τ_b measure is designed for nominal data and could show high values when data contradict Goldberg's theory. We suspect Goldberg used it because τ_b measures an (*ex post*) prediction of single observations whereas conventional ordinal measures such as γ are restricted to the prediction of observation pairs.

[36] Goldberg, pp. 12–13. A note of caution. The type of *ex post* analysis we conducted with Goldberg's data can lead to an overestimate of the $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ value with small samples. The overestimation is negligible with samples as large as Goldberg's. See Bartlett, "Partition Analysis of Categorical Data."

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

problems, we first need to extend the analytical framework.

Multivariate Prediction Logic

To avoid complicated notation, we shall focus on trivariate predictions. The general multivariate method is an immediate extension of the trivariate procedures.

Let $W=\{w_1, w_2, \cdots, w_k, \cdots, w_S\}$ be the third variable with S ("strata") states. The Cartesian product set $V=X\times W$ is the composite independent variable. Then, by direct extension of bivariate prediction, a multivariate prediction can be stated as:

$$\mathscr{P}_{.jk}:(x_j, w_k) \rightsquigarrow \mathscr{S}(x_j, w_k) \subseteq Y$$

Then $\{\mathscr{P}_{.jk}\}=\mathscr{P}_{YV}=\mathscr{P}_{YXW}=\mathscr{P}_{YWX}$ denotes the overall trivariate prediction concerning the dependent variable Y. Similarly the symbols $\mathscr{P}_{XW}$, $\mathscr{P}_{YX}$, $\mathscr{P}_{YW}$, respectively, denote bivariate propositions in which X is predicted by W, Y is predicted by X, and Y by W.

In defining the error structure for multivariate predictions, we continue the correspondence to formal logic:

> An event belongs to the error structure for a multivariate proposition if and only if that event would falsify the proposition were it expressed as a compound statement in formal logic.

The multivariate proposition $\mathscr{P}_{YV}$ might be stated in the form of a logically connected set of bivariate statements. As an example, consider the proposition

$$\mathscr{P}_{YXW}: \mathscr{P}_{YW} \text{ or } [\mathscr{P}_{XW}\,\&\,\mathscr{P}_{YX}]$$

What is the relation between the error structure for the multivariate proposition and that of the component bivariate statements? This question is important if the investigator wishes to evaluate the contribution of each component to the prediction success achieved by the multivariate model. As Table 14 illustrates, a multivariate theory can be formed in a number of ways by logically connecting simpler propositions, and its error structure is defined in exact correspondence to the truth table for the compound statement were the multivariate proposition expressed in formal logic.[38] We next present methods for empirical evaluation of such multivariate theories.

Table 14. Some Multivariate Error Structures

(a)

	xw	$\bar{x}w$	$x\bar{w}$	$\bar{x}\bar{w}$
y		▨		
$\bar{y}$	▨	▨	▨	

$\mathscr{P}_{YXW}:(w \rightsquigarrow x)\,\&\,(x \rightsquigarrow y)$

(b)

	xw	$\bar{x}w$	$x\bar{w}$	$\bar{x}\bar{w}$
y				
$\bar{y}$	▨	▨	▨	

$\mathscr{P}_{YXW}:(w \rightsquigarrow y)\,\&\,(x \rightsquigarrow y)$
$\mathscr{P}_{YV}:(w \text{ or } x) \rightsquigarrow y$

(c)

	xw	$\bar{x}w$	$x\bar{w}$	$\bar{x}\bar{w}$
y				
$\bar{y}$	▨			

$\mathscr{P}_{YXW}:(w \rightsquigarrow y) \text{ or } (x \rightsquigarrow y)$
$\mathscr{P}_{YV}:xw \rightsquigarrow y$

(d)

	xw	$\bar{x}w$	$x\bar{w}$	$\bar{x}\bar{w}$
y				
$\bar{y}$		▨	▨	

$\mathscr{P}_{YXW}:[w \rightsquigarrow (\bar{x} \rightsquigarrow y)]\,\&\,[\bar{w} \rightsquigarrow (x \rightsquigarrow y)]$
$\leftrightarrow (w)(\bar{x} \rightsquigarrow y)\,\&\,(\bar{w})(x \rightsquigarrow y)$
$\mathscr{P}_{YV}:(\bar{x}w \text{ or } x\bar{w}) \rightsquigarrow y$

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[38] In this paper we do not consider how non-binary error weights for bivariate propositions should be treated when these propositions are logically connected to yield a multivariate prediction. For example, if an error event for the multivariate prediction is also an error event for two distinct bivariate components, and the event is weighted differently for these components, then what weight should be used in analyzing the multivariate prediction?

In this paper we assume either that unweighted errors are used or that the error weights are given directly for the multivariate prediction.

Measuring Success and Prediction Shift of Multivariate Propositions

Now consider the empirical evaluation of a multivariate proposition in an entire population or in a sample that is sufficiently large so that sampling considerations may be ignored. For ease of exposition, we continue to limit attention to pure strategy predictions relating just three qualitative variables. The extension of these methods for more than three variables is direct. For the trivariate case, we employ standard notation to indicate unconditional probabilities by P_{ijk}, $P_{ij.}$, $P_{i..}$, etc., and conditional probabilities indicated by expressions such as $P_{y_iw_k|x_j}$.

Given that the trivariate proposition may be expressed in equivalent bivariate form as $\mathscr{P}_{YV}$, it is clear that the trivariate del (∇) measure can be defined by direct extension of the bivariate measure:

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}} = 1 - \frac{\sum\limits_{i,j,k} \omega_{ijk} P_{ijk}}{\sum\limits_{i,j,k} \omega_{ijk} P_{i..} P_{.jk}} = 1 - \frac{\text{expected error for } \mathscr{P}_{YXW} \text{ in predicting } Y\text{, given } V(X \text{ and } W)}{\text{expected error for } \mathscr{P}_{YXW} \text{ in predicting } Y\text{, given random } V} \qquad (10)$$

The second expression in (10) indicates that this overall measure has a direct proportionate reduction in error (PRE) interpretation.

To measure the *partial* success of $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ in predicting Y, *controlling for* X, we again use the PRE model. Under the *case-K* information condition, one applies the trivariate proposition knowing each observation's values on X *and* W. Then the expected *case-K* error rate is

$$\sum_{i,j,k} P_{.j.}\omega_{ijk}P_{y_iw_k|x_j} = \sum_{i,j,k} \omega_{ijk}P_{ijk}$$

Under *case-U*, one applies $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ to each observation, knowing that it is drawn randomly from the $X = x_j$ subpopulation, thus predicting $\mathscr{S}(x_j, \omega_k)$ for this observation with probability $P_{w_k|x_j}$. Since $P_{.j.}$ of the observations have $X = x_j$, the probability of *case-U* error in the population as a whole is

$$\sum_j P_{.j.} \sum_{i,k} \omega_{ijk}P_{y_i|x_j}P_{w_k|x_j} = \sum_{i,j,k} \omega_{ijk}P_{y_i|x_j}P_{.jk}$$

Then define partial del, *controlling for* X, as the PRE measure

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW|X}} = 1 - \frac{\sum\limits_{i,j,k} \omega_{ijk}P_{ijk}}{\sum\limits_{i,j,k} \omega_{ijk}P_{y_i|x_j}P_{.jk}} = 1 - \frac{\mathscr{P}_{YXW} \text{ error in predicting } Y\text{, given } X \text{ and } W}{\mathscr{P}_{YXW} \text{ error in predicting } Y\text{, given } X \text{ and random } W} \qquad (11)$$

Notice that the partial differs from multiple del as given by (10) only by substituting conditional probabilities of y_i, given x_j, for unconditional probabilities in the denominator. It is this substitution of conditional probabilities that partials out the information value of X to the proposition $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ in predicting Y for the population. Omitting degenerate cases for which the denominator is zero, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW|X}}$ measures the PRE accomplished by the trivariate proposition that can be attributed to W, controlling for X. The multiple and partial dels are analogous to the bivariate measure in interpretation and behavior. Similarly, partial del can also be expressed as a weighted average of the partials for each error cell analogous to expression (3), thus permitting a decomposition of prediction success of $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ attributable to W and controlling for X.

In regression analysis, the partial coefficient of determination is related to the simple and multiple coefficients by the following partitioning equation:

$$(1 - R^2_{YXW}) = (1 - R^2_{YX})(1 - R^2_{YW.X}) \qquad (12)$$

In contrast to this simple relation in linear models, evaluating the marginal contribution of W in prediction logic propositions is more difficult. In adding W to the model, thus moving from $\mathscr{P}_{YX}$ to $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$, two changes occur. First, the information conditions change. Adding W makes the joint probability distribution of Y, X, and W relevant rather than just the joint distribution of Y and X. The ordinary partial coefficient of determination in fact assesses this change in information by measuring the relative gain in linear predictability about Y when information about W is added to that associated with X. If the simple model is

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x$$

and the trivariate model is

$$y = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x + \gamma_2 w \qquad (13)$$

then the simplicity of the partitioning equation (12) provides a straightforward way of measuring the marginal contribution of W. But if the trivariate model is

$$y = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1[\max(x, w)] \qquad (13')$$

the model is no longer linear in X and W, although the regression is linear in the variable enclosed in brackets. In this case, conventional partial techniques fail. Yet (13′) appears to be a perfectly reasonable trivariate model. Prediction logic problems are generally similar to (13′). In addition to changing the information by adding W, the *form* of the prediction is altered. Consequently, in addition to a partial measure accounting for information effects, we need to account for the "shift" in the *nature* of the predicted relation.

Unless special conditions obtain, an expression analogous to (12) relating multiple, bivariate and partial dels will not balance. In order to guarantee that the accounting equation does balance, we need to multiply the right side by the measure of *prediction shift:*

$$\Psi_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}/\mathscr{P}_{YX}} = \frac{[\mathscr{P}_{YXW}\text{ error}/\mathscr{P}_{YX}\text{ error}],\text{ given } X \text{ and random } W}{[\mathscr{P}_{YXW}\text{ error}/\mathscr{P}_{YX}\text{ error}],\text{ given random } V(X \times W)} \qquad (14)$$

The numerator and the denominator of the shift both control for information conditions in comparing $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ and $\mathscr{P}_{YX}$. In the numerator only X (and not W) is known, while in the denominator the states of both independent variables are unknown. Thus, the shift does not reflect information effects which have been accounted for by the partial. The numerator compares the prediction accuracy of $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ to that of $\mathscr{P}_{YX}$, eliminating the effect of W information on prediction accuracy. The denominator normalizes the numerator for differences in the form of relations specified by the bivariate and trivariate propositions.

Given the measure of prediction shift, the prediction logic analogue to (12) is the equation

$$\begin{aligned}(1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}})\\ = (1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}})\Psi_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}/\mathscr{P}_{YX}}(1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW|X}}) \quad (15)\end{aligned}$$

The measures in this expression provide the basis for trivariate analysis. We next illustrate application of these multivariate methods with examples taken from the political science literature.

Trivariate Examples

The descriptive lore of American politics indicates the dominant position of rural, southern Democrats in the House of Representatives. Wolfinger and Heifetz[39] present data on this point for the House as of January, 1964. We examine the data on subcommittee chairmanships as if they had been collected to test the *a priori* statement that in this population of Democratic congressmen, "southern, rural" $\rightsquigarrow$ "subcommittee chairmanship." The error event for this statement is the double-hatched cell in Table 15 (compare Table 14(c)). The error set is the intersection of the error sets for the bivariate statements "southern $\rightsquigarrow$ subcommittee chairmanship" and "rural $\rightsquigarrow$ subcommittee chairmanship." The bivariate $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ values of .31 and .22 for these predictions, respectively, indicate that chairmanships are better predicted for representatives of southern rather than rural districts. The multiple $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ value is .48, indicating that the substantial decrease in precision inherent in the more restrictive multivariate prediction is offset by a marked increase in prediction accuracy over that available from either bivariate statement. When, as in this example, one shifts from the bivariate prediction $x \rightsquigarrow y$ to the multivariate proposition $w \& x \rightsquigarrow y$, the prediction shift measure always equals 1.0, leaving us with a direct analogy to the partitioning equation in linear regression. The partial del, controlling for the urban-rural variable, equals .32; it is .24 when North-South is controlled. This is consistent with the comment above that "southern" has greater predictive power than "rural."

Next consider a somewhat more complex example where the prediction shift does not equal 1.0. In Rosenthal's analysis of electoral coalitions in the Fourth French Republic,[40] the dependent variable is whether or not a "centrist strategy" coalition forms: $Y = \{cs, \overline{cs}\}$. The two independent variables are whether the degree of "Communist danger" present (X) is *h*igh, *m*edium or *l*ow, $X = \{h, m, l\}$, and (W) whether a "rightist alternative" is available, $W = \{ra, \overline{ra}\}$. The investigator's initial proposition may be stated

$$\mathscr{P}_{YX}: h \rightsquigarrow cs,\ m \rightsquigarrow (cs \text{ or } \overline{cs}),\ \&\ l \rightsquigarrow \overline{cs}$$

This proposition makes differentiated predictions only for the extreme categories of the "Communist danger" variable, identifying as errors those cells that are *double*-hatched in Table 16.

To differentiate the prediction when $X = m$, Rosenthal offered the trivariate proposition

$$\mathscr{P}_{YXW}: h \rightsquigarrow cs,\ m \rightsquigarrow (ra \leftrightsquigarrow \overline{cs}),\ \&\ l \rightsquigarrow \overline{cs}$$

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[39] Raymond E. Wolfinger and Joan Heifetz, "Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress," *The American Political Science Review*, 59 (June 1965), 337–349, at 339.

[40] Howard Rosenthal, "Voting and Coalition Models in Election Simulations," *Simulation and the Study of Politics*, ed. William Coplin, (Chicago: Markham, 1968), pp. 237–287, at pp. 279–280.

Table 15. Subcommittee Chairmanship, Democrats, House of Representatives by Region and Urban-Rural, 1964[a]

Congressman Is . . .	Constituency Type				n
	North		South		
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	
Subcommittee Chairman	32	19	7	51	109
Not Subcommittee Chairman	75	34	16	22	147
n	107	53	23	73	256

[a] Since the table was originally published in percentage form, there may be some slight errors in the number of cases shown in each cell. Shading indicates error cell.

Source: Wolfinger and Heifetz, "Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress," Table 1, p. 343.

This trivariate proposition identifies as errors all cells that are single- or double-hatched in Table 16. Note that whether a rightist alternative is available has predictive significance under $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ only when $X=m$; thus this variable may be ignored when $X \neq m$ without affecting the value of $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}$.

For the bivariate prediction, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}}=.781$, but the denominator in this measure, the measure of prediction precision, is only $U=.24$. Thus, only a 24 per cent error rate for $\mathscr{P}_{YX}$ is expected under statistical independence. Although the multivariate proposition make predictions with twice the precision ($U=.48$), its prediction success is nearly as high: $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}=.758$. By simple algebra, the sign of the partial, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW|X}}$, can be shown to depend solely on the probabilities in the "*m*" cells. The rightist alternative variable achieves substantial prediction success within the "*m*" cells, as reflected in the .591 value for the partial.

In the ordinary linear model, a positive partial implies that the trivariate coefficient of determination must be greater than the bivariate coefficient. Contrast this with the result for Rosenthal's data that $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}=.76<\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}}=.78$. Thus, by (15), the shift measure in this case must be greater than one

Table 16. Centrist Strategies as Predicted by Communist Danger and Rightist Alternative (1951 French Legislative Elections)[a]

(*W*) Rightist Alternative?	(*X*) Communist Danger				*n*
	High (*h*)	Medium (*m*)		Low (*l*)	
		($\overline{ra}$)	(*ra*)		
Centrist Strategy (*cs*)	35	17	4	1	57
Not Centrist Strategy ($\overline{cs}$)	4	2	21	11	38
n	39	19	25	12	95

[a] The abbreviation *ra*= rightist alternative; $\overline{ra}$= no rightist alternative. The cross-tabulation involving rightist alternative was not available for the *h* and *l* categories on Communist danger. Since the rightist alternative variable has no predictive significance for these categories, the available data suffices for all relevant computations.

Source: Rosenthal, "Voting and Coalition Models in Election Simulations,"

($\Psi = 2.70$). The error structure for the multivariate prediction is formed from $\mathscr{E}_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}}$ by adding $\mathscr{E}^{+} = \{(cs, ra, m), (\overline{cs}, \overline{ra}, m)\}$. Since $\nabla_{\mathscr{E}^{+}}$ for this set of two additional error cells is only .735, we know from the weighted-average expression (5) that $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}$ must be less than $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}}$. The overall trivariate prediction is less successful than $\mathscr{P}_{YX}$ (albeit more precise), even though the partial del indicates that the rightist alternative variable succeeds in predicting centrist strategies in districts having medium "Communist danger."

The final example is based on the predictions by Riker and Zavoina cited earlier for the data shown in Table 5. The first of two trivariate propositions to be examined uses learning theory to predict that an action is repeated if reinforced, but makes no prediction if the action is not reinforced. Letting f and f' denote voting "*f*or" on the preceding and current (′) match, respectively, and using w to denote that the subject *w*on on the last match, the simple learning prediction may be stated as

$$\mathscr{P}_{YXW}:(f \,\&\, w) \rightsquigarrow f',\ (\bar{f} \,\&\, w) \rightsquigarrow \bar{f}',$$
$$\&\, \bar{w} \rightsquigarrow (f' \text{ or } \bar{f}')$$

Riker and Zavoina modify this proposition by predicting that a losing vote "for" will be switched to a vote "against";

$$\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}:(f \,\&\, w) \rightsquigarrow f',\ [(f \,\&\, \bar{w}) \text{ or}$$
$$(\bar{f} \,\&\, w)] \rightsquigarrow \bar{f}', \&\, (\bar{f} \,\&\, \bar{w}) \rightsquigarrow (f' \text{ or } \bar{f}')$$

These two propositions can be contrasted with the simple (bivariate) persistence model, $\mathscr{P}_{YX}: f' \leftrightsquigarrow f$. For this simple model, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}} = .142$. The model $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$, which makes predictions only for reinforced subjects, attains $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}} = .254$. The complete Riker-Zavoina prediction is slightly less successful: $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}} = .227$. This occurs because $\mathscr{E}_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}}$ is formed by adding $(f'\bar{w}f)$ to $\mathscr{E}_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}$, and $\nabla_{f'\bar{w}f} = .133$, which not only is less than $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}$ but also is less than the corresponding value for the simple persistence model. The lack of success in predicting for the $\bar{w}f$ subjects was anticipated by Riker and Zavoina when they stated that for unreinforced players, "the prediction is not so clear."

The value of the partial del controlling for X, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW|X}} = .158$, indicates that the variable, W, describing whether or not the subject won on the previous trial, contributes to the success of Riker and Zavoina's multivariate prediction, $\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}$ but $X = \{f, \bar{f}\}$ contributes slightly more ($\nabla_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW|W}} = .197$). The shift factor for these data equals $\Psi_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}/\mathscr{P}_{YX}} = 1.07$. By expression (15), the proportion of *case-U* error that is *not* reduced by the multivariate proposition, $1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}} = .773$, can be accounted for by the product

$$(1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}})\Psi_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}/\mathscr{P}_{YX}}(1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW|X}}) =$$
$$(1 - .142)1.07(1 - .158) = .773$$

This concludes our analysis of examples taken from the research literature. Our purpose in presenting these examples is future-oriented. We think that the prediction logic approach provides a convenient and robust model for theory construction and data analysis in political science.

COMMUNICATIONS

Cross-over Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules

To the Editor:

This communication presents sample survey data tending to confirm the factual assumptions about cross-over voting in presidential primaries that led the Democratic party to restrict participation in delegate selection processes to declared Democratic voters.[*]

On December 7, 1974, the Democratic party adopted a formal Charter which, among other things, specifies that its National Convention "shall be composed of delegates who are chosen through processes which . . . restrict participation to Democrats only."[1] The Democratic National Committee subsequently adopted resolutions providing that an "adequate provision" for carrying out this mandate "includes laws which restrict participation to Democratic voters who have been registered as such at least 14 days in advance . . . through a system of state or federal voter registration which includes party registration, or where appropriate, a system of party enrollment approved by the National Democratic Party."[2]

A subsequent staff paper points out that this is not the only means by which a state could conform to the delegate selection rules, but that there is "a first preference for this type of system."[3] Where necessary, state Democratic parties have "an obligation to make all feasible efforts to repeal, amend, or otherwise modify [state] laws to accomplish these objectives."[4]

At the onset of the 1976 campaign, primaries were scheduled in 30 states represented by 2299 (76.5 per cent) of the 3007 Democratic convention delegates.[5] In 22 states, 1914 (63.7 per cent) of the delegates will be named in primaries. Fifteen of these states, selecting 1325 delegates, have advance party registration of voters. Several state selection systems, approved by the Democrats' Compliance Review Commission, appear plainly inconsistent with the Charter's "first preference" for advance party registration and with the underlying rationale of the reform rules. Wisconsin's open primary, selecting 68 delegates and testing voter preferences for presidential candidates, is the plainest instance. The requirement in six other states, selecting 521 delegates, that a voter need only declare his party affiliation at the polls also defeats the rules' purpose.[6]

The rationale for these rules is found in the work of the McGovern-Fraser Commission which insisted that Democratic party affairs be opened to all who wanted to become members, but that "a full opportunity for all Democrats to participate is diluted if members of other political parties are allowed to participate in the selection of delegates to the Democratic National Convention."[7] In a somewhat stronger statement, the Executive Director of the Democratic National Committee replied to newspaper criticism of a closed presidential primary with the assertion that "cross-over primaries have become the mechanism of the most flagrant manipulation of democratic decision-making . . ."[8]

Two factual assumptions underlie this rationale. First, in the absence of advance party registration of voters, there will be substantial crossing over by independents and Republicans into Democratic presidential primaries. Second, cross-over voting dilutes the participation of Democratic voters because the cross-overs cast ballots in a way significantly different from the Democrats.

The Data

This analysis relies primarily on statewide sample surveys of Wisconsin voters taken by the Survey Research Laboratory at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.[9] The most reliable of these was taken soon after the 1968 presidential primary.[10] In 1964 and 1972 surveys were taken after the November election, requiring voters to recall their participation in the April presidential primary. Although this long time-lag apparently contributed to some distortion in voter recall, the survey data fall within accepted tolerances between poll data and actual voting patterns.

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[*] I am grateful to Dennis Affholter for preparing the analysis decks and making the computer runs. Professor Jack Dennis graciously made available his 1972 survey of the Wisconsin electorate. The University of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory and its director, Professor Harry P. Sharp, were very helpful in supplying the 1964 and 1968 survey data.

[1] *Charter of the Democratic Party of the United States*, Article II, section 4.

[2] "Call to the Democratic National Convention" (mimeo, 1975), Resolution II: Qualifications of State Delegations, section (c).

[3] Democratic National Committee, "Research Project on Section 9 of our Mandate and Guidelines A-3 and C-3" (mimeo, 1975), p. 3.

[4] "Call to the Democratic National Convention," Resolution II, section (c).

[5] Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, "*The Wisconsin Presidential Primary: Open or Closed?*", Research Bulletin 75-RB-1, August, 1975, p. 11.

[6] Arkansas, with 26 delegate votes, and Idaho, with 16 delegate votes, hold presidential preference primaries which bind delegates but do not select them. In both states voters declare a party preference at the polls. These regulations also violate the purpose of the Democratic selection rules.

[7] Report of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, *Mandate for Reform* (Washington, 1970), p. 47.

[8] Mark A. Siegel, "Democratic Leader Responds to Open Primary Editorial," *Madison Capital Times*, July 21, 1975, Editorial Page.

[9] These statewide samples were 702 in 1964, 573 in 1968, and 839 in 1972.

Reported participation in all three presidential primaries was reasonably close to the percentage of the voting age population that actually cast ballots.[11] In 1968, survey respondents overreported participating by 5.3 per cent.[12] In 1964 and 1972, they underreported voting by 8.2 and 8.7 per cent respectively. While underreported voting is unusual, the eight month delay between primary day and polling may have blurred respondents' memories.[13]

Respondents' recall of whether they had voted in the Democratic or Republican primary was also quite accurate for 1964 and 1968.[14] In 1972, however, the Democratic primary attracted 79.8 per cent of the voters, but only 62.3 per cent of the survey remembered participating. Richard Nixon's November landslide may have caused voters to forget or misreport their vote in April's Democratic primary.

Finally, voter recall of which Democratic candidates they voted for was accurate within 2.3 per cent in 1968. In 1964, however, the survey reported a 12 per cent smaller vote for George Wallace than he actually received; and in 1972, George McGovern's survey strength was 15 per cent higher than he actually received. The "halo" effect of both the primary and general elections may account for these disparities. In any case, the survey reports of candidate voting must be treated cautiously in the subsequent analysis.

How Much Cross-Over Voting?

Studies of the Washington blanket primary, which permits voters to select which party's primary they will vote in for each office on the ballot, suggested little cross-over voting. Aggregate voting data showed that in only 13 of 71 primaries for statewide and national office had the vote for the combined candidates of one party for one office been more than 5 per cent above or below the mean vote cast for their political party for all other offices.[15]

Similar conclusions were reached for two Wisconsin gubernatorial primaries in studies based on more reliable survey data. In 1964, only 6.2 per cent of voters reported casting ballots in the primary of the opposite party.[16] In 1966, when the Democrats had a bitterly contested four-way gubernatorial primary and the Republican contender faced no nomination challenge, the cross-over vote was only 7.5 per cent.[17]

There is, however, persuasive evidence that cross-over voting occurs far more frequently than these figures indicate. The aggregate data used in the Washington study may well conceal large numbers of party affiliators crossing over into the opposition party's nomination contests. That voting in most primary contests did not exceed the party's mean primary vote by more than 5 per cent may simply reflect the netting out of a much larger cross-over vote by each party's identifiers into the other party's nomination contests. Survey data tend to confirm this suspicion: in a statewide survey 78 per cent of Washington voters reported voting for candidates of more than one party; and 37 per cent declared an intention to vote in contested opposition party primaries where they favored their own party's nominees, but they had no primary opposition.[18]

Cross-over voting in Wisconsin presidential primaries appears to be much higher than was reported for the 1966 and 1968 gubernatorial contests. One reason might be that gubernatorial primaries cöincide with party nomination contests for Congress, lesser statewide constitutional officers, state legislators, and county officials. A partisan is constrained from voting in the opposition gubernatorial primary by his interest in numerous other nomination contests on his own party's ballot.[19] No such constraint exists in presidential primaries, which are held in April when no other partisan races are on the ballot.

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[10] Some of these data have been previously reported in Austin Ranney, "Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972), 24–26, 34–36.

[11] Actual vote figures were obtained from the *Wisconsin Blue Book* for 1966, 1969, and 1973. Total voting age population is reported in United States Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, 1974), Table 614.

[12] Studies showing overreported voting ranging from 2 to 27 per cent are collected in David Adamany and Philip Dubois, "The 'Forgetful' Voter and an Underreported Vote," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (Summer, 1975), 227 note 1. Many factors produce voting overreport; but actual voter misrepresentation is usually set at 2 to 8 per cent, much lower than total overreport. Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 94–95; Aage R. Clausen, "Response Validity: Vote Report," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 32 (Winter, 1968), 594–602; Helen Dinerman, "1948 Votes in the Making—A Preview," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12 (Winter, 1948), 585–598.

[13] The only published analysis of underreported voting is apparently that of Adamany and Dubois.

[14] In 1964, 72.5 per cent of voters participated in the Democratic primary; 72.3 per cent of the survey sample reported casting Democratic ballots. In 1968, the actual and sample survey Democratic vote was respectively 59.9 per cent and 64.7 per cent.

[15] Daniel M. Ogden, Jr. and Hugh A. Bone, *Washington Politics* (New York: New York University Press and Citizenship Clearing House, 1960), pp. 38–40. An earlier study of a smaller number of primaries reached the same conclusion. See Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., "The Blanket Primary and Party Regularity in Washington," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 39 (January, 1948), 33–38.

[16] Austin Ranney and Leon D. Epstein, "The Two Electorates: Voters and Non-Voters in a Wisconsin Primary," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 28 (August, 1966), p. 609, n. 17.

[17] Austin Ranney, "The Representativeness of Primary Electorates," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12 (May, 1968), 227–228.

[18] Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., "Washington's Popular Primary, "*Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, Vol. 19 (September, 1951), 146–147.

Defining cross-over voters as those who do not identify with the party in whose primary they cast ballots, all independents are cross-over voters as are all Democrats voting in the Republican primary and all Republicans voting in the Democratic primary.[20] In 1964, cross-over voters composed 24.6 per cent of the total primary electorate. In 1968, they were 23.2 per cent, and in 1972, 27.1 per cent.

In all three years there were vigorous Democratic presidential nomination contests, but no races or only nominal competition on the Republican side. Hence the tendency was for Republicans and independents to cross over into the Democratic primary, while Democrats remained in their own party column. Cross-over voters were therefore a greater percentage of the Democratic electorate than of the total. Table 1 shows the composition of both parties' primary electorates in 1964, 1968, and 1972. Cross-over voters accounted for a minimum of one-quarter of the Democratic electorate in 1964 and a maximum of one-third in 1972.[21]

The Consequences of Cross-Over Voting

The strongest objection to open primaries is that they permit one party's adherents to "raid" the opposition party primary. This was the apparent meaning of Mr. Seigel's heated insistence that they lead to "flagrant manipulation of democratic decision making . . ." But there is a difference between cross-over voting and raiding. The former "is a drifting across party lines in search of the excitement of a pitched primary battle. Raiding is an organized attempt on the part of one party to send its partisans into the primary of the other in order to foist the least attractive candidates on it.[22]

Although there is substantial crossing over, there is precious little evidence of raiding. In his analysis of cross-over voting in the 1968 Wisconsin presidential primary, Austin Ranney tabulated the reasons for crossing over given by the small sample ($N=38$) of voters who had done so. He concluded that "most of the crossovers temporarily deserted their party to register their special approval of a candidate, or a policy associated with a candidate, available only in the other party."[23] Similar reasons were given by the 37

Table 1. The Partisan Composition of Wisconsin Presidential Primary Electorates in 1964, 1968 and 1972

Voters' Party Identification	Party Primary											
	1964				1968				1972			
	Dem.		Rep.		Dem.		Rep.		Dem.		Rep.	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Democrat	137	74.1	10	14.1	142	71.7	4	3.7	136	66.3	9	7.3
Independent	18	9.7	5	7.0	22	11.1	11	10.2	23	11.2	11	8.9
Republican	30	16.2	56	78.9	34	17.2	93	86.1	46	22.4	104	83.9
	185	100.0	71	100.0	198	100.0	108	100.0	205	99.9	124	100.1

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[19] In one-party situations, the weaker party may have very few primary contests and its partisans may therefore cross over into the dominant party's primary without forgoing choices within their own party. This may explain the apparently high cross-over vote in earlier Wisconsin gubernatorial primaries. See Leon D. Epstein, *Politics in Wisconsin* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), pp. 35–40, 95–96. Also Frank J. Sorauf, *Party Politics in America*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972), p. 214.

[20] Survey respondents were divided by the standard seven-point scale. Independent Republicans and independent Democrats were classified as party affiliators, because it is probable that under the mildest form of party registration, in which the partisan declares his affiliation at the polls, they would be willing to volunteer a party identification in order to vote. Participating in the opposition party primary would, therefore, be cross-over voting for them.

[21] A survey of 382 voters as they left the polling places in 1972 set the composition of the Democratic primary at 73.3 per cent Democrats, 19.3 per cent Republicans, and 7.3 per cent independents. The poll, commissioned by *The New York Times* and conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Inc., was made available by the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Library. We attribute the difference between the one-third in our survey who reported crossing over and the one-quarter in the Yankelovich survey to the less reliable sampling technique used by the latter.

[22] Sorauf, p. 214.

[23] Ranney, "Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections," p. 35.

Table 2. Party Identification of Voters Casting Ballots for Leading Candidates in the 1964 and 1968 Wisconsin Democratic Presidential Primaries

Voters' Party Identification	1964						1968							
	Wallace		Reynolds		Total		McCarthy		Johnson		Others[a]		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Democrat	10	6.8	127	93.2	137	100.0	68	47.9	56	39.4	18	12.7	142	100.0
Cross-Overs	30	62.5	18	37.5	48	100.0	39	69.6	8	14.3	9	16.1	56	100.0
Independent	4	22.2	14	77.8	18	100.0	12	54.5	5	22.7	5	22.7	22	99.9
Republican	26	86.7	4	13.3	30	100.0	27	79.4	3	8.8	4	11.8	34	100.0

[a] Write-in votes for Hubert Humphrey, Robert Kennedy, and George Wallace.

per cent of respondents in the Washington survey who said they would cross over into the opposition primary when their own party's candidate, whom they intended to vote for in the general election, was unopposed. Thirty-four per cent indicated they would "vote for the best man in the other party to have two good men running in the general election." Only three per cent wanted to nominate the opposition's weakest contender in order to enhance their own party's prospects.[24]

The absence of raiding does not, of course, dispose of the McGovern-Fraser Commission's contention that cross-over voting might "dilute" the participation of Democrats in selecting delegates and ultimately presidential nominees. Only if cross-over voters favor competing candidates in the same proportions as Democratic participants can the Commission's position be dismissed. It is plain from the Wisconsin survey data that this is not the case.

Tables 2 and 3 show that the candidate preferences of cross-over voters are quite different from those of Democratic voters. Because of small numbers of respondents in some cells, independents and Republicans are reported together as well as separately in these tables. In 1964, Democrats gave 93.2 per cent of their ballots to Governor John Reynolds, President Johnson's stand-in. Cross-over voters, by contrast, preferred George Wallace by a margin of 62.5 per cent to 37.5 per cent. In 1968, Democratic voters gave Senator Eugene McCarthy a 47.9 per cent to 39.4 per cent edge over President Johnson. Cross-voters were far more emphatic in their preference for McCarthy, preferring him by a margin of 69.6 per cent to 14.3 per cent.[25]

In 1972, George Wallace was the main beneficiary of cross-over voting. He captured only 7.4 per cent of the Democratic ballots, but received 29 per cent of the cross-over vote. George McGovern, on the other hand, was disadvantaged by cross-over voting; he was supported by 51.5 per cent of Democrats, but only 33.3 per cent of cross-overs. Hubert Humphrey and Edmund Muskie polled about the same percentage among cross-over voters as among Democrats.[26]

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[24] Ogden, "Washington's Popular Primary," p. 147.

[25] Taking the unreliably small number of independents and Republicans separately in 1964 and 1968 shows that both groups voted differently from the Democrats. In 1964, independents gave a smaller majority to Reynolds than did Democrats, and Republicans supported Wallace. In 1968, both groups supported McCarthy more strongly than did Democrats, but again Republicans tended to be more dissimilar from the Democrats than were the independents.

[26] Taking the unreliably small number of indepedents and Republicans separately in 1972 shows that the similarity between the cross-over vote for Humphrey and Muskie and the Democratic vote for them was caused by aggregating their higher support among independents and lower support among Republicans.

Table 3. Party Identification of Voters Casting Ballots for Leading Candidates in the 1972 Wisconsin Presidential Primary

Voters' Identification	McGovern		Humphrey		Muskie		Wallace		Others[a]		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Democrat	70	51.5	22	16.2	14	10.3	10	7.4	20	14.7	136	100.1
Cross-Overs	23	33.3	11	15.9	7	10.1	20	29.0	8	11.6	69	99.9
Independent	5	21.7	7	30.4	4	17.4	5	21.7	2	8.7	23	99.9
Republican	18	39.1	4	8.7	3	6.5	15	32.6	6	13.0	46	99.9

[a] Votes cast for Shirley Chisholm, Edward Kennedy, Henry Jackson, John Lindsay, and scattered write-in candidates.

Table 4. General Election Voting by Cross-Over Voters in 1964 and 1972

	1964						1972							
	Goldwater		Johnson		Total		Nixon		McGovern		Schmitz		Total	
Voters	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Cross-Over Voters[a]	29	61.7	18	38.3	47	100.0	39	60.9	17	26.6	8	12.5	64	100.0
Independent	3	17.6	14	82.4	17	100.0	8	40.0	9	45.0	3	15.0	20	100.0
Republican	26	86.7	4	13.3	30	100.0	31	70.5	8	18.2	5	11.4	44	100.1
All Republican and Independent Voters	153	64.8	83	35.2	236	100.0	291	84.8	39	11.4	13	3.8	343	100.0
Independent	9	18.0	41	82.0	50	100.0	38	59.4	22	34.4	4	6.3	64	100.1
Republican	144	77.4	42	22.6	186	100.0	253	90.7	17	6.1	9	3.2	279	100.0

[a] Republicans and Independents who voted in the Democratic presidential primary. Does not include occasional Democratic cross-overs into the Republican presidential primaries.

In none of these three primaries did the participation of cross-over voters alter the statewide outcome. The candidates preferred by Democratic voters—Reynolds, McCarthy, and McGovern—won statewide majorities, despite the cross-over vote. This does not imply, however, that cross-over voting did not "dilute" the participation of Democratic voters. First, Wisconsin law requires that at least two-thirds of delegates must be chosen by congressional districts. Statewide survey data cannot tell whether the results in specific congressional districts, especially those with predominantly Republican electorates, might have been altered if only Democrats had participated.

The prospect that delegate outcomes will be altered by cross-over voting is further heightened by the new Democratic party rules requiring that "delegates . . . be chosen in a manner that fairly reflects the division of preferences expressed by those who participate in the presidential nominating process."[27] Tables 2 and 3 plainly demonstrate that the proportional preferences of Democratic and cross-over voters are sharply different, and the participation of cross-over voters will therefore alter the composition of national convention delegations. There always remains, of course, the possibility that in a close primary contest, the cross-over voters would tip the statewide vote against a candidate favored by the majority of Democratic voters.

Second, the primaries have effects quite distinct from allocating delegates. They affect the national standing of candidates. "A triumph in one state primary contest is apt to lead to a higher standing in public opinion polls. The winner of a primary is also likely to be given more attention in the mass media, by the party organizations and by the general electorate. In seeking commitments from other delegates, a candidate can use his primary victory to demonstrate his political appeal."[28] A strong primary showing is also helpful in wooing campaign workers and financial support. Because cross-over voters do not cast ballots in the same manner as Democratic voters, they distort the impression of candidates' relative strengths.[29] And they may therefore alter the decisions of Democratic voters, workers, contributors, and delegates in other states about which candidates to support.

Cross-Over Voters in the General Election

Proponents of the open primary sometimes argue that the participation of cross-over voters in the nomination process may encourage them to vote for the party's general election nominee.[30] The open primary is here seen as a recruitment process which expands the party's general election vote. Although the number of cross-over voters in the 1964 and 1972 survey samples was too small for definitive analysis, those data, presented in Table

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[27] Democratic National Committee, *Delegate Selection Rules for the 1976 Democratic National Convention* (Washington, 1975), Rule 11, p. 6.

[28] Gerald Pomper, *Nominating the President* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1966), p. 109. Also Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections*, 3rd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 131–133. Morris Udall put the point pungently when responding to a reporter's question whether he would enter the Wisconsin primary if the state's delegates would not be seated because the primary did not conform to Democratic party rules. "The whole early primary game is momentum and psychology . . . Even if it's not binding, even if it's a beauty contest, the Wisconsin primary is still important." *Wisconsin State Journal*, September 21, 1975, section 1, page 4.

[29] Crossing over may especially exaggerate the strength of incumbents or other well-known figures. Ogden and Bone, *Washington Politics*, p. 39. This may, of course, give these primary candidates a substantial psychological advantage as they enter the general election.

[30] "Open Primary A Must," *Madison Capital Times*, June 12, 1975, Editorial Page.

4, supply at best only mixed evidence to support this thesis.[31]

In 1964, cross-over voters supported President Johnson in the general election in only the same proportion as did all Republicans and independents casting November ballots. By contrast, cross-over voters were measurably more likely to support George McGovern in 1972 than were Republican and independent voters generally. Among that very small subset of cross-over respondents ($N=20$) who had supported McGovern in the primary, his general election support was, however, only slightly higher (30 per cent) than among all cross-over voters (26.6 per cent).

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this communication tends to confirm the factual assumptions underlying the Democratic party's rules preferring advance party registration of voters participating in delegate selection primaries. First, Wisconsin's open primary has permitted a heavy cross-over vote, ranging from a quarter to a third of the total Democratic electorate. Second, the candidate preferences of cross-over voters are markedly different from those of Democratic voters. This may alter the composition of the state's national convention delegation, especially under new rules emphasizing proportionality between primary voting for candidates and their share of state delegations. And, it may affect the perceived standing of candidates as their delegate search moves from Wisconsin to other states. In both ways the role of Democratic voters in the selection process may indeed be "diluted" by the open primary.

The counterproposition, advanced by opponents of the new rules, that cross-over primary voters are likely to support the party's general election nominee cannot be confirmed from the mixed evidence available for 1964 and 1972.

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[31] This analysis cannot be replicated for 1968. Because that year's survey was taken shortly after the primary, the general election choices of primary voters cannot be ascertained.

Julius Turner Revisited: Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in "Safe" Districts

TO THE EDITOR:

Basic to our American democracy is the notion of competitive elections: government by and for the people demands that voters be offered realistic alternatives at the polls.[1] Yet as students of elections know, the outcome of most contests for the United States House of Representatives is a foregone conclusion even before the polling booths have been opened on the Tuesday following the first Monday of November. It just might be, however, that voters were offered a true choice between candidates, and the representatives-elect were confronted by strong challengers, in primaries conducted in districts lacking keen party competition. If so, then perhaps there is an alternative method—primary competition— by which the people, in districts that are safely in the fold of one political party, can regularly take their representative to task.

The preceding thesis is, in baldest terms, the basis of Julius Turner's widely cited article, "Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in 'Safe' Districts," which was first published in 1953. "The purpose of this paper," Turner wrote, "is to examine the primary election in one-party areas (both within and outside the South) to discover whether it does provide for a competitive politics similar to that found in two-party areas."[2] Turner's conclusion that primary elections did not present "realistic alternatives in over three-quarters of the safe Congressional districts of the country . . . " as well as his pessimistic assertion that "we have not yet found a successful substitute for two-party competition"[3] have become staples of American electoral analysis.

Do Turner's findings for the 1944–1950 period *still* obtain? The present piece reports the principal findings of a replication and extension of Turner's seminal study. Data for the last decade—1964 through 1974—are presented and compared with Turner's findings for 1944–1950.[4]

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[1] "Democracy" is a term that has been assigned many different, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, meanings. In this paper, the notion of a competitive struggle of elites for the electorate's vote is stressed. A statement of this view of democracy is Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 269–273.

[2] Julius Turner, "Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in 'Safe' Districts," *Journal of Politics*, 15 (May, 1953), 197–210, at 198.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 210.

[4] All data for 1944–1950, except where specified, are from the tables and text of Turner's article. In some instances Turner's data have been manipulated. All election results for 1964 through 1972 are from Richard M. Scammon, ed., *America Votes*, vols. 6–10 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Governmental Affairs Institute, 1965–1974). The 1974 primary election results are from the appropriate number of *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*. *CQ Weekly Report*, 5 April 1975, pp. 716–723, is the source of 1974 general election returns.

Sections of the United States are defined as follows: *South*: Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., La., Miss., N.C., S.C., Tenn., Texas, Va.; *Northeast*: Conn., Del., Me., Mass., N.H., N.J., N.Y., Penn., R.I., Vt.; *Border*: Ky., Md., Mo., Okla., W.VA.; *Central*: Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ks., Mich., Minn., Neb., N.D., Ohio, S.D., Wisc.; *West*: Alaska, Ariz., Calif., Colo., Hawaii, Idaho, Mont., Nev., N.M., Ore., Utah, Wash., Wyo.

"Safe" Districts[5]

"The major conclusion to be drawn from analysis of Congressional general elections," Turner declared in 1953, "is that the one-party area is a problem for every section of the country, both metropolitan and rural, and is not limited to the South and a few states in the North. . . "[6] For the most part, this conclusion also summarizes the 1964–1974 data. There are important differences, however, between the two periods.

Outside the South, for every five elections won with 60 per cent or more of the total vote between 1944 and 1950, more than seven elections were likely to be this one-sided from 1964 through 1974. In the South, the frequency of party competition (as defined in note 5) was more than four times higher in the later period. This increase is, of course, a manifestation of the cracking of the "Solid Democratic South" by Republican House candidates.

Turner found that competitive elections occurred more often in metropolitan than in rural districts. In the last decade, elections in urban districts were the ones least likely to give rise to party competition.

Across the United States, the percentage of House elections in which the winner received at least 60 per cent of the votes cast, rose from 55.6 during 1944–1950 to 64.8 from 1964 through 1974.[7] This increase in the frequency of noncompetitive elections has been traced to greater incumbent strength at the polls.[8]

David Mayhew has argued that the decrease in the number of marginal House seats—those in which a disproportionately high number of partisan turnovers occur—has allowed the House to "become insulated from presidential and partisan electoral currents."[9] Yet the 1964 and 1974 general elections and the subsequent role of the Democratic freshmen who had just replaced Republican incumbents are illustration enough

Table 1. Number of House Elections Won with 60 Per Cent or More of Total Vote, Ten General Elections, 1944–1950, and 1964–1974 Compared, by Sections

1944–1950

Section	House Seats	1944	1946	1948	1950	Total	Per Cent
South	105	99	99	99	98	395	94.0
Northeast	121	56	65	46	57	224	46.3
Border	42	11	10	20	21	62	36.9
Central	118	50	63	36	58	207	43.9
West	49	19	22	21	17	79	40.3
All Sections	435	235	259	222	251	967	55.6

1964–1974

Section	House Seats[a]	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	Total	Per Cent
South	106	75	82	74	93	82	78	484	75.6
Northeast	109	63	62	70	67	71	64	397	61.5
Border	36	29	24	19	29	30	26	157	73.4
Central	115	42	68	76	73	75	54	388	56.9
West	69	35	45	46	50	50	39	265	61.9
All Sections	435	244	281	285	312	308	261	1691	64.8

Source: 1944–1950—Turner, p. 199, Table I except for Delaware (1944–1950), Connecticut (1944–1950), and Rhode Island (1944–1946) which are taken from the relevant volumes of the *Congressional Directory* and added to the Northeast. 1964–1974 see note 4.

[a] For 1972 and 1974, the number of House seats for each section was South–108, Northeast–105, Border–35, Central–111, and West–76.

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[5] Adopting Turner's usage, the term "safe district" is merely a shorthand for "a district in which the winner of the House election received 60 per cent or more of the total vote." An election in which the winner receives less than 60 per cent of the total vote is defined in this analysis as an election with party competition.

[6] Turner, p. 201.

[7] At least since 1896 most House election winners have received 60 per cent or more of the two-party vote. See Cortez A. M. Ewing, "Primaries as Real Elections," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, 29 (March, 1949), 293–298, and David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," *Polity*, 6 (Spring, 1974), 295–317.

[9] David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Representation: Theory and Practice in Drawing the Districts," in *Reapportionment in the 1970s*, ed. Nelson W. Polsby (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 249–285, at 268.

that the House is not, at least presently, impervious to all shifts in public sentiment.

The final opportunity for electoral competition for House seats is the general election. But it is not the first: "much of our politics is intraparty, not interparty politics."[10]

Close Primaries in "Safe" Districts

The nomination process is of most importance in districts lacking animated party competition. These are are the districts in which, as the saying goes, the primary is the real election. Have House primaries really offered the electorate realistic political alternatives in one-party districts? A preliminary answer to this inquiry can be arrived at by examining the nomination process of the party winning the November election in the safe districts identified above.

In order for a primary to be considered an alternative to party competition its outcome must be *uncertain* to the candidates and their backers. For our purposes, primaries in which the winner defeated his nearest challenger by "less than 2 to 1 are considered close contests, comparable to the contests in general elections in two-party areas."[11] Although arbitrary, this is a widely used cut-off point and one that pleases notions of what is electoral uncertainty in primary elections.

Twenty-two years ago, Julius Turner concluded that "the primary is not a successful alternative to two-party competition in most parts of the United States."[12] Once more his conclusion also holds for the last decade. Again, however, there are important differences between the two periods.

A drop-off in the proportion of safe districts with a close primary occurred in all sections of the nation, in all types of districts, and in districts both with and without entered incumbents. Southern states, Border states, nonurban districts, and districts with an entered incumbent showed the largest declines.

Republican North Dakota and Republican Vermont were the states in which the primary was the most effective substitute to party competition from 1944 through 1950. During 1964–1974, the primary was most effective in the Democratic cities of New York and Baltimore.

Across the nation, from 1944 through 1950, primaries supplied real competition in 22.2 per cent of the safe districts. In the last decade, only 9.1 per cent of those elected to the U.S. House from a safe district had to survive a close primary.

Table 2. Safe House Districts with Close Winning Party Primary, Ten Election Years, 1944–1950, and 1964–1974 Compared, by Sections

Section	Number of Safe Districts	Number of Safe Districts with Close Primaries[a]	Per Cent
	1944–1950		
South	395	118	29.9
Northeast[b]	222	29	13.1
Border	62	20	32.3
Central	207	36	17.4
West	79	11	13.9
All Sections	965	214	22.2
	1964–1974		
South	484	58	12.0
Northeast[c]	397	39	9.8
Border	157	14	8.9
Central	388	22	5.7
West	265	21	7.9
All Sections	1691	154	9.1

Source: 1944-1950 is equivalent to Turner, p. 204, Table III. For 1964-1974 see note 4.

[a] As previously defined, a close primary is one in which the winner failed to double the vote of his nearest rival. For districts in which both a regular and run-off primary were held, the closer of the two was used in the calculations.

[b] Delaware (one representative) and Connecticut (six) had no provision for House primaries during the 1944–1950 period. Rhode Island (two) had no provisions for House primaries for the 1944 and 1946 elections. Thus the two districts (out of 32) in which a House candidate received 60 per cent or more of the November election vote are excluded from further analysis in Tables 2, 3, and 4.

[c] Though Delaware had no provision for a House primary until 1970, its one representative did not receive 60 per cent or more of the vote in 1964, 1966, or 1968. There is thus no effect upon the number of safe districts analyzed.

Increased tenure in office is an obvious result of the decline in the frequency of competitive elections and of close primaries in safe districts. Longer average continuous service by House members is bound up with a heavy reliance on the criterion of committee seniority as a mechanism for distributing committee and subcommittee chairmanships, an increased stability of House leadership, the growth of the "congressional career," and, more generally, a rigidification of organizational patterns.

Incumbents were quite successful in gaining renomination in safe districts during both periods. In the minority of those quests for renomination in which they were forced into a contested primary, incumbents won consistently and usually by better than 2 to 1 over their nearest challenger. High success rates for incumbents and an increase in the

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[10] V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 435.

[11] Turner, "Primary Elections as the Alternative," p. 203.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 210.

Table 3. Primary Results in Safe Districts with Entered Incumbent, Ten Election Years, 1944–1950, and 1964–1974 Compared, by Sections

Section	Number of Safe Districts	Incumbent Lost		Incumbent Won		
		Close	Futile	Close	Futile	No Contest
			1944–1950			
South	371	21	2	78	103	167
Northeast	206	3	0	20	34	149
Border	57	3	0	13	23	18
Central	198	5	0	26	56	111
West	76	1	0	7	41	27
All Sections	908	33	2	144	257	472
			1964–1974[a]			
South	449	4	0	31	105	309
Northeast	374	6	0	21	84	263
Border	150	2	0	7	75	66
Central	366	1	1	11	71	282
West	253	2	0	14	68	169
All Sections	1592	15	1	84	403	1089

Source: 1944–1950—Turner, p. 208, Table V. For 1964–1974 see note 4. Incumbency status verified in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, and 1974, relevant numbers.

[a] Not included are 12 safe districts in which pairs of incumbents competed in the primary. Their distribution was South 2, Northeast 5, Border 1, Central 4, and West 0. All contest results were close except for the one in the Border section.

Table 4. Primary Results in Safe Districts without Entered Incumbent, Ten Election Years, 1944–1950, and 1964–1974 Compared, by Sections

Section	Number of Safe Districts	Close	Futile	No Contest
		1944–1950		
South	24	19	4	1
Northeast	16	6	3	7
Border	5	4	0	1
Central	9	5	3	1
West	3	3	0	0
All Sections	57	37	10	10
		1964–1974		
South	33	21	8	4
Northeast	18	7	6	5
Border	6	5	1	0
Central	18	6	6	6
West	12	5	4	3
All Sections	87	44	25	18

Source: 1944–1950—Turner, p. 209, Table VI. For 1964–1974 see note 4.

proportion of incumbents enjoying a comfortable margin of victory characterize House elections and primaries in safe districts over the last three decades.

Electoral Competition for the U.S. House

Voters may be offered realistic alternatives in the primary or the general election. Likewise, a House candidate may be defeated in either. Now considered are the proportion of House races with party and/or primary competition[13] and the ratio of competitive elections to close primaries in safe districts—a valid indicator of the relative importance of interparty and intraparty politics.

In all sections of the United States the proporportion of races for U.S. House seats with either party or primary competition was lower from 1964 to 1974 than during the 1944–1950 period. This decline was substantial in all regions of the nation except the South. In the South, however, the focus of electoral competition switched from the Democratic primary to the November general election—the ratio of competitive elections to close primaries in safe districts was 1 to 4.7 from 1944 to 1950 but was 2.7 to 1 from 1964 through 1974. This reshuffling of the focus of electoral competition, which bought the South into line

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[13] A House race consists of a nomination and an election. In this analysis, a nomination decided in a primary in which the winner defeated the next strongest candidate by less than 2 to 1 is considered a nomination with primary competition. As defined in note 5, an election in which the winner receives less than 60 per cent of the total vote is an election with party competition. A House race with either party or primary competition is termed a competitive race.

Table 5. Electoral Competition in House Races, Ten Election Years, 1944–1950, and 1964–1974 Compared, by Sections

Section	Years	House Races[a]	Elections Won with Less than 60 Per Cent of Total Vote	Safe Districts with a Close Primary	Percentage of Races Competitive[b]
South	1944–1950	420	25	118	34.0
	1964–1974	640	156	58	33.4
Northeast	1944–1950	484	260	29	59.7
	1964–1974	646	249	39	44.6
Border	1944–1950	168	106	20	75.0
	1964–1974	214	57	14	33.2
Central	1944–1950	472	265	36	63.8
	1964–1974	682	294	22	46.3
West	1944–1950	196	117	11	65.3
	1964–1974	428	163	21	43.0
All Sections	1944–1950	1740	773	214	56.7
	1964–1974	2610	919	154	41.1

Source: Tables 1 and 2.
[a] The number of races is the product of seats and general elections.
[b] See note 14.

with the pattern characteristic of all the other sections during both 1944–1950 and 1964–1974, is but another indicator of the "erosion of sectionalism."[14]

Across the nation, metropolitan races were more likely to be competitive than rural ones from 1944 to 1950. In the last decade, urban races were the ones least likely to be competitive.

From 1944 through 1950, 56.7 per cent of those elected to the United States House of Representatives were confronted with party and/or primary competition in their quest for House membership. In the last six election years, only 41.1 per cent ran similar risks.

The low proportion of House races in which voters are offered true political alternatives is a departure from a basic norm of our American democracy: competitive elections. Between the unattainable ideal of full competition and "the cases in which all competition with the established leader is prevented by force," Joseph Schumpeter has reminded us, "there is a continuous range of variation within which the democratic method of government shades off into the autocratic one by imperceptible steps."[15]

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Social Change and Political Mobilization in the United States: A Methodological Note

TO THE EDITOR:

In a recent issue of the *Review*, I advanced and tested a causal model of the process of political mobilization in the United States.[1] Since that time, I have come to realize that a more appropriate perspective on that data is available, and that a new method of generating the base correlations yields markedly improved results. This note describes that alternative method, and indicates that the model is appropriate as originally identified, but with an increase in explained variance of over 30 per cent when compared with the prior method. In addition, the data for the decade 1960–1970, are incorporated to update the model.

The previous paper treated each decennial census period as a sample. The magnitude of each variable for each state was treated as an observation. Averaged correlation matrices for several census periods were developed for analysis.

While this method does introduce an element of longitudinal analysis into the research, it is definitely not the nicest available procedure. An alternative is to treat each state as a sample. The magnitude of each variable at successive decennial periods is observed, and a correlation matrix is generated for each state. The process relationship between each of the variables is captured by this procedure, since we are conducting a truly longitudinal analysis. The next step is to average these matrices across states, which yields one averaged matrix with a reliability equivalent to the number of original observations less the degrees of freedom lost in averaging.

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[14] As in V. O. Key, Jr., "The Erosion of Sectionalism," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, 31 (Spring, 1955), 161–179.

[15] Schumpeter, p. 271. The comments of Milton C. Cummings, Jr., Alan J. Eade, Robert L. Peabody, Stephen V. Stephens, and two anonymous *Review* referees are gratefully acknowledged.

[1] Jesse F. Marquette, "Social Change and Political Mobilization in the United States: 1870–1960" *American Political Science Review*, 68 (September, 1974), 1058–1074.

Two problems arise when using this method, or in fact when conducting any longitudinal analysis. First it is necessary to identify the most appropriate functional form of the relationship between the variables, since they will not all be linear, and second, we must consider the problem of serial correlation. In Tables 1 and 2, the actual functional forms are given for each of the three link equations in the model. Since 48 states were included in the analysis, and there are three nontrivial regressions in the model, the possibility of auto-correlation existed for 144 separate relations. Of those 144 relations, only 14, or 9.7%, indicated a possibility of auto-correlation when subjected to the Durbin-Watson test.[2] This result is slightly misleading, since the available bounds for the Durbin-Watson test are calculated only to $N=14$. The probability is that an exact test would indicate no auto-correlation.

The correlations which are reported in this re-

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[2] J. Durbin and G. S. Watson, "Testing for Serial Correlation in Least Squares Regression II," *Biometrika*, 38 (June, 1951), 159–178.

Table 1. Analysis for the Averaged Matrices 1870–1960

Model and Link Correlations



Partials

Relation	Original r	r	Partial r	r^2	Proportional Reduction
IE.M	.9403	88.4%	.3168	10.0%	88.7%
MP.*E*	.8780	77.1%	.0711	.5%	99.4%
IP.ME	.8275	68.5%	.2161	4.7%	93.1%

Regression Analysis

$$I \xrightarrow{+.75\%} M \xrightarrow{+.09\%} E \xrightarrow{81.49\%} P$$

Relation	R	R^2	Direct Additional Variance
P.E	.9027	81.49%	81.49%
P.EM	.9032	81.58%	.09%
P.EMI	.9073	82.33%	.75%
E.M	.9635	92.83%	92.83%
E.MI	.9672	93.55%	.72%

Functional Forms

Relation	Equation
M on I	$M = a + b \log I + e$
E on M	$E = a + bM + e$
P on E	$P = a + b \log E + e$

Table 2. Analysis for the Averaged Matrices 1870–1970

Model and Link Correlations



Partials

Relation	Original	r^2	Partial r	r^2	Proportional Reduction in r^2
$IE.M$	.9553	91.3%	.3136	9.8%	89.3%
$MP.E$	.8670	75.2%	.1847	3.4%	95.5%
$IP.ME$	.8348	69.7%	.0906	.8%	98.9%

Regression Analysis

$$I \xrightarrow{+.07\%} M \xrightarrow{+.84\%} E \xrightarrow{75.46\%} P$$

Relation	R	R^2	Direct Additional Variance
$P.E$	.8687	75.46%	75.46%
$P.EM$	.8734	76.30%	.84%
$P.EMI$	.8738	76.37%	.07%
$E.M$	.9743	94.92%	94.92%
$E.MI$	.9768	95.42%	.50%

Functional Forms

Relation	Equation
M on I	$M = a + b \log I + e$
E on M	$E = a + bM + e$
P on E	$P = a + b \log E + e$

search are extremely high for social science data. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether or not the correlations are spurious. If two variables grow in magnitude through time, then it is likely that these variables will show a high degree of covariation. It is possible that the observed covariation is spurious, resulting simply from mutual growth. High correlations are not, therefore, *prima facie* evidence of a reliable causal relationship.

If, for good theoretical reasons, we expect high correlations between variables, and in addition expect a particular pattern of relations between variables, then we may use both expectations in conjunction as a source of mutual validation. If the expected *pattern* of correlations holds, that is if the expected model is identifiable, then the existence of the pattern may be used to justify the nonspuriousness of the high *magnitude* of the observed correlations. Further confirmation of the validity of these results is provided by the initial successful identification of the model using cross-sectional procedures.

Table 1 presents the model and analysis for the period 1870 to 1960 to allow comparison with the earlier results. Table 2 presents the updated version, 1870 to 1970, and also confirms the identified model.

Figures 1 a–c present a plot of the three link relations for the state of California from 1870 to



Figure 1. Plot of three link relations for the State of California: 1870–1970

1970, to illustrate that the high correlations are not due to outliers.

This analysis reconfirms the results presented in the earlier paper, but with very significant improvement in the level of explained variance. The success of this methodology suggests that it would be most appropriate for many other forms of comparative research that are currently relying on cross-sectional analysis.

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Development and Strategy in Latin America

To the Editor:

In the June 1975 issue of this *Review* Robert L. Ayres raises a number of very important questions about the benefits of the development strategy which has been pursued in Latin America in the postwar period. He argues that this strategy has not only failed to produce high growth rates; it has exacerbated and even created serious problems such as inequality, unemployment, and structural dependence. The solution, in his view, is a radically different approach to development: an approach "emphasizing distribution over growth and concentrating on policy measures designed to produce 'livable' rather than wealthy societies" (p. 507). At a time when the benefits of affluence or "growth for growth's sake" are being questioned by the North American public, it is likely that his views will be received sympathetically. However, certain difficulties should not pass unnoticed.

Perhaps the central weakness of Ayres's argument is logical. He convincingly argues that existing development policies have been unsuccessful for political reasons, yet he proceeds to propose a set of alternative policies without seriously considering the problem of implementation. While readers of the *APSR* may find a touch of utopian thinking refreshing, the utility of any specific policy prescription is obviously related to the question of feasibility. Ayres recognizes this when he evaluates the high-growth, high-investment strategy and rejects it on the grounds that "it is hard to see the political factors that account for the historically low rates of savings and investment in Latin America changing over the long run" (p. 516). I find it equally hard to see the political factors which have rendered existing redistribution policies ineffective (e.g., progressive income taxation and land reform) changing over the long run. To suggest that the emergence of "effective, developed polities" is a necessary condition for the policies of "livability" (p. 524) is merely to evade the central issue. Insofar as political realities render existing policies ineffective, they will have the same effect on Ayres's proposals.

Ayres's case for rejecting growth strategies in favor of distribution is also weak. To the extent that the issue is genuinely one of alternatives, one doubts that an emphasis on redistribution would create "livable" societies in impoverished countries such as Haiti or El Salvador. Even in relatively prosperous countries, an emphasis on redistribution at the expense of investment and growth produces rather dismal social and political consequences, as the case of Uruguay demonstrates all too clearly.

But more fundamentally, the relationship between distribution and growth depends on a variety of factors such as the distribution of power and wealth in a society, the organization of production, the level of economic development, the pattern of social mobility and the dispersal of income by factor shares, socioeconomic groups, occupations, geographical regions, and sectors of the economy. Ayres does a disservice by minimizing these complexities in order to present a dramatic choice between "livability" and wealth. It should be remembered that the Latin American nation which has had the most effective redistribution, namely Cuba, also has one of the highest rates of savings and national investment in economic growth. It is clear that the Cubans do not view redistribution as an alternative to growth, but as a political necessity for achieving higher growth.

Furthermore, import-substitution policies have not proved nearly as disastrous for redistribution as Ayres suggests. In Argentina import-substitution development has proceeded further than elsewhere in Latin America. On the basis of Ayres's analysis, one would thus expect the most unequal distribution of income in Latin America. In fact, however, the distribution of income in Argentina is not only one of the most egalitarian in the region; it is considerably more equal than in France, Canada, Ireland, Finland and Norway (C. L. Taylor and M. C. Hudson, eds., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2nd ed. [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972], pp. 263–64).

The difficulty in assessing distribution patterns is that everything depends on where one is looking. Economic growth can be associated with growing equality in one range of income distribution and growing inequality in another. Cross-national comparisons indicate that concentration of income tends to decrease with the level of economic development, because of the increase in income shares received by the middle range of the distribution (Nancy Baster, *Distribution of Income and Economic Growth: Concepts and Issues* [Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1970], pp. 19–33). The fragmentary evidence on longitudinal changes in Latin American income distribution suggests that the relative position of the top 5 per cent of the population has improved in countries with low growth rates and worsened in those with high growth rates (ECLA, *Income Distribution in Latin America* [New York: United Nations, 1971] pp. 51, 59, 68–69, 87–88). Since concentration of income in the top 5 per cent is the chief source of inequality in Latin America, this evidence indicates that if one looks at upper-class groups, there is a positive trade-off between growth and distribution. On the other hand, there is also evidence of a reduction in income shares received by the poorest 50 per cent of income units in Latin American countries with high growth rates (*ibid.*). This pattern is similar to that found in the U.S. where the share of income received by the poorest and wealthiest groups has tended to decline over time (Robert Girling, "Dependency and Persistent Income Inequality," in *The Structures of Dependency*, ed. Frank Bonilla and Robert Girling [Stanford, California: n.p. 1973], p. 96). Thus perhaps the issue is not so much the failure of existing policies in Latin America as it is the general framework of growth in a capitalist system.

In the last analysis it seems inappropriate to suggest from the pages of a prestigious North American journal that Latin Americans abandon growth as a basic goal and reconcile themselves to the status of permanent economic underdevelopment. As Latin Americans have become increasingly sensitive to the issue of *dependencia*, they will surely wonder whether this suggestion will meet their needs or those of U.S. corporations. Ayres asks, "Does Latin America need social scientists capable of analyzing the demographic correlates of municipal budgets using the IBM 360?" (p. 522). This type of capability is precisely what Latin Americans require to generate their own development policies designed to confront basic social and political problems and avoid the imposition of oversimplified models offered by North Americans.

KAREN L. REMMER
University of New Mexico

TO THE EDITOR:

Questions concerning the politics of poverty-oriented development strategies raise difficult and complex issues. Prof. Remmer seems to identify the central issue as "the general framework of growth in a capitalist system," and this is certainly in line with an increasingly prevalent view among Latin Americanists in the United States. Indeed, one might summarize reams of recent "theorizing" about Latin American politics in a few sentences. Thus: Latin American countries, Cuba excepted, are "dependent capitalist" states. They lack a growth-promoting "national bourgeoisie" because the most powerful political actors are closely tied to foreign capital and interests. They are thus structurally inhibited from pursuing poverty-oriented strategies because these would transform the status quo from which the elites derive benefit. In such political systems, policies designed to combat poverty would be mere palliatives at best and probably counterproductive. The only real solution lies in the revolutionary uprooting of the dependent capitalist system and its wholesale replacement by some variant of socialism.

This is obviously not the place to debate such controversial points. Briefly, I believe that so great an emphasis upon "the general framework of growth in a capitalist system" structures the analysis in a way which does not do justice to the complexities of politics in Latin American countries. Of course, much depends on what one means by "politics." I happen to be interested in mechanisms and strategies for producing change in "reformist" regimes, in populistic regimes, and even in corporatist-authoritarian ones. I am interested in these questions because of my general belief that the likelihood of additional revolutionary regimes in the proximate future of Latin America is nil and my further belief that not everything has to change before anything can change. If there is anything "impractical" at the moment, it would appear to be waiting for the revolution. In the present stage of my intellectual development. I agree with Robert A. Packenham that "the world is simply too complex and variegated to be satisfactorily ordered in terms of any of the extant total pictures"—including, I might add, the total picture of "the general framework of growth in a capitalist system." (Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973], p. 356.)

Having said this, I hasten to add that in my article I explicitly noted (p. 524) that "an equity-emphasizing Third World socialism may be the most fruitful in terms of compatibility" (with livability emphases). This may or may not be the case. But, failing the socialist alternative, it will not do to dismiss my policy prescriptions as merely "utopian." Among other things, this would place countries like South Korea and Taiwan in the category of utopias—hardly an apt classification. These and other countries have adopted many of the sorts of policies I recommend and have achieved greater equity (though not utopia) in so doing. Similarly, the poverty-oriented lending of the World Bank is perhaps inaccurately characterized if labeled utopian. I see nothing utopian, for example, in the Bank's recent $110 million loan for an integrated rural development project in Mexico. (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *World Bank Annual Report 1975* [Washington, D.C., 1975], p. 55.) It is no doubt true that there are formidable problems of implementation and that many of these problems are "political," but I do not think we can label the policies utopian on this ground alone. This sort of cavalier dismissal results in the neglect of many of the important events occurring in the field of contemporary international development. As I stated in my article (p. 524): "It will also be necessary to explore the politics of income redistribution, technological adaptation, or rural development from a comparative perspective." I am currently devoting a year's research leave to this and allied tasks, and my tentative conclusion is that their study suggests numerous fascinating and unlikely outcomes. Of course "the utility of any specific policy prescriptions is obviously related to the question of feasibility." Prof. Remmer apparently feels that I have exaggerated the feasibility of many policies. I feel that her orientation precludes even looking at things which I consider important.

Prof. Remmer further argues that "the relationship between distribution and growth depends on a variety of factors such as the distribution of power and wealth in a society, the organization of production, the level of economic development, the pattern of social mobility and the dispersal of income by factor shares, socioeconomic groups, occupations, geographical regions, and sectors of the economy." I think it is clear that writing on this potpourri of factors would have necessitated two or three books instead of one article. She maintains that "everything depends on where one is looking." I was looking at the relationship between distribution and growth, and this is by no means a misplaced emphasis. In the period since I wrote the article (mid-1972), much has been written on this topic. A popular conclusion is that "income inequality first increases and then decreases with development. . . . (T)he objectives of growth and equity may not be in conflict." (Hollis Chenery et al., *Redistribution With Growth* [London: Oxford University Press], p. 17.) This "have our cake and eat it too" answer may be accurate; I hope it is. Nevertheless, I remain somewhat skeptical. For the fact is that Cuba, to which Prof. Remmer refers in this connection, showed piddling growth rates from 1960 to 1970 in comparison with five other developing countries in a recent well-documented study. (*Ibid.*, p. 253.) Indeed, curiously enough, one of the principal conclusions of the study was that "*except for Cuba*, redistribution has been accompanied by significant growth. . . . " (*Ibid.*, p. 255. My italics.) I am not trying to minimize complexities at all; maybe the Cubans are.

Prof. Remmer's reference to Argentina is rather amusing since she commits precisely the error of which she accuses me. She omits, that is, any reference to *political* phenomena. One would not expect, on the basis of my analysis, Argentine income distribution to be the most unequal in Latin America unless one knew nothing of Peronism as a political movement and the economic policy emphases thereof. I spent much of 1974 conducting field research in Argentina, and I can assure Prof. Remmer that questions concerning possible tradeoffs between growth and distribution, the fate of small- and medium-scale industry, the future role of agriculture, the development of intermediate technology, and the export-inhibiting effects of import substitution are live issues of political and economic debate.

Finally, I should comment briefly on the last paragraph of Prof. Remmer's letter. In the first place, I did not recommend that Latin Americans *abandon* growth. I talked about a possible lowering of the *rate* of growth and about how high aggregate growth rates with reliance upon "trickle-down" distributive effects seemed increasingly ill-advised. It is a gross oversimplification of my arguments to suggest that I was only talking about the equal distribution of the current stock of bananas in Central America. Second, I am dismayed (but not at all surprised) by the questioning of the "appropriateness" of my article for publication in "a prestigious North American journal." In a liberal society, judgments concerning "appropriateness" are inordinately complex and generally resolved, for better or worse, in the market place of ideas. In other kinds of societies, including most in Latin America, such judgments are generally far easier to render. This is yet another unfortunate feature of their underdevelopment.

ROBERT L. AYRES

Guest Scholar
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D.C.

China and the Taiwan Question

TO THE EDITOR:

In his review of my book, *China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis*, (*American Political Science Review*, Vol. 69 [March, 1975], 363–364), Allen S. Whiting makes a number of unfair and ill-founded statements that deserve a rebuke. For example, Whiting castigated me for omitting Lung-chu Chen and Harold D. Lasswell's *Formosa, China and the United Nations* (1967) in the "Selected Bibliography." This is most unfair since Whiting himself acknowledged that the book is a "presently irrelevant tome"; if that is so, what is wrong with omitting it in a bibliography which is supposed to be selective? Also, Whiting failed, and apparently purposely, to acknowledge that I did include Lung-chu Chen and W. M. Reisman's "Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title?" (*Yale Law Journal*, 81 [March 1972]) in the selected bibliography. The article is more current and relevant to the Taiwan question since it represents the latest view of an advocate of the Taiwanese independence movement, while the earlier book is, as correctly pointed out by Whiting, now "irrelevant."

Whiting's simplistic interpretation of the impact of the February 1972 Sino-American communique on the legal status of Taiwan also needs clarification. According to Whiting, the issue of the legal status of Taiwan has been "overtaken" by the communique. However, senior U.S. foreign service officials denied that the communique represented any change in the position held by the U.S. since 1950, i.e., that the status of Taiwan is as yet undetermined (see the then Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green's view reported in *Mainichi Daily News*, March 29, 1972, p. 2). Furthermore, the U.S. commitment in the communique is: It does not challenge the position taken by "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait . . . [that] there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of

China." The communique does not legally prohibit the U.S. from changing its position if in the future the Chinese on one side of the Taiwan Strait change their mind on the status of Taiwan.

Finally, it must be pointed out that, except for an American contributor, Whiting made unfair statements on all Chinese contributors to my book and almost one half of the review was devoted to attacking Professor Wei, though he never spelled Wei's name correctly in the entire review, for which Professor Wei will respond in a separate letter.

HUNGDAH CHIU
University of Maryland Law School

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Allen Whiting's review of my chapter in Hungdah Chiu's book on *China and the Question of Taiwan* (*APSR*, March, 1975) is a typical example of a "non-review" in which the reviewer avoids a frontal attack on the approach, method, and data base of a work but indulges in skirmishes on the irrelevant. He offers two "comments," and only two, on my contribution. First, he asserts that I have "professional and personal ties" on Taiwan, therefore my writing on the island automatically "suffers." Second, he made the observation that my identification was "curiously omitted" from the biographical summaries in the back of the book, as if there is some unmentionable secrets.

The fact is: the biographical information on the contributors to Chiu's book was arranged alphabetically. My biographical data happened to be on the last page which, owing to an oversight of the publisher, was left out in the final binding process. Both the publisher and the editor wrote letters to me, expressing their regrets. As for the first "critique," if one accepts Whiting's argument that one's professional and personal ties with a country unavoidably weakens his writings about it, then few of the American scholars would be qualified to examine the problems relating to the United States and most of the immigré scholars would be disqualified to study the countries of their origin. And there would not be many left to examine the world's problems. How would Professor Whiting feel if one questions the quality of his writing on American foreign policy toward China or other areas merely because he has been in the U.S. foreign service and has had other governmental connections?

Finally, if Professor Whiting is seriously interested in reviewing my work, he should at least know how to spell my name correctly. He mentioned my name twice in the review—the first time, Yang Wei and the second time, Yan Wei—both times incorrectly. For readers who would like to see a more serious review of my writings, I would recommend the reviews on my work in *China Quarterly*, *American Journal of International Law* and in the book review section of *The Asian Students*.

YUNG WEI
Stanford University

TO THE EDITOR:

I am grateful to Professors Hungdah Chiu and Yung Wei for calling my attention to errors in my review of the book, *China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis*. I was remiss in not checking the galley proof more closely and I apologize for the misspelling of Professor Wei's first name. I appreciate learning that the omission of his identification was the fault of the publisher. Finally my interpretation of the Sino-American communique of February 1972 was more political than legal as Professor Chiu properly points out. The wording and nature of that document does not resolve the legal status of Taiwan once and for all.

I reject, however, the implications as well as the specific allegations in Professor Chiu's final paragraph. Professor Ting-yee Kuo's assertion that "Taiwan suffered the most" of all China under the Japanese is flatly and correctly contradicted by Professor Ramon Myer's essay which I quoted. If this is "unfair," so be it. Only two sentences and not "almost one half" of the review criticized Professor Wei's contribution. After living on Taiwan for ten months in 1974–75 I retain my original judgment concerning the constraints on native scholars in sensitive areas of political development there. But regardless of my review and whatever reactions it may have unintentionally aroused, my respect for Professor Wei remains high both on the basis of personal participation with him in academic conferences and his consistent dedication to the application of social science concepts and methods in the analysis of Taiwanese society.

Last and least, surely I have not "castigated" Professor Chiu by simple reference to the "curious omission" of a book from his bibliography.

ALLEN S. WHITING
University of Michigan

Stability of Partisan Attachments

TO THE EDITOR:

Douglas Dobson and Douglas St. Angelo's article in the *APSR*, June, 1975, proposes to test three hypotheses. Hypothesis One deals with stability of partisan attachments. The authors conclude that there are "rather clear patterns of variation in party attachments over time." This conclusion supports the conclusions of other scholars. However, even given that replication may be important, the article is misleading at this point.

The authors present a novel conceptualization of partisan stability which is then employed in testing a later hypothesis. Yet, the discussion of Hypothesis One ignores the operationalization used in the later section of the article. The data in this first part of the paper are presented so that an interested reader finds it impossible to construct anything like the "Change of Party Identification" variable which is employed later. If validation of the "Change of Party Identification" variable is a hidden purpose of this section, that purpose is never achieved.

The second hypothesis deals with the relationship between political information and vote switching. The "floating-voter hypothesis" posits an inverse relationship between media attention and vote switching. Dobson and St. Angelo conclude: "a reconsideration of the floating-voter hypothesis suggests that voters with low media involvement do not seem to be disproportionately represented among floaters. Rather, voters who switched their vote between elections modally tended to be in the higher involvement categories" (p. 489).

This could be an important finding. Yet, it is so flawed as to render questionable the rest of the research presented in the article. The question as stated by these authors and by their predecessors carries with it implications for democratic theory. The floating-voter hypothesis may be restated to say that those who are least involved have the most to do with electoral outcomes. Dobson and St. Angelo argue that this is not true. I wish that this conclusion had validity.

Dobson and St. Angelo base their conclusion on the observation that the modal percentage of floating voters is found toward the higher end of media involvement. Use of the mode as an indicator masks the fact that voters with stable voting patterns were more likely to be highly involved than were floaters. Using the authors' data, definitions, and approach, the following simple table (with $\chi^2 = 36.76$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$) can be constructed to show the relationship between vote stability and media involvement.

Level of Involvement	*Stable Voters*	*Floaters*
Low (0–2)	34%	52%
High (3–4)	66	48
N	653	349

Dobson and St. Angelo have seriously misled their readers by seeking to prove a hypothesis and no amount of obfuscation such as one finds in the following passage can correct the error.

> It must be noted that these results do not, however, deny the central thrust of both Converse's and Dreyer's analysis of the interelection hypothesis—i.e., that voting stability tends to increase with levels of involvement. Rather, it is simply being argued that increasing vote/vote stability as a function of level of involvement does not imply decreasing rates of floating as a function of involvement (p. 487).

Both voting stability and floating are functions of involvement and the point can be demonstrated rather easily. The first step is to look at how and why the question is asked. The Dobson and St. Angelo article is concerned with explaining the behavior of floating voters and shifting partisans. What if one were to change the question, and ask what the ramifications of media involvement are (as Dobson and St. Angelo did anyway in the disclaimer quoted above)? As the figure below indicates, there is a linear decrease in the probability of floating votes as media involvement increases among voters.

Finally, the reader comes to the meat of the article in Hypothesis Three: "the highly involved voter, who is likely to be more constrained in his partisan attitudes than are voters of low involvement, is more likely to alter his party attachment so that it is consonant with his current vote intention than are voters of low involvement" (p. 488). The authors find a linear relationship between change in party identification and vote switching for voters in the high media involvement category only.

The measure of change of party identification employed in testing Hypothesis Three may be highly misleading. Clearly, voters at the extremes cannot vary toward their party; they can only vary away from it. Independents (in any of the three categories) may vary toward or away from either of the parties to the extremities of the scale. How many of the changers in Figures 1 and 2 were 1956 independents and thus relatively unconstrained at the outset? The answer is not made available in the discussion of Hypothesis One where the 1956 and 1960 surveys are never directly compared.

Dobson and St. Angelo appear to have provided some basis for rejecting the hypothesis that voting and party identification are unaffected by current events (or at least their representation in the media). Voters who were highly involved with the media and who switched their vote between 1956 and 1960 behaved differently from uninvolved vote switchers. Yet the control variable, media attentiveness, has been shown to be a predictor of the dependent variable. Are Dobson and St. Angelo presenting a spurious relationship resulting from collinearity?

The authors' conclusion that "a completely random model of change of party attachment does not seem appropriate for the entire electorate" may be worthy of further investigation. Their hypothesis certainly could bring Converse's notion of "mass"

Figure 1

Increase in Media Attentativeness and Probability of Floating Votes (Voters only, $N = 1002$)



Regression Slope = −.09

	df	Chi-square
Total	4	38.06
Due to Regression	1	37.58
Due to Non-Linearity	3	.48

Key

———— Observed

– – – – – – Predicted Regression Line

(Data source: Dobson and St. Angelo, Table 6, page 488)

into question. But, putting questions about evidence and inference aside, neither this article nor its predecessors come to grips with Converse's hypothesis directly. Converse equates "mass" of stored information with partisan stability. No data are brought forward in the Dobson and St. Angelo article to suggest that this is incorrect. The article replicates Converse's assumption that "number of media attended" at time t is somehow an indicator of media attended at some previous time, $t-n$. Yet, Converse also observed that floating voters "show a high susceptibility to short-term change in partisan attitudes *provided that any new information reaches them at all.*" (*Elections and the Political Order*, p. 144, emphasis in original.) Dobson and St. Angelo could have tested this hypothesis. But all that we know about their "high information group" is that these voters were attentive to three or four media *in 1960*. This becomes more important when one takes account of the possibility that the party changers may disproportionately include voters from the independent categories—the voters who Converse hypothesized to be *least* constrained in their partisan attitudes.

A proper test would require that media attention be compared temporally in much the same manner as change in party identification is operationalized by Dobson and St. Angelo. Had this been done, the authors would have been able to differentiate between those who were regularly involved and those who somehow became involved in 1960. As is stands, the test and discussion of Hypothesis Three adds extremely little to the literature.

JAMES W. HOTTOIS

University of San Diego

TO THE EDITOR:

With an air of assured assertiveness, Professor Hottois takes our paper in the *APSR*, June, 1975, to task. He attacks our findings and methods and wishes that our findings had validity in order that he might have faith in liberal democracy. Hottois' opening attack is that our findings on partisan instability merely replicate the work of other scholars. We assume that our critic read the early sections of the paper, but we have been wrong before. To refresh his memory, we did indicate that Converse has touched on the question of partisan stability. Moreover, we noted that Dreyer examined partisan turnover in the 1956–60 SRC panel data, although he came to quite different conclusions than did Dobson and Meeter. Although we did not cite them, we are also aware that some popular writers and commercial survey organizations have drawn attention to shifting patterns in the marginal distributions of party attachment for the past five to seven years. We are not aware, however, that any of these commentaries or reports are based on panel data. If our findings are merely a restatement of established scholarly conclusions, Hottois could have done us all a favor by providing documentation for that point. In all fairness, we may on this point have misled some of our readers who are not familiar with the voting literature by saying on page 489 that our findings are in "agreement with other research." It would have been more accurate to have said that our findings are in agreement with some parts of some other more recent research.

We are next taken to task for our measure of partisan stability and change. Hottois complains that he cannot see the relationship between the conceptions of stability, interparty change and intraparty change utilized in the early part of the paper and the simple subtractive measure utilized to obtain a *numeraire* in the final portions of the paper. We can only assume that either Professor Hottois did not read the paper carefully or, alternatively, that he sat down at his typewriter without thinking about the problem. To spell it out for him, a reading of footnote 26 will suggest, for example, that 1956 Strong Democrats who were *stable* would have received a score of zero if their 1960 party identification was subtracted from their 1956 party identification. Strong Democrats who made an *intraparty* move would have been scored 1 or 2, while those who made an *interparty* move would have been scored 3 or more (but collapsed to 2 in the final analysis because of *N* problems). The process is similar for other categories of identifiers. Perhaps Hottois is objecting to the fact that the full 7 by 7 tables are not presented in the paper. If that is the problem, we apologize. The full tables were in the original draft, but many readers of the draft felt that they were too cumbersome and difficult to follow. We will be happy to provide Professor Hottois with the original tables.

Next, Hottois objects to our patently true conclusion that "In a modal sense, . . . floating voters exhibit relatively high levels of political involvement." It is true that stable voters are slightly more likely to be highly involved than unstable voters. But Professor Hottois chooses cutting points for high and low media attention in order to dramatize the point. If he had chosen 1 as the cutting point, for example, he would have found about 90% of the stable voters and about 80% of the floating voters to be highly involved. Clearly there is a negative relationship in this table. Stable voters tend to be the most highly involved and consistent nonvoters tend to be the least involved. It must be noted, however, that the differences between involvement levels among stable voters and switchers is rather small. Indeed, stable voters followed an average of 2.81 media while switchers followed an average of 2.51 media. One-time voters followed an average of 2.25 media while consistent nonvoters followed an average of 1.87 media. The interpretation that makes sense to us is the one which we articulated in the original paper, i.e., that vote stability increases with media involvement, that vote switching is not related to media attention, and that nonvoting tends to decrease with increased media attention. Although we would not press the point without further analysis, we would suggest that these relatively involved vote switchers might offer some comfort to Professor Hottois's rather shaky belief in liberal democracy.

In his next point, Professor Hottois again chooses to ignore the relationship between nonvoting and media involvement. He redefines the sample to include voters only and looks at the linear trend between media involvement and floating. Not surprisingly—since vote stability increases with media attention and that the proportions must sum to one—he finds a decreasing probability of floating as media involvement increases. If Hottois had examined all of the relationships in the table, he would have found that stability increases with involvement (slope = .14, significant at .05); that there is almost no relationship between switching and involvement (slope = −.003, not significant); that one-time nonvoting tends to decrease slightly with involvement (slope = −.04, significant at .05) and that consistent nonvoting decreases rapidly (albeit nonlinearly) with involvement (slope = −.09, regression is significant at .05, as are departures from nonlinearity).

Next, Hottois objects to the fact that the standard measure of party identification is finite. Presumably, he would have liked to see categories such as "very strong Democrat" or "very extra strong Democrat." There is, of course, something of an infinite regression problem here. But how is it that the boundedness of the partisanship measure affects the analysis? All Hottois says is that independents were relatively unconstrained in terms of the direction of their moves relative, that is, to strong partisans of both parties. That is a fairly obvious point, but what is the implication? If we could figure out what question Hottois was raising, we would try to answer it. Then his problem shifts to his difficulties in deducing how many of the "changers" were 1956 independents. Presumably he is talking about change in partisan identification and is again objecting to table formats, i.e., the fact that Table 4 is not a 7 by 7 by 7 table that would permit calculation of the 1956–turnover table. For the record, we note that about 36 per cent of the 1956 Independents remained so in 1960. About 35 per cent moved toward the Democratic party and about 28 per cent moved toward the Republican party. Relative stability

Level of Involvement	Stable Voters	Vote Switchers	Nonvoters in One Election	Consistent Nonvoters
0	1.2	2.1	5.4	13.4
1	8.4	14.2	16.9	24.1
2	23.8	29.0	36.7	32.6
3	41.0	39.3	28.9	21.3
4	25.5	15.3	12.0	8.4
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

and change rates were about the same in the 1956–60 period as in either of the other two-year periods. About 51 per cent of the sample made some kind of change between 1956 and 1960 (ignoring changes made in 1958). Of those who changed, about 13 per cent were independents. Overall, independents composed about 9 per cent of the total 1956 sample. That is not nearly as disproportionate as Hottois suggested.

Finally, we are criticized for not attempting to treat the dynamics of media attention. We agree with Professor Hottois that media attention should be treated as a dynamic variable, as should most of the other variables examined in voting studies. In fact, we have recently made some preliminary efforts along these lines. We have made at least enough effort to know that the test-retest correlation between media attention in 1956 and 1960 is an unimpressive .38 (tau-B); that there are some wording differences between the questions in 1956 and 1960; that the 1958 study contained no questions regarding media attention, and that the percentage of homes with televisions increased from 73 per cent in 1956 to 89.4 per cent in 1960. We also know that when one tries to treat vote change, change of party identication and change in level of media attention simultaneously, frequencies on the order of zero show up with disturbing regularity. Handling these and other problems relating to dynamic formulations of the electoral process creates a difficult design problem. We have not solved that problem, nor has Hottois, but apart from this we remain convinced that our findings and procedures are sound.

DOUGLAS DOBSON
Northern Illinois University
DOUGLAS ST. ANGELO
Florida State University

More on Political Violence

TO THE EDITOR:

I have no wish to prolong the exchange with Jeffrie Murphy on my *Political Violence & Civil Disobedience* (*APSR*, June, 1975). However, Murphy's attribution of words to me which I never wrote strikes me as unethical and demands correction.

Murphy writes, referring to my views, "it simply will not do to haul out some nineteenth-century clichés (e.g., Bentham's famous claim that talk of natural rights is 'nonsense on stilts')". Murphy clearly suggests that I quoted Bentham or other "nineteenth-century cliches." I did neither. Further: "On p. 15 van den Haag asserts that Hobbes rules out 'any qualification' on [sic] the obligation to obey the law"; and since "Hobbes allows self-preservation to function as a qualification," my "claim is clearly false." But I did not write on p. 15 of *Political Violence & Civil Disobedience* or anywhere else what Murphy "quotes." There is a footnote which does not refer to self-preservation, but, unequivocally, to "any qualification" of "the general moral obligation to obey laws" which, I point out, Hobbes rejects. If Murphy is as "aware that self-preservation is different from civil disobedience" as he claims to be, how can he believe self-preservation qualifies the general moral obligation to obey laws as only a contrary moral obligation could? (Civil disobedience rests on such contrary moral obligations, while draft dodging rests on self-preservation.)

I asserted nothing about Herman Melville's views, although Murphy says I did. To prove as much, Murphy now offers a dictionary definition of "affirm" (a synonym for "assert"), and concludes that one is "justified in attributing to a man a view he has asserted to be true." Since I wrote Melville "affirmed in the novel," I attributed the asserted view to Melville, according to Murphy. But I wrote—and Murphy (wisely perhaps, but not accurately) now omits—"in the novel." One is not justified in attributing to an author a view affirmed or asserted to be true *in a novel*, and I did not. Murphy goes on to describe the dilemma Melville deals with, suggesting that I did not realize that he dealt with one. Since my whole essay is concerned with this dilemma, described as such, there is no basis for Murphy's claim.

I could go on. But I think I have said enough to support my original contention that Murphy's review was "captious"; I must now add that his rejoinder is deceptive.

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Editorial Comment

In Transition. Owing to the sizeable backlog of accepted, but unpublished articles, there is a transition period in which the affairs of the *Review*, while not exactly in limbo, are conducted in two locations. Charles O. Jones, Manging Editor Elect, since January 1 of this year has been responsible for the evaluation of all new manuscripts, and for the contents of all issues starting with the issue of December, 1977. The orderly publication of all issues until then remains the responsibility of the current Managing Editor. Both new and old managing editors attend meetings of the Council of the Association, but only the current incumbent votes. Persons having business with the *Review* can address either editor, and he will pass the buck or pocket it, or refund it, as circumstances appear to dictate. New management and old alike guarantee a square deal all around, the customer always right our usual 12.5 per cent of the time.

A New Broom (continued). Starting with the issue of December, 1977, at the same time Charles O. Jones becomes Managing Editor, the Book Review section of the *Review* will change management as well. Paul Allen Beck and Robert S. Walters, both Associate Professors of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, will become Book Review Editors, succeeding Philip Siegelman. Effective immediately, all books for review should be sent to Professors Beck and Walters at the Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260.

Professor Beck has written articles on partisan realignment and political socialization, and Professor Walters, with David Blake, has just completed a book entitled *The Politics of International Economic Relations*. They intend to create an Advisory Panel which will be asked to assist them in selecting books for review and identifying subjects for review essays.

Articles Accepted for Future Publication

Joel D. Aberbach, University of Michigan, "Power Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis"

C. Arnold Anderson, University of Chicago, "Conceptual Framework for Political Socialization in Developing Societies"

John M. Bacheller, Kirkland College, "Lobbyists and the Legislative Process: The Impact of Environmental Constraints"

Richard M. Bank, University of California, Santa Barbara and Steven R. McCarl, University of Denver, " 'Virtue, Obligation and Politics' Revisited"

Paul Allen Beck, University of Pittsburgh, "Partisan Dealignment in the Post-War South"

Robert A. Bernstein, Texas A&M University, "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U.S. Senate Races, 1956–1972"

Paul R. Brass, University of Washington, "Party Systems and Government Stability in the Indian States"

Steven R. Brown, Kent State University, "Toward An Experimental Analysis of Political Literature"

Charles D. Cary, University of Iowa, "A Technique of Computer Content Analysis of Transliterated Russian Language Textual Materials: A Research Note"

Clarke E. Cochran, Texas Tech University, "Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves Simon, and Michael Polanyi"

Neal E. Culter, University of Southern California, "Demographic, Social Psychological, and Political Factors in the Politics of Age: A Call for Research in Political Gerontology"

Barbara Deckard, University of California, Riverside, "Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda—The House of Representatives, 1925–1938"

Shaheen F. Dil, Princeton University, "The Cabal in Kabul: Great Power Interaction in Afghanistan

Lowell Dittmer, State University of New York, Buffalo, "Thought Reform and the Cultural Revolution: An Analysis of the Symbolism of Chinese Polemics"

Robert Eyestone, University of Minnesota, "Confusion, Diffusion and Innovation"

Norman I. Fainstein, Columbia University and Susan S. Fainstein, Rutgers University, "The Future of Community Control"

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester, "Congressmen in Their Constituencies: An Exploration"

John A. Ferejohn. California Institute of Technology. "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections"

Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey Smith and Oran R. Young, University of Texas at Austin, "A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting"

Dante Germino, University of Virginia, "Eric Voegelin's Framework for Political Evaluation in His Recently Published Work"

John V. Gillespie, Diana A. Zinnes, Philip A. Schrodt, G. S. Tahim and Richard Rubinson, Indiana University, "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races"

R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard, Oregon State University, "Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government"

Robert T. Golembiewski, University of Georgia, "A Critique of 'Democratic Administration' and Its Supporting Ideation"

George D. Greenberg, Jeffrey A. Miller, Lawrence B. Mohr and Bruce C. Vladeck, University of Michigan, "Developing Public Policy Theory: Perspectives from Empirical Research"

Robert W. Jackman, Michigan State University, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World"

Bryan D. Jones, Saadia Greenberg, Joseph Drew, and Clifford Kaufman, Wayne State University, "Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit"

Russell Hardin, University of Pennsylvania, "Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition"

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies"

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy"

M. Kent Jennings and Gregory B. Markus, University of Michigan, "The Effect of Military Service on Political Attitudes: A Panel Study"

Sam Kernell, University of Minnesota, "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Mid-Term Congressional Decline of the President's Party"

Arthur J. Lerman, St. John's University, "National Elite and Local Politician in Taiwan"

Michael S. Lewis-Beck, University of Iowa, "The Relative Importance of Socioeconomic and Political Variables for Public Policy"

Michael Margolis, University of Pittsburgh, "From Confusion to Confusion—Issues and the American Voter (1956–1972)"

Richard D. McKelvey. Carnegie Mellon University and John H. Aldrich, Michigan State University, "A Method of Scaling, With Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections"

Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria"

R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, University of Lancaster. "The Political, Military, and Economic Performance of Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems: A Cross-National Aggregate Study"

J. Miller McPherson, Susan Welch, University of Nebraska, and Cal Clark, New Mexico State University, "The Stability and Reliability of Political Efficacy: Using Path Analysis to Test Alternative Models"

Paul E. Meehl, University of Minnesota, "The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument"

Abraham H. Miller, Louis H. Bolce and Mark Halligan, University of Cincinnati, "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory Using Both Objective and Perceptual Indicators"

Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown, University of Michigan, "A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election"

Edward N. Muller, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support"

Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "On the Meaning of Political Support"

Garrison Nelson, University of Vermont, "Partisan Patterns of House Leadership Change, 1789–1976"

Helmut Norpoth, University of Cologne, "Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes"

Thomas C. Nowak, Waynesburg College and Kay A. Snyder, Michigan State University, "Politics and Administration: The Philippines Before Martial Law"

Karen Orren, University of California, Los Angeles, "Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts"

Benjamin I. Page, University of Chicago, "The Theory of Political Ambiguity"

Thomas L. Pangle, Yale University, "The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*"

James L. Perry, University of California, Irvine and Charles H. Levine, Syracuse University, "An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining"

James H. Qualls, The Johns Hopkins University, "Barber's Typological Analysis of Political Leaders"

David Resnick, Cornell University, "Crude Communism and Revolution"

Neil R. Richardson, University of Texas at Austin, "Political Compliance and U. S. Trade Dominance"

Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University, and Subrata K. Sen, University of Rochester, "Spatial Voting Models for the French Fifth Republic"

Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and John G. Peters, University of Nebraska, "Corrupt Politicians and their Electoral Support: Some Theoretical and Experimental Observations"

Lester M. Salamon, Duke University, and John J. Siegfried, Vanderbilt University, "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy"

Lars Schoultz, Miami University, "The Socioeconomic Determinants of Popular-Authoritarian Electoral Behavior: The Case of Peronism"

Thomas Schwartz, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading"

Donald D. Searing, University of North Carolina, "Measuring Politicians' Values: Administration and Assessment of a Ranking Technique in the British House of Commons"

Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, "A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences"

Peter J. Steinberger, University of California, Riverside, "Hegel as a Social Scientist"

J. Weinberger, Michigan State University, "Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of *The New Atlantis*"

Fred H. Willhoite, Jr., Coe College, "Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective"

Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Florida Atlantic University, "Contextual Models of Electoral Behavior The Southern Wallace Vote"

Marvin Zetterbaum, University of California, Davis, "Equality and Human Need"

"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954

A Review Essay*

GEOFFREY S. SMITH
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Thirty years have passed since Harry S. Truman succeeded Franklin Roosevelt as President. Although the Missourian's place in history is impossible to pinpoint at this juncture, one thing is certain: The Truman who appears in the pages of recent books by revisionist historians would not be recognizable to those persons who knew him well. Their response, after reading New Left assessments of his foreign and domestic policies, might well be, "Harry, we hardly know you."[1]

During the 1950s, liberal historians depicted Truman in glowing terms. A compromise vice-president who assumed the presidency with little preparation, the "man from Missouri" overcame his inexperience, forcefully countered Soviet aggression, and extended Rooseveltian liberalism under the aegis of the Fair Deal. In 1948 he achieved an unexpected victory over Thomas E. Dewey of New York, only to fall victim to the Korean War and McCarthyism. Truman's foreign policy successes dominate this favorable interpretation. The doctrine that bears his name, the Marshall Plan, Point IV, and the establishment of NATO all contributed to his ranking as "near great" in Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger's 1962 poll, and as one of America's eleven greatest Presidents.[2] Similar notes of approval flavored Cabell Phillips's account of *The Truman Presidency*, Eric Goldman's narrative of *The Crucial Decade*, and, more recently, Merle Miller's *Plain Speaking*, William S. White's *The Responsibles*, and Alonzo Hamby's *Beyond the New Deal.*[3] All of these works emphasize Truman's achievements in meeting challenges posed by postwar transformations in American society and by the new, bipolar system of international relations.

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* *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946.* Edited and with an Introduction by John Morton Blum. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973. Pp. 707. $15.00.)
The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948. By Richard M. Freeland (New York: Knopf, 1972. Pp. 419. $10.00.)
The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947. By John Lewis Gaddis. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. Pp. 361. $12.50. $3.95.)
The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate. By Robert Griffith. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1970. Pp. 362. $8.50.)
The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism. Edited and with an Introduction by Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis. (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974. Pp. 368. $4.65.)
Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism. By Alonzo L. Hamby. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. Pp. 635. $12.95.)
The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952. By Alan D. Harper. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corp., 1969. Pp. 318. $13.00.)
Truman and the 80th Congress. By Susan M. Hartmann. (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1971. Pp. 241. $9.00.)
Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War. By George C. Herring, Jr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. Pp. 365. $15.00.)
The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972. Edited and with an Introduction by Richard S. Kirkendall. (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1974. Pp. 246. $10.00.)
The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War. By Robert J. Maddox. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. Pp. 169. $7.95.)
The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941–1948. By Norman D. Markowitz. (New York: Free Press, 1973. Pp. 361. $8.95.)
The Anti-Communist Impulse. By Michael Parenti. (New York: Random House, 1969, Pp. 333. $7.95.)
Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War. By Thomas G. Paterson. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1973. Pp. 287. $12.00.)
Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft. By James T. Patterson. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. Pp. 749. $12.50.)
After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War. By Lisle A. Rose. (New York: Scribner's, 1973. Pp. 216. $7.95.)
Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965. By Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier. (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1970. Pp. 268. $8.95.)
New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists. By Joseph M. Siracusa. (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1973. Pp. 138. $6.95.)
Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism. By Athan Theoharis. (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971. Pp. 238. $6.95.)
The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955. By Athan Theoharis. (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1970. Pp. 263. $10.00.)
Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism. By Allen Yarnell. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. Pp. 155, $8.95.)

[1] With apologies, of course, to Kenneth P. O'Donnell and David F. Powers with Joe McCarthy, *"Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye": Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972).

But Truman's favorable reputation did not withstand the tremors of the 1960s. The easing of Soviet-American tension, the apparent bankruptcy of liberal solutions to a host of domestic problems, and the nation's involvement in Vietnam contributed to a climate of disillusionment similar to that which generated historical revisionism during the 1920s and 1930s and the early Cold War era itself.[4] Historians began to analyze postwar developments in less favorable terms. Rather than the champion of liberalism and defender of the "free world," as he earlier appeared, Truman struck revisionists as ill-qualified for office and incapable of providing aggressive, progressive leadership.[5] According to Barton Bernstein, the liberal premises upon which Truman constructed his Fair Deal actually strengthened the fetters of the past and prevented the Chief Executive from enacting a humane program of national and international reform. Even had the Korean War never occurred, and even had Truman achieved his Fair Deal goals, the administration would not have been able to solve basic problems facing American society.[6]

Athan Theoharis, another revisionist, concurs. Allowing that Truman's intentions were noble, Theoharis laments the narrowness of his vision, arguing that in the absence of effective presidential leadership a reactionary Congress regained the initiative, thereby precluding the resolution of basic problems and the consideration of other options. Theoharis finds that Truman's foreign policy and internal security decisions "helped to legitimate conservatism and undermine reform." In a very real sense Truman "became a victim of his rhetoric, elitism, and partisanship and not simply of war-created hysteria or a frustrated public seeking scapegoats."[7]

The Cold War Debate: Toward A New Synthesis

The domestic revisionism of the past decade is inextricably tied to similar developments in the historiography of postwar American foreign relations, more specifically to the emergence of a serious challenge to orthodox interpretations of the origins and development of the Cold War.[8]

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[2] Arthur M. Schlesinger, "Our Presidents: A Rating by 75 Historians," *New York Times Magazine*, July 29, 1962, pp. 10–14; Richard S. Kirkendall, "Harry Truman," in *America's Eleven Greatest Presidents*, ed. Morton Borden (Chicago: Rand NcNally, 1971), pp. 255–88. The "rating game" is challenged in Thomas A. Bailey, *Presidential Greatness: The Image and the Man from George Washington to the Present* (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1966).

[3] Cabell Phillips, *The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession* (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Eric F. Goldman, *The Crucial Decade and After: America, 1945–1960* (New York: Knopf, 1960); Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1973); William S. White, *The Responsibles* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Alonzo L. Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973). See also Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), pp. 171–78; Irwin Ross, *The Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948* (New York: New American Library, 1968); and Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman* (New York: Morrow, 1973).

[4] On earlier revisionism, see Warren I. Cohen, *The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 309–32; and Justus D. Doenecke, *The Literature of Isolationism: A Guide to Non-Interventionist Scholarship, 1930–1972* (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1972).

[5] Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), pp. 55–83; Barton J. Bernstein, ed., *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970); Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971); Bert Cochran, *Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1973); Howard Zinn, *Postwar America, 1945–1971* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973); Jerome M. Milieur, ed., *The Liberal Tradition in Crisis: American Politics in the Sixties* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1974).

[6] Barton J. Bernstein, "America in War and Peace: The Test of Liberalism," in *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History*, ed. B. J. Bernstein (New York: Pantheon, 1968), pp. 289–321. See also Bernstein, "The Presidency Under Truman," *Yale Political Review*, 4 (Fall, 1964), 8f.

[7] Athan Theoharis, "The Truman Presidency: Trial and Error," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, 55 (Autumn, 1971), 49–58 at p. 58.

[8] "Orthodox" accounts include Dexter Perkins, *The American Approach to Foreign Policy*, rev. ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1972); John W. Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 4th rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1971); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Russian

Early critiques questioning whether the Soviet Union deserved full blame for the conflict came from "realists" like Walter Lippmann and Hans Morgenthau, who contended that Soviet challenges to American interests manifested peculiarly *Russian*, not *Communist* ambitions. Lippmann and Morgenthau warned that the United States would in fact risk escalating the Cold War by insisting upon opposing communism in areas not vital to national security.[9]

A more radically revisionist position emerged in the writings of William Appleman Williams. In *The Contours of American History*, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, and *The Roots of the Modern American Empire*, Williams argued that since the 1880s American diplomacy functioned to meet the requirements of America's capitalist socioeconomic system. According to this interpretation, the nation's policy makers have been rational and calculating in seeking to establish an international environment (an "open door") that would promote commercial penetration and business expansion. In the 1960s revisionist historians applied this thesis to the Cold War era, which they deemed the most recent and most ambitious period of American imperialism. Such writers as Bernstein, David Horowitz, Lloyd Gardner, Gar Alperovitz, and Gabriel Kolko contended that the origins of the Cold War lay not with the expansive thrust of Soviet communism, but with the requirements of the American domestic order. These writers depicted Josef Stalin as a cautious nationalist, concerned not with initiating global revolution but with protecting Russia's historic interests. Stalin's desire to establish Soviet power in Eastern Europe impressed most revisionists as a natural extension of historic Russian policy. The area had always been unstable, and it possessed as strategic an importance as a gateway to Russia as Gibraltar did to the Mediterranean.[10]

Yet while revisionists agree that the Truman Administration initiated the Cold War by confronting Soviet power in Eastern Europe, they differ markedly in defining responsibility for Washington's offensive policies. Moderate revisionists echo the complaints of Progressives like Henry Wallace and Rexford Guy Tugwell by stressing Truman's alleged departure from the statesmanlike policies designed by Roosevelt to secure postwar harmony.[11] The more radical historians, meanwhile, reject entirely the notion of individual responsibility for the onset and development of the Cold War. In *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954*, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko argue that the foreign policies of both FDR and Truman inevitably served the structural requirements of American capitalism. Institutional dynamics during and after World War II resulted in the rational objective of restructuring the world "so that American business could trade, operate, and profit without restrictions everywhere."[12] Truman's failure lay in his inability to comprehend the political necessities of such a goal. Throughout his administration he not only battled for power with the Soviets, but more important, sought consciously to crush the world-wide forces of "the Left" by manipulating great economic and social transformations occurring throughout the Third World. Despite their rigid ideological framework, turgid and repetitive prose, and failure to define precisely some important terms, the Kolkos impressed many colleagues with the depth of their research, thorough analysis of important topics, and provocative discussion of the background of the Truman Doctrine and of shortcomings in American policy before and during the Korean War.[13]

But the revisionism of the late 1960s and early 1970s did not go unchallenged. The accusation that Washington policy makers utilized their economic power ruthlessly and unceasingly after 1945 injected new life and new stridency into the debate. The premises, the conclusions, and in some instances, the scholarship of revisionist writers drew criticism from many quarters. Rejoinders

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Revolution—Fifty Years After: Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, 46 (October, 1967), 25–52.

[9] Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1947); Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Knopf, 1952).

[10] For overviews, see Thomas A. Bryson, "The Concept of Empire in American Diplomatic History," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations *Newsletter*, 4 (December, 1973), 7–19; and Thomas J. Noer, "The Changing Concept of Containment," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations *Newsletter*, 5 (September, 1974), 4–14. Representative titles include David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1965); Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (New York: Random House, 1968); Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose* (Boston: Beacon, 1969).

[11] See Rexford G. Tugwell, *Off Course: From Truman to Nixon* (New York: Praeger, 1971); Henry A. Wallace, *Towards World Peace* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948).

[12] Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 2.

[13] See, for example, Gaddis Smith's review of *The Limits of Power* in *The New York Times Book Review*, February 27, 1972, p. 31, and Warren F. Kimball's insightful review essay, "The Cold War Warmed Over," *American Historical Review*, 79 (October, 1974), 1119–36.

dwelled upon the sources of revisionist historiography, suggesting, for example, its theoretical similarity to right-wing attitudes on foreign policy, the extent to which the New Left's commitment to restructuring society necessitated the development of a "usable past," and the importance of external events in shaping intellectual attitudes.[14] But through many of these assessments there coursed a combativeness that appeared to divert the attention of historians from the validity of revisionist conclusions to social and psychological explanations of why revisionist accounts were written at all.

Robert J. Maddox's *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* belongs in this latter category. Maddox argues that "an examination of the *manner* in which new interpretations are reached ought to precede dialogues over the interpretations themselves."[15] But this good idea is vitiated by an intemperateness reminiscent of Robert E. Brown's condemnation of Charles A. Beard's *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.*[16] Maddox checks footnotes and impugns the scholarship of seven writers who offer revisionist interpretations of important wartime and postwar Soviet-American disputes.[17] These issues include the Polish boundary and provisional government, the occupation zones of Germany and reparations, and the relationship between America's possession of the atomic bomb and Russia's decision to enter the campaign against Japan. Maddox also explores revisionist assessments of Washington's decision to terminate Lend-lease, the possibility of a Soviet loan, and the significance of Truman's stormy meeting on April 23, 1945, with Soviet Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov. And Maddox discovers that the revisionists have based some of their conclusions on incomplete or distorted evidence, that some writers have taken quotations out of context, and that revisionist works are marred by many factual errors.

Despite Maddox's claim to objectivity, his book fails to clarify the complex factors that generated and escalated the Cold War. What he has done is to inject gratuitously ideology and *ad hominem* arguments into his analysis. Although he distinguishes between "hard" and "soft" revisionists, he does not apply this yardstick in any systematic way. Consequently readers are left with the impression that there are no differences between Horowitz, D. F. Fleming, and Kolko, and that Williams's *Tragedy* and Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy* still occupy the vanguard of revisionist scholarship. Nor has Maddox noted differences of opinion within New Left circles on several key issues.[18] His book also fails to recognize that some students of postwar foreign and domestic policy have utilized both traditional and revisionist hypotheses to fashion eclectic interpretations.[19]

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[14] The review literature is voluminous and often testy. The most helpful analyses include Ole R. Holsti, "The Study of International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Theories of the Radical Right and the Radical Left," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March, 1974), 217–42; Charles S. Maier, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins," *Perspectives in American History*, 4 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 313–47; Henry Pachter, "Revisionist Historians and the Cold War," *Dissent*, 15 (November–December, 1968), 505–18; Walter Lacquer, "Rewriting History," *Commentary*, 55 (March, 1973), 53–69; J. L. Richardson, "Cold-War Revisionism: A Critique," *World Politics*, 24 (July, 1972), 579–612; Daniel M. Smith. "The New Left and the Cold War," *Denver Quarterly*, 4 (Winter, 1970), 77–88; William W. MacDonald, "The Revisionist Cold War Historians," *Midwest Quarterly*, 11 (1969), 37–49; Norman A. Graebner, "Cold War Origins and the Continuing Debate," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13 (March, 1969), 123–32; Irwin Unger, "The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends in United States Historiography," *American Historical Review*, 77 (July, 1967), 1237–63; J. A. Thompson, "William Appleman Williams and the 'American Empire'," *Journal of American Studies*, 7 (1973), 91–104; Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971); Robert D. Schulzinger, "Moderation in Pursuit of Truth is No Virtue; Extremism in Defense of Moderation is a Vice," *American Quarterly*, 27 (May, 1975), 222–36. See also comments by Robert Ferrell, Richard W. Leopold, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in *Interpreting American History: Conversations with Historians*, ed. John A. Garraty, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1970), II, 220–21, 244–45, 268–69, 276–77. For some effects of the debate upon the historical profession, see B. W. Cook, A. K. Harris, and R. Radosh (eds.), *Past Imperfect: Alternative Essasys in American History*, 2 vols. (New York: 1973), II, 320–52.

[15] Robert James Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), dust-jacket blurb.

[16] Robert E. Brown, *Charles Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).

[17] Volumes under review include William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, rev. ed. (New York: Dell, 1962); D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins, 1917–1960*, 2 vols. (New York: Doubleday, 1961); Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*; Horowitz, *Free World Colossus*; Kolko, *Politics of War*; Diane Shaver Clemens, *Yalta* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Gardner, *Architects.*

[18] See, for example, William Appleman Williams's criticism of Lloyd Gardner's emphasis upon external developments in shaping postwar American foreign policy in *From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. W. A. Williams (New York: John Wiley, 1972), p. 6. See also Lloyd C. Gardner, "Truman Era Foreign Policy: Recent Historical Trends," in *The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972*, ed. Richard S. Kirkendall (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974), pp. 68–69.

[19] Examples of eclectic scholarship include Thomas M. Campbell, *Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944–1945* (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1973); Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: Norton, 1970); and the books under review by Gaddis and Herring.

That Maddox's volume polarized attitudes among American historians is not surprising. By attacking revisionists for prostituting their intellectual standards for fame and academic advancement, publishers for ignoring historical accuracy to push salable commodities, and reviewers for "endorsing these . . . works as responsible pieces of historical research," the author in effect "impugned the ethics of seven people by name and many others by implication."[20] Maddox's book thus stands as a warning, both of the pitfalls of ideology and subjectivity in writing recent history, and of the need for scholars to avoid sarcasm and name-calling. Criticism for the sake of criticism will only beget more criticism.

Joseph M. Siracusa's assessment of revisionism, meanwhile, is as bland as Maddox's is angry. Siracusa's study, *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists*, also criticizes this group of writers, emphasizing their presentism and narrow theoretical bases. But the book remains for the most part descriptive, adding little that is new in analysis. The volume's major contribution consists of views concerning the New Left, communicated to the author by such realist and traditionalist historians as Norman A. Graebner, Robert A. Divine, and Herbert Feis. The views of these correspondents are generally disparaging, although several agree with the author that despite its shortcomings, New Left scholarship provides historians with alternative hypotheses to explore—hence the new history's therapeutic value.

More satisfactory than either Maddox's or Siracusa's volume is Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., *The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972*, which now ranks as the point of departure for students of the postwar era. Volumes such as this, which supplements a similar study in 1967, do much to counter recent criticism of presidential libraries for favoring "an elite group of insiders" and fostering "a kind of cozy, closed, official history."[21] In this collection of essays and commentary, Robert H. Ferrell and Alonzo Hamby analyze historiographical trends from traditional-liberal positions, while Lloyd Gardner and Harvard Sitkoff do so from revisionist perspectives. Comments are provided by David S. McLellan, Barton J. Bernstein, Richard O. Davies, William C. Berman, and Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. Bernstein's assessment is the ablest, and indicates how complex and open-ended the debate on postwar politics and diplomacy has become. He argues convincingly that despite its unifying animus against Truman and American liberalism, revisionism is by no means monolithic. Revisionist historiography is in fact characterized by disagreement and conflict between (and among) neo-Marxists, left-liberals, right-liberals, and other groups. Old labels and categories, therefore, retain little utility in classifying interpretations, and more than ever historians need to assess new books in individual terms.

The contributors agree that scholars ought to widen their horizons, both by utilizing archival material now being opened for research, and by shifting their attention from "the White House and presidential synthesis" to themes allowing for more meaningful analyses.[22] Such topics would include reassessments of the nature and impact of social and economic determinants of foreign policy; viewing the Truman administration's postwar policies within a context of the changes wrought by World War II; and inquiring not only into the ways in which domestic constraints limited the President's foreign policy options, but also the extent to which his large role in global affairs contributed to his domestic difficulties.

John Lewis Gaddis confronts these problems in *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947*. Winner of the prestigious Bancroft and Stuart L. Bernath prizes, Gaddis's book represents less "a successful response to the current revisionist fad" (to quote John W. Spanier), than an attempt to move "beyond revisionism" and incorporate the best of all recent scholarship.[23] Gaddis contends that recent historians have debated the causes of the Cold War without much success. He counters an important revisionist argument that Soviet-American conflict resulted primarily, if not entirely, from dynamics within this nation's political economy. He discovers that far from being an expansive force, the domestic political culture circumscribed sharply the alternatives of Washington policy makers. Writing that "the Cold War is too complicated an event to be discussed in terms of either national guilt or the determinism of inevitability," he suggests that revisionists too often ignore the complexity and unpredictability of human behavior.[24] Individual frailty remains a crucial part of the decision-making process, according to Gaddis, who contends that the actions of statesmen are not predestined by ideology but are subject to such noncontrollable variables as political pressure, chance occurrence, ignorance and error, and irrationality.

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[20] Maddox, pp. 10, 159–61; Kimball, "Cold War Warmed Over," 1126. See the stridently favorable review by Francis Lowenheim, together with rejoinders by revisionist authors, in *The New York Times Book Review*, June 17, 1973, pp. 6f. Also see Maddox, "*Atomic Diplomacy*: A Study in Creative Writing," *Journal of American History*, 59 (March, 1973), 925–34, and Alperovitz's reply, 1062–67.

[21] Alexander DeConde, "What's Wrong with American Diplomatic History," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations *Newsletter*, 1 (May, 1970), 1–16 at p. 4.

[22] The quote is Harvard Sitkoff's, after Thomas Corcoran.

[23] John W. Spanier, review of Gaddis in *Journal of American History*, 59 (December, 1972), 768.

[24] Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, p. 360.

Gaddis seeks to explain why American leaders defined their policy alternatives as narrowly as they did. Analyzing several basic policies that revisionist writers interpret as unnecessarily generating Soviet hostility, he rejects the idea that the survival of capitalism required continuing global expansion of American economic influence during and after the war. Economic motives did play an important part in shaping policies, but the domestic political system exerted an even stronger impact.[25] Gaddis finds that "the delay in opening the second front, nonrecognition of Moscow's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the denial of economic aid to Russia, and the decision to retain control of the atomic bomb can all be explained far more plausibly by citing the administration's need to maintain popular support for its policies rather than dwelling upon requirements of the economic order."[26]

In fact, for numerous reasons Soviet-American amity had all but dissolved by autumn 1944, and there existed little possibility of renewing the friendship.[27] Truman's preoccupation with "lessons" of the past (particularly the Europe of the 1930s) reflected his desire to prevent a renewal of warfare, but instead seriously clouded the American vision of the postwar world.[28] Although the Missourian hoped to continue his predecessor's policies, Truman's abrasive personality—and his desire to appear decisive and efficient—suggested to Soviet leaders that he had reversed FDR's conciliatory approach. This problem was manifest in April 1945, when the new President "gave it to [Molotov] straight 'one-two to the jaw' " to emphasize his displeasure with Moscow's failure to implement the Yalta accords on Poland.[29] What Molotov and Stalin could not see was that this "no nonsense" rhetoric was as much tailored for domestic as for their own consumption. Attempting to educate public opinion, which still contained a strong component of isolationism, Truman had undertaken to convince Congress and the populace of the validity of his effort to utilize economic power for political purposes in Europe.[30]

Similarly, although tipping the postwar balance of power in favor of the United States, nuclear power did not become a diplomatic weapon against the Soviet Union. In fact, the ultimate weapon signified for Washington the "impotence of omnipotence," since there existed within administration circles no agreement on "a clear strategy for employing the weapon's potential power as a bargaining instrument on specific issues." In addition, by the end of the war Congress had begun "to reassert its authority over the conduct of foreign affairs, severely restricting the administration's freedom of action, not only in the field of international control but also in more conventional areas of military and economic policy."[31] In Gaddis's view, therefore, domestic constraints such as these serve as a reminder that "policy makers operate within a certain range of acceptable options, but they, not historians, define degrees of acceptability. It is surely uncharitable, if not unjust, to condemn officials for rejecting courses of action which, to them, seemed intolerable."[32]

A deeper antipathy toward revisionism distinguishes Lisle Rose's *After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War*. Like Gaddis, Rose denies that Truman "pursued an aggressive policy aimed at world economic hegemony" and "cynically manipulated a good-natured but gullible public into accepting the thesis of an internal and external Communist threat of terrifying proportion."[33] To comprehend Truman's failure to forge a constructive relationship with Moscow, one must study as a unit the diplomatic and domestic histories of the early Cold War Era. For within America's political culture lay an important source of Soviet-American conflict. In an interpretation that bears similarity to the "psychic crisis" concept utilized by Richard Hofstadter, Rose reemphasizes the importance of emotionalism and idealism in the formulation of foreign policy.[34] He explains that policy makers emerged from World War II buffeted by "the successive shocks of depression, world war, reform, bureaucratization, and, above all, the responsibilities of world power." This atmosphere of extended crisis and anxiety, characterized by a "frantic quest for an ever more elusive security and status," insured that Truman's policies were not at "all a matter of design," but a product of "paralysis and drift, deferral and delay." After Yalta, paradoxically, "the outward thrust of American power was in large measure the product of an ongoing domestic crisis of self-confidence."[35]

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[25] Indeed, in a statement that would have labeled him a radical a decade ago, Gaddis contends that "Washington chose to withold the one instrument which might have influenced Soviet economic behavior—a postwar reconstruction loan—in hopes of extracting political concessions." But Gaddis emphasizes that such a loan would not have been an end in itself, only a means to an end: "Establishing a new world economic order without first resolving the deep political differences which divided the United States and the Soviet Union was naive in the extreme, for, in the long run, politics turned out to be more important than economics for the leaders of both nations." Gaddis, p. 23.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 358.

[27] Gaddis contends that even had American policy makers possessed the freedom to seek accommodation with Moscow, they would have been unsuccessful. Soviet xenophobia, security fears, bureaucratic suspicion, and Stalin's paranoia all contributed to the absence of a conciliatory attitude within the Kremlin. Stalin, furthermore, must assume greater responsibility for the Cold War than either FDR or Truman. This conclusion rests on the premise that Stalin possessed "more chances to surmount the internal restraints on his policy than were available to his democratic counterparts in the West." *Ibid.*, p. 361. An important essay that stresses the need to avoid moral judgments in analyzing Soviet-American friction is Ernest R. May, "The Cold War," in *The Comparative Approach to American History*, ed. C. Vann Woodward (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 328–45.

[28] Gaddis, pp. 354–55. See also John Lewis Gaddis, "Harry S. Truman and the Origins of Containment," in *Makers of American Diplomacy: From Benjamin Franklin to Henry Kissinger*, ed. Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson (New York: Scribner's, 1974), pp. 493–522. On Truman's reading of history, an important study is Ernest R. May, *"Lessons of the Past": The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). Also see George E. Mowry, "The Uses of History by Recent Presidents," *Journal of American History*, 53 (June, 1966), 5–18.

[29] Quoted in Gaddis, *Origins of Cold War*,, p. 205.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 224, 341–42.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 246, 254, 261–63.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 357.

Like Hofstadter, however, Rose encounters problems in establishing how such domestic tensions affected the key decisions of specific policy makers. This failure detracts from his criticism of several revisionist hypotheses. In addition, Rose seems not to recognize the diversity within revisionist ranks. Some, but not all writers argue that Washington decision makers consciously sought economic hegemony, while other interpretations either deny that free will played any part in American Cold War policies, or skirt the issue entirely.

Rose denies Alperovitz's "atomic diplomacy" thesis, but argues nonetheless that America's nuclear monopoly escalated Soviet-American conflict by creating in Russian eyes "the potential for a more effective and frightening capitalist encirclement than ever before." Rather than "a possible benefit to the United States in any quest to remake the world," the bomb became "at once a national burden and a fertile soil for foreign jealousy." Atomic power may have provided Washington with "a wide range of aggressive new political options," but Rose correctly emphasizes that options do not necessarily become policies. Although Soviet leaders had reason to mistrust the United States for not sharing its atomic secret, they could not see that numerous factors prevented Truman—even had he so desired—from formulating "an explicit program of atomic diplomacy directed against the Soviet Union after Hiroshima."[36]

Although more plausible than Alperovitz's argument, Rose's emphasis upon Soviet-American nuclear friction diverts attention from other important issues. Rose finds no evidence to locate the origins of the Cold War in Russian-American conflict over Germany and Eastern Europe, or in "solely or even largely . . . economic factors."[37] But other writers, including Gaddis, have established that these and other problems became contentious before atomic power. The author also ascribes to Moscow "an equal if not greater measure of responsibility" for the Cold War, explaining that although "gross insensitivity to the understandable fears of an erstwhile ally rather than any coherent thrust or pretense to omnipotence" characterized American policy, Stalin did seem ready to expand Russian power into areas "often considered critical to western security."[38] Once again, Rose suggests, domestic distractions prevented American leaders from appreciating that for the moment, war casualties had established practical limits to Soviet aspirations. This argument is also reasonable, but it too must be demonstrated in practical terms.[39]

Two studies of economic diplomacy during and after World War II also deal with domestic America, and illustrate further the extent to which recent scholars have fashioned interpretations based upon combinations and variants of orthodox, realist, and radical hypotheses. George C. Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War*, and Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*, also suggest that at this juncture the major contribution of revisionism lies less in its controversial conclusions than in forcing historians to integrate social and economic factors in foreign policy with more traditional emphases upon power, politics, personalities, and public opinion. Both monographs, furthermore, reflect solid research, are gracefully written, and display similarities to arguments advanced by Louis J. Halle and Walter LaFeber.[40]

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[33] Lisle A. Rose, *After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Scribner's, 1973), pp. 31–33.

[34] Richard Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," in *America in Crisis: Fourteen Crucial Episodes in American History*, ed. Daniel Aaron (New York: Knopf, 1952), pp. 173–200.

[35] Rose, pp. 112, 177, 183.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 32–33, 176–78. An important recent study of atomic diplomacy, published after this essay was completed, is Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (New York: Knopf, 1975).

[37] Rose, p. 175.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

[39] Rose has written another book, *Dubious Victory: The United States and the End of World War II* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1973). This volume avoids moral judgments and the use of hindsight as it assays Big Five diplomacy between Yalta and Potsdam. A related book, tentatively titled *The Ordeal of Peace*, will deal extensively with the domestic context of postwar diplomacy.

Herring adamantly rejects the views of early revisionists on Lend-lease, while accepting or modifying more recent hypotheses. He contends that the diplomacy of global war was "an infinitely complicated process involving many different forces which were rarely in harmony and often in conflict."[41] He repudiates both the idea that Washington attempted naively to purchase Soviet friendship through Lend-lease, and the contention that the United States utilized its economic power to force Moscow to accede to American postwar designs. Lend-lease, he asserts, reflected FDR's emphasis upon military expendiency and political realism. The measure strengthened Russian military power, provided glue to hold together uneasy allies, and played a significant role in the defeat of the Axis. But economic assistance did not promote the broader objectives of postwar unity. The author argues persuasively that the large gap in postwar objectives, combined with American pressure for retrenchment, limited severely the capacity of foreign aid to promote unity. Paradoxically, economic assistance heightened East-West tensions.

Like Gaddis and Herbert Feis, Herring accepts the revisionist argument that the Truman Administration's decision to end Lend-lease on May 11, 1945, signified a basic change in policy. But he rejects as oversimplified the position advanced by Kolko, Bernstein, and Alperovitz that the act denoted a political and economic move against Moscow. Herring shows that the administration was in fact fulfilling the requirements of congressional legislation, which prohibited "the use of Lend-lease for anything but essential military purposes."[42] That Truman's policies reflected a growing suspicion of the USSR did not mean that "the administration employed Lend-lease systematically to achieve its foreign policy objectives."[43] As Truman himself pointed out, aid to Britain was also stopped, and the British suffered most heavily from the termination. To Herring, then, the cessation of aid was less an economic weapon directed against Moscow than an indication of the need to build up supplies for the coming showdown against Japan. Yet Herring agrees with revisionists who contend that the abrupt cutback of Lend-lease exacerbated Russian suspicion of American motives. Moreover, his analysis of the administration's management of the postwar loan issue converges with Paterson's, as both historians concur that State Department attempts in the spring of 1946 to secure major political concessions for a loan further augmented Russian hostility. This episode probably cost Truman and his advisers whatever chance they had to utilize economic assistance to secure even minimal concessions, or to contribute to postwar amity.[44]

Unlike Paterson, however, Herring finds no evidence to suggest that a postwar loan would have mitigated Soviet antipathy, although he speculates that relations might have improved had Washington combined a loan with acceptance of a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Herring concludes that while "the wisdom of such a course has much to commend it in retrospect . . . history and experience had not prepared American leaders to act in this fashion."[45] Not only would Truman have undertaken a mammoth political risk by disavowing Congress's mandate to limit aid to the military requirements of the Allies; the Chief Executive faced many other domestic pressures that also restricted his freedom of action. These included his own inexperience and extreme sensitivity to congressional attitudes, his ostensibly formidable difficulties in securing legislative approval of FDR's postwar diplomatic designs, and difficulties produced by bureaucratic confusion and administrative bungling.

Conversely, Paterson maintains that Washington's "will to dominate" the postwar world was neither restricted by domestic political pressures, nor, as Kolko would have it, shaped solely by the requirements of capitalism. Paterson argues that the administration based its reconstruction policies upon its own conception of national interest. Reflecting an ideology devoted to the attainment of "peace and prosperity," policy makers assumed that their objectives depended upon a healthy global economy, political stability, unrestricted world trade, and the development of markets for business and commercial interests. Paterson also feels that the Cold War was not inevitable: American leaders possessed options to defuse postwar tension, but unfortunately these were blocked by policies that divided the world "into hostile spheres and emasculated the goal of peace and prosperity that . . . Americans hoped to fullfill."[46]

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[40] Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1971* (New York: John Wiley, 1972).

[41] Herring, *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946*, p. xix. See also George C. Herring, Jr., "Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War," *Journal of American History*, 56 (June, 1969), 93–114.

[42] Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p. 288.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 292; Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), pp. 33–42. A thoughtful critic of revisionism agrees with this point. See Maier, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins," pp. 340–41.

[45] Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p. 293.

[46] Paterson, pp. 263, 267. See also Thomas G. Paterson, "The Abortive American Loan to Russia and the

Soviet-American Confrontation thus reflects the influence of Williams and Kolko, but Paterson warns that in addition to economics "other diplomatic variables were also active" in shaping policy.[47] The author avoids the one-dimensional quality of much leftist historiography by emphasizing in his analysis the importance of distorted American perceptions of the Soviet Union, the influence of the regular political process, public opinion, bureaucratic lethargy and conflict, and the impact of personalities. Establishing himself as one of the most circumspect of the younger writers on the left, he carefully assesses the background of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the role of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, American economic relations with Europe, the recovery of West Germany, Russian penetration of Eastern Europe, and the abortive Soviet loan.

According to Paterson, the parochial nationalism and universalist expectations characterizing United States reconstruction policies reflected the style and personality of administration leaders—and their reading of history—more than the external problems posed by Soviet military and diplomatic initiatives. "When the postwar period brought tension rather than peace," the author explains, "an explanation was drawn from history: Soviet Russia was replacing Nazi Germany as the major disrupter of a stable, pacific international order. Therefore, the United States must isolate the evil and avert the cyclical recurrence of war."[48] As illustrated by the abrasive rhetoric utilized by Truman, Averell Harriman, James F. Byrnes, and Dean Acheson, the administration had concluded, in Acheson's words, that "only the United States had the power to grab hold of history and make it conform."[49]

Taking Acheson and other policy makers at their word, Paterson argues that overwhelming economic strength endowed Washington with the ability to coerce international compliance with American reconstruction policies. But in asserting that "few restraints inhibited the exercise of American power," the author seemingly neglects evidence provided by Gaddis and Herring, who emphasize the importance of Truman's difficulties in the face of Congress's desire to retrench and to reassert its prerogative over foreign policy after four years of executive direction.[50] Disagreeing with this view, Paterson contends that the "foreign policy public"—composed of professionals, businessmen, and organized pressure groups—endorsed Truman's major proposals without much opposition, while congressional influence on foreign policy was declining, and the diplomatic debate was being curtailed by bipartisanship. Here, however, Paterson seems to be defining public opinion too narrowly, as well as underestimating Truman's sensitivity to congressional attitudes. Herring and Gaddis indicate that senators and representatives were in fact more closely attuned to the attitudes of their constituents than to the elite groups Paterson emphasizes.

Postwar Politics

Our understanding of the restrictions, peculiarities, and importance of domestic influences upon foreign policy during the postwar years is expanded further in the eclectic scholarship of Susan M. Hartmann and Allen Yarnell. In *Truman and the 80th Congress*, Hartmann describes the manner in which the President utilized the Republican-dominated legislature to lay the basis for the 1948 campaign. Yarnell, meanwhile, in *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as Test of Postwar Liberalism*, dissects Democratic campaign strategy, clarifying the interrelationship between foreign policy issues and liberal anti-communism, which supplied the framework for the administration's attack upon Henry Wallace and the Progressive Party.

Hartmann considers the era of the 80th Congress significant for providing insights into "patterns in foreign and domestic politics that would affect events in the United States for the next twenty years."[51] She shows how Truman's inept leadership in 1946 contributed to Republican victories in that off-year election, endowing the GOP with firm control in Congress for the first time since Hoover's presidency. Attempting as a matter of necessity to keep foreign policy out of domestic politics, Truman first tried to cooperate with his adversaries—except, of course, in matters concerning important New Deal legislation. In part because his administration "fabricated a crisis atmosphere and made its proposals in terms of U.S. security from communist expansion," the President was able to secure opposition support

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Origins of the Cold War, 1943–1946," *Journal of American History*, 56 (June, 1969), 76–92.

[47] Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation*, p. ix.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 262. See also Thomas G. Paterson and Les K. Adler, " 'Red Fascism': The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930's–1950's," *American Historical Review*, 75 (April, 1970), 1046–64. For the ensuing controversy, see *American Historical Review*, 75 (December, 1970), 2155–64; 76 (April, 1971), 575–80. A similar study of the origins of anti-Soviet sentiment is Elliott West, "The Roots of Conflict: Soviet Images in the American Press, 1941–1947," in *Essays on American Foreign Policy*, ed. M. F. Morris and S. L. Myres (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974), pp. 83–116.

[49] Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson* (New York: Cooper Square, 1972), p. 416.

[50] Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation*, p. 264.

[51] Susan M. Hartmann, *Truman and the 80th Congress* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), p. 1.

for his major foreign policy initiatives, especially the Truman Doctrine.[52]

Speaking loudly, but brandishing a small stick, Truman approached politics in a manner that some writers have termed self-defeating.[53] But while Hartmann agrees that the Missourian's vigorous rhetoric was not usually matched by commensurate deeds, she explains that the distance between the President's words and the realities of policy making did not necessarily constitute failure. On the contrary, apparent legislative defeats for the administration tended to cloak calculated, strategic victories. Truman's emphatic veto of the Taft-Hartley Bill, for example, blunted but did not halt the Republican attack upon federal labor policy. Yet his liberal rhetoric served "the crucial purpose of returning labor securely and energetically to the Democratic fold and denied a big domestic issue to a possible third party movement."[54]

Truman's ability to emphasize his sharp differences with the 80th Congress enabled him to step forward as a defender of the public interest and a champion of the New Deal. He followed a political strategy that was skillfully directed by Clark Clifford, who counseled that the President's tactics and recommendations during the campaign "must be tailored for the voters, not the Congressmen; they must display a label which reads 'no compromise'."[55] Casting himself as "the Galahad of reform pluckily fighting the dragon of privilege," Truman himself emerged as a first-rate strategist. In 1948 he retreated from his earlier commitment to civil rights when it appeared that too radical a stand would jeopardize party unity prior to the Philadelphia convention. Similarly, his emphasis upon bipartisan foreign policy, to prevent diplomatic issues from entering the arena of domestic politics, did not prevent his own use of the Soviet menace for partisan purposes. Hartmann explains that the President's "get tough" speeches of March 17, in which he indicted Moscow for complete responsibility for the global crisis and denounced "Henry Wallace and his Communists," signified a form of crisis management that undercut the latter's political appeal by attacking his patriotism.[56]

If the desire to avoid contention over Cold War policies formed an integral facet of Truman's political strategy, the Republican party itself aided the President in utilizing domestic political conflict to advantage. After the nomination of Governors Dewey and Earl Warren, and the adoption by the convention of a moderate platform, Truman— in a masterstroke—summoned the 80th Congress into special session and challenged it to approve the major planks in the Republican platform. This Congress failed to do, and the incumbent executive, who spoke to the issues with characteristic directness, maintained his paramount campaign issue—the association of Congress's negative record with the Republican party.

According to Hartmann, the significance of Truman's victory lay in its assurance that American liberals would place priority upon anti-communism rather than domestic reform. Yet nowhere does the author depict the President as a slave of capitalist ideology. She admits that government and business were on good terms during the period, and that domestic reform tended to support the strategic requirements of corporate capitalism. But she correctly stresses the need to assess Truman's conduct during the campaign—and his liberalism generally—within the matrix of politics. In this context one may appreciate Truman's substantial contributions to domestic reform—contributions that were consistent both with his conservative termperament, and with the conservative American political system. Perhaps the major virtue of this well written study is its reminder that chief executives are neither deities nor dupes. Better than other postwar presidents, one feels, Truman discovered early in his tenure that harsh political realities both determined the limits of his foreign policy goals and limited the administration's movement toward substantial reform.

Yarnell's study of the Democratic party's response to Wallace's candidacy follows closely Hartmann's account, and counters the assertion of several scholars that the Progressives pushed Truman to the left on domestic issues during the campaign.[57] Utilizing the recently opened Wallace papers, numerous manuscripts, and interviews with key figures, Yarnell argues that Wallace's presence in the campaign contributed prominently to Truman's hard line on foreign policy—a crucial ingredient in his victory. Wallace, of course, had hoped to redirect America's diplomatic course—and while this proved impossible, many observers claimed, in the words of Karl Schmitt, that "for the first time in American history, the thunder of a party of discontent had been stolen, neither four nor forty years later, but in the very midst of the campaign."[58] This assertion, according to Yarnell, does not withstand scrutiny. Nor does the author find evidence to sustain Walter LaFeber's conclusion that "the Berlin Blockade and Truman's shift to the left on domestic issues killed off any hopes that Progressives nursed of determining the election."[59]

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[52] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[53] This theme is emphasized in Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, 3rd rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 26–42.

[54] Hartmann, p. 90.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 72–101, 128–31, 147, 168–69.

[57] Rexford Guy Tugwell, "Progressives and the Presidency," *The Progressive*, 13 (April, 1949), 5; David A. Shannon, *The Decline of American Communism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959), p. 179. See also, for similar interpretations, Curtis D. MacDougall, *Gideon's Army* (3 vols., New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1965); and Richard S. Kirkendall, "Election of 1948," in *History of American Presidential Elections, 1789–1968*, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 4 vols. (New York: Chelsea House, 1971), IV, 3099–3145.

Much irony, in fact, existed in Wallace's attempt to provide a forum from which Americans might force the Democrats to adopt a more conciliatory foreign policy. Not only did Wallace fail in this task; his presence in the campaign actually facilitated Truman's projection of a liberal image, despite the lack of new programs to substantiate it. Refuting the notion that the Democrats shifted to a more liberal stance during the campaign, Yarnell demonstrates that party strategy remained consistent after November 1947, when Clifford prepared his memorandum on the coming election. The document analyzed the problems posed by a potential Wallace candidacy, but predicted that the third party would play only a minor role in influencing the President's course. Clifford argued that the Republicans would remain the prime foe, and that Truman should campaign against Dewey rather than Wallace. Yet at the same time Clifford cautioned that "every effort should be made *now*, jointly and at one and the same time, to dissuade Wallace and also to identify him in the public mind with the communists."[60] The latter task was carried out not by Truman, who remained personally aloof during most of the campaign, but by practical liberals like Hubert Humphrey, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Leon Henderson, who, in historian Robert Griffith's words, "took to baiting Wallace and his followers in an effort to strengthen their own position as sober, industrious, and 100% American reformers."[61]

Yarnell maintains that Wallace's position in the campaign was consistent with his own postwar beliefs and that he was not being duped by Communists. The indisputable presence of Communists among his supporters did not mean that they controlled the party, but charges by Americans for Democratic Action emphasized this point and had the effect of undermining Wallace's criticism of American foreign policy. Although admitting that it is impossible to test the effect of this theme from available voting statistics, Yarnell concludes that as leaders of the attack ADA members saw clearly that the issue of communism provided a means to secure control within the liberal community, and thus profited most from Wallace's failure.[62]

Wallace and Taft Revisited

Both Hartmann and Yarnell conclude that Truman succeeded in achieving his major objectives during the campaign. But both accounts also question whether his goals were constructive, and whether his leadership was good for the country. Two of the President's contemporaries—Wallace and Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio—exhibited similar doubts, and it is not surprising that a generation later their careers have been reinterpreted in more positive terms. John Morton Blum, Frederick and Edward Schapsmeier, and Norman Markowitz join Yarnell in depicting Wallace as a far more complex man than the mystical, political ignoramus of liberal historiography, or the crypto-"open door imperialist" as portrayed by New Left writers Ronald Radosh and Leonard Liggio.[63]

Blum and the Schapsmeiers grant that Wallace's critique of administration diplomacy was naive and misguided, but at the same time present a sympathetic portrayal of a man whose search for social justice led him on a tortuous odyssey, from FDR's third-term Vice-President to political Waterloo. These two books indicate that Wallace's idealistic, progressive philosophy remained consistent as he moved from scientific farming to journalism, and finally to politics, where he became "a man driven by conscience and conviction, so much so that his concern for political realities was often obscured by the cause itself."[64]

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[58] Karl M. Schmitt, *Henry A. Wallace: Quixotic Crusade, 1948* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1960), p. 91.

[59] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, p. 73.

[60] Allen Yarnell, *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 32–33.

[61] Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate* (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1970), p. 46.

[62] Yarnell, pp. 106–07. See also Alonzo L. Hamby, "Henry A. Wallace, the Liberals, and Soviet-American Relations," *Review of Politics*, 30 (April, 1968), 153–69. Although Yarnell occupies solid ground in contending that the politics of anti-communism figured prominently in Truman's victory, the author fails to sustain the assertion that "by hurling charges of communism at the third party," the President "fully legitimized the issue for use in American politics" (p. 85). This argument ignores the long history of guilt-by-association in politics. See Geoffrey S. Smith, *To Save a Nation: American Countersubversives, the New Deal, and the Coming of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), for an assessment of the Roosevelt administration's utilization of this theme in the battle against isolationism. See also Wayne S. Cole, *Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974). Yarnell's assertion that the Truman administration gave the nation "a real taste of what was to come in later years over the issue of anti-communism" (p. 114) also lacks convincing proof. Yarnell has not demonstrated the links between Truman's anti-communism (which he defines as synonymous with the ADA's version) and the anti-communism of the McCarthyites. To do this he would have to carry his story at least into 1950, demonstrating the political impact of the fall of China, the spy cases, and the Korean War.

[63] John Morton Blum, ed., *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, *Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1970); Norman D. Markowitz, *The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941–1948* (New York: Free Press, 1973); Ronald Radosh and Leonard P. Liggio, "Henry Wallace and the Open Door," in *Cold War Critics*, ed. T. G. Paterson, pp. 76–113.

While Blum's skillful editing provides important insights into Wallace's character, into the personal and bureaucratic conflict of the Roosevelt and early Truman administrations, and into the Iowa native's growing disdain for political compromise, both volumes emphasize the importance of the Second World War as the nemesis of Wallace's liberalism. His diary entries during the conflict reveal the hope that peace would herald the emergence of a "century of the common man." But his unyielding commitment to continuing the anti-fascist alliance after 1945 led him astray. Failing to grasp Sir Harold Nicolson's dictum that foreign policy cannot be based on enthusiasm or sentiment, Wallace counseled a policy of moderation toward Moscow, despite Stalin's dubious actions in Eastern Europe. Eschewing power politics, Wallace warned that the United States was on a collision course with her former ally, and that Truman was responsible for this dilemma. By 1948 Wallace's *Weltanschauung* had become Manichaen: The administration faced a choice between one world and nuclear holocaust. Increasingly his statements became self-righteous, arrogant, and parochial. He completed his ill-fated campaign for the presidency believing that opponents of his mission were either malicious or ignorant. And he in turn earned the appellation of an appeaser.

While these two books are not likely to stir much controversy—except perhaps for overcorrecting the harsh accounts of earlier writers—Norman D. Markowitz's monograph is at once more ambitious and more problematic. Markowitz utilizes Wallace's career to attack interest-group politics and post-New-Deal liberalism. The author shows how as wartime Vice-President, Wallace joined other "social liberals" to create a new order—a global New Deal. This noble goal eluded him, however, partly because he lacked political skill, but also because of forces beyond his control. Decrying social injustice at the same time that he defended capitalism, Wallace failed to grasp the contradiction within his concept of "progressive capitalism" and proved no match for advocates of "corporate social liberalism." Ultimately his politics exhibited "the poverty and . . . emptiness of social liberalism—its failure to deal realistically with the American political economy and thus to make a difference in the real world."[65]

According to Markowitz, Wallace represented the humanitarian wing of social liberalism. A man who championed the democratic process and social welfare, he could not prevail against "corporate social liberals"—reformers "interested primarily in adjusting people to an efficient business culture."[66] Even before Roosevelt's death, these conservative spokesmen had begun to reassert themselves. Powerless in the face of corporate interests, unable to master the intricacies of pressure-group politics, and unsuccessful in defusing the Truman administration's hostility toward the Soviet Union, social liberalism quickly disintegrated. The President's conservative politics, anti-Communist rhetoric, and domestic loyalty program forced many former associates of Wallace to jettison their idealism. Many of these individuals embraced the image of "Red-Fascism" and joined the ranks of "Cold War liberalism," opposed to any accommodation with the Soviets. After the Progressive campaign of 1948, which in the author's view posed "the real questions confronting postwar America," the way lay open for Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles, for Korea, and for the junior senator from Wisconsin. In the end, Wallace himself suffered a failure of nerve, giving up his quest for a people's century, supporting Truman in Korea, even popularizing the old canard of the "Yellow Peril."

Markowitz's accounts of Truman's vice-presidential nomination (the "second Missouri compromise") and of the inception of the Progressive party are first-rate. Moreover, his conclusions indicate once again that left-wing revisionism is not monolithic. Although proposing a general revisionist interpretation of the origins of the Cold War, for example, he challenges other radical historians in several instances.[67] Yet despite insights provided into the liberal movement, the author's neo-Marxian perspective caricatures the administration and transforms Wallace, Truman, and other actors into captives of economic, intellectual, and social forces. Markowitz's view of Wallace assumes that capitalism and humanitarianism are mutually exclusive categories, when in fact specific sections of the book suggest that they overlap. The author also appears to over-simplify differences between Wallace's vision of a people's century, and the imperialistic drive toward what Henry Luce of *Time* termed an "American Century," a vision shared, incidentally, by Wallace's "corporate-liberal" opponents, including ADA, the business establishment, and the administration itself.[68]

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[64] Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier, pp. 163–64.

[65] Markowitz, pp. 3, 8–9.

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 324–28.

[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 195, 227–28.

Markowitz's analytical framework also minimizes the importance of bargaining and compromise in the day-to-day operation of politics. Wallace and his supporters may have envisioned a good society modeled upon an ideal cooperative commonwealth, but their labors occurred within the parameters of the political system, not within the realm of speculative philosophy. From his days as Secretary of Agriculture, Wallace sought to humanize and democratize capitalism, not to supplant it with another system.[69] Wallace thus occupied ground between the worlds of competition and cooperation, and if this made him at times an insightful and prophetic thinker, it also influenced his quixotic politics. But if Wallace appeared to lack abilities usually connected with political achievement, he nonetheless managed to survive in politics for thirteen years, a point that bears emphasizing.

While recent historians have found new meaning in Wallace's dissent against Truman's domestic and foreign policies, current revisionism has altered in a positive way the reputation of Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. After World War II liberals depicted the most influential Republican in Congress as a stiff and negative political troglodyte and an ultranationalistic opponent of globalism. According to Henry W. Berger and James T. Patterson, however, this picture is erroneous.[70] Berger's view of Taft suggests in fact an intriguing similarity between the origin of many of the Ohioan's attitudes toward domestic and foreign affairs, and the sources of disillusionment felt by many radicals and liberals in the late 1960s.[71] Like many New Left historians, Taft viewed domestic and foreign affairs as inseparable, and believed that political and economic liberty would survive in the United States only if government controls were kept to a minimum and if the nation avoided war.

Taft exhibited concern that another conflict would destroy private enterprise and Republican government, and he thus rejected bipartisanship in foreign policy. He warned repeatedly after 1948 that increased global commitments threatened the national interest by restricting the freedom of the United States to act unilaterally in the event of crisis. Skeptical of the military threat posed by the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, he opposed overcommitting the military in Europe, and scored Truman for ignoring the implications of large economic investments in underdeveloped nations. After the President failed to consult either Congress or the United Nations before ordering American troops to Korea, Taft charged him with usurping Congress's authority to declare war. In terms very similar to those employed by recent revisionists, Taft argued that Washington policy makers could not expect to impose democracy and capitalism upon other nations. American had to exert international influence through example.

Although in Berger's words Taft never indicated "the exact point at which government activity intruded upon liberty," the senator decried corporate monopoly and remained a lifelong adversary of the New and Fair Deals.[72] Domestic reform under FDR and Truman centralized power in the executive branch of government and fostered public monopolies, while such policies as deficit spending and wage and price controls threatened personal freedom. Here Berger emphasizes Taft's social conscience, explaining that the Ohioan believed that society did possess responsibility to battle depressions, prevent poverty, and secure equal economic opportunity for all citizens.

In claiming Taft as a precursor of the contemporary left's opposition to globalism, however, Berger neglects the Republican leader's virulent anti-communism and its effect upon domestic politics and the development of the Cold War. These issues receive close attention in Patterson's model biography, *Mr. Republican*. Patterson is no radical, but his analysis has been influenced by recent revisionism. Like Berger, he rejects as simplistic the orthodox picture of Taft as a reactionary spokesman for business interests. The senator emerges here as a man of urbanity and warmth, who possessed the ability to change his mind on important national issues. Patterson finds much to praise in Taft's career—his principled opposition to American involvement in

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[68] See Henry Luce, *The American Century* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941).

[69] Markowitz's interpretation has much in common with Norman Pollack's assessment of Populism. See Norman Pollack, *The Populist Response to Industrial America: Midwestern Populist Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

[70] James T. Patterson, *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Henry W. Berger, "Senator Robert A. Taft Dissents from Military Escalation," in *Cold War Critics*, ed. T. G. Paterson, pp. 167–204; Henry M. Berger, "A Conservative Critique of Containment: Senator Taft on the Early Cold War Program," in *Containment and Revolution*, ed. David Horowitz (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 125–39.

[71] Murray N. Rothbard, "The Transformation of the American Right," *Continuum*, 2 (Summer, 1964), 221. A spirited New Left defense of Taft's views on foreign policy, together with those of Charles Beard, Oswald Garrison Villard, John T. Flynn, and Lawrence Dennis is presented in Ronald Radosh, *Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975). See also the attempt of "new conservatives" to claim Taft as one of their own in Russell Kirk and James McClellan, *The Political Principles of Robert A. Taft* (New York: Fleet Press, 1967). Taft's own views are contained in *A Foreign Policy for Americans* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1951).

[72] Berger, "Taft Dissents," 171.

World War II, his criticism of the "victor's justice" at Nuremberg, his advocacy (after earlier opposition) of public housing and federal aid to education, and his support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

But Patterson admits that Taft's libertarian views were sometimes distorted by partisan and fiscal considerations, and by the issue of communism. The Ohioan was not above demagoguery: He appreciated the political capital inherent in anti-Communist rhetoric. As early as 1945 he expressed astonishment at "how many professors and other so-called intellectuals have been converted to a sympathy with the Russian system."[73] In 1946 he charged that Truman "coveted the support of . . . the communists in the November election," at the same time as he sought a Congress "dominated by a policy of appeasing the Russians abroad and of fostering Communism at home."[74] By 1950, for partisan reaons, Taft joined other conservative Republicans in warning against Communist infiltration of the State Department. Patterson concedes that Taft's charges "not only lacked solid proof, but also cast the debate over China policy into an unproductive search for scapegoats."[75] The Ohio politician had long been a foe of communism, but with the advent of Senator Joseph McCarthy, Taft moved to a more aggressive position. Privately he expressed dismay over McCarthy's lack of civility, his ignorance of Senate tradition, and his failure to verify his accusations. Indeed, in calmer times Taft's strong record on civil liberties might have led him to denounce or disassociate himself from McCarthy's crusade.

Taft did not do so. Instead he counseled that the Wisconsin senator should "keep talking and if one case doesn't work out, he should proceed with another one."[76] In explaining the complex motives behind the Ohioan's failure to break with his "crude and undisciplined colleague," Patterson stresses Taft's own "instinctive hatred of Bolshevism."[77] He believed that the great struggle of his era was ideological and not military in nature, and he advised that unless the government was cleansed of subversives "it could never hope to serve as an example of capitalist virtue to the rest of the uncommitted world."[78]

Taft's defense of McCarthy also reflected "his party loyalty and aggressive partisanship in an election year."[79] Not only had his consistent criticism of Democratic foreign policy lent plausibility to the charge of Communist sympathizers within government, but concurrent developments in international and domestic politics made 1950 a poor time to contradict McCarthy's accusations. In addition, Taft himself faced strong opposition from Catholic bishops, the AF of L, and NAACP. According to the author, therefore, "the temptations of politics, more than anything else, had turned Taft toward irresponsibility."[80]

Patterson's biography emphasizes the centrality of partisan politics in domestic and foreign policy making, and suggests once more that the genius of the democratic system—along with its defects—lies not in the realm of ideology but in the trenches of day-to-day compromise. During the postwar era conservatives hoped to undo the Roosevelt-Truman welfare state, and to place the nation once more upon the path toward responsible government. Taft's nomination in 1952 would have overthrown the eastern, liberal wing of the Republican Party. Yet although he possessed many political skills—as epitomized by his role in constructing a strong alliance between conservative Republicans and southern Democrats—that honor eluded him. And here, perhaps, one may quarrel with Patterson's emphasis upon external factors to explain Taft's failure. The liberal press did caricature him as an intractable ideologue, thus helping to destroy his presidential ambitions, but the author might have accorded more attention to Taft's political and administrative qualifications for the White House, along with the implications of his criticism of United States Cold War policies.

Truman, McCarthy, and Civil Liberties

Next to the origins of conflict with the Soviet Union, the most controversial issue of Truman-era historiography concerns the relationship between the Cold War, the administration's position on civil liberties, and the rise of McCarthyism. Where earlier observers portrayed the embattled Chief Executive as a stalwart champion of civil liberties, recent revisionists have found in his own anti-Communist position—in his exaggerated rhetoric, partisan strategies, and foreign policies—the basis of the witch hunt that began in 1950.

During the 1950s liberal historians explained McCarthyism primarily in personal, sociological, and psychological terms. These writers indicated that McCarthy's appeal was strongest not among traditional conservative sectors of society, but among laborers, rural folk, and certain ethnic groups located within the American reform tradition. Richard Hofstadter, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Daniel Bell analyzed McCarthyism as a facet of "mass" and "status" politics, identifying the phenomenon with Populism, and depicting both movements as irrational responses to the industrial secular state.[81]

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[73] Patterson, p. 446. See also James T. Patterson, "Alternatives to Globalism: Robert A. Taft and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1945," *Historian*, 36 (August, 1974), 670–88.

[74] Patterson, *Mr. Republican*, p. 313.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 443.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 446.

[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 447–49.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 449.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] *Ibid.*, pp. 448–49.

This approach, which reflected a distrust of mass democracy, dominated McCarthy scholarship until 1967, when Michael Rogin challenged attempts "to explain the hysteria with which McCarthy infected the country by the hysterical preoccupations of masses of people."[82] Centering his attention upon Wisconsin and the Dakotas, Rogin utilized Gallup Polls to demonstrate that in emphasizing the irrational component of rural radicalism, "pluralists" like Hofstadter ignored the specific goals and issues of popular protest; that unlike earlier agrarian protest movements, McCarthyism was not a mass movement; and that historic agrarian radicalism contributed not to McCarthy's strength but to the constituencies of liberal Democrats. Discarding an elitist model of America's sociopolitical structure, Rogin concluded that McCarthy lacked a "cohesive, organized popular following," and that "the attack was made by one section of the political elite against another and was nurtured by the very elites under attack."[83] McCarthyism thus developed within the context of the nation's conservative tradition, and the Wisconsin senator capitalized mainly upon the political frustrations of the traditional, midwestern conservative wing of the Republican Party.

Rogin's assessment transcended the particular significance of McCarthyism with its warning to scholars who utilized social science theory and a pluralistic model of American politics. By separating such issues as McCarthy's ideology, his political backing, and his popular support, Rogin pointed out that psychological insights (which dominated consensus interpretations of radical dissent) are also pertinent to analyses of mainstream politics. He also suggested that pluralism can explain neither elite support for emotional, antidemocratic movements like McCarthyism, nor, for that matter, democratic and creative mass movements.

Agreeing that the values of interest-group liberalism provide a poor yardstick to comprehend McCarthyism, Athan Theoharis moves several steps beyond Rogin. Theoharis argues that in initiating the Cold War and pursuing an inconsistent course on civil liberties, the administration contributed directly to the red scare of the 1950s. In *The Yalta Myths* he probes the emergence of the Yalta Conference as a problem in politics. In 1945, he finds, most citizens shared the Roosevelt administration's view that relations with Moscow required a policy of trust and conciliation. Only "extremist" politicians denounced Yalta, and they did so to discredit the New Deal. Yet by 1950 the conference had become a political weapon for the GOP, as a result of the fall of China, the Hiss case —and the Republicans's unexpected and galling defeat in 1948. Ironically, Theoharis suggests, the Republican party was aided by Truman's earlier reorientation of foreign policy. Containment, together with the President's tough rhetoric, created a crisis atmosphere in which Truman ultimately proved unable to defend his policies—except in partisan terms. When the administration "reversed its views on the reasonableness and desirability of trusting the Soviet Union," the author writes, "Yalta became a conference that it had never been."[84]

In *Seeds of Repression* Theoharis continues his indictment. While searching frantically for issues to secure popular and congressional support, the President and his advisers emphasized American righteousness and Soviet depravity and in effect created a new political environment—an environment that ossified foreign policy and limited the parameters of public debate. An even more important factor in laying the basis for McCarthyism, according to the author, was Truman's loyalty programs, which set impossibly high standards, stressed the dubious concept of guilt by association, and encompassed all government employees with suspected "subversive tendencies." Paradoxically, this program provided the criteria upon which the administration was subsequently judged. With numerous decision makers calling for a battle to the death with communism at home and abroad, Theoharis finds it not surprising that Truman was eventually devoured by the monster he created. When the President's adversaries condemned him for "losing" China and for his "no win" policy in Korea, they were merely criticizing him for failing to keep his word.

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[81] See Daniel Bell, ed., *The New American Right* (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), and its revised edition, Bell, ed., *The Radical Right: The New American Right Expanded and Updated* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964). See also Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (New York: Knopf, 1965). A criticism of "consensus" historians is offered in Marian J. Morton, *The Terrors of Ideological Politics: Liberal Historians in a Conservative Mood* (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1972). Another book assessing liberal historiography in the 1950s is Bernard Sternsher, *Consensus, Conflict, and American Historians* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974).

[82] Michael Paul Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter* (Cambridge: M.I.T. University Press, 1967), p. 217.

[83] *Ibid.*, pp. 216–60. Other recent critiques of pluralism include R. Alan Lawson, *The Failure of Independent Liberalism, 1931–1941* (New York: Putnam, 1971); Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York: Norton, 1969); and Theodore J. Lowi, *The Politics of Disorder* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

[84] Athan Theoharis, *The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970), p. 219. In addition to the books under review, Theoharis's publications include "The Threat to Civil Liberties," in *Cold War Critics*, ed. T. G. Paterson, pp. 266–98: "The Rhetoric of Politics: Foreign Policy, Internal Security, and Domestic Politics in the Truman Era, 1945–1950," and "The Escalation of the Loyalty Program," in *Politics and Policies*, ed. B. J. Bernstein, pp. 146–268; and "The Politics of Scholarship," in *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism*, ed. Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), pp. 262–81.

Theoharis's views are bold and original. His analysis has the advantage of removing McCarthy from the limelight—a fortuitous development, it would appear—since the Wisconsin Republican's bombast and primitive style mesmerized liberal historians as they did liberal politicians during the early 1950's. Unfortunately, however, the validity of Theoharis's conclusions is undercut by the narrowness of his own frame of reference, and by the one-dimensionality of his studies. Both *The Yalta Myths* and *Seeds of Repression* overstate their case when they label Truman as the midwife of McCarthyism.

Like Charles Beard and Charles C. Tansill, who constructed a "devil theory of Franklin D. Roosevelt" to explain American entrance into World War II, Theoharis offers a similar interpretation of Truman's mendacity in matters pertaining to foreign policy and civil liberties. In fact, *Seeds of Repression* reveals its author's Nader-like opinion of American political elites (a tendency that may become more pronounced in the aftermath of Watergate). Not only are Truman and his associates unlikable, misguided, narrowminded, and self-interested, but readers must also conclude that they are omnipotent as well. Laboring under the illusion of American omnipotence (moreso, one feels, than his protagonists ever did), Theoharis denies that public servants might in fact be motivated by idealism and altruism. He also neglects the possibility that their policy options may be limited by the complexities of domestic and international politics. In any event, while it is probably true that conspiracy theories of history reveal more about the plight of their purveyors than about history itself, the burden of proof lies with the theorist.

And Theoharis does not offer a convincing case. Even if one grants that Truman's civil liberties record was inconsistent, and that he achieved more success in correcting inequities outside than within the administration, many problems remain. The author does not accord sufficient weight to the existence of indisputable Soviet espionage activities during the immediate postwar era; he does not consider the degree to which conservatives affected the political context in which the President operated; he misses the perseverance of prewar anticommunism, which gave structure to the debate between Truman and his adversaries; and he vastly overrates the Chief Executive's influence over the postwar political environment. Like most revisionists, Theoharis places undue emphasis upon *American* motives, images, actors, and developments. He neither probes nor speculates upon the possible effect of developments within the Soviet Union. Nowhere does the reader encounter any estimate of the reality behind Russian statements and actions. Nor is there any consideration of such important topics as Soviet national interests, Russian strategy, or Stalin's ideology.

Theoharis's case rests on the premise that Truman's rhetoric controlled public opinion. But the author does not explain why the President lost control of the Communist issue after 1948. This point is pertinent because, contrary to Theoharis's assertion, Truman did not adopt a consistently harsh, anti-Communist line until 1948 and 1949. Consequently the universalistic rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947, may in fact have represented a realistic appraisal of what was required for the Chief Executive to achieve his goal. As Alonzo Hamby pointed out, the political system may well "require a crisis atmosphere for the passage of important foreign policy measures; at the least we should be aware that the administration was not itching to establish one."[85]

Truman did resort to hyperbole to "scare hell out of the country" (to quote Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg), as the President sought to justify the assumption of Britain's role in protecting Greece against communism. But this is not the same thing as saying, as Theoharis does, that the Missourian's words signaled a revolution in foreign policy and suddenly alerted the populace to the menace of international and domestic communism. As John Lewis Gaddis writes, "Gaps between rhetoric and reality in U.S. foreign policy have often been large; indeed, such gaps might be said to constitute a defining characteristic of this country's diplomacy." While Theoharis views the Truman Doctrine as a misguided departure from FDR's "more sophisticated" approach to Soviet-American relations, Gaddis interprets the Doctrine as consistent with "previously established precedents for dealing with shifts in the European balance of power." Despite Truman's noisy rhetoric between 1947 and 1950, the administration "had neither the intention or the capability of policing the world," says Gaddis, adding that the "real commitment to contain communism everywhere originated in the events surrounding the Korean War, not the crisis in Greece and Turkey."[86]

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[85] Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Clash of Perspectives and the Need for a New Synthesis," in *Truman Period: Reappraisal*, ed. R. Kirkendall, p. 132.

In addition, to ascribe responsibility for McCarthyism to Truman's ability "to infect the population with his own fantasies" constitutes an amazingly facile generalization.[87] It assumes that the President's belief in the devil theory of international communism remained consistent between 1946 and 1952. And the assertion also ignores the point that while Truman's anti-Soviet rhetoric waxed militant between April and December, 1947, public opinion polls at the end of the year actually showed that a larger percentage of Americans believed that Communists were loyal citizens and deserved commensurate rights. This leads to the conclusion that Truman's rhetoric had less effect upon popular fears than Theoharis claims. As Murray Kempton observed, "historians can make the mistake, once they have proved that a speech was made, of going on to the assumption that people paid it much attention."[88]

Another revisionist account, which rejects Theoharis's left-liberal explanation, is Richard M. Freeland's *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*. Freeland argues that in order to safeguard economic and strategic interests on the European continent, the administration perceived the necessity of sending massive economic aid to war-ravaged countries. In securing popular and congressional support for such controversial measures as the Marshall Plan, the President and his advisers initiated an anti-Communist propaganda campaign that nudged the United States into the McCarthy era, and continued with sufficient strength through America's commitment in Vietnam. Freeland explains that this approach did not reflect expedient decisions, shortsighted policies, and mistakes. On the contrary, "the emotional and political forces and the patterns of belief . . . that were to provide the essential energies of postwar anti-communism . . . were aroused and these patterns of behavior developed . . . as a result of a deliberate and highly organized effort by the Truman administration in 1947 and 1948 to mobilize support for the Marshall Plan."[89] The President and his advisers thus emerge as progenitors of "a conscious, purposeful strategy deriving from the dynamics of a politics and ideology of multilateralism and economic internationalism."[90]

Because the administration's foreign policy was determined by a quest for markets to consume expected postwar surpluses, and because it was necessary to create those markets with foreign aid, the government faced a major stumbling block—a conservative Congress unwilling to expend large amounts of capital to rebuild Europe. Unable to persuade Congress of the advisability of foreign aid—a proposed loan to Britain was itself in difficulty in 1946—Truman then placed the issue within the context of deteriorating Soviet-American relations. The tactic proved successful and the President learned an important lesson.

According to Freeland, "no central decision was ever taken by the President or cabinet to use such techniques to support the campaign for Cold War policy."[91] Such a decision was unnecessary, for Truman's top advisers shared his sense of urgency, which was heightened by the reluctance of the 80th Congress and the American people to support foreign aid. The author marshals much evidence to show that the administration moved forcefully to silence its critics, and that its initiatives subsequently generated the fires of McCarthyism. Centering upon the period 1946 to 1948, with an epilogue carrying the story through 1950, Freeland assays well such matters as the Federal Employee Loyalty Program, Attorney General Tom Clark's controversial list of suspected communists, administration attempts to deport "subversive" aliens, high-level support offered the House Un-American Activities Committee, and Truman's strategic release of diplomatic documents revealing apparent Soviet hostility.

Yet despite impressive scholarship, Freeland fails to prove his case. His assertion that the administration did not need to make a central decision to create "a coherent pattern of official behavior" does not jibe with his claim that Truman and his advisers undertook "a deliberate and highly organized effort" to silence their detractors. In addition, the author's assessment of the government leaves the impression of a monolithic structure more rigid than the Kremlin. In arguing that Truman's official circle possessed one mind and a singular set of motives, Freeland is forced to employ circumstantial evidence. The author's contention that Attorney General Clark and J. Edgar Hoover were motivated in their critical attitude toward dissent by the commercial benefits that would accrue from approval of the Marshall Plan is at the least problematic. Even more debatable is

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[86] John Lewis Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" *Foreign Affairs*, 51 (January, 1974), 386–402 at p. 386. The significance of Korea in politics is stressed in Ronald J. Caridi, *The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968).

[87] The phrase is Murray Kempton's. See "Truman and the Beast," *New York Review of Books*, March 11, 1971, p. 6.

[88] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[89] Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and Internal Security, 1946–1948* (New York: Knopf, 1972), pp. 3, 5.

[90] Athan Theoharis, review of Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, in *Journal of American History*, 59 (June, 1972), 218–19.

[91] Freeland, pp. 225–26.

Freeland's suggestion that the administration "manufactured" the war scare of 1948 to engender that ambience of urgency required to secure congressional approval of ERP. A more plausible hypothesis might be that the European situation warranted Truman's concern, while his harsh rhetoric aimed both to alert apathetic citizens and to facilitate his chances in the coming election. There is no doubt that the Czech coup of 1948 and the Soviet move against Berlin "came to Truman's rescue when his political fortunes were at their lowest."[92] But there exists no evidence to demonstrate that the President and his advisers created these incidents; hence Freeland appears to confuse fortuitous occurrences with deliberate conspiracy.

If Freeland minimizes the importance of events that for good reason might have made Americans fear Communist aggression and subversion, he also exaggerates the political utility of anti-communism prior to Dewey's defeat. As Earl Latham indicated in *The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy*, the issue of Communist infiltration in government did not become an important political rallying point until *after* Truman's victory.[93] Only then did conservative Republicans, joined by Southern Democrats, popularize the issue in political terms. One should remember that Truman himself inadvertently placed control of the Communist issue in the hands of Congress when he summoned that body into special session in July 1948. And it would not be until Eisenhower's election four years later that the Communist issue was stripped of its political utility.

Congress's role in the drive for internal security legislation, and Truman's sincere, albeit unsuccessful attempts to defend civil liberties against his conservative adversaries form two basic themes of Alan D. Harper's *The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952.* Harper's positive view of Truman's leadership contrasts sharply with the revisionist contention that the administration's "garrison-state" ideology produced McCarthyism. Admitting that federal review boards often confused loyalty with security and thus acted on suspicions rather than facts, the author nonetheless finds that Truman himself championed the principle of civil liberties, as illustrated by his veto of the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Walter-McCarran Act of 1952. Harper argues from liberal premises, asserting that Stalin's policies initiated the Cold War, that Communist subversion posed a real danger to national security, and that Henry Wallace was duped in 1948 by the CPUSA. Hence it is not surprising that Harper's image of Truman differs markedly from the *diabolus ex machina* encountered in Theoharis's and Freeland's volumes. *The Politics of Loyalty* gives the Chief Executive high marks, both for recognizing that the right's demand for internal security would menace individual liberties, and for attempting to balance arguments from these anti-subversive forces with those by defenders of civil liberties.

That Truman failed in his quest, therefore, should not make one doubt his sense of fairness. Harper notes that the President realized the threat of Communist subversion was exploitable, but as internal problems and external events converged to exacerbate popular anxiety and cast doubt on the administration's Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights, he proved unable to keep the issue from being politicized. The author points to several circumstances beyond Truman's control, which perverted his concern with how the loyalty program functioned and led to the administration's failure to appease hard-line conservatives in Congress. The need to formulate a loyalty-security program within a short period of time, the combination of Soviet gains in Europe and partisan pressures, and the appointment of individuals sympathetic to a broad definition of security resulted in "too much stress on protection against subversion and rather too little on protection of traditional rights."[94] The President's efforts to influence executive departments and agencies administering the program also foundered because of the failure of Democratic leaders in the Senate to maintain discipline within party ranks. This dearth of leadership, together with Truman's dependency upon cabinet officers to formulate and execute policy, ultimately hindered him from dealing effectively with the inconsistencies and wide latitude demonstrated by agencies administering the program.

In contrast to Theoharis and Freeland, who consider Truman uniquely responsible for McCarthyism, and in contrast to Harper, who pictures the President as its victim, Robert Griffith offers a more detached view in *The Politics of Fear:*

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[92] Robert A. Divine, "The Cold War and the Election of 1948," *Journal of American History*, 59 (June, 1972), 90–110 at p. 95.

[93] Earl Latham, *The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 394–99, 422–23. Other important assessments of McCarthyism include Dennis Wrong, "Theories of McCarthyism: A Survey," *Dissent*, 1 (Autumn, 1954), 385–97; David A. Shannon, "Was McCarthy a Political Heir of LaFollette?" *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, 45 (Autumn, 1961), 3–9; Nelson W. Polsby, "Towards an Explanation of McCarthyism," *Political Studies*, 8 (October, 1960), 250–71; Philip C. Chapman, "The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism *vs.* Political Philosophy," *Political Science Quarterly*, 75 (March, 1960), 17–34.

[94] Alan D. Harper, *The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corp., 1969), p. 232.

Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate. Contending that McCarthyism was neither an aberration in American politics, nor the result of an emotional, conspiratorial, mass political binge, Griffith presents a convincing case that the phenomenon represented the continuation of earlier antiradical politics, stimulated by the irresolution and fear of important senators, and facilitated by the decentralized political system. McCarthy's success, Griffith submits, stemmed less from the ethos of the Cold War than from "a political dynamic created during the 1940s by a band of Republican partisans as they scrapped and clawed their way to power."[95]

The Wisconsin Senator's ability to take advantage of the routine features of politics speeded his rise to power. Republicans who valued party loyalty and Senate decorum did not attack him for fear of splitting the GOP. Southern Democrats, who disliked the Fair Deal and northern urban liberalism, joined their colleagues in a conspiracy of silence. Liberal and conservative politicians alike thus made possible both McCarthy's impact and his duration as an anti-Communist leader. Griffith thus indicates that the dynamics of McCarthy's career lay in the irresolution and failures of political elites. His analysis is convincing, and his book is probably the best we shall have for some time. Nonetheless, one regrets the author's failure to assess further the respective roles and priorities of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in this affair. For Truman battled over the best method to oppose communism, first with conservative Republicans and then with McCarthy, and lost both rounds. Eisenhower survived McCarthyism, but in retrospect it seems safe to conclude that the Senator's demise in 1954 did not change the essentials of either the government's or the public's image of the Communist threat. Anticommunism remained an important theme in sustaining popular approval of U.S. foreign policy.

In accounting for liberal complicity in McCarthy's methods and tactics, Griffith might have clarified further the battle between McCarthyites and anti-McCarthyites by emphasizing its concern with anti-Communist means rather than ends. From the outset of his national career, the Wisconsin politician remained an outsider who never secured entrance into the exclusive "club," and whose civil liberties were themselves substantially compromised by the surveillance of all first-class mail sent his residence between October 24 and November 16, 1952. McCarthy's opponents, then, utilized tactics similar to his, just as anti-McCarthyite forces argued from similar assumptions about communism. Murray Kempton has noted that Senator Ralph Flanders of Vermont, who in March 1954 launched the first Republican attack upon his raucous colleague, also feared "a monstrous and diabolic conspiracy against world peace," while the members of the Watkins Committee, the group that censured McCarthy, expressed criticism of Truman's foreign policy and analyzed communism in monolithic and moralistic terms.[96]

The problem of drawing a line of principle between McCarthy and his critics is underlined in a recent collection of original essays, edited by Griffith and Theoharis, which is heavily though not exclusively influenced by revisionist premises and assumptions.[97] Defining McCarthyism as a facet of conventional politics, rooted in the actions and inactions of conservative and liberal elites, the editors note that although the Wisconsin senator did not initiate the postwar Republican battle against executive privilege and secrecy, he came to personify the assault after 1950. Paradoxically, Eisenhower's victory in 1952 did not herald a new era of candor in policy making. On the contrary, the Republicans "abandoned their earlier condemnations of executive secrecy to support executive privilege on national security grounds."[98] According to the editors, the insulation of executive decision making from public scrutiny after McCarthy's fall both produced a more conservative and elitist politics than before, and also "reinforced anti-democratic political procedures."[99] *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism* seeks to explain the sources of "this profound shift in American politics in the post-McCarthy years." Several of the essays deal with groups usually identified with McCarthyism—conservatives, Catholics, and businessmen—while other writers assess the problem of liberal complicity in the repressive politics of the era by analyzing parts played by Americans for Democratic Action, the CIO, and the American Civil Liberties Union. This volume concludes with considerations of several broader themes—the origins of internal-security legislation, the 1950 congressional elections, and McCarthy's utilization of the anti-Communist theme before 1950.

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[95] Griffith, *Politics of Fear*, p. ix. See also two essays by Griffith, "The Political Context of McCarthyism," *Review of Politics*, 33 (January, 1971), 24–35; and "The Politics of Anti-Communism: A Review Article," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, 54 (Summer, 1971), 299–308.

[96] Kempton, "Truman and Beast," p. 12.

[97] Griffith and Theoharis, eds., *The Specter*. The complex relationship between the liberals and McCarthyism is dealt with from three different perspectives in Irving Kristol, " 'Civil Liberties,' 1952—A Study in Confusion," *Commentary*, 13 (March, 1952), 228–36; John Steinke and James Weinstein, "McCarthy and the Liberals," *Studies on the Left*, 2 (1962), 43–50; and Thomas C. Reeves, *Freedom and the Foundation: The Fund for the Republic in the Era of McCarthyism* (New York: Knopf, 1969). See also Mary Sperling McAuliffe, "The Red Scare and the Crisis in American Liberalism, 1947–1954," unpublished dissertation, University of Maryland, 1972; Leslie K. Adler, "The Red Image: American Attitudes Toward Communism in the Cold War Era" (dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1970); Peter H. Irons, "America's Cold War Crusade: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, 1942–1948" (dissertation, Boston University, 1972).

[98] Griffith and Theoharis, eds., p. xii. Other readers on McCarthyism include Thomas C. Reeves, ed., *McCarthyism* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1973); Allen J. Matusow, ed., *Joseph R. McCarthy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970); and Earl Latham, ed., *The Meaning of McCarthyism*, 2nd ed. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973).

[99] Griffith and Theoharis (eds.), p. xiii.

In contrast, Michael Parenti discerns no shift to a more elitist politics in the post-McCarthy era. His book, *The Anti-Communist Impulse*, defines anti-communism as nothing less than a national purpose and national ideology. Parenti condemns this "impulse," alleging that since 1947 it has led policy makers to ignore diversity and competition within Communist systems, and to interpret all of them as a threat to the American way of life. Furthermore, he asserts that anti-Communist leaders have wrongfully stressed the innocence and beneficence of American motives and actions, at the same time that they have undermined the nation's commitment to freedom, prevented the resolution of severe domestic problems, and contributed to a disastrous foreign policy of global counter-revolution.

A revisionist diatribe, *The Anti-Communist Impulse* demonstrates how "selective historical evidence, in addition to the trappings of scholarship, can attempt to create a new [historical] orthodoxy that is even more self-righteous and mentally restricting than the old one."[100] Because his research centers upon a narrow range of revisionist studies, Parenti does not add to our understanding of the historical origins of American anti-communism nor of the variety of forms it assumed in postwar American politics. Like Theoharis and Freeland, he tends to confuse all variations of anti-communism with McCarthyism, leaving little room for appreciating the political and diplomatic dilemmas facing Truman and American liberals during the first decade of the Cold War.

Beyond the New Deal

It is to these dilemmas that Alonzo L. Hamby turns in his important study of the Truman presidency. *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism* provides an impressive defense of postwar liberalism and ranks with Gaddis's volume in its judicious use of sources, multidimensional framework, and temperate conclusions. No Cold Warrior, Hamby emerges as a qualified champion of postwar, "Vital Center" liberalism, a philosophical amalgam of ethics and expediency that rejected totalitarianism of the left and right and helped preserve New Deal values and aspirations in adverse times.[101]

Although admitting that some liberal politicians and intellectuals compromised their integrity when threatened by popular preoccupation with communism, Hamby finds no evidence to indicate that the liberal community either created McCarthyism or encouraged it. On the contrary, most liberals "refrained from character assassination and defended fundamental liberties."[102] Right-wing anti-communism was well established before the emergence of the non-Communist Vital Center, and would have "achieved its McCarthy-era strength earlier had the Popular Front continued to dominate the liberal movement."[103] Stressing the reluctance with which most liberals embraced the Cold War, Hamby demonstrates that the Vital Center's success in isolating Popular Frontism during the campaign of 1948 actually helped Truman to wage and win an election based on a platform of liberal reform. Not until 1950, when the Korean War refired an anti-Communist extremism that might otherwise have sputtered out, did the Vital Center—and the administration's social welfare program—become politically vulnerable.

Beyond the New Deal also questions the assumption—made by revisionists and nonrevisionists alike—that the administration's Cold War policies sabotaged domestic reform. Hamby contends that this hypothesis has yet to be proved in practical terms. Nor does the argument take into account how tremendous the barriers to reform would have been had the Cold War not occurred. By 1938 the conservative coalition in Congress had blunted the legislative thrust of the New Deal, while the war-induced economic boom served paradoxically to strengthen popular desires to secure and protect gains made during the mid-1930s.[104] In arguing that the Cold War stifled reform impulses, revisionists have wrongly assumed that "ongoing reform was the normal condition of politics," thus missing the effect of earlier developments upon the fate of Truman's programs.[105]

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[100] Robert K. Murray, review of Michael Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse*, in *American Historical Review*, 76 (June, 1971), 844.

[101] See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949).

[102] Hamby, *Beyond New Deal*, pp. 400–01, 507.

[103] *Ibid.*, pp. 507, 509–10.

[104] An indispensable analysis of the development of domestic political constraints during the prewar era is James T. Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939* (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1967). The effects of World War II are discussed in Richard Polenberg, *War and Society: The United States, 1941–1945* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1972); Richard Polenberg, ed., *America at War: The Home Front, 1941–1945* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968); and Donald R. McCoy, "Republican Opposition During Wartime, 1941–1945," *Mid-America*, 49 (July 1967), 174–89. A first-rate bibliographical survey is Jim F. Heath, "Domestic America During World War II: Research Opportunities for Historians," *Journal of American History*, 58 (September, 1971), 384–414.

Although administration preoccupation with foreign affairs did divert attention from the Fair Deal, Hamby explains that "international hostilities, hot or cold, are not necessarily inimical to reform causes."[106] The civil rights movement, for example, received a stimulus when the Korean War transformed into reality the President's earlier order desegregating the U.S. Army. In a broader sense the Cold War made it imperative that the administration move forcefully in the area of civil rights legislation. Here, Hamby concurs with recent studies by Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten, and by Richard M. Dalfiume, who take pains not to read the "Black Power" demands of the late 1960s into the history of the late 1940s.[107] Hamby points out that Truman's vacillation on integration must not be interpreted as the personal failure of a man of narrow vision, but rather as the President's recognition of the need to de-emphasize a volatile political issue. Truman's record actually reveals great personal growth and major contributions to the cause of equal justice.

Hamby recaptures a perspective on the postwar era that has been submerged in recent years. Contrary to revisionist accounts, he argues that in the main Truman and Vital Center liberals reaffirmed strongly the nation's progressive tradition. The President not only defended the New Deal in a hostile environment; he also presided over its integration within the national consensus. To adjust the depression-generated New Deal tradition to a climate of postwar affluence was a difficult task, made more troublesome by Truman's inability to achieve a relationship of trust with leading liberals. The latter accepted his direction grudgingly, and had difficulty seeing beyond his gaudy sportshirts, past association with the Pendergast Machine, and undeleted expletives.

In comparison to Roosevelt, Truman fared poorly with the postwar liberal community. But Hamby considers such a comparison "loaded." Truman may not have been among the best and the brightest, but neither was he, as David Lilienthal averred at FDR's death, a "Throttlebottom."[108] Truman recognized his personal limitations, and he soon understood the numerous internal constraints upon his power as Chief Executive. A realist, according to Hamby, the President fashioned a legislative program that—like his own career—"reflected the course of the mainstream of the Democratic Party in the twentieth century."[109] As he sought to identify with issues that would appeal to the most important segments of his party, his sense of fair play and empathy helped nudge him toward more liberal policies. And if he never achieved the liberal support accorded FDR, he did function, especially after 1948, "with varying degrees of acceptance as a liberal leader."[110] With the exception of the Brannan Plan, Truman recognized that his was a mandate not for change, but for the continuation and consolidation of Roosevelt's policies. And although revisionist writers have emphasized the barrenness of his legislative record—failure to strengthen FEPC, to repeal Taft-Hartley, to augment federal aid to education, and to secure a national health insurance program—achievements in the field of public power and social security nonetheless made the 81st Congress the most liberal in a decade.

Hamby's book marks a suitable point at which to conclude this survey of the most contentious battleground in current American historiography. With three decades' perspective and a burgeoning literature from which to draw, historians have begun to formulate issues upon which future writers will no doubt center their research and their disputes. The New Left revisionists have played an important role in this process, and will continue to do so. To their credit, the revisionists have focused much-needed attention upon the domestic context of foreign policy. They have challenged the prevailing model of diplomatic historians, which treats domestic sources of external policy as "exogenous variables, alien influences leading to irrational and hence potentially dangerous courses of action."[111] The revisionists have sought to demonstrate that foreign policy does not always reflect decisions made by men in rational pursuit of the national interest. New Left writers have suggested, in fact, that the criteria both for developing and assessing policy derive from this nation's leading institutions. And to varying degrees, these historians have illuminated the dynamics of society—especially the effects of social status and career experience upon policy makers; the links between the country's basic needs and its recent economic, political, and military policies; and the growth in importance of the presidency, federal bureaucracy, and an elite cadre of national security managers.[112]

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[105] Hamby, *Beyond New Deal*, p. 510.

[106] *Ibid.*, pp. 510–11.

[107] See Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten, *Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration* (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1973); Richard M. Dalfiume, *Desegregation of the Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939–1953* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969). More critical interpretations are offered in William C. Berman, *The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1970); Barton J. Bernstein, "The Ambiguous Legacy: The Truman Administration and Civil Rights," in *Politics and Policies*, ed. B. J. Bernstein, pp. 269–314; and Harvard Sitkoff, "Harry Truman and the Election of 1948: The Coming of Age of Civil Rights in American Politics," *Journal of Southern History*, 37 (November, 1971), 597–616.

[108] *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal: The TVA Years, 1939–1945* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 690. On Truman's relationship with the liberal community, see also Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Liberals, Truman, and FDR as Symbol and Myth," *Journal of American History*, 56 (March, 1970), 859–67.

[109] Hamby, *Beyond New Deal*, p. 508.

[110] *Ibid.*, p. 509. Agreeing with Hamby, J. Joseph Huthmacher contends that the "liberals' 'holding action' during the Truman years proved successful, but in addition . . . the frontiers of social responsibility were enlarged." See Huthmacher's superb biography, *Senator Robert F. Wagner and the Rise of Urban Liberalism* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), pp. 342–43.

Yet if the revisionists have expanded the horizons of diplomatic historians by suggesting how society helped contribute to foreign policy making during the postwar era, many revisionist premises and conclusions remain debatable. Most writers on the left have adopted almost an exclusively American point of view in their analyses. This manifestation of what D. W. Brogan termed "the illusion of American omnipotence" accords the U.S. too much responsibility for the globe's myriad ills, while underestimating or discounting the ability of other nations to initiate developments affecting the international balance of power. In addition, in their emphasis upon institutional dynamics, the more radical revisionists overlook the extent to which elements of personality affected events. Although issues of domestic and foreign policy—and the forces that precipitated them—often transcended the purposes and preoccupations of Truman and his advisers, those issues invariably found expression in the unpredictable and often chaotic realm of personal motivation and choices made by fallible men. Thus we are reminded that historians must not forget that policies are made by men, not abstractions, and are the product of unique beliefs, principles, ambitions, and patterns of behavior. This "personal equation" seems especially important in Truman's case, for the Missourian is the only president since 1929 who entered the White House without inherited wealth or social position, who possessed no personal fortune, and who did not ally himself—personally or professionally—with the upper crust of society.

If revisionists have not delighted in remembering Harry Truman (as Clinton Rossiter predicted historians would), neither have they accepted the thirty-third President on his own terms. Their accounts have criticized him, in fact, for failing to accomplish results that would have exceeded the abilities of any President, party, or social movement in recent history. Rather than depending upon their own criteria for assessing change, therefore, historians must empathize with their protagonists, judging their policies in terms of the alternatives and options they faced at the time. Hindsight, after all, is not foresight, although much revisionist historiography seems to ignore this historical canon.

At this time, the literature on the Truman years supports J. Joseph Huthmacher's observation that "whatever verdict history may in the end pronounce on the state of the American system, it is clear that Harry Truman will not bear the sole responsibility for it."[113] One may argue to the contrary, of course, pointing out that Truman reversed FDR's policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union and slammed shut the door of negotiation and compromise. One may also fault the administration for not moving significantly beyound the achievements of the New Deal. It is true that interest politics remained supreme during the Truman presidency, and that the groups which achieved success did so through organizing, lobbying, and demanding political recognition. It is also true that the forgotten men and women of the Depression—the urban poor, "unmeltable" ethnic minorities, rural sharecroppers, and residents of Appalachia—remained two decades later denizens of what Michael Harrington designated "the other America."[114]

Many historians would agree that as Chief Executive Truman sought to minimize conflict and to evade divisive issues, assuming (with much historical precedent) that time would adjudicate major difficulties in America's favor. But to an extent not appreciated by his detractors, Truman entered the White House a captive of his predecessor's policies, of his own perceptions of the requirements of a bipolar international order, and of a formidable set of domestic constraints. An inheritor more than a creator of the issues he faced during his years in office, Truman defined politics as the art of the possible—which was not surprising considering his own conservative temperament and his political experience at local, state, and national levels.

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[111] Thomas A. Krueger, "The Social Origins of Recent American Foreign Policy," *Journal of Social History*, 7 (Fall, 1973), 93–101 at p. 93.

[112] See, for example, David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972); Richard J. Barnet, *Roots of War* (New York: Atheneum, 1972); Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World* (New York: World, 1968), pp. 3–46; G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circle: The Governing Class in America* (New York: Random House, 1970); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).

[113] J. Joseph Huthmacher, ed., *The Truman Years: The Reconstruction of Postwar America* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden, 1972), p. 11. An important source for the postwar era is Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, eds., *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

[114] Michael Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1962).

Truman's reputation dipped dramatically during the 1960s, and his place in history will be debated for many years. The positive reception accorded the books by Hamby and Gaddis suggests that the pendulum is again swinging in Truman's favor—a movement that may be accelerated by current preoccupation with the "imperial presidency," dishonesty in government circles, and the high price paid by political candidates to manufacture charismatic images. When compared with this dreary panorama, the plain-speaking Missourian's personal qualities seem refreshing. He had no illusions about his image. He did not worry about his place in history. He made decisions in keeping with his understanding of history and his long party experience. And he impressed contemporaries with his intelligence, decisiveness, and loyalty. Truman's integrity—and his old-fashioned candor—may yet help in removing the tarnish left by the events of the 1960s.

Political Participation in America: A Review Essay*

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Political participation is an important subject in any democratic state. Who participates, in what ways, why, and with what effect are all topics of concern to the theorist and politician and, hopefully, to the everyday citizen. Many of our ideas on participation, so prominently displayed in the literature, were not empirically tested until survey methodology was developed in the post-World War II period. The pioneering work of the Columbia and Michigan election studies, in particular, cast doubt on the theorist's assumption of an enlightened and involved citizenry. Other research studies contributed further data and fact, continuing to reduce our uncertainty about what political participation meant to the individual. In 1972, what was heralded as the all-embracing study on participation was published: Sidney Verba and Norman Nie's *Participation in America*. Based on survey material collected from a national sample of the electorate in 1967, this study attempted to examine the entire Eastonian model as applied to participation—the ways people participate in politics (the system or process), and the causes (inputs) and consequences (outputs) of this participation. The following is a summary of Verba and Nie's major substantive and empirical findings with a later review of them in light of the conceptual and analytic techniques they employ, the past literature in the field, and the recent developments in our political system.

An Overview

Verba and Nie believe there are four fundamental ways that people can participate in politics to influence the government: voting, campaigning, communal activity, and particularized contacting. Voting and campaigning are self-explanatory; communal activity is group participation aimed at contributing to the community or public good; and particularized contacting is individual interaction with a public official to achieve some personal or self-interest goal. Each of these "modes" of participation is considered to be substantively and empirically distinct from the others. In addition to the differences implicit in the acts themselves, each act also has a different combination of values on the following criteria: the scope of the outcome expected from the participatory act, the initiative required for the act, and the amount of conflict associated with it (p. 73). As a result, people with different political orientations and goals tend to engage in different kinds of participatory acts (pp. 118–119). The different acts, whether viewed separately or combined into an overall index of political activity, reveal higher levels of participation than previous research studies have demonstrated.

Several factors cause individuals to participate in politics at different rates. First and foremost in the Verba-Nie analysis is social class: upper-class people participate more in politics than lower-class people. Variables widening the participatory gap between upper- and lower-class individuals include political beliefs (especially conservative beliefs among upper-class Republicans), political party affiliation, and affiliation with voluntary associations. The one variable narrowing the status gap in participation is race: "group consciousness" among blacks motivates them to participate more than would have been predicted from their class backgrounds. Community size and relative isolation also have independent effects on participation rates, the smaller, relatively isolated communities having a norm structure and physical environment which encourages higher political activity.

The social class analysis has implications for the consequences of participation. The obvious inference is that the views of the upper class will tend to be overrepresented because they are politically more active. Since they favor different issues and solutions to problems than members of the lower class do, their increased activity could lead to an upper-class bias in elite decision making. Supplemental interview materials collected from political leaders of small communities show that elites tend to perceive the same issue and problem priorities as upper-class participators, although the representational link varies with the rate of participation and the consensual/nonconsensual nature of the community. Upper-class individuals have greater representational advantages in low and moderately active communities which are nonconsensual, and they lose some of these advantages as communities achieve higher participation rates and become more harmonious in their opinions.

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* *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality.* Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Pp. 428. $10.00.)

Many of the Verba-Nie findings, on the surface, do not appear particularly novel. All of the four modes of participation have been mentioned before by past researchers. Class, party, issue, voluntary association, and racial determinants of participation have been empirically explored elsewhere. Upper-class bias in elite decision making has been a prevalent theme in the literature since at least the time of Matthews's book, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers.*[1] The novelty in the Verba-Nie study seems to reside in the following important areas. First, the authors are unique in viewing the four modes of participation as theoretically distinct behaviors, engaging different people with different political orientations and goals. Second, their data analysis is a painstakingly detailed and sophisticated multivariate treatment. Whereas other studies have dealt with similar variables, the analysis techniques previously used have rarely progressed beyond simple bivariate or "control table" explanations of the data. Third, the Verba-Nie project is one of the few studying the consequences of behavior which has collected data from both the mass and the elite. Fourth, and most important, the Verba-Nie study explores participation from all its angles—its nature, frequency, causes, and effects. Most previous research on participation was done in bits and pieces, necessitating the cataloging and synthesizing work of such people as Lane[2] and Milbrath.[3] The Verba-Nie break in this trend shows the analytic potential of studying the modes, causes, and consequences of participation in the same research project. The question of how Verba and Nie conceptually and empirically treat each of these aspects of participation, and with what success, must now be examined.

Modes of Participation

Verba and Nie view participation, for the purposes of this book, as instrumental activity aimed at influencing the government. They believe theoretically, and they assert they prove empirically, that four distinct ways of participating exist in this "instrumental" context. The implicit inference is that these four modes represent the only types of participation which have meaning to substantial numbers of people. While these types or modes represent a useful distinction, the fact that Verba and Nie discover these particular four and no others in their data analysis is hardly surprising, given their analytic techniques. When one asks some fifteen questions on participation dealing with only the substantive areas of voting, campaigning, communal activity, and particularized contacting and then factor analyzes their intercorrelations, one would assume that the factor analysis would uncover some, if not all, of these dimensions of activity. The factor analysis might uncover fewer than four dimensions if the distinctions between modes were not as important as Verba and Nie thought, or it might uncover more than four dimensions if what Verba and Nie viewed as one mode actually broke up into two, but the crucial point is that the authors would not get additional modes which were substantively different from voting, campaigning, communal activity, and particularized contacting because they did not ask questions about them. Dimensional results, it is well-known, are dependent on the number and kinds of questions asked. If one were to include questions on other substantive areas of activity (some of which will be suggested below), further dimensions could conceivably have resulted. In general, while the authors have in a strict sense tested a legitimate hypothesis, it seems difficult to see how it could fail. All of this leads to the conclusion that, while Verba and Nie have uncovered four dimensions of activity which are important, they are by no means the only four —or even necessarily the most important set of four—activities which have meaning to the electorate.

Two types of participation which seem to have been left out of the Verba-Nie scheme are "interest-group activity" and "protest behavior." These are serious omissions because each has had profound effects on influencing the government—interest-group activity since the origin of organized politics in America, and protest behavior in the last decade or so with the civil rights, Vietnam, and draft demonstrations. Neither of these activities fits either of the group-oriented modes of participation—communal or campaign activity—as Verba and Nie have defined them. In fact, what is conspicuously lacking from the Verba-Nie typology are group participation modes which are characterized by either economic motivation or mass demonstration methods. Economics alone has motivated much participation aimed at influencing the government. Individuals participate in such interest groups as trade unions, farm organizations, and veterans' groups with an underlying economic motivation in mind, but, ironically, the only time Verba and Nie mention such groups as these is in the context of communal activity aimed at contributing to the public good. While Verba and Nie do not discuss it, individuals in these groups can and often do help in political campaigns, but the important point, of course, is that they participate through their groups in many ways, other than just campaigning, to influence the economic policies of government. While economics is a prime motivator for some people to participate, major issues and events attract still others. In recent years, several issues and events have prompted new forms of mass participation, but protest activities and demonstrations are not mentioned at all in the Verba-Nie book. To be fair, Verba and Nie state that their focus is limited to activities "within the system" (p. 3), but much of what is called "protest behavior" has been perceived in just this way. A study by Milbrath has documented the view that much protest behavior is oriented toward within-system participation and change. Milbrath has also found that people engaging in protest behavior participate in what would be called "conventional" ways as well.[4] Not including protest behavior as a mode of participation is unfortunate since, during the last fifteen years, it has represented one of the main developments in the political system and also one of the prime shapers of elite decision making. The neglect also of interest-group activity is puzzling since it has long been considered to be a legitimate form of participation which has had effects on the system. All in all, the addition of questions to the Verba-Nie study in the "protest" and "interest-group" areas might well have uncovered two further dimensions of activity with important consequences for elite decision making. Failure to add questions in these and other possibly relevant areas means that the Verba-Nie book on "participation in America" deals with only certain aspects of this complex subject.

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[1] Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954).

[2] Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959).

[3] Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

What Verba and Nie do cover in their book is, however, an important part of the participation phenomenon. The four modes of participation are meaningful activities to people. Verba and Nie maintain that they are distinct behaviors as defined by the criteria mentioned earlier and that they attract different kinds of people. The definitions they use in the beginning of the book, however, do not always fit the discussion and data analysis that follow. For example, sometimes one has the feeling that those participating in communal activities (the "communalists") are more motivated by self-interest than by altruistic concerns. Perhaps this group-oriented mode, in reality, encompasses a more eclectic set of orientations and motivations than Verba and Nie's definition presumes. Also, at times, the "communalists" and "campaigners" seem to resemble each other in their beliefs and orientations, although Verba and Nie maintain that communalists are basically involved in nonconflictual activities aimed at contributing to the public good while campaigners are enmeshed in conflictual behavior aimed at gaining a partisan advantage. Most central, however, is whether people basically engage in one of these modes of activity to the virtual exclusion of the others. While the authors allow some flexibility in their system (e.g., almost all types of participators can vote), their definitions are sufficiently distinct to provide a clear test of this hypothesis. Intuitively one would expect considerable overlap of activity among people, especially since Verba and Nie's own data analysis in chapter 2 shows people engaging in more participatory acts than past researchers had thought. Despite this finding, Verba and Nie demonstrate that their main hypothesis has considerable validity. About 60 per cent of their sample could be unambiguously classified into one of six "participator categories" based on the four modes of participation (the six "participator categories" being the "voting specialists," "campaigners," "communalists," "parochial participants," as well as the "inactives" and "complete activists"). Another 21 per cent were borderline cases but, with some reservations, could be classified as well. These results, while not covering everyone satisfactorily, tend to indicate that people basically limit their political participation to just one kind of activity.[5] The corollary argument of Verba and Nie that different activities are engaged in by different kinds of people also has some merit, although the extent to which communalists and campaigners have distinctive characters is questionable at certain places in the book. While these ideas are interesting and partially proven, analysis tests using political issues as data will be needed in future studies to completely confirm the hypotheses of the Verba-Nie study.[6] But for the moment, the summary picture appears to be one of definable and fairly isolated behaviors of given groups of people, discounting some of the previous notions about "gladiators" and the cumulative nature of political participation.

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[4] Personal communication from Lester W. Milbrath (October 15, 1974). Also see Lester W. Milbrath, "Individuals and the Polity: Patterns of Linkages," in Kurt Back, ed., *Social Psychology* (New York: John Wiley, forthcoming).

[5] By "one kind of activity" is meant a single mode which is participated in with considerable frequency. In their classification scheme, Verba and Nie allow "communalists" and "campaigners" to vote as well. "Voting specialists" only vote, and "parochial participants" only engage in particularized contacting. "Inactives" engage in none of the four modes of activity, and "complete activists" engage in all activities but particularized contacting. The latter come closest to the "gladiator" concept and the idea of cumulative participation, but they make up only 9 per cent of the sample (p. 396). Percentages of people in each "participator category" are taken from Appendix F, pages 394–397, of the Verba-Nie book. See Table 4–8 on page 78 of the Verba-Nie book for a summary of the activity profiles of these six "participator categories."

[6] Analysis tests using political issues would tell which kinds of issues attract such people as "communalists" and "campaigners." Verba and Nie assume that nonconflictual community or public good issues attract communalists while conflictual, partisan, and ideological issues attract campaigners, but this assumption is never empirically tested. If the data do not show such patterns, much of what Verba and Nie say about the distinct characters of communalists and campaigners would have to be retracted.

The levels of participation in these modes are considered by Verba and Nie to be higher than past studies have shown. If these levels are accurate estimates of activity, then the picture of the participating citizenry that Verba and Nie present would be an improvement over the more pessimistic assessments of the past. What should make us cautious about this finding is the way the participation questions are asked. Most of these questions employ a longer time frame which allows many occasionally active citizens to qualify as "participants" in contrast to the more time-specific questions of earlier studies which were oriented toward activity in a given election campaign. "Have you ever done this?" or "In the last 3 or 4 years have you done this?" are the types of questions which are most likely to elicit participatory responses.[7] There are areas, however, in which the Verba-Nie figures may have face validity—those involving participation in the local community. The Verba-Nie study places great emphasis on local modes of activity—communal involvement and particularized contacting—and these may be the areas in which people participate more readily than one might normally expect. Unfortunately, the questions on local participation employ the most liberal of Verba and Nie's time referents, making it impossible to separate out the effects of question wording from those of a more involved citizenry at the local level. If we adjust the participation figures downward for the various modes, it seems that, contrary to the Verba-Nie study, the scenario of the past still holds: that people mainly vote and do little else. Perhaps people participate in a few other activities over a long span of time, but probably politics is much more peripheral to people than Verba and Nie believe.[8] Problems arising out of the local community may motivate a person to participate from time to time, simply because problems seem more manageable and easier to influence at that level. But for the most part our society has evolved a complex division of labor which leaves politics mainly to elected and appointed officials and the day-to-day concerns of life to the rest of us. This division of labor allows most people to regard politics as only a remote activity, to be entrusted to public officials as their duty. Only when times are bad does the ordinary citizen allow politics to intrude into his life-space as a central concern.

Causes and Consequences

Regardless of the actual level of participation in the United States, different people do participate at different rates. What causes people to take varying postures toward participation has long fascinated political scientists. Verba and Nie study several such causes, but the dominant theme of their analysis is social class. The treatment of social class as a determinant of participation often raises more questions than it answers. This "social variable" stands for a variety of different life experiences which are the real causal factors of note. But which of these experiences? The answer to this question is crucial. Only a detailed probing of socialization processes and psychological perceptions associated with these experiences can provide us with an adequate understanding of this variable and its relation to political participation. Depicting the statistical relationship between class and participation (with or without the intervening variable of civic attitudes) is not enough—it merely represents the starting point in any analysis. Another point of some concern is the way in which the authors perform their multivariate analysis of the determinants of participation. They use class as a baseline model against which to measure the effects of other variables on participation (these other effects seen as deviations from the effects of the class model). To use class as a baseline model assumes substantial relationships between it and participation, but Verba and Nie show that social class explains only between 5 and 14 per cent of the variance in participation (pp. 131–132). Correlating successive variables (such as race, party affiliation, etc.) against participation scores corrected for class effects may be a useful technique to show, in steps, how these various factors deviate in their effects from a class model. Nevertheless, one also wishes that the authors had put all causal factors (including class) into one multiple regression equation in order to get a precise state-

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There is another aspect of this problem which is also interesting to explore. Some of these nonconflictual issues aimed at contributing to the public good may change over time into more conflictual and partisan issues in which sides are taken. If this happens, do the communalists withdraw from what now appears to be a conflictual situation or do they continue to cling to the issue as it is newly formed and hence fight for its support in an arena joined by campaigners? Empirical tests on this score would show to what extent communalists and campaigners withdraw from or join an issue as it changes its political character. Since many issues change from public support to conflictual bases over time, this example is probably not as isolated or trivial as it might first appear.

[7] The wording of the participation questions is found on pages 351–355 of the Verba-Nie book. The marginals for these questions are also listed there as well as on page 31.

[8] "Interest-group" and "protest" behavior are probably also peripheral activities to most Americans. Even though protests often take the form of mass demonstrations, probably very few people, in percentage terms, ever engage in such behavior.

ment of their explanatory weights relative to one another as well as an overall summary of the percentage of variance explained by all these factors combined. The latter statistic would give us a good idea of just how much of the "causal waterfront" Verba and Nie have covered and what yet remains to be done.

In general, Verba and Nie study sociological causes of participation more than psychological ones. Probably this orientation represents a conviction that social variables are better able to explain participation conceptually and more likely to account for the variance in such behavior statistically, although earlier remarks in this essay point to weak elements in this position. Class, race, party, community, and organization variables are undoubtedly important choices for analysis, but one's psychological response to politics is at least as crucial. While Verba and Nie do look at "civic attitudes" and the "group consciousness" of blacks, they do little else in the psychological area. Probably a major reason for this neglect—other than the conviction expressed above—is that the authors wished to study the causes of participation in a neutral setting, a setting removed from the short-term stimuli of an election year and people's psychological reactions to these stimuli. Studying participation in an election year, however, would have considerably enriched our theory of causes, since the nature and extent of participation in America is shaped both by the social characteristics forming long-term dispositions toward politics and by the character of short-term forces acting on these dispositions.[9] The first set of variables—the causal determinants of people's basic dispositions toward politics—is represented by some of the social-structural factors that Verba and Nie study; the second set of variables is associated with the Michigan studies of people's psychological reactions to the candidates and issues of the moment, as well as to the "state of the times."[10] The Michigan-based variables can play an important part in the participation process—either interacting with the social variables in inducing people to participate or else causing such behavior independently, thereby increasing the participation levels already produced by these social factors and long-term dispositions. The Michigan scholars have studied these variables only in an electoral context, but one imagines that psychological reactions to these stimuli could lead as well to other forms of participation such as protest demonstrations, interest-group activity, and communal behavior. When combined, the two sets of variables dictate the basic dispositions and orientations that the individual brings to the political situation as well as the short-term stimuli to participate that the situation provides.

Although neglecting short-term psychological variables, Verba and Nie's study of long-term factors yields certain benefits. Measuring the impact of long-term factors from a baseline class model—despite the limitations noted above—can enrich our understanding of how sociological characteristics and basic dispositions relate to one another in causing people to participate, and this knowledge can help to amend and refine past research findings. For example, while it has long been known that blacks participate less because of their socioeconomic backgrounds, Verba and Nie show that feelings of group consciousness and organizational activity help to counteract the dampening effects of low status. The potential of this finding is enormous. As the authors note, if blacks can further develop these two attributes, which are themselves interrelated, they can continue to increase significantly their participation levels and hence better aid their cause in the future. On the other hand, Verba and Nie find that organizational affiliation and especially the factors associated with it—activity and political discussion in the organization—increase the status disparity in participation among whites. Upper-class whites not only participate with greater frequency than lower-class whites because of their class backgrounds, but they also join organizations more which influence them to participate at still higher rates. While the effects of class and organizations have been noted before,

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[9] Of course, psychological variables should also be studied in a non-electoral context, such as the Verba-Nie study provides. One imagines that feelings of political trust, attitudes toward the issues and the "state of the times," and group loyalties, for example, play a part in influencing political participation in non-election settings. The important point made here is that psychological variables probably have a greater explanatory role when studied in election settings. The salience of politics among people is simply higher with an approaching election, and people are usually more aware of their political attitudes and feelings at this time and more likely to be affected by them.

[10] The reader may recall that Verba and Nie study the political beliefs of people. What they mean by "political beliefs" seems quite different from the Michigan concept of "election issues." Political beliefs seem to be more general and long-term postures toward politics, such as ideologies or attitude structures, while the Michigan concept refers to short-term stimuli unique to a given election. Verba and Nie include in their study of political beliefs general questions on social welfare, economic inequality, and civil rights (p. 225), which have not, in general, been the specific issues of importance to people in the elections of the last decade. The Michigan studies, on the other hand, let the people define what the important issues are in any campaign, the issues which can motivate people to participate who might not otherwise do so. These issues can and do change from election to election, as do candidates and their personality appeal and feelings about the "state of the times." When these factors emerge and gain salience, people respond by participating in elections, protest demonstrations, interest-group organizations, and communal activities.

Verba and Nie have revealed how organizational effects relate to the effects of the baseline class model. What still is puzzling, though, is the political nature of these organizations. For instance, how can one justifiably view all voluntary associations—which run the gamut from sports and hobby clubs to school and political groups—as influencing participation?[11] It seems that some of these groups have little manifest or latent relationship to anything "political" and would rarely promote discussion or activity of a political nature. And second, why do Verba and Nie believe that all these organizations basically engage in the same kind of political activity? Some organizations may engage in only communal activity, but surely some also engage in activities which are more conflictual, self-oriented, and partisan in character. Of course, some groups are probably not political at all, engaging in none of the activities Verba and Nie or I believe to be political. While not resolving the exact nature of these organizations or the influences they have, Verba and Nie find another variable—political beliefs—which also increases the participation of upper-class whites. Upper-class whites, especially Republicans, tend to have conservative views on politics, and these beliefs motivate them to higher participation rates than their class backgrounds alone would indicate. Since these political beliefs, in Verba and Nie's formulation, represent basic dispositions rather than short-term issue positions, they would exert a highly stable effect over time on participation rates. This finding, however, does not explain why upper-class Democrats—many of whom are liberal—are not motivated by their particular political beliefs. It would seem that liberal views, if as intensely held as conservative views, should have some effect on participation rates. Quite possibly, by not studying protest behavior, Verba and Nie miss one area in which liberal views have an important influence on participation rates.

A last causal variable that Verba and Nie study is the type of community in which political participation takes place. They report that smaller communities—especially if they are relatively distinct and autonomous units—have an important influence on participation rates. Verba and Nie refer to these communities as "bounded" because physically they have clear boundaries separating them from other communities and demographically they encompass most of the economic, social, and political life of their residents. Included in this classification are many of the communities which Verba and Nie feel are becoming rarer and rarer in American society—the rural community, village, and isolated town or city.[12] While representing only a small part of the American population, these communities distinguish themselves by having fairly high rates of political activity. They engage in voting and campaigning at respectable rates, and they particularly emphasize communal activity and other forms of local participation. This discovery by Verba and Nie of the influence small communities have on participation seems to run counter to some of the notions regarding the "nationalization of politics."[13] Theories on the nationalization of politics contend that the distinctive character and influence of the local community has largely been eroded in the last 50 to 100 years. The development of the mass media, in particular, has led people to increasingly focus their attention on national politics and the modes of activity associated with it, voting and campaigning. The media have also provided the national stimuli and influences which are supposed to shape most people's political behavior today. Part of this theory has been empirically tested by Stokes using vote turnout data from congressional districts.[14] While congressional districts are not the same unit of analysis as Verba and Nie's small communities, in some ways they can be considered to resemble one another. Stokes finds a progressive nationalization of influences bearing on the vote and, by inference, the campaign associated with it over the last century. In the face of this evidence, Verba and Nie seem to have evidence of their own which shows that voting and campaign participation are influenced by the local community as well. More importantly, Verba and Nie also show the marked influence small communities have on communal participation, a finding seemingly at odds with the picture of an era preoccupied more with national than with local politics.[15] Perhaps the influence of the local community is not as weakened by these nationalizing trends as originally thought, or else the small community stands as the last element of resistance to such trends. While all the answers are not known, the differences between the Verba-Nie and Stokes analyses highlight the fundamental question of what forces motivate political participation in any particular community. Obviously, further study of both nationalizing trends and local political influences is needed to clear up some basic questions about causality and the relative explanatory power of these two forces.

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[11] For a list of these organizations, see pages 178–179 in the Verba-Nie book.

[12] The community characteristics "boundedness" and "isolation" are related, although a community which is "bounded" does not have to be "isolated," but the converse most usually is true.

[13] Verba and Nie also realize this problem in their book (see chapter 13), but they phrase the question somewhat differently from the treatment here.

[14] Donald E. Stokes, "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces," in *The American Party Systems*, ed. William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 182–202.

[15] At times this reviewer has trouble viewing communal activity as political participation. Political participation, as Verba and Nie define it, is activity aimed at influencing the government (p. 2). Certainly some people view communal activity in this way, but others contribute to the community good without ever thinking to (or having to) influence governmental officials in the process. Residents of small communities, in particular, would often seem to be preoccupied with "friends-and-neighbors" communal activities which are not associated in any way with politics. Feelings of "duty to community" and "community spirit" may motivate many to participate in communal affairs who never engage in any political activity to influence the government.

While the study of causes is important, the most crucial aspect of participation is its consequences. Individual participation must be shown to influence politicians and the government in order for the study of participation to move beyond the purely descriptive level of accumulating "knowledge for knowledge's sake." If individual participation does not influence government, what is the justification for studying this subject beyond merely describing people's behavior? Recognizing this as their central concern, Verba and Nie define participation for their study as instrumental activity to influence the government. But *does* participation influence governmental officials? In some ways, the data Verba and Nie use to test this proposition are limited in what they can tell us. They are, first of all, limited to interviews of political elites in small communities (under 50,000 in population), and they focus only on local issues and problems. Second, they are confined to elite perceptions of the salience and priority of issues, not including actual elite decisions which would have been a better data source for testing the notion of "successful" mass influence on the government. Given scarce resources and the pioneering effort required to move into the "consequences" area with both elite and mass data collections, perhaps this is all that could be asked of any study at this stage in the research game.

Verba and Nie use the data they have to report one major research finding: that upper-class participators and political elites tend to mention the same issues and problems as being important to the community. Such a finding suggests support for Matthews's earlier views but does not completely indicate whether participation influences politicians. For instance, one wonders if this congruency in the mentioning of issues is determined by the higher participation of the upper class or some other variable such as the similar social backgrounds of the upper class and the political leaders of the community. Verba and Nie recognize this problem and proceed to show empirically that the greater participation of the upper class and not other variables is most responsible for this congruency in issue perceptions. It seems that the upper class, by virtue of their participating more in the system, have a greater influence on what elites perceive to be the important issues in the community. Significant questions, however, remain unanswered. The most crucial question is whether this congruency in issue perceptions would still exist if actual elite decisions were the dependent variable. Actual decisions of elites could be quite different from a mere listing of elite attitudes on the important issues in the community. Further, the listing of attitudes is done in the Verba-Nie study with no hint as to the policy direction of the problems and issues being raised, making it impossible to compare the mass and elite on actual issue stands. For these reasons, a test using elite decisions seems crucial to document the hypothesis that political participation by the masses, particularly the upper-class element, influences elites. Assuming for the moment that the hypothesis would be confirmed by this separate test, another question looms large: whether or not this situation of representation would seriously change if Verba and Nie focused on national rather than local problems and used larger communities in their sample base. The more liberal policies advocated by demonstration and protest participators could cut into the conservative influence of upper-class participators at the national level, obviously a proposition for future study. Overall, however, even if all the above is confirmed, one must ask whether Americans—even upper-class Americans—are active enough to have much influence on elites when compared to interest groups, agencies, and other organized forces. Since Verba and Nie do not study the impact of other forces, the question of what relative weight to assign mass participation in the "consequences" process is unresolved, and, yet, in the end, this question has to be answered to justify the importance of the Verba-Nie enterprise. Assessments by political scientists of the relative influence of mass participation are generally not very optimistic. Voting is still the main and typically the only political activity that Americans engage in with any real frequency; and voting, as Verba and Nie themselves admit, is not the best mode for conveying issue preferences to the elite. If issue preferences are conveyed, they would seem to be conveyed best at the local level, the level Verba and Nie emphasize the most. Such preferences, it is generally agreed, are conveyed even less clearly at the national level. In general, issue preferences cannot be easily conveyed to elites or have much influence on them, especially through the voting mode, the form of activity most people use for this purpose.[16] Of course, there are important exceptions to this statement, but, for the most part, people probably do not often participate in or influence those decisions that most affect their lives.

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[16] This statement should not be confused with the earlier discussion of issues as causes of participation. Issues can be causes without necessarily having consequences. In other words, issues can cause people to participate, but these issue preferences may not be communicated clearly

While influence levels may be low, whatever influence occurs from mass participation is obviously skewed in the direction of those who participate the most. Upper-class people do have an advantage in representation, although Verba and Nie contend that the extent of this advantage depends on local community characteristics, such as the participatory level and amount of consensus in the community. Verba and Nie argue that the upper class exerts its greatest influence on elites in low and moderately active communities with low consensus levels and that it loses some of this advantage as communities become more active and consensual. Since Verba and Nie select only communities with less than 50,000 inhabitants for their mass-elite comparisons, one wonders if there is enough variation in the activity and consensus levels among these communities to be able to test the notion of community effects on representation.[17] Verba and Nie's earlier causal analysis provides some partial answers to this question. The authors find that a large number of the communities in the less than 50,000 population range represent the small, bounded locale. In this setting, participation rates follow a similar pattern from community to community, being relatively high in most modes and particularly in communal activity and other forms of local participation (pp. 236, 238–239, 241). Instead of a wide dispersion in political activity, therefore, these communities show fairly uniform levels of participation[18] which are generally higher than the rates of the more populated communities which were left out of the elite part of the study.[19] Other research also indicates that small communities are fairly homogeneous in their partisan and issue orientations.[20] These communities, especially if bounded, often are predominantly Republican or Democratic in orientation with political views to match. All such communities—whether mainly Republican or Democratic, conservative or liberal—would probably qualify as "consensual" in the Verba-Nie terminology. While there is obviously some variation between communities on these characteristics and perhaps enough to validate Verba and Nie's notion of "community effects," it would be useful if this hypothesis could be tested on communities with a wider range in population size and boundedness and, hence, political opinions and participatory rates. For the present, the Verba-Nie results are highly suggestive of the role that community characteristics can play in increasing or decreasing the representational advantages of upper-class participators. If a wider range in these characteristics were available, further tests could ascertain just how much credence should be placed in the belief that the upper-class edge in representation varies inversely with the participation and consensus levels of communities.[21]

Conclusions

In summary, the Verba-Nie book has both virtues and limitations, not unexpected for a complex work which attempts to cover the modes, causes, and consequences of participation all in one study. While Verba and Nie fail to cover completely the subject matter of "political participation in America," they have studied this topic in greater depth and on a far vaster scope than any-

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to elites or, if so, may not influence their decision making (in essence, a two-step hurdle in the influence process). Of course, issues with widespread salience and intensity—such as the Vietnam War—can and will have effects on elite decision making.

[17] For the most part, Verba and Nie do not answer this question directly. What has been attempted here is to use those pieces of information which seem relevant in the Verba-Nie book to reach a tentative answer. Quite possibly, a few computer runs on the Verba-Nie data file would be the best way to clear up at least part of this problem.

[18] In one place, the authors also give partial data on the activity levels of all communities under 50,000 in population when they classify them for their analysis of consequences (footnote 1, pp. 312–313). The percentage range between the "very low" and "very high" participating communities is between 12 and 13 per cent for all activities except voting, with the two types of moderately active communities falling somewhere within this range. These figures do not appear to depict widely contrasting participatory situations among communities. These communities do vary somewhat in their demographic characteristics although it is assumed that most of these communities are rural areas, villages, and isolated towns or cities. A few small suburbs would also fall within this group and a much fewer number of larger suburbs. (See page 234 of the Verba-Nie book for a list of the types of communities which have less than and more than 50,000 inhabitants.)

[19] These comparisons between communities are done using both "corrected" and "uncorrected" participation rates. Actually, Verba and Nie most emphasize the "corrected" rates which control for the socioeconomic backgrounds of people living in the community. The reason for this emphasis, when studying consequences, is to see if the political characteristics of the community have effects on elites above and beyond the socioeconomic backgrounds of its citizens.

[20] One is particularly reminded of the early Columbia University studies of voting behavior. See Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948) and Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). For another study on this interesting phenomenon of local political homogeneity, see Warren E. Miller, "One-Party Politics and the Voter," *American Political Science Review*, 50 (September 1956), 707–725.

[21] These relationships are described here using linear concepts. Actually, both relationships are somewhat curvilinear, although they approximate linear relationships quite well.

one previously. They have succeeded in validating and refining many past findings (especially in the area of "causes"), in providing supporting evidence for earlier expectations and theories (especially with regard to "consequences"), and in delineating modes of participation which are relatively distinct, theoretically and empirically, from one another. In short, what they have done, they have done well, and while much still remains, the comments in this essay are aimed at guiding future research efforts which attempt to build from and improve on the Verba-Nie study. For those so motivated, new conceptualizations, models, techniques, and data bases will be needed. As an example, future researchers could profitably use a combined model of long-term and short-term forces—sociological and psychological variables—to explain why people participate at different rates, being careful to specify the relative explanatory weights of each variable. In addition, the social class variable should be more carefully operationalized and studied as a cause of participation in future research designs. In another area, the dimensional analysis of political activity could be expanded to include other possible types of political activity—in the belief that political participation is a much broader subject than the four modes of activity that Verba and Nie have defined. Further checks and probes could also help to ascertain whether the Verba-Nie modes, as defined, fit the motivations and orientations of the people who engage in them. Finally, one would want to enlarge Verba and Nie's question and data base to get firmer evidence for any conclusions that people participate more than previously thought or that they have substantial effects on elite decision making, whether mediated by community variables or not. The picture that still emerges from the Verba-Nie analysis is that the electorate, while possibly improved on these matters, has not made major changes in its political activity either quantitatively or qualitatively. The only exception to this might be the recent phenomenon of protest behavior which was not covered in the Verba-Nie book.

None of these remarks about shortcomings or disagreements with the Verba-Nie book are intended to downplay the contribution Verba and Nie have made. If this review has seemed too critical at times, it is only because important works like the Verba-Nie book should be judged by the strictest and highest standards. Using such standards, Philip Converse calls this study a "classic,"[22] and, if he means by this a "basic work" which will influence research in the area of participation for years to come, his remark is indeed appropriate. While much yet needs to be discovered and validated, Verba and Nie have given us a good start on the road to surer knowledge in this area.

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[22] See Philip Converse's remarks on the inside jacket cover of the Verba-Nie book.

Recent Writing on Northern Ireland*

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In the last five years, more has been published about Northern Ireland than about any area of comparable size in Europe. This cannot be attributed purely to the turmoil which the area has known since 1968. Even before that date, social scientists were beginning to turn their attention to Northern Ireland, and the fieldwork for the most substantial pieces of research reviewed here (those by Harris, Rose, and Budge and O'Leary) was complete before the troubles began. But disorder has enormously increased the amount of interest taken in the region: it has added work by politicians (e.g., Callaghan, FitzGerald, O'Brien—among the authors being reviewed here) and journalists (e.g., the *Sunday Times* Insight Team) to the work being done by academics, and has transformed an acceleration of publication on the area into an explosion. There are now so many books available on Northern Ireland that a newcomer can only feel bewilderment. The purpose of this review article is to provide a guide to the most important of them.

Such a newcomer will probably wish to start with an historical account: he will need to know what has happened in Northern Ireland before he starts seeking for explanations of why it has happened. An outline history has been provided by a Pelican book, *Divided Ulster*, written by a Dublin academic, Liam de Paor (pronounced 'de Pwair'). De Paor's book is short, readable, and inexpensive. In ninety pages it traces the history of the region from mediaeval times to the establishment of Northern Ireland as a separate unit in 1921; in a further hundred and thirty pages it covers the salient developments between then and 1971. De Paor is hostile to the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland, and his interpretation of a number of events is controversial. But no other book covers so much ground so succinctly; and, provided the reader remembers to look at something else as well, he will find de Paor a useful introduction.

For a fuller account of the more recent period, a first-class history is at last available. F. S. L. Lyons's *Ireland since the Famine*, a massive general history of Ireland from the 1840's to the present, was first published in 1971 and at once established itself as the standard work on its subject. It has all the qualities one could hope to find in such a work: it is reliable, comprehensive, lucid, fair-minded. Lyons seems to have read everything ever published on his period, and has synthesised it all into a coherent narrative. His prejudices, if any, are kept well in check, and he expounds sympathetically the outlook of each main group in Irish history. The eighty pages which he devotes to Northern Ireland since 1921 form the best short history of the region that has yet been written; but what he has to say about the rest of Ireland since that date, and about undivided Ireland under British rule before 1921, is also important and relevant for a student of Northern Irish affairs.

From an outline of history, the reader may wish to turn to a more detailed study of recent events. A good starting-point is provided by Barritt and Carter's *The Northern Ireland Problem*. This book, first published in 1962, was reissued ten years later with an introduction and epilogue briefly surveying events since the first edition. It appeared at a time when academic study of Northern Ireland had barely begun, and when almost the only material available was propaganda, on one side or the other. Its authors—one a social worker, the other an academic economist—aimed to provide for the first time a dispassionate survey of contentious issues in Northern Ireland. Relying largely on interviews for evidence, they covered the main areas of controversy: attitudes to Irish unity, religious tensions, education, discrimination, civil rights, and so on. With hindsight we can see that they were too tender to the deficiencies of the regime. But their carefully researched survey remains the best available study of Northern Ireland before the pot boiled over, and makes a useful introduction to a study of the period of turmoil.

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* *The Northern Ireland Problem*. By Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, second edition with a new preface and postscript, 1972. Pp. xxviii, 176. $2.95 paper).

Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970. By Ian Budge and Cornelius O'Leary. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973. Pp. xxi, 396. $10.95).

A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland. By James Callaghan. (London: Collins, 1973. Pp. 207. £2.50).

Divided Ulster. By Liam de Paor. (New York: Penguin Books, 1971. Pp. xx, 250. $1.25).

Towards a New Ireland. By Garret FitzGerald. (London: Charles Knight, 1972. Pp. viii, 190. £2.50).

Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbors and "Strangers" in a Border Community. By Rosemary Harris. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972. Pp. xvi, 234. $10.00).

Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict. By The London *Sunday Times* Insight Team. (New York: Random House, 1972. Pp. 316. $7.95 cloth; $1.95 paper).

Ireland since the Famine. By F. S. L. Lyons. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. Pp. xiii, 852. $17.50).

War and an Irish Town. By Eamonn McCann. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974. Pp. 256. £0.40).

Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict. By John Magee. (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974. World Studies Series. $10.95 cloth; $5.50 paper).

States of Ireland. By Conor Cruise O'Brien. (New York: Random House, Pantheon Books, 1972. Pp. 336. $7.95).

Governing without Consensus: an Irish Perspective. By Richard Rose. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Pp. 567. $12.50).

For the period of turmoil itself, two books may be recommended. James Callaghan's *A House Divided* covers the period from 1967 to 1972. It is particularly authoritative for the first half of this period, down to June 1970, when the author, as Home Secretary in the Labour government, was the minister in London with oversight over Northern Ireland affairs. Callaghan does not minimize his own talents as a statesman and a diplomat; but his account seems generally balanced and fair-minded and, as a participant, he is able to reveal facts that had not been previously known. *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, by the London *Sunday Times* Insight Team, covers much the same period. The London *Sunday Times* prides itself on its Insight column, in which a group of able and lavishly-financed reporters turn their attention to various problems of the day. In the late 'sixties and early 'seventies they devoted much of their energies to Northern Ireland, and the book summarizes their findings. It is based heavily on unattributable interviews, which makes it impossible to evaluate the reliability of the information. In one instance, in which I can identify the informant because he told the same story to me, I would place less trust in his accuracy than the Insight reporters do. From internal evidence one can guess that their sources were best where one might least expect: among the two fighting forces —the I.R.A. and the British army. They were less good among the politicians, and especially Ulster Protestant politicians. This has affected the emphasis in their book, which shows least sympathy towards those from whom the authors received least information. But the book is racily written, and worth consulting provided the reader retains his critical faculty.

One limitation of both Callaghan's book and the *Sunday Times* report is that they do not carry the story past 1972. The gap will be filled by other books now in the pipeline, but in the meantime the inquirer can find an outline of events up to the spring of 1974 in John Magee's *Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict*. Magee's book is a reader: it contains documents illustrating different aspects of the Northern Ireland problem, accompanied by a commentary. Magee is a moderate Catholic; his outlook is fair-minded, and his commentary and selection of texts, if not exciting, are judicious. His book is designed for undergraduate use, and anyone teaching a course including Northern Ireland might find it worth adopting as a text.[1]

From narrative, the reader may wish to turn to interpretation. What is the cause of the Northern Ireland problem? Why is it that Catholic and Protestant get on so badly in this corner of the world? The question is certainly puzzling. Even in the nineteenth century—the era of the Kulturkampf in Germany and of the Know-Nothings in the United States—when Catholic-Protestant tensions were far more widespread than they are today, Belfast already headed the world league for sectarian rioting. And in the later twentieth century, when ill-feeling between Catholic and Protestant has died away almost everywhere else, it appears to be still strong in Northern Ireland. What is the reason for this deviant behavior?

One explanation is that the conflict is not really religious at all: that it is a class conflict masquerading as a religious one. The best and most up-to-date exposition of this view is provided by Eamonn McCann in his Penguin book, *War and an Irish Town*. McCann is a Marxist who has played an important part in the politics of his native Derry, the second largest town in Northern Ireland. His book is vividly written, and contains detail on life and politics in Derry which will entertain those most opposed to his thesis. The core of the book, however, is a presentation of that thesis, a Marxist interpretation of the Northern Ireland conflict.

McCann believes that conflict has recurred in Northern Ireland because the ruling class, in pursuit of its own interests, has artificially fomented the division between Catholic and Protestant among the working class. He cites evidence of this from the 1880s, the first decade of the twentieth century, the period after the First World War, and the 1930s. On each of these occasions, Protestant workers showed signs of making common cause with their Catholic fellows, but on each occasion the bosses (who were mainly Protestant) were able to restore control by beating the sectarian drum: by threatening Protestant workers that, if they did not submerge their interests in an all-class Protestant alliance, they might plunge Northern Ireland into an all-Ireland state, in which Roman Catholics would be a majority and their liberties at risk. In this task, McCann concedes, the bosses were helped by the fact that the independent state which developed in the rest of Ireland after 1921 did indeed show many of the signs of a Catholic theocracy.

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[1] Another useful teaching text, succinct and well-balanced, is David E. Schmitt's *Violence in Northern Ireland: Ethnic Conflict and Radicalization in an International Setting* (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1974. University Programs Modular Studies. Pp. 35).

McCann's thesis has force. There is no doubt that the pan-Protestant alliance in Northern Ireland has been sustained by unscrupulous propaganda. But to suggest that this has been the main cause of the acceptance by Protestant workers of leadership from Protestant bosses is to postulate a degree of gullibility among the former which is hard to credit. It is at least possible that they were better judges of their own interests than McCann accepts, and that there were more substantial reasons for their stand than manipulation by their bosses. McCann's difficulty arises only because he feels that class politics ought to prevail in Northern Ireland; he has then to find reasons why they do not. But if we abandon the assumption that all conflict must be reduced to class terms, and accept that religious or ethnic or national tensions may have an independent basis, then the Northern Ireland conflict becomes easier to explain. This is the position taken by some other interpreters of the problem.

The most forceful opponent of an economic interpretation of the Northern Ireland conflict is Richard Rose. Rose, an American political scientist who has lived for many years in Britain, is the author of the longest of the recent crop of works on Northern Ireland. The amount of sheer information which his book, *Governing without Consensus*, contains is enough to make it one of the most important ever written on the area. He provides a summary history of Northern Ireland, a detailed analysis of its institutions, and comparative material on divided societies elsewhere. The core of his book, however, is his report of an opinion survey which he conducted in Northern Ireland during the spring and summer of 1968. His sample consisted of 1,291 people—757 Protestants and 534 Catholics. His questionnaire comprised 63 items on a wide range of topics, and the median interview took 75 minutes to complete. The survey was by far the most comprehensive ever carried out in Northern Ireland, and the report on it, which takes up nine of Rose's sixteen chapters, is presented in sufficient detail for readers with interests different from Rose's to draw their own conclusions from it. It constitutes a uniquely important source of information on attitudes in the province.

Rose found that economic circumstances had but slight effects on political attitudes:

> In so far as class differences are more important than religious differences, then Ulster people of the same class should have more similar regime outlooks than people of different classes but the same religion. The data from the . . . survey clearly reject this hypothesis. The difference between middle-class and working-class Protestants in support for the Constitution is four per cent, and three per cent in endorsement of an Ultra position. Similarly, among Catholics, there is only only a two per cent difference across classes in support for the Constitution, and a five per cent difference in readiness to demonstrate against the regime. The differences between religions are much larger. Within the middle class, Protestants and Catholics differ by 36 percentage points in their readiness to support the Constitution, and manual workers differ by 30 percentage points. . . . It is particularly noteworthy that there is no consistent tendency for middle-class Ulster people to be readiest to endorse the Constitution and refrain from extra-constitutional politics, notwithstanding their relative advantage in terms of status (pp. 280–1).

Having rejected an economic explanation of political differences, Rose also rejects several others. One theory sometimes propounded in Northern Ireland is that tensions are so bad because Catholics and Protestants are usually educated apart, and thus are prevented from getting to know each other at the age most crucial for attitude formation. But Rose picked up in his sample sufficient people who had experienced mixed education to be able to check this theory: he found that those with such education did not have noticeably more dove-like attitudes than other people. Indeed, again and again Rose found that factors which might have been expected to induce moderation had this effect only slightly, or not at all. For instance, one might guess that the most educated would be the most tolerant but though this proved true to some extent on the Protestant side, among Catholics the educated were even more likely to be critical of the regime than the uneducated. Trade unionists are members of a professedly nonsectarian movement, but Rose found that they were almost as likely to hold extreme views as the rest of the population. So were those who had traveled abroad, those who lived in religiously mixed areas, those who had no personal memories of previous bouts of violence. Catholic public employees had attitudes similar to those of other Catholics.

To Rose, the trouble stems from non-bargainable conflicts of religion and nationality. There is no way of effecting a compromise. As he starkly puts it: 'In the foreseeable future, no solution is immediately practicable' (p. 21). Developments in the area since he published his book in 1971 have only served to support this view. But his survey data do not, and in the nature of such material could not, throw light on a further problem: how did these conflicts come about?

For this, we must turn to works with a larger historical element. One such book is Garret FitzGerald's *Towards a New Ireland.* FitzGerald was, at the time he wrote this book, an economist who had lately turned politician; he has since become Minister for Foreign Affairs in the government of the Republic of Ireland. A man with his interests might have been expected to stress economic factors; but, while he offers some well-informed economic commentary, he concedes primacy to the religious factor. 'The Irish problem,' he says, 'is quite simply the fruit of Northern Protestant reluctance to become part of what they regard as an authoritarian Southern Catholic state' (p. 88). FitzGerald finds that this reluctance is not unreasonable. The Republic of Ireland, as it has developed since 1921, has in his opinion developed features which legitimately arouse Protestant distrust. Its legislation on divorce, contraception, censorship, education, and indeed its constitution, derive from Catholic principles which are then imposed on the whole population, Catholic and non-Catholic alike. FitzGerald proposes the abolition of the apparatus of Catholic ascendancy in the Republic. If this were done, he believes that northern Protestants, who possess a latent Irish patriotism, would begin to look more favourably on a united Ireland.

The weakness of this analysis is that it attributes too much importance to relatively recent developments. To be fair to FitzGerald, he does not claim that northern Protestant antipathy to the Catholic south dates only from 1921; but he devotes most of his book to discussing developments in the last fifty years. Any satisfactory treatment of the Northern Ireland problem must delve deeper into history for its roots.

A book which attempts this is Conor Cruise O'Brien's *States of Ireland.* O'Brien, journalist, academic, former professor at New York University, has, like FitzGerald, entered politics, and is now a minister in the government of the Republic. His book is at once a commentary on contemporary events, an interpretation of Irish history since about 1890, and a work of personal and family reminiscence. It might have been more cogent if he had not tried to do so many things simultaneously, but he has a good line in ironic wit, and as it stands his book is one of the most readable of the recent crop of books on the Northern Ireland issue. Like FitzGerald, O'Brien believes that the conflict is basically a religious one, but he defines 'religious' in such a way as to bring in the collective memories of the peoples concerned:

> It would not . . . be exact to say that it is a conflict between Catholics and Protestants. It is a conflict *between IRISH Catholics and ULSTER Protestants*. . . .
>
> The actual *religions*—the systems of beliefs and of feelings about those beliefs—cherished by Ulster Protestants and by Irish Catholics are distinct, in reality though not formally, from the religions of the same name as practised elsewhere.
>
> In both cases the actual, as distinct from the formal, religion is an amalgam of the strictly ecclesiastical body of doctrines and practices, and of other doctrines and practices derived from the past history of Irish Catholics and Ulster Protestants. A cult of the ancestors enters into both, and is acted out in the annual commemorative rites at Bodenstown, Finaghy and elsewhere. (pp. 307–8)[2]

The conclusion which O'Brien draws from his analysis is that Irishmen in the Republic should face reality, should accept that they do not really consider Ulster Protestants as belonging to the same people as themselves, and should put into cold storage their hopes for a united Ireland.

This thesis is more satisfactory than FitzGerald's. It accepts that religious tensions in the north are too deep-rooted to be much affected by institutional changes in the south. But O'Brien does not push his analysis back far enough to examine the origins of these tensions in any detail. For such an examination, we shall have to turn to other works.

One important contribution to the historical examination of Northern Ireland's troubles is Budge and O'Leary's *Belfast: Approach to Crisis.* Belfast is only one city in Northern Ireland; but it is so much the largest, and has witnessed such a disproportionate amount of the disorder, that any explanation of its tensions will go a long way toward explaining those of the region as a whole. Budge and O'Leary's approach is not purely historical: they also report on a survey which they conducted among Belfast electors and city councillors in 1966. The survey, however, was a small-scale exercise, from which only the most general conclusions could be drawn. It is the historical chapters which give the book its value.

Budge and O'Leary discount economic explanations of Belfast's troubles. They demonstrate that there is no close fit between economic depression and sectarian disorder: on the contrary, some political event can be shown to be the cause of almost every outbreak. They prefer to stress religious factors: the growth of the Orange Order, a militantly Protestant organization, during the nineteenth century, and the inflammatory preaching of particular Protestant clerics. This, they believe, created a pattern of hostility which proved self-perpetuating, so that when, in the nineteen-sixties, some of the Protestant majority at last decided that it was time to build bridges to the Catholics, they had no experience of how such a task might be accomplished, and were unduly timid about arousing opposition within their own community. Their thesis is not entirely satisfactory because it leaves unresolved the problem of why the Orange Order should have found Belfast such congenial soil. But they have contributed more than any other author under review here to exposing the historical roots of Northern Ireland's troubles.

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[2] Bodenstown, the burial-place of the eighteenth-century founder of Irish republicanism, Theobald Wolfe Tone, is the scene of annual commemorations by present-day Irish republicans; Finaghy was until very recently the site of the principal annual demonstration by the Orange Order, in commemoration of the victory over Catholic forces at the Battle of the Boyne (1690).

The most careful attempt to assess the relative weight of economic and religious factors can be found in Rosemary Harris's *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster*. Harris is an anthropologist, and her fieldwork was carried out more than twenty years ago in a small rural community which she calls Ballybeg. Her conclusions should not be applied unmodified to other areas of Northern Ireland, or to other periods in its history. But anyone who knows Northern Ireland will agree that much of Harris's analysis can be extended to the region as a whole. Her book is beautifully written, sensitive, never patronising, occasionally lit up by shafts of slightly melancholy wit. It is the best book yet published on Northern Ireland, and as such deserves extended comment.

Harris chose for her study an area which was doubly divided: religiously, between Catholic and Protestant, and economically, between prosperous farmers in a valley and poorer farmers in the hills. Though Catholics were strongest in the hills and Protestants in the valley, there were enough rich Catholic and poor Protestant families in the area for her to be able to distinguish the effects of religion and economy. Thus she was able to build up an analysis at three levels: the common culture; the significance of economic divisions; and the significance of religious divisions.

Her account makes clear the pervasiveness of the common culture. Whether Protestant or Catholic, rich or poor, the families which she studied revealed many common traits in their family relationships, their attitudes to kin and non-kin, and their values. Modesty was the quality they most appreciated. Social pretentiousness was what they most disliked. They all shared a suspicion of officialdom, of Belfast, of England. Economic differences, however, were also significant. Hill farmers, who depended heavily on cooperation between neighbors, were more gregarious, while valley farmers were more self-sufficient, and busier. Hill farmers were more likely to be intolerant in their religious and political attitudes.

Yet despite these features, the religious cleavage emerges from Harris's account as fundamental. Although the two communities interacted at work, in most other spheres they were rigidly compartmentalized. They went, obviously, to different churches. Their children went, on the whole, to different schools (though the Protestant hill children went to a Catholic school—without much effect in improving community relations). They played different games, went to different dances, patronized different shops, found employment with different masters. Nearly all Protestant men belonged to the Orange Order, from which Catholics were excluded. Most important of all, there was hardly any exogamy. This was crucial in a society where kinship ties largely dictated whom one could visit informally: it meant that members of one community were cut off from the principal means of getting thoroughly acquainted with people in the other community. Harris stresses that most people sought to promote friendly ties across the division. But she adds that this was achieved by the device of never mentioning politics, religion, or any subject that could conceivably be connected with either, in religiously mixed company. As a result, one community retained grotesquely inaccurate ideas about the beliefs of the other, and outward harmony could co-exist with deep-rooted mistrust.

The weight of scholarly opinion so far, then, is that religious factors cannot be reduced to economic ones in the Northern Ireland situation but have an independent explanatory force. There is considerable disagreement, however, among the authors who accept this view, on what aspect of the religious factor should be stressed. FitzGerald emphasizes mistakes made by the Republic in comparatively recent times. Budge and O'Leary direct attention to the nineteenth-century roots of current attitudes. O'Brien defines religion loosely so as to include the folk-memories, not strictly religious, of both communities. Harris emphasizes the importance of institutional separation and of endogamy. Perhaps the truth is that no one explanation fits all the people of Northern Ireland. Catholic and Protestant are not just two uniform groups; there are important divergences within each of them, as most of the authors we have discussed, notably Rose and Harris, bring out. Different segments of each community are likely to be swayed by different influences. This may be the next area of advance for Northern Ireland studies: instead of of talking just about Protestants and Catholics, researchers should ask themselves more often; *which* Protestants, and *which* Catholics.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography. By Jose V. Abueva. (Manila: La Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971. Pp. 497. $10.25. Distributed in the United States by Cellar Bookshop, 18090 Wyoming Street, Detroit, Michigan.)

This biography about the fourth President of the Philippine Republic, Ramon Magsaysay, is more than a drama of the life and times of a Filipino chief executive. It is also a study of a developing nation: its civic culture, its presidential character, and its executive-legislative relations.

The author, a former Executive Secretary of the 1971 Philippine Constitutional Convention, does his job well in pointing out four aspects of Filipino civic culture which Magsaysay exploited in the art of governance. The first is *utang na loob* (personal debt of gratitude), which Magsaysay used to defend his appointment of persons to high government positions from the erstwhile Democratic Party which helped the Nacionalista Party and Magsaysay capture the presidency from Elpidio Quirino in 1953. The second is the game of *pakikisama* (camaraderie) which Magsaysay played as a superstar. The third is the notion that "politics is addition, not subtraction"—popularized by the late Senate President "Amang" Rodriguez in justifying the admission of defecting Liberals into the fold of the Nacionalista Party. The fourth is the *compadre* system (agreeing or even volunteering to be a godfather to children of political and civic leaders). In Philippine politics, a *compadre* (godfather) becomes *ipso facto* a political follower, ally, or *lider.* The more *compadres* one has, the greater the political dividends, since the system is a form of an investment in "mutual fund" politics—Filipino style!

Like James D. Barber, the author gives us a glimpse of Magsaysay's character. "The man was a paradox of humility and ambition," he wrote, "eager to serve yet wanting to command. . . . He would berate erring officials in public to dramatize his integrity and honesty before a secretly applauding . . . audience who would surely spread the story" (p. 443). After the incident is over, Magsaysay wastes no time in telling the embarrassed official to forget the whole thing because it was only a *palabas* (show)!

Magsaysay had little or no problems in his relationships with local officials, but he had some difficulties in getting along with the legislature. His relationship with senators and representatives was less than cooperative and friendly. The author attributes this to several factors. The first is the nature of the Philippine political parties; the author claims that Filipino Liberals and Nacionalistas are like Tweedle-dee and Tweedle-dum. In some respects, this characterization of Philippine parties is correct and partly explains why Magsaysay's administration must be judged as fairly successful. There are other features of the Filipino party system, however, that contributed to Magsaysay's disillusionment and his secret plan to form a third party after the 1957 presidential election had it not been for the plane crash that took his life. Among these features which the author overlooks are: (1) the lack of discipline among the two major parties; (2) the absence of a highly centralized national party organization; and (3) the irresponsible nature of Filipino parties.

The second factor is the social and economic composition of the Philippine Senate. "Except for a few, all [Senators] were seasoned politicians and skilled speakers and parliamentarians. . . . [Thus] the more popular, prominent, and affluent among them, who were also pillars of the party, could be much more independent and critical of the President than most other colleagues" (p. 379). While this may partly account for Magsaysay's troubles with the Senate, it does not explain his problems with the House of Representatives. The author forgot that the different systems in which the President and representatives are elected could produce contrasting outlooks toward political and socio-economic issues.

Mr. Abueva is correct in asserting that "congress resented for years its subordination to the President . . ." (p. 379). Why is this so? Is it because of the influence of the landed gentry upon the legislative branch which is more susceptible to pressure than the executive branch? Is it because of the nature of the two bodies themselves: legislative bodies are generally conservative in outlook, whereas executive bodies tend to be more liberal? Or is it due to one of the fundamental doctrines upon which the Filipino system of government rests: the theory of separation of powers under which the legislative branch is merely asserting its constitutional prerogative as an independent, co-equal, coordinate and separate branch of the government when it refuses to say "amen" to everything Magsaysay says?

Despite my criticisms, I feel that the author has produced a fully documented and well-written piece of research.

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Negative Dialectics. By Theodor W. Adorno. Translated by E. B. Ashton. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973. Pp. xv, 416. $17.50.)

Negative Dialectics, originally published in West Germany in 1966, was Adorno's major and most ambitious statement of his program. It is the equivalent among his works to Heidegger's *Being and Time* or to Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*. It does not stand alone. The *Jargon of Authenticity* (New York, 1973; Frankfurt, 1964) and the article "Fortschritt" in *Stichworte* (Frankfurt, 1969) were written initially as parts of *Negative Dialectics* but were published separately. 'Dialektische Epilegomena' in *Stichworte* (Frankfurt, 1969) were also written as responses to political and philosophical issues aroused by *Negtive Dialectics*. These texts are inseparable from the rest of Adorno's work in a further sense. They amount to an experimental attempt to state a method apart from its practice when the special nature of that method is that it is inseparable from its practice. Thus they complement Adorno's many writings on music, literature, philosophy, and sociology. It might be said that the very decision to write *Negative Dialectics* was an admission of failure. If it is a failure, it is a magnificent and important one.

The large and varied corpus of writings by the many philosopher-sociologists belonging to the Frankfurt School have revolved since the 'thirties around the question which Marx posed in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844:* "How do we now stand in relation to the Hegelian *dialectic?"* They asked this question for the era and generation after Lukács'. The experiences of that generation included the triumph of Fascism, the lack of any proletarian revolution, the establishment of doctrinaire Marxism in Eastern Europe, and the flourishing of nondialectical philosophies and sociologies in Western Europe and America. Adorno began the first page of *Negative Dialectics* with a proposition which has become infamous: "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed" (p. 3).

In the book Adorno decodes the history of thought. He claims that the history of philosophy has been the history of what he calls "identity thinking" and he demonstrates that another mode of thinking, which he calls "nonidentity thinking," or negative dialectic, is possible and necessary for the valid cognition of social reality. To perceive the nonidentity in the concepts and theories of nondialectical philosophies and sociologies is to perceive how their central concepts are not "fulfilled by their objects." Unlike other writers in the Marxist tradition, Adorno is not denying the laws of identity or noncontradiction. Nor does he propose an alternative set of theoretical concepts. Nondialectical philosophies and sociologies are not located in a social structure which is known independently of them. That structure is derived from the antinomies found in those bodies of thought. This is called the "immanent method."

The text is riddled with paradox and polemic. Paradox arises because Adorno is in the inherently paradoxical position of presenting a critique of a universally prevailing mode of thought without relying exclusively on that mode of thinking himself. His style is thus designed to induce his reader to think in that different way which he believes is desirable and possible. It is an indirect exhortative method. There is polemic because although Adorno concedes that the works of Husserl, Heidegger, and Lukács reveal the "ontological need" to grant "priority to the object," to break out of epistemological subjectivism, he demonstrates that they have failed and have relapsed into subjectivism. As he dramatically puts it, they have "broken out into the mirror" ([sic], p. 84). There is no scholarship in these chapters: no sympathetic and detailed discussion of what is characteristic or original about another man's ideas. Precisely because he is concerned to sublate this tradition, he takes certain liberties in his construal of it.

Negative Dialectics is a very uneven book. The Introduction and Part Two, "Negative Dialectics: Concept and Categories," are among the most original and sustained pieces that Adorno ever wrote. The exemplars or "models," as he called them, which form the second half of the book, are poor. The reader would do better to look elsewhere in Adorno's *oeuvre* where there are finer ones.

E. B. Ashton, in his Translator's Note, sets the text in its political and philosophical context. He offers several sensitive hints for understanding Adorno's presentation. It is therefore astounding when Ashton suggests that Adorno *thinks in English* (p. xv). One of Adorno's reasons for returning to Germany from America after the Second World War was that the English translations of his work distorted his ideas so much. He believed he could only say what he had to say in German (cf. his essay "*Auf die Frage:* was ist deutsch" in *Stichworte*, pp. 110-2). Furthermore, Adorno deliberately uses his own language so that it is syntactically and semantically difficult even for the German-speaking reader to read. He is a latter-day Nietzsche, too, whose most lucid expression may contain all manner of equivocation. Ashton's opinion has influenced his translation, as has his commitment "to put Adorno's thought into English" (p. xiv) in addition to his task of translating Adorno's text. This robs the ideas of their *raison d'être* by assimilating them to the very idiom they are designed to resist. Adorno discusses "thought" and "spirit," their identity and nonidentity modes, using impersonal constructions. Thought and spirit are not attributed to "us" but are frequently personified, sometimes by dramatic metaphor. This is a strategy crucial in presenting a dialectic from the point of view of the object, for an attempt "to see beyond the subject" (p. 376), even though that dialectic only admits people in their concrete social relationships. Ashton has turned all the passive constructions into personal ones. This results in a completely different text. Equally bad, Ashton has frequently retranslated terms from the tradition with which Adorno is debating. Adorno relies on his reader's engagement in that tradition, and on the reader's automatic recognition of a word or expression as Marx's or Hegel's. Ashton has made the text familiar where it should be unfamiliar and unfamiliar where it should be familiar. There are many other mistakes and omissions on his part. An index would improve the edition.

Adorno explains one of his motives for writing *Negative Dialectics* as the desire "to transcend the official separation of pure philosophy and the substantive or formally scientific realm" (p. xx). Yet even those social scientists versed in the traditions of German social thought and sympathetic to the search for alternatives to philosophical and sociological positivisms may be disappointed to find that Adorno is a man with a message and that the message is deeply pessimistic. It is that society and consciousness are almost completely reified. The concept and theories of reification are notoriously elusive. Adorno seems to mean that critical consciousness, including his own, is almost impossible. History, in some sense, has come to a halt. *Negative Dialectics* is an attempt to break out of this unbreakable paradox and to invite others to do so too. But Adorno's message and his guilt at having survived Auschwitz make him write like the man whom he says that he became in his dreams—"the emanation of the insane wish of a man killed twenty years earlier" (p. 363), as if his thinking was crippled from then on. This is not to say that his message is wrong. Anyone who is involved in the possibility of Marxism as a mode of cognition *sui generis,* at a time when critical consciousness can no longer be even "imputed" to an ideal-typical class as Lukács could do in 1923 in *History and Class Consciousness,* must read Adorno's book.

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The War Disease. By Norman Z. Alcock. (Oakville, Ontario: CPRI Press, 1972. Pp. 238. $6.00, cloth; $3.00, paper.)

This work is an interim attempt to formulate a precise definition of the causes of war. To accomplish this task, the author seeks to provide a catalog of the findings of peace research in order to synthesize the results into a theory of war.

The book is subdivided into thirteen chapters. The introductory chapter establishes the tone of the work. Chapter two very briefly mentions and seemingly dismisses (although many are to reappear in later pages) a host of popular single-factor approaches to explaining war. The next nine chapters are dubiously segregated by the alleged disciplinary source of the empirical evidence to be considered: biology, anthropology, history, "mathematical modeling," sociology, psychology, economics, political science, and the "laboratory." The evidence presented is nowhere near as representative of the "essential streams of contemporary science" as the author claims. While a number of topics are mentioned, most are handled superficially. For example, the biology and anthropology chapters rely quite heavily on Sigmund Freud, Konrad Lorenz, and Robert Ardrey. The history chapter consists of a brief overview of a portion of L. F. Richardson's *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels.* The sociology chapter discusses beliefs, attitudes, and public opinion but only as illustrated by a few CPRI surveys. The economics chapter is restricted inexplicably to a few studies of the early 1960s which investigated the possible economic impact of disarmament. Other chapters have similar problems; but a major shortcoming of the book is that the chapters fail to catalog adequately the findings of peace research.

The last two chapters deliver a disappointing synthesis and a supposedly related "dynamic two-phase theory of war" which can be summarized in five statements: (1) Territorial disagreements, reinforced by ideological differences, lead to tensions. (2) Tension causes leaders to become aggressive and to escalate their arms expenditures; to increase their power still further they simultaneously form alliances with compatible allies. (3) Under the strain of increasing armament expenditures, domestic conflict increases, which slows down military spending. (4) Although the rate of increases in armament steadily diminishes, the absolute arms level continues to grow. At this point the "military mind" considers going to war for two reasons: (a) the country is as strong as it will be for several years, and (b) a war will tend to arrest the anticipated downward swing of military spending. Most wars therefore start just when the arms race is about to crank down. (5) As the level of arms spending steadily increases, such an "intolerable level of spending" is reached that a massive war breaks out.

The reader is told that this "theory" accounts for seventy-five per cent of the variance in international and larger civil wars betwen 1946 and 1971, in spite of the fact that only two of the "theory's" variables have been operationalized: arms expenditure rate of increase, and the presence or absence of war. Alcock may have stumbled upon something—namely that the rate of increase in global arms expenditures is a good predictor of global conflict, a finding which is most interesting from a geocentric (as opposed to a nation-state centric) perspective of world politics—but he has hardly tested his "theory." In any event, Alcock's abstract statements do not even begin to approximate the more rigorous specifications and procedures conventionally associated with contemporary theory construction. And since his approach is unfortunately predicated on the devil concept of the "military mind," it is debatable whether his assertions, as presently constituted, are worth testing.

The author does state that he is writing for two audiences: the concerned public (potential supporters of peace research) and the scientific community (potential peace researchers). The former group may find the book of some interest. For instance, some of the arms-race modeling research is described in easy-to-read fashion. But the book will probably not appeal to most of the scientific community. At best, more informed readers will only be irritated by the glaring lack of references to pertinent findings when a topic is discussed (e.g., the discussion of domestic/foreign conflict linkages mentions only early Rummel and Tanter), the inconsistencies in methodological terminology and the nature of evidence required for casual assertions (e.g., compare pages 139-140, 142, and 152-153), an over-reliance on secondary sources, a lack of respect for levels of analysis problems, a currently outdated "doomsday approaching" mood, and, of course, the basic failure of the book to attain its specified objectives. Nevertheless, the rationale for the book is commendable. It is hoped that the faults of this work will encourage others to produce better and much-needed literature surveys, syntheses, and theories of the causes of war.

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Mathematical Approaches to Politics. By Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Antoine H. Stoetzel. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., Publishers, 1973. Pp. 475. $15.00.)

One of the more important cleavages in political science is defined by the use or nonuse of sophisticated mathematical models. In fact, with appropriate apologies to Lord Snow, we might refer to this cleavage as one of two cultures. One culture is not only quantitative but also mathematical: manipulating symbols, numbers, and sometimes data in an effort to attain a particular kind of logical rigor in its statements. The other culture, more dependent upon words and data guided by speculative and/or simple statistical thinking, finds it difficult to understand the complex mathematical models of the first culture.

This notion of the two cultures perhaps puts a bit of a twist on the usual divisions of methodists and theorists, behavioralists and others, scientists and philosophers. These differences are surely real enough, but the communications barriers accompanying them seem a great deal less than those between the political mathematicians and the rest of us. The latter barriers have moved some in the last few years as generations of new graduate students have sat through scope and methods courses and as older members of the profession have gone to summer institutes. Nevertheless, the work of the new mathematical political scientists is closed to all but those with a fairly solid education in mathematics or those who are willing to work hard to get their mathematics piecemeal.

Mathematical Approaches to Politics is recommended for nonmathematical political scientists who want an introduction to what is happening in the other culture, but warning must be given that this is no easy book to read. Its very high level of abstraction and its frequent use of mathematical symbols and logic make it something more than the direct sequel of the introductory statistics text. Its pieces are not written as introductions but are reports on ongoing research in the field. Background information, therefore, is sometimes lacking.

The book is a collection of papers originally given by scholars from Europe and North and South America in sessions of the Mathematical Approaches to Politics Research Group at the Eighth World Congress of Political Science in Munich, September 1-5, 1970. It is divided into four major sections each having to do with a major kind of mathematical approach to politics: (1) statistical models and data analysis, (2) rational choice theories, (3) structural theories, and (4) simulation models.

The approach most familiar to political scientists in the nonmathematical culture is that of statistical models and data analysis. They have been around the longest. Examples included in this volume are Richard Chadwick's work on transactional systems for measuring power and integration, Jeffrey Milstein's time-serial regression analysis of choices facing United States policy makers between 1968 and 1970 in Vietnam, and Simon Schwartzman's study of voting in Brazil between 1945 and 1964. Schwartzman works primarily with data tables, and Milstein uses a form of regression analysis not much beyond that learned in basic statistics (although he does it in a most interesting way). Chadwick, on the other hand, with his matrices, employs much more complicated algebra. All three papers, however, use conventional descriptive or inferential statistics at some point.

Perhaps the second most familiar approach demonstrated in the book is that of simulation. At least the graduates of Northwestern University learn about it. Hayward Alker attacks the problem of measuring power, integration, and development through the use of the Simon-Homans causal modeling approach and the rational modeling tradition in simulation. His genius, here as elsewhere, is to take the work of others (e.g., Harsanyi, Brunner, Lipset), to discuss and to mathematicize it further, and to make of it much more than the original authors have done. Raymond Hopkins explores the conceptual problems arising in the quantitative analysis of mobilization and assimilation processes and develops two simulation models in dealing with these. His paper includes the use of data from Belgium, Malaysia, and Quebec. Paul Smoker writes a useful review of the major simulations of politics developed between 1959 and 1970 and relates them to each other.

Less familiar to many political scientists are the structural and rational choice theories. Harrison White develops a structural analogy between telecommunications systems and human networks. This paper is the least obviously mathematical of all in the book, but its underlying mathematical logic is provocative. The other paper on structural analysis written by František Charvât, Jaroslav Kučera, and Miroslav Soukup demonstrates that structures of dependency can be interpreted in terms of some of the classical elements of information theory. Both of these papers leave to the readers' imaginations their relevance to politics.

Three examples of rational-choice research are included in the book. Anatol Rapoport, Melvin Guyer and David Gordon compare the performance of Danish and American students in a game designed as a threat situation. The "underdog" is shown to be better off if he acts in a seemingly irrational way; by accepting immediate loss to himself, he can inflict significant loss on his adversary and make it rational for the latter to change his tactics and allow a more equitable division of rewards. Peter Aranson, Melvin Hinich, and Peter Ordeshook are concerned with "the partial explanation and preciction of variations in public policy with variations of election rules." They are particularly concerned with the effect a candidate's objectives have on his choice among election strategies. Michael Taylor developes a model of collective decision making for voting bodies choosing on more than one attribute and with multidimensional alternatives. Basic to his model is the assumption that individuals making choices have a salience ranking of the policy dimensions and these rankings may not be the same for each individual.

These four sections are preceded by an introduction in which Karl Deutsch discusses some past trends and future prospects of quantitative approaches to political analysis. This discussion is particularly helpful to the political scientist of the nonmathematical culture in placing the research reported in the rest of the book into an historical context. Similarly, the brief introductions to each of the four sections are more than the usual summaries of the contents of the papers to follow. Each is a little, well-written essay on the particular approach. These should be thought stimulating for scholars of either culture.

What is likely to be the reaction of the nonmathematician to the political substance of the book? He will probably be tempted to wonder at all of the marvelous equipment brought out to move a molehill. In all honesty, it seems to me that most of the political accomplishments of very sophisticated mathematical political science are still for the future. Alker himself says on page 370 that a lot has been attempted and little accomplished thus far. It might be difficult to maintain that Aranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook have broken much ground not already dug into by Duverger, or that Taylor says much that any local politician worth his salt does not already know. It appears that the more sophisticated the mathematics, the less impressive the politics. There may be a reason for this. It takes some time for an approach to develop and, in the early stages, so much energy is placed on the technique that little is left for the substance. Perhaps, therefore, judgment needs to be withheld for some time longer to see just what the new culture can say about politics.

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Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. By Shlomo Avineri. (New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. xi, 252. $11.95.)

It is both common and natural to regard the *Philosophy of Right* as one of the more intellectually accessible of Hegel's major writings. It is largely free from the tortuous obscurities of style and presentation, the enigmatic allusions, which make the *Phenomenology* so dark and opaque a work; nor does it—unlike some of Hegel's excursions into logical theory and the philosophy of nature—raise speculative issues whose apparent remoteness from contemporary preoccupations is liable to set up a communicative barrier between the author and the modern reader. If scarcely always pellucid, it is rarely intractable: moreover, the matters with which it is chiefly concerned are relatively familiar, being connected with problems that continue, in one form or another, to remain close to the center of much present-day controversy and debate. The nature and rationale of law, the role of government, the function of the state and its relations to other social institutions, the scope and limits of individual liberty—these are among the topics discussed in a book which frequently impresses by its attention to practical detail and by its characteristically hard-headed concern with the empirical realities of political life. Even so, it is notorious that in this sphere, no less than in other departments of his thought, Hegel's intentions and claims have occasioned extreme and passionate disagreements. Not only have his doctrines given rise to a host of widely conflicting interpretations, but he himself has been extolled, or alternatively denounced, as contributing to the advance of different and often fundamentally opposed ideologies. Some have treated him as anticipating liberal or progressive ideals, while others have condemned him as a reactionary. To some his significance essentially lies in his connection with the development of Marxism, while to others he has appeared as an extreme nationalist and as an apologist of Prussian militarism. He has even been viewed as a precursor of twentieth-century fascism and racism.

Professor Avineri believes that Hegel has been a victim of persistent misunderstanding, many of the positions attributed to him bearing little or no resemblance to those which he in fact held. Philosophy, according to Hegel, "is its own time apprehended in thoughts," and Avineri makes this observation the epigraph of his book. In his view, Hegel's critics have typically been led astray by a failure to identify the questions that chiefly occupied him and by an accompanying tendency to ignore the historical context within which they arose. What Hegel wrote, he maintains, cannot be adequately appreciated in abstraction from the background of changing conditions against which his ideas evolved; in particular, it is mistaken to treat the doctrines propounded in the *Philosophy of Right* as if they represented no more than an attempt, pleasing to the Prussian establishment, to justify the Restoration of 1815. Rather, they should be seen for what they were—the product of a sustained effort, extending over a considerable period, to come to terms with a social reality that had been radically and irrevocably transformed under the impact of the French Revolution and the reforms introduced by Napoleon.

It is a merit of Avineri's study that it presents a clear and well-documented account of the development of this prodigious undertaking. Thus he shows how, even in his early "theological writings," Hegel was already profoundly concerned with the problem of defining the relation of the individual to social institutions and norms: the comparisons he drew at that time between Judaic and Hellenic attitudes to religion and law prefigured, if only in embryo, themes that were insistently to recur in his subsequent work. It was, however, in the unpublished manuscripts and lectures of the Jena period—in the *Verfassung Deutschlands*, the *System der Sittlichkeit*, and (above all) the *Realphilosophie*—that his political and social preoccupations first achieved determinate expression. Avineri draws heavily upon the last of these writings, tracing its connections with Hegel's later analysis of civil society and the state and at the same time stressing its intrinsic importance as embodying original insights into the nature of emergent industrialism. In doing so, he convincingly demonstrates that Hegel was conscious of the tensions inherent from the start in the modern industrial system and that his description of its workings often exhibited an astonishing prescience. Here, as elsewhere, the German thinker was acutely sensitive to factors that made the paradigms of classical political theory no longer seem appropriate.

The Hegel who finally emerges from Avineri's pages was neither an incipient totalitarian nor a reactionary traditionalist. Accusations of aggressive German nationalism are likewise out of place; during the Napoleonic wars he supported the French, and if he afterwards displayed qualified approval of Prussia it was of a nation that had been altered out of all recognition by vom Stein's and Hardenberg's reforms. Essentially, he stood for the rational reorganization of government and legislation and for the modernization of political institutions; the *Philosophy of Right* portrays a differentiated and pluralistic state, sufficiently strong to keep the potentially destructive forces of civil society in check while simultaneously safeguarding fundamental liberties and guaranteeing the representation of separate interests. In this sense Hegel may be said to have tried, in Avineri's words, "to strike a balance—perhaps an unattainable one—between *homo economicus* and *zoon politikon*" (p. 240).

As Avineri himself emphasizes, his concern is with only one fact of Hegelian thought; thus the connections that indubitably exist between Hegel's social theory and other aspects of his philosophical system tend to drop into the background. The discussion of certain topics sometimes suffers as a result, including that dealing with the notorious assimilation of the actual to the rational. Avineri argues (no doubt correctly) that Hegel has been badly misrepresented on this score, but his own positive account of what the disputed dictum amounts to is too abbreviated to be useful and is hardly likely to satisfy its critics. In general, however, and within his self-imposed limits, he offers a timely and illuminating re-appraisal of a philosopher whose powerful contributions to the understanding of society have been recurrently obscured by passion or prejudice. Avineri may not persuade all his readers that Hegel's political ideas were as reasonable and moderate as he presents them as being. But his scholarly and eminently readable book should at least help to ensure that they receive a more objective and fair minded hearing in future.

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The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History. Edited by William O. Aydelotte, Allan G. Bogue and Robert William Fogel. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. ix, 435. $13.50.)

It is a truism that historians are largely a different breed these days from what they have traditionally been. Not only do they routinely use quantitative data and increasingly sophisticated statistical methodology, but some also think in terms of model building and the ways they can contribute to improving scientifically rooted descriptions of human behavior. Still, indifference and resistance to quantitative-behavioral approaches remain strong in the profession. Most historians do not ordinarily employ statistical methods, even when appropriate. The History Advisory Committee of the Mathematical Social Sciences Board, therefore, has sought to promote wider knowledge of, in the words of the editors of this volume, "the advantages and limitations of these methods for historical purposes . . . through concrete applications to specific problems" (p. 3). In particular, the committee has funded a number of conferences, one on general historical themes, others focused on a number of specific matters: the economics of slavery, popular voting behavior, social structure, legislative behavior and urban history, among others. The papers from the first of these, held at the University of Chicago in 1969, and subsequently much revised, are the core of this volume.

The essays lay stress on "the scope of the quantitative methods that are today being applied in history and on the variety of issues to which these methods are germane" (p. vii). They vary greatly in subject matter, time focus, and geographic concerns. Some are progress reports of ongoing work, others are finished case studies. Some test old and elusive questions of historical interpretation by adding some hard data. Others break significant new ground in scope, approach, and findings. In all they give the reader a substantial taste of what quantitative historians have been up to and what the promise of quantification is throughout the diffuse historical discipline. The editors contribute a long introduction that strongly argues the case for historical quantification and places each essay in its historiographic and methodological context.

Most of the authors have had long experience in the historical-quantitative enterprise. Stephen Thernstrom continues his study of the relationship between ethnicity and occupational mobility in ninetheenth-century Boston. Lawrence and Jeanne Stone ingeniously reconstruct the patterns of house building and home ownership over three centuries in Hertfordshire in order to create a methodological and data base for a larger examination of social mobility into the English political elite. Robert Fogel and Jack Ruttmer apply the well-developed tools of the cliometricians to test the efficiency of federal land policy in nineteenth-century America. The new urban history is represented by Rogers and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth's recreation of the expenditures of American cities at the turn of the twentieth century as part of a study of public policy outputs at the urban level.

Only three of the papers concern institutional political activity. Allan Bogue and William Aydelotte investigate legislative behavior; Bogue shrewdly tests a number of models of personal power within Congress in the Civil War era; Aydelotte uses scalogram analysis of roll calls in the House of Commons to determine to what extent ideological factors affected the split within the Tory party in the 1840s. Gerald Kramer and Susan Lepper develop a regression model of popular voting behavior to demonstrate the strong influence which changing economic conditions had on the outcome of American congressional elections since the 1890s. There are also two papers whose trust is basically political. Charles Tilly investigates the relationship between outbreaks of violence and the stage of economic and political development in nineteenth-century France. Gilbert Shapiro and James Dawson consider the relevance of different theories of status tensions to revolutionary commitment in the France of 1789.

This is both varied and valuable fare. Many of its findings will become welcome additions to our data files. But its importance, particularly to students of history, goes beyond the substantive findings presented. Everything about the way historians have engaged or should engage in this enterprise is here. Historians, for example, have some real problems with their data. Not blessed with the series of survey results routinely worked over in other social science disciplines, they must rely on frequently fragile and incomplete aggregate data. Often their work depends on the recovery of elusive data or finding ways of constructing useful numerical indices from disparate material. Some of the work here illustrates such efforts. The Stones' essay, for example, is primarily an attempt to construct a data base for a larger problem of measurement and analysis. Similarly much of the interest of the Tilly and the Shapiro and Dawson pieces lies in their imaginative reconstruction of data banks. At the same time, where the data do exist, the historians included here have characteristically borrowed a wide variety of methods and approaches available in other disciplines to manipulate and analyze their data. As is usual in quantitative-historical work, the methods employed vary from simple summary statistics to the application of complex models of human behavior. The scaffolding of historical quantification is therefore nicely revealed for all to see. Concerned but inexperienced historians can learn much to guide them in their own quantitative probes. Nonhistorians will also find much of value here. Although I doubt that history can ever shed its methodological soft side completely, or even in most cases, the sophistication exhibited here should suggest to students of the political and social process that some historians are ready to contribute precise data and well-formulated insight to the process of understanding human behavior.

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Ramsay MacDonald's Political Writings. Edited by Bernard Barker. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972. Pp. 258. $10.95.)

This book is of particular interest to political theorists and students of the British Labour movement. It deals with the ideas of Britain's first Labour Prime Minister, as expressed in his eleven major theoretical works between 1905 and 1921. Extracts from five of these are represented here, and the editor has provided a fifty-page introduction, which traces the intricate pattern of influences on them, and their place in Labour Party history.

MacDonald was the leader of the Labour Party from 1911 to 1914 and from 1922 to 1931. When he formed the coalition National Government in 1931, he was expelled from the Party. Since then his name has been associated with that "great betrayal." Whether his political ideas were leading him in the direction of forsaking his party must be a relevant question, and they are clearly not those of a "hard-liner." MacDonald rejected revolution, Marxism, class war and industrial strife. In this he was the typical British Labour leader, dedicated to evolutionary reforms, and when in power, inclined to placate the capitalists at the expense of the trade unions and the working class.

He adds a Scottish touch: socialism will come largely through education, moral fervor and willpower. The tone is reminiscent of sermons which he must have heard in his youth at Lossiemouth. "The man through whom socialism is to come is not the economic man, the class-conscious man, the man toiling with the muck. He is to be the man of ideals, of the historical spirit, the man in whose intelligence religion and sense of what is of good report will have a dominating influence" (p. 48). The Calvinist doctrine of the elect seems as relevant here as the continental socialism of Saint-Simon and Comte, discussed by Mr. Barker.

MacDonald was aware of the continental philosophers, and deals with them in *Socialism* (1907). But he was more concerned to produce a British version of socialist philosophy. For this he turned to Darwin, and J. A. Hobson, the economist. The result is a kind of "Social Darwinism," without a critique of capitalism. Socialism comes about through the evolution of technology in industry, and not as a result of the "contradictions" in capitalism, leading to its overthrow.

There are echoes of that in the Labour Party in Britain today, and it is perhaps time to rehabilitate MacDonald as a representative Labour theorist. But the doubt remains: does his philosophy not lead eventually to a sellout of the "man toiling with the muck"?

This book is particularly valuable for the editor's introduction, which bridges political theory and political history. It is a distinctive contribution to the literature on socialism and the development of the Labour Party.

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Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects in Western Society. By Raymond Boudon. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973. Pp. v, 220. $12.50.)

Boudon is a sociologist, professor of social sciences at the University of Paris, who wrote this volume while a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford. Many of the data Boudon reviews were collected while he was a consultant with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A necessary limitation of those data is that they are not uniform in quality and were not collected by Boudon on the basis of a design he articulated. But there can be no doubt that Boudon is at home with methodology appropriate for display and interpretation of data focused on a response to the rhetorical question, "Why has the tremendous surge in the development of education, common to most Western countries since World War II, had so little impact in furthering the cause of social equality and economic opportunity?"

In suggesting that the extension of educational opportunity in the lower classes has won little economic or social advantage for the youth of those groups, Boudon's monograph complements *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America* by Christopher Jencks et al. (New York: Basic Books, 1972). The Jencks study argues that the number of years of schooling, and even the quality of academic achievement, have little effect on later income. Boudon undertakes to explain the apparent lack of relation between reducing the inequality of educational opportunity (IEO) and inequality of social (or socio-occupational) opportunity (ISO). The analysis is skillful and persuasive. It could have been proposed a bit more modestly and without a modish claim to being an example of systems analysis. At one moment structuralism is *the* approach, then the analysis of systems has center stage. Actually an understanding of formal education as a system calls for the interaction of all behavioral studies, including a social-psychological probing of attitudes. It was the French study of the latter, which as Jean Floud reminds us, gave rise to the illuminating phrase, *la famille éducogène*—that is, the family that highly prizes education—wishes a maximum amount of education for its children and cooperates with schools in spurring students to high levels of achievement. (Jean Floud, together with A. H. Halsey pioneered the study of social-class influences on education, using British populations for studies initiated just after World War II.) This type of family has exerted social and intellectual pressures reinforcing those of the schools. Surely humanistic reflection on the reformist visions, to which Boudon gives hardly more than a nod, is not out of order. One recalls that it was Boudon's predecessors who, shortly after World War I, joined in *Les Compagnons de l'université Nouvelle.* These proponents of a new education may have seemed romantic optimists, but their desire was not primarily for social and economic advantage. Rather it was the humanistic goal of achieving less snobbishness and monopolization of privilege.

Given these caveats, Boudon's reader will be sobered by his demonstration that there is a low correlation between education (grade completed) and mobility (p. 6). If one wishes to increase mobility, the conclusion of Boudon and Jencks (together with many styled "revisionists" among contemporary historians of American education), is that the character of the economic-social order must be reconstructed to greatly reduce the distance between high and low income and hence between upper and lower class. It is not enough to revise the structure of education by advancing the cause of comprehensive education, mixing youth without regard for social class, or increasing the years of compulsory and fee-free education. It is not enough, Boudon argues, to increase the number of lower- and lower-middle-class families who qualify as *les familles éducogenès.* The manner in which Boudon uses a number of analyses to buttress his contention disarms his opposition. But we are left without direction. Perhaps that is too much to ask of the behavioral sciences, the moreso if they are not in tandem with conventional literary-moral humanism. Nonetheless, for those who wish to understand what Boudon refers to as the data of school bookkeeping, his methodological explorations truly will advance comparative studies in education. Those of us concerned with those studies are very much in Boudon's debt.

Robert H. Beck

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The Economic Theory of Representative Government. By Albert Breton. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1974. Pp. 228. $8.50.)

Albert Breton has put it all together—an economic theory of public goods, of democracy, of representative government, and of bureaucracy. And somehow, the whole seems less than the sum of the parts. Maybe, as I suspect, some parts are not yet sufficiently sound to build a substantial structure.

This book has many merits: Most important, it is the only book I know that attempts to synthesize an economic theory of government. It should prove valuable for advanced courses in the theory of public choice, and I plan to use it for this purpose. It is careful, concise, coherent and creative—but not conclusive. All of us should aspire to this standard.

Professor Breton builds on now conventional economic assumptions: Citizens maximize a utility function defined in terms of the level of private and government services. Elected officials maximize a utility function defined in terms of the probability of reelection and other variables. Bureaucrats maximize a utility function defined in terms of the size of the bureau. And, of course, resources are limited. The calculus of constrained maximization is then used to develop hypotheses about the individual demands for government services, the aggregative demand facing a specific government, and the supply of government services. This approach is used to evaluate the consequences of specific "constitutional" characteristics of government—e.g., the voting rule, the election period, the range of authorized functions, the political rights of individuals, the role of the bureaucracy, etc.—although Breton does not develop an explicit calculus for deciding these constitutional issues.

The strongest sections of the book, from my perspective, focus on the behavior of individuals to minimize the coercion of any specific set of government policies and on the behavior of the governing party for any specific set of constitutional characteristics. Breton demonstrates how political participation and individual economic response is related to the level and character of coercion and how the amount of coercion is related to the constitutional characteristics. This material represents his major unique contributions.

Other sections of the book are less satisfactory. Breton distinguishes between government policies and government instruments—the probability of being subject to a crime, for example, rather than the units of police activity. He contends that individuals express their demands and officials base their decisions on these policy outcomes rather than on the instruments. I do not find this formulation to be valuable. Individuals can usually affect the policy outcomes by a variety of personal actions, and it is the government instruments, not the outcomes, which are necessarily common to the affected polity.

Second, I expect that the concept of public goods will become recognized as not very valuable in explaining government behavior. Many public goods are adequately supplied by private organizations in cases where property rights and marketing technology permit efficient exclusion of nonpaying demands. And the developing empirical evidence suggests that very few government activities manifest much "publicness."

And last, a number of minor quibbles: Breton contends that political participation is a positive function of the degree of coercion from a specific set of government actions, but some polar cases are not considered. Political action would not go to zero even in a noncoercive "Lindahl equilibrium" because everyone still has an incentive to reduce his personal tax share. Political action may nearly disappear in the face of considerable coercion if the expected payoff is small. He also contends that a reduction in the cost of political participation will increase the discretionary power of elected officials, but this seems to be based on the simple error of assuming that the voting rule is based on some absolute number of votes rather than on some proportion of those who vote. And finally, he develops the rationale for logrolling as a device to minimize coercion within the governing coalition, but he overlooks the important role of logrolling to protect intense minorities.

In summary, economists (and other social scientists) have yet to develop a satisfactory theory of the most important social phenomenon of our times—the relative growth of government. The construction of a satisfactory paradigm of government, however, will probably build on the foundation Breton has so carefully established.

WILLIAM A. NISKANEN
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The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau. By John Charvet. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974. Pp. 148. $8.95.)

Most books written to denounce Rousseau are dreadful. Until recently selected passages from his works were used to flog authors' pet hates, be they romanticism, pragmatism, democracy, fascism or communism. At present the vocabulary of psychoanalysis is deployed to reveal Rousseau's insanity and so the sickness of his ideas. In either case we learn a lot about the writers of these books but little about Rousseau. John Charvet, Lecturer at the London School of Economics, has written a work that is therefore uniquely welcome. For though he criticizes Rousseau relentlessly, he has written a penetrating, closely reasoned and very lucid essay. He never takes his eyes off his subject, which is a single theme in Rousseau's mature work (the *Second Discourse*, the *Social Contract* and especially *Emile*) and wisely cites no other books. That allows one to concentrate on the matter at hand, which is Rousseau's claim that when men in the dawn of history leave their natural isolation they lose their healthy egoism (*amour de soi*) and acquire a destructive vanity (*amour propre*). Instead of simply pursuing their natural needs they come to see themselves only in relation to, and through the eyes of, others.

This is the source of competition, inequality and every other known vice. Charvet calls this the "social problem" and he believes that Rousseau's conception of and solution for it are "misconceived and radically incoherent" (p. 3). His arguments are always supported by textual references and are cogent, but they are not flawless.

Charvet's first complaint is that in the *Second Discourse* Rousseau has made man too completely an animal to be able to account for his social fate. Indeed that "stupid and limited animal" is no different from any other in the state of nature. His peculiarity is only potential, in what Rousseau calls his freedom. By that he means only that man can alter in response to experience as animals cannot. Man is capable of unlimited self-transformation (perfectibility), and this makes him a moral being whom one can praise and blame for his choice. One does not tell a hog he ought to behave differently, after all. Mr. Charvet professes not to understand what Rousseau means by free will (p. 10) and that is unfortunate, because freedom explains why man can and does leave the animal order. No more is needed. Even natural man's pity is like that of any animal. All feel disturbed by the sight of suffering. That is, of course, quite unlike the pity a social person feels; this distinction is not confusing, though Charvet finds it so (p. 18). Finally, precisely because man is just an animal, he first develops his ability to estimate and compare in relation to other beasts with whom he must cope. This ability is pre-social, not suddenly aroused by primitive society. This social state is, in fact, a late one, preceded by the domestication women impose upon their mates. This together with the natural capacity for measuring is quite enough to lead to competition and awareness of opinion—for these only express a new kind of measurement, inevitable once men see that they are alike: equal and unequal. These stairs to vanity, to "being for others," have no gaps, and only Charvet's own omissions create them. By the time vanity is born men have long since given up their merely casual mating and hunting relations in favor of the settled conditions that undo them. It is not sudden as Charvet claims (pp. 30-31). That does not, however, mean that Rousseau is right.

When he turns to *Emile*, Charvet is on more solid ground. This is the best part of his book. Given that his education is to make a man who can live in society without being corrupted, Emile must become an unshakable egoist. He is accordingly preserved until adolescence from any human relationship. Only contact with things is permitted. Even tutor and pupil treat each other like things for mutual use, not as people (p. 65). Emile thus submits only to natural necessities, among which his tutor is one, and nothing else can influence him. As in the *Second Discourse*, sexuality interferes with this natural state of oneness. To prepare him for society the tutor teaches Emile pity, to identify with the victims who suffer, for his own sake, to be sure, not theirs. This natural emotion is generalized so that Emile comes to feel compassion for mankind, without having to deal with specific people. Vanity however is not absent now. Pity among social men includes the pleasant awareness of not being a victim. This to Charvet seems a corruption of pity and so nothing but vanity (93). The cure for vanity, however, cannot be natural; vanity must somehow supply its own antidote and that is what Rousseau offers. It is, perhaps, a low, but not an incoherent, protection for Emile as he enters society. Having revealed the dark side of pity, Charvet goes on to argue that since Emile now feels generalized as well as egoistic pity he is torn between morality and nature and that this is reflected in the mind-body dualism of the "Confession of the Savoyard Vicar" (pp. 108-109). That may be, but it is not clear why it should be so. The Vicar is a pure case of what Hegel called "the unhappy consciousness" with his divided ego, half soul and half thing. The egoism of Stoics and Christians bent upon personal salvation is proverbial, and their self-division is endemic in our culture and hardly Rousseau's invention. The Vicar is not just Emile.

Because Rousseau was far more obsessed with inequality and its opposite than Charvet seems to recognize, the *Social Contract* is here treated as an extention of these aspects of *Emile*. In a too brief chapter Charvet tries to show what is meant by an association that leaves its members as free as they were before entering it. No conflicts of rights and so no full personal relationships or lesser associations are to be allowed. If there were to be conflict one party would dominate others. Each citizen generalizes his own interests, as Emile generalizes pity, and this is the general will. That will is identical for all because of its limited scope and its impersonal abstract form. Charvet thinks that Rousseau has here confused universalization (Kant?), generality, and equality (p. 134). Universality, however, has no place in this patriotic republic, and equality must in any case be general. The trouble is rather Rousseau's demand that equality should amount to complete identity. That is indeed why, as Charvet says, citizens relate to each other as objects not as people. That is what is wrong with all Rousseau's solutions to "the social problem," and Charvet has brought that out with great clarity and intelligence in his interesting book.

JUDITH N. SHKLAR
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Population and Politics: New Directions in Political Science Research. Edited by Richard L. Clinton. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973. Pp. 320. $14.00.)

This is the third volume published in the last three years by Heath on the relation between population and politics. Each has remarked on the lack of interest by political scientists in the field of population research. Let us hope that if a fourth should come along soon, it will take note of what has actually been going on, i.e., that there is indeed considerable interest by political scientists in this policy area.

This upsurge of interest can be traced in part to the recognition that population problems are largely political problems. A theme that runs through this volume, as well as other recent works on the subject, is that family planning (contraceptives plus educational and informational services) is by itself an ineffective means of confining the population explosion in the Third World. At AID, where family planning has long been a keystone in the foreign aid program, some officials have recently been turning to political scientists to see if they have any answers to the political problems of population control. Among a new generation of political scientists they have found many who have wanted to become more "relevant" and have seen in the study of rapid population growth the means of doing so. Many of the contributors to this volume exude an enthusiasm and dedication about their work that has become typical among those whom we might refer to now as "postbehavioralists."

It seems inevitable that symposia of this type will be subject to two basic criticisms: that they lack focus or contain much material not germane to the main topic, and that the quality of the contributions is uneven. The present volume cannot be excepted from these criticisms, although they apply with some qualifications. In the first half of this work, one can perceive a certain degree of focus, at least, which apparently was achieved by the manner in which the papers for the volume were produced. They came out of a political science/population workshop sponsored by AID at the Carolina Population Center in January 1972. Instead of inviting people to give papers at the workshop, the conference planners organized roundtable discussions of a few central themes. Afterward, when presumably the themes and issues involved were sharpened and clarified, the participants were asked to go back and write their papers. For each of the four major topics covered, one person was assigned to do a "wrap-up" chapter which would attempt to tie each of the other chapters in his section together.

Following the organization of the workshops, the volume is divided into four sections: (1) "Normative Concerns"; (2) "Methodological Issues"; (3) "The Less Advantaged Countries and Their Relations with the Advantaged Countries"; and (4) "The Advantaged Countries, with Special Emphasis on the United States."

The first section on normative concerns really involves two fundamental issues. The first two chapters deal with the ethics of governmental control of population. The other issue is whether political scientists, as such, ought to get into the population policy question; the authors of the next four chapters all argue that they should. Their reasons are varied, however, and here we are introduced to the major underlying conflict among the political scientists writing for this volume. The chief spokesman for one point of view is Terry McCoy who, in his chapter, "Political Science in Population Studies: A Disciplinary Perspective," demonstrates the value of population policy analysis for the discipline of political science. He sparks the controversy by emphasizing the professional obligation of political scientists to advance their discipline, stating that we "often overlook this responsibility in our eagerness to prove the social utility of our chosen profession," and that "in the final analysis, our value as problem solvers is only as strong as the discipline on which it is based" (p. 16). The opposing point of view is represented by the symposium editor, Richard L. Clinton, in his concluding chapter of this section. A. E. Keir Nash's chapter in this section lies somewhere in between these two. Nash suggests that political scientists could benefit by specifically investing some time in population research. He sees this as helping to make political science a "harder science," and points to the "impetus which political science might receive along behavioral paths from increased attention to demographic studies" (p. 31).

Clinton's chapter strikes out at McCoy and those who would put the interests of the discipline before the pressing problems of population. In order to establish the priority of the latter, he finds it necessary to denigrate the trends and present status of the former. Initially, this is simply a "postbehavioralist" attack against behavioralism for its positivistic implications and alleged conservative bias. But, then he goes on to deplore the conditions of *all* the social sciences, which he sees as having been plagued by three ills: "overspecialization, the emphasis on quantitative analysis, and the premium on the construction of general theories analogous to the laws of the physical sciences" (p. 62).

This sort of critique seems to be particularly ill conceived and misplaced. Certainly there may be overspecialized political scientists from one point of view, but the behavioral revolution's effect on the discipline was to broaden its scope substantially and to increase its interdisciplinary relationships. Furthermore, it is curious that one would call for de-emphasizing quantitative analysis when approaching population research. Keir Nash in his chapter saw that a splendid opportunity was provided for political scientists to sharpen their quantitative tools in analyzing the wealth of available demographic data. Finally, the desire to de-emphasize theory seems simply wrongheaded. What sort of atheoretical research would be superior to theory-guided research is not made clear. Actually, Clinton wants to mount a frontal attack on the problem of population and does not want anything to get in his way—neither theory, nor the requirements of quantification and varification, nor present limitations of the discipline. It is difficult, however, to see how the product of such a quixotic venture would be even relevant or useful, let alone be of any value to the discipline.

The behavioralist/anti-behavioralist controversy emerges again in somewhat disguised form in the second section on methodology. The major contention here is about the value of the case-study method as against comparative analysis. Steven Sinding, a political scientist with the Office of Population of AID, feels that "rigorous and systematic" case studies would be quite useful to his agency in that they could provide "country-specific" information and data that would help inform the actions of the agency. He finds cross-national aggregate analysis less useful because the sort of information it provides "is not likely to be either firm enough or specific enough to imply action" (p. 127). He is incapable of seeing how political scientists can be useful to him except as data gatherers.

A diametrically opposed view to Sinding's is taken by Mair deVoursney who extolls the virtues of comparative aggregate data analysis over the case-study approach. In addition to the obvious theoretical advantages, she points to a number of practical ones such as the fact that it involves unobtrusive measures in a policy area very sensitive to intrusion. The most comprehensive article in the section is by Nazli Choucri. She sets forth the requirements for systematic inquiry and provides an extensive inventory of research alternatives for the population policy field. Each of the alternatives is analyzed from a cost-benefit standpoint, and here the case-study approach makes a poor showing. The wind-up chapter for this section makes a valiant attempt to reconcile some of the differences among the authors, but they seemed to be too fundamental to make this attempt successful.

The last half of the book is almost totally without focus. The only common thread in Part 3 is that the authors draw on their experience in Third World countries for their comments. Most of the material in this section is personal and subjective. These authors tend to be critical of AID policy, generally from a radical perspective. The concluding chapter in the section gets in another jibe at the behavioralists for their "insensitivity to issues"!

There are two excellent chapters, however, in the book's final section. In one, Elsa Chaney discusses the need for research and action on provision of alternative roles for women as a major means of affecting population growth. She is persuasive in showing that altering the status and role of women in society and providing other roles than motherhood for them can reduce the desire for large families. If this perspective has been largely neglected, it has probably been, as she points out, because population research and policy making have been dominated by men. The other chapter is by Dorothy Stetson and is concerned with the development of a framework for the comparative analysis of population policy. She focuses on "levels of capability performance" and surveys policy options and categories of variables hypothetically related to governmental capability. Her aim, she says, "is to make the study of population policy compatible with the pursuits of political scientists."

The final chapter by Michael Kraft re-echoes the postbehavioralists' points. It is, of course, critical of Stetson for being more concerned about the discipline than about the problems of population policy. In this context he asks, "Why do we continually need to justify the study of 'policy relevant' research by appeals to the significance of such work to the discipline?" I suppose the answer is that if you want to enlist our professional competence in something in which you are interested, then I should think you would have to appeal to our professional interests.

In this volume of 20 essays, then, seven or eight are quite worthwhile. A higher score certainly could have been achieved if the book had not got mired down in the controversy over behavioralism. It may have been useful to point to the defects in present-day political science, but the reiteration of this criticism unaccompanied by any specific remedies for these defects greatly dilutes the value of this volume.

JOHN G. GRUMM

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Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction. By Harold Eugene Davis. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. 269. $10.00.)

Latin American thought is very difficult to categorize, systematize, or synthesize. Few "Latin Americanists" agree on what the term "Latin American" means in a social or cultural sense. "Thought," of course, is an equally vague word. What is more, even if the subject were definable, its kaleidoscopic nature would frustrate all but the most determined. Nevertheless, these difficulties have not deterred some scholars, Latins and North Americans alike, from tackling this subject in a systematic way. In English alone, several significant attempts have appeared, including W. Rex Crawford's *A Century of Latin American Thought* (New York: Praeger, 1961), Harold Eugene Davis' *Latin American Social Thought* (Washington: The University Press of Washington, D.C., 1963), and Miguel Jorrín and John Martz's *Latin American Political Thought and Ideology* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1970). Of these, the Jorrín and Martz book is the most successful. It achieves a reasonably balanced and manageable synthesis of the material, whereas Davis (1963) is massive and undigested and Crawford is brief and, now, somewhat outdated.

Against this background Professor Davis has again sallied forth to joust with his favorite windmill. The product of his latest effort, *Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction*, digests and partially updates the material found in *Latin American Social Thought*. While his previous volume contained extensive excerpts from the work of each of the thinkers discussed, this latest study is straight description and analysis. In a mere 239 pages, the author examines what he feels to be the major currents of Latin American thought from before the arrival of the Spaniards to the present. Starting with the pre-Conquest and colonial antecedents, he proceeds to the Age of Reason and the Independence Movements; revolutionary liberalism, utilitarianism, and traditionalism; positivism and evolutionary thought; end-of-the-century traditionalism; revolutionary and traditional twentieth-century thought; twentieth-century Marxist thought; existentialist idealism and spiritualism; and finally neo-Christian thought.

Although this book purports to be a history of the entirety of Latin American thought, its treatment of the various schools is uneven. Davis clearly is most at home in the period from the Enlightenment through the early twentieth century. His insightful discussions of the different elements of thought which emerged during this long time span are obviously based on extensive and meticulous research. His coverage of schools which preceded or followed this period is less impressive. One would have hoped, considering the tremendous impact of Iberic-Catholic thought on the Latin American mind, to have found an extensive examination of the transplantation of Tomistic-corporative thinking into the New World in the period immediately following the Conquest. This important subject is virtually ignored. More regrettable is Davis' neglect of the major trends of Latin American thought in recent decades. His coverage of the "Democratic Left," the Catholic Left, and the Marxist guerrillas is extremely sparse. The Democratic Left, for instance, is not mentioned as a category, and its two leading spokesmen, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre and Rómulo Betancourt are discussed only as twentieth-century "Marxists." Christian Democracy is virtually ignored except in a brief section on its Chilean spokesman, Eduardo Frei Montalva. The Christian radicals, who have published prolifically in the last decade, are given a mere two paragraphs of summary attention. Finally, among the Marxist guerrilla writers, Ché Guevara is the only individual to receive any mention.

Another problem with this book centers around its thesis that "Latin American thought since independence has been revolutionary and nationalist . . ." (p. 232). Superficially this statement appears accurate; many of the most prominent thinkers of the last century-and-a-half have been revolutionaries. This thesis, however, ignores the fact that Latin American social, economic and political institutions (which must have been molded by somebody's thinking) are generally traditional and conservative in the extreme. Therefore, although the revolutionaries may have been the most vocal, they have not been the most influential. (This more complex truth is examined most skillfully in a recent article by Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model" [*World Politics*, January, 1973, 206-235].) By emphasizing the more visible revolutionary thinkers and by failing to dig more deeply into Latin America's conservative, corporative roots, Davis has distorted reality.

In conclusion, this study is not recommended as a basic text for courses on Latin American thought. Not only does it ignore or underemphasize certain important bodies of material, but also it is too abbreviated and, at the same time, often too sophisticated in its use of terms to be of much value to the beginning student. It will, however, be of interest to more advanced scholars, especially those concerned with the period from the Enlightenment to the early twentieth century.

THOMAS W. WALKER

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The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century. By Georges Duby. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974. Pp. 292. $10.00.)

Georges Duby, professor at the Collège de France, is one of the most prolific medievalists active in the world today. In this volume, rendered into excellent English from the French edition of 1973, he explores in brief but masterly fashion the "early growth of the European economy," essentially the economic history of Europe from the seventh century to approximately 1180.

Since the time of Henri Pirenne, there has been no clear and firm synthesis of the economic experiences of early medieval Europe, and much time and effort have been expended, in these past fifty years, in scholarly haggling over Pirenne's imaginative but untenable thesis. Pirenne gets short shrift in this present work (he is cited twice); Duby rather advances his own, totally independent thesis concerning the economic development of early medieval Europe.

Although neither the footnotes nor the bibliography acknowledge it, the book is deeply indebted to the researches of anthropologists into the economic behavior of primitive societies. The work reads in parts like a practical demonstration of principles expounded in Marshall Sahlins' *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972). Although Duby could not have seen this last work, he surely caught wind of the ideas it proposes, in the writings of French anthropologists, especially Marcel Mauss.

"At the end of the sixth century, Europe was a profoundly uncivilized place." This, the first sentence of the book, conveys in the word "uncivilized" the essence of the thesis to follow. At least through the ninth century, Europe lived by "an economy of pillage, gift and largesse" (p. 57). What then changed this "gift economy" into the "profit-making economy" of the later Middle Ages? The architects of the new economic order were primarily the magnates, the great warrior princes and, in lesser measure, the prelates of the Church. Until the ninth century, these chiefs lived from booty, tribute and gifts. But when wars of conquest ceased after the reign of Charlemagne, they had to develop new sources of economic support. "To preserve their way of life," Duby explains, "the diminishing return from booty and tribute led magnates to stir up enthusiasm on the part of farm managers: manors had to be made to yield more." The magnates, or their farm managers, thus encouraged technological innovations and the settlement of virgin land. The peasants cooperated—there is even a chapter entitled "Peasant Conquests"—but the chief impetus to growth came from on high. "Power was the motive force behind increasing expenditure and commercial vitality."

Duby thus locates the principal stimulus for economic advance in the actions of the aristocracy. And he does not doubt that there was advance. His last chapter is entitled "take-off," by which he means the triumph of the profit-making economy, characteristic especially of the growing towns, over the primitive forms of economic behavior of the early medieval world.

Duby's work, saturated with anthropological concepts, brings us close to the society of the early Middle Ages—probably closer than any previous synthesis. Still, doubts persist about the appropriateness of the model Duby implicitly proposes. Did the magnates of the early Middle Ages become rational economic men and promoters of a productive economy when they rationally discerned that their earlier reliance on pillage was irrational? Somehow, the directions, allegedly given by the magnates to their "farm managers" to increase manorial yields, has a distinctly unprimitive ring. The manorial surveys of the early Middle Ages punctiliously list charges and services due from dependents; does this emphasis on regular rents, regularly paid, represent "an economy of pillage and largesse"? How primitive was European society in the early Middle Ages? This is the fulcrum upon which Duby's thesis tips or balances. Something surely persisted of the Roman legacy, which stressed clarity, precision, and rationality. Duby's orientation is clearly northern, rooted in Europe's newer lands, where this theory of dominant primitivism is perhaps more acceptable than it is when applied to the Mediterranean regions. Still, to his credit, he has written a book which is likely to remain for years to come a source of lively and fruitful debate.

DAVID HERLIHY

Harvard University

Compassion: Toward a Science of Value. By William Eckhardt. (Oakville, Ontario, Canada: CPRI Press, 1972. Pp. 311. $8.00, cloth; $4.00, paper.)

Every so often there is evidence of progress toward the new investigation and new statement of basic social theory. Most new theorizing deals with institutions; some of it with humans as passive inhabitants of institutions; some of it with humans as nonpassive interactors with institutions and values, as humans and civilization develop together. Eckhardt's *Compassion* is new evidence of progress in theorizing of the third sort.

The book deals with compassion (or empathy or nonsexual love), both as an innate characteristic of our species and as a social value derived from the nature of humans. Eckhardt contrasts compassion with compulsion. pairing them with (p. 6) altruism ("loving others as well as oneself") and egoism ("satisfying oneself at the expense of others"). All this could be mere logical exercise in moral categorization, but the author does more. He brings to his analysis the research that he and others have done on the correlates between compassion as an expressed value and its manifestations in human interactions. He includes those that take place in both proximal (direct, person-to-person) and distal (attachments to people far from oneself that are mediated by those near to oneself) contexts. In addition he compares the sequence from compulsive to conformist and finally compassionate interactions to the stages of moral development that the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg—building on Jean Piaget's foundations—has posited and researched.

Eckhardt argues that in their early stages of moral development humans are more likely to be compulsive, then conformist to external power and authority, and in their later stages compassionate. This change is a product of the interaction between the nature of humans and the social (including institutional) conditions prevailing at a particular stage of development. The interaction is not one in which humans are passive, merely conditioned responders to the environment: rather they select between alternative responses whenever the conditions are such as to permit choice.

As Eckhardt acknowledges, his case is not demonstrated by his data, and he argues that research in values will no more change those that are innate in origin than research in nuclear physics changes the nature of elementary particles. On the other hand, he also argues that people's beliefs about each other do affect their interaction. And this all raises that issue which can be disguised in supposedly neutral and scientific language but seems to pop up any way: are humans good by nature or by benefit of values acquired in society and its institutions?

The author does not very clearly deal with human good and evil. He implies what Rousseau stated: that humans are naturally good and are corrupted by society. And he asserts that, since it is human beings who have created the conditions that make them behave badly toward others, they can also recreate the conditions. These implied and asserted statements help trace the question of virtue back a step toward its origins, but they leave unresolved the issue of humans' innate or acquired goodness.

Unless a writer specifies the natural and the social (including institutional) circumstances in which people are at a particular stage of development of people-in-their-culture, I would argue that implications or assertions about human good and evil are meaningless. Humans may die if they behave with total altruism in a totally egoistic society and such a death would be neither moral nor meaningful. In such a hypothetical society, the only value and the only virtue is asocial: it is individual survival—and survival is not to be depreciated when only it is possible. An individual hospitalized with a mortal disease or injury who loses the will to live because the only real virtue is compassion, may lose his own life and therefore the later opportunity to love others.

If indeed it is natural for man, when circumstances allow him to choose, to behave *less* compulsively and egoistically and *more* compassionately and altruistically, then it may more clearly be said that it is human nature to choose to become good, or more compassionate, or more human. This is to say that the innate potential of human beings requires favorable circumstances to emerge: that other-orientation is natural but can be realized only when individual survival is assured. Eckhardt is not very clear on the organism-environment interaction, but he seems to imply that circumstances must be favorable for compassion to emerge.

On an intuitive basis, Marx—more exactly, the 28-year old Ur-Marx of the 1846 *German Ideology*—said such things. Two decades later, in the 1867 *Capital*, Marx had freed mankind from choice: the environment determined all. In our century after Marx, there has developed a boldness about research and theory on the human organism as one of the two major determinants (with the environment) of behavior. This new development is much more promising than research and theory that, following the later Marx, has accepted rather than tested the assumption that the environment—and so, tautologically, institutions—are totally determinant of human behavior.

This book on compassion is a major step toward new, surer, qualified, and quantified assertions of the sort that the Buddha, Confucius, Socrates, Aristotle, Christ, Mahomet, and Marx made intuitively about the nature of humans. In our politically critical time, it is too late to rely on intuition about human nature. We are free to continue to rely on rote ignorance and free therefore to perish with categorical and vague imperatives. We are also a little free not to do these things.

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Francogallia. By François Hotman. Latin text by Ralph E. Giesey. Translated by J.H.M. Salmon. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. xii, 581. $37.50.)

Francois Hotman was born a few years before the death of Machiavelli and died shortly after the birth of Hobbes. Although he never acquired the fame of either one, his capacities and accomplishments are noteworthy. A professor of law and one-time teacher of classical literature, Hotman, like his more celebrated near contemporaries, was very learned in ancient history and philosophy. His earliest works included a French translation of Plato's *Apology of Socrates* and a commentary on Cicero's speeches. What is more, he had a thorough grasp of the Justinian Code, of its different compilations and interpretations, and of the numerous ancient and modern commentaries on it. Prolific in his writing, Hotman devoted most of his energy to short works on Roman law and history or to disputes about political questions of the day.

All of these interests and capacities are evident in his major work, the *Francogallia*. Its basic argument derives from Hotman's interpretation of what the old French and German historians reveal about the way Francogallia was originally constituted. Convinced that it flourished so long as those original institutions were preserved, he tried to show what those institutions were and to identify the erroneous changes that had arisen over time. That task involved him in the tangles of historical interpretation and led him to burden the work with disputes about correct sources or the proper way to understand different events. Nonetheless, his basic contentions stand forth clearly: from earliest times there is abundant evidence to prove it was never intended that the kings of Francogallia should have unlimited powers; only tyrants have unlimited powers; kings, appointed by the people, should always be responsible to the people and strive to provide for the well-being of the people.

Hotman's book may be divided into three major parts. If the chapter division of the 1573 edition is followed (see "Editors' Preface," p. xi and "Editors' Introduction," sections 7-11), the first part includes chapters 1-5. In these chapters, Hotman gave a brief history of Gaul before its subjugation by the Romans, destroyed the fables which portrayed the Franks as descendants of Trojan warriors by showing why they must have originated in "that swampy region along the coast between the mouths of the Elbe and the Rhine," and explained that they were dubbed "Franks" because their contemporaries considered them to be free men. The second part explains the original institutions and fundamental laws of Francogallia (chapters 6-11) and accounts for the changes which occurred to these institutions and laws under the Carolingians (chapters 12-15) and the Capetians (chapters 16-18). Referring to chronicles and philosophers, Hotman argued passionately that originally there was no hereditary monarchy, that the people elected and deposed kings, and that the regime was basically a mixed polity in which the king shared powers and duties with councils of commoners and nobles. The last two chapters identify two evil practices which gave rise to what Hotman considered great injustices in his own time. As a remedy, he argued that women should be excluded from royal office and that the legal chicanery practiced in the swollen parliamentary courts should be stifled by turning away from superstitious allegiance to the edicts of the court of Rome and by consulting Scripture with one's own natural reason as a guide.

The basic simplicity of the argument is obscured only by Hotman's constant reliance on citations. No aspect of written knowledge seems to have escaped his notice. References to ancient historians—Herodotus, Polybius, Caesar, Livy, Josephus, Plutarch, and Tacitus—abound, as do passages from Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, St. Augustine, and Marsilius. In addition, Hotman frequently buttressed a point by citing poets and orators such as Homer, Ovid, Isocrates, and Quintilian. And he seems to have been equally familiar with more recondite sources: he drew heavily on jurists and historians of the middle ages or of his own time, as well as on humanists and legal compilations, in order to make his arguments. There is scarcely a page of his book which is not laden with learned references.

While such erudition inspires a certain kind of respect, it is not without its problems. The numerous references sometimes obscure the basic argument and frequently prompt the reader to become careless. Because they are so numerous and apparently repetitious, it is easy to overlook comparing them with one another or with the original text. Similarly, the reader may neglect to think about the relationship between the reference and the principal argument. Above all, the sheer quantity of the references induces the reader to consider them all as equal. When these tendencies are checked, the vague outlines of a greater depth to Hotman's book may be discerned.

For example, in the dedication to this book published in Geneva, the Frenchman, François Hotman, sought to persuade Frederick III, elector palatine of the Roman Empire, that love for one's fatherland was good and praiseworthy. After acknowledging that the reflections of philosophy and the bitter truths of practical experience argued against patriotism, Hotman rested his case on the feelings stirred by poetic verse. France, suffering from evils of tyranny which had to be quenched like flames, was to be succored by Hotman's portrayal of the way Francogallia was originally constituted. Frederick and other readers, already softened by poetic persuasion, were expected to identify the ancient order of things with the natural order and to recognize that the ancient and natural were unquestionably good.

The presence of equally rhetorical arguments throughout the book, in the form of distorted quotations or erroneous narrations of events, suggests that Hotman's argument is not as simplistic as it first appears. Two questions then become urgent: first, why did Hotman try to base his argument on an identification of the ancient as the good rather than argue against unlimited monarchy on other grounds; and secondly, what is the basis for Hotman's devotion to popular sovereignty and his opposition to absolute monarchy? To arrive at a correct appreciation of the book's merit, one would have to examine these questions.

With the publication of this volume by Professors Giesey and Salmon, such an undertaking is now feasible. The different editions of the work have been carefully collated, and the changes noted. All of Hotman's references are identified and some of his distortions indicated. Except for a habit of speaking of "constitution" when Hotman speaks of "institutions" or of "state" (as in "state of being," i.e., *status*) and a tendency to be somewhat more reserved than the original, Salmon's translation is excellent. A thorough essay on Hotman and the *Francogallia* precedes the text. Unfortunately, the essay is directed almost exclusively to the specialist schooled in the history of the period and thus fails to address itself to a critical assessment of Hotman's contribution. Nonetheless, if Hotman's standing in the republic of letters is ever to be reconsidered, this praiseworthy volume will be an invaluable document.

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Functionaries. By F. William Howton. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1969. Pp. 268. $2.95, paper.)

Professor F. William Howton, a sociologist, has written a book which focuses on the processes of functionalization within contemporary organizations and a new social type, i.e., the functionary, which these processes have created. By functionalization, Howton means "the process by which the division of labor within an organization becomes progressively rationalized" (p. 9). The functionary is a new kind of man who is found in the middle and upper ranks of public, private, and voluntary organizations. In his role as a functionary, the individual knows no bounds. "The only limits he knows come from the rationality applied to the choice and use of means in relation to a given end . . ." (p. 5). He is not concerned with the content or the ends of his work. His ethic is the Functional Ethic, and this ethic may dehumanize him. Large organizations and modern technology, however, have made the functionary a necessary social type that is pervasive in contemporary society.

In his attempts to characterize the functionary and to develop a theory of functionalization, Howton describes the functionary abstractly as being (1) an organization man, (2) ubiquitous, (3) prototypic, and (4) new elitist. The functionary is an organization man because he is "the organization's creature and at the same time part of its apparatus . . ." (p. 23). He is part of both the conscience and the brain of the organization. The functionary is ubiquitous because the organization of work in modern society tends to accept large-scale efficiency as the overriding value. The large production organization where tasks and duties are differentiated functionally is the dominant type, and the functionary operates within it everywhere. The functionary is prototypic because "his occupational type has become a pattern and a mold for all other occupations . . ." (p. 26). In an earlier period, the entrepreneur was the model; today, virtually every occupation looks to the functionary as the model. Functionaries have become new elitist because of their prestigious place in society. Those in large organizations also become leaders outside of the organization because of the influence of the organization.

Howton develops his theory by identifying functionaries and analyzing the processes of functionalization in the military, government, business, and voluntary associations. Howton suggests that functionalization is becoming the dominant force in all of these categories of organizations. The military man, for example, is close to the ideal functionary because his organizational acts have nothing to do with his individual goals and he is relatively unhampered by cultural norms and values. Howton contends that in government, functionalization is also becoming more prevalent and is the result of a cultural invasion carried on by people entering government who are already imbued with its logic and who are ready to install its substance. In business, functionalization is the prevailing logic in modern industry, and commerce, which once lagged behind industry in organizational development, is now becoming more and more functionalized—particularly with the development of large chain department stores and supermarkets. In the services industry where the self-employed craftsman is still utilized, a burgeoning technology and the need for greater capital investment means that functionalization will ultimately take place. In voluntary associations, functionalization has also taken place as leaders gradually relinquish or share their maintenance, action, intelligence and command functions with evolving functionaries.

Howton includes an excellent case study of a prison which focuses on the struggle of corrections officers to maintain their positions in the face of pressures from rehabilitationists, i.e., professional staff personnel, and inmates. The corrections officers use a variety of techniques—e.g., uniforms, bureaucratization in communication, and bargaining—to maintain themselves in their functional roles. Overall, the corrections officer is conservative and tends to resist change. Howton concludes that the corrections officer may actually be classified as a subfunctionary because he is subjected to peer as well as official discipline and because of the absence of a clear reason for being for the prison, i.e., the unresolved conflict between the custodial and rehabilitation approaches. He reaches up, however, to influence the true functionary above him and this influence is likely to be conservative.

Howton saves for his final chapter his description of the functionary in total institutions and in extreme situations. By total institutions, Howton means institutions which operate on the basis of functional rationality and treat substantive rationality as a remote factor when considering any kind of action. By extreme situations, he means a situation in which an individual is under surveillance and under pressure to accept a role which he or she considers degrading. In their classic form, extreme situations also involve the de-legalization and de-moralization of functionary-inmate relationships. Howton argues that society is gradually creating more extreme situations, and empirical examples include concentration camps, mental hospitals, ineffective states, i.e., where individuals are subjected to guerrillas and vigilantes, totalitarian states, genocide and the threat of thermo-nuclear war.

Howton is not optimistic. He concludes that "total institutions occur in nontotalitarian social structures, and that extreme situations are not confined to total institutions" (p. 244). Moreover, he states that it is not aberrant groups, institutional breakdowns, or criminal functionaries that produce extreme situations, but rather the very success of our functional institutions. The functionary is merely following the logic of the scientific technique, the norm of efficiency and a concept of duty. Howton asserts that there is no real answer to the paradox of being threatened by the success of functional rationality. But he does suggest that total institutions and extreme situations are bound up in a cult of technology which we mistakenly call science.

What is to be done? Howton suggests that man must continue to struggle for a better world and "catch a vision of a larger goal" (p. 249). One way to do this perhaps is to continue to study the behavior of formal organizations. A better understanding of professionalization, the structure and climate of organizational innovation, relationships between organizations and their environments and internal organizational conflict may enable scholars and organizational designers gradually to develop organizations in which managers and decision makers are subjected to a variety of nonfunctional as well as functional influences. With a more diverse set of influences, managers at all levels may be able to catch the vision of larger goals, e.g., those of society and of the role of the organization within society. Professor Howton's description of the pervasive dangers of functionalization leaves us with no choice except to try.

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The Rich, the Well Born and the Powerful: Elites and Upper Classes in History. Edited by Frederic C. Jaher. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 377. $15.00.)

This book is a collection of twelve papers on elites. The discussion ranges from classical Athens and the aristocrats of Rome to Renaissance Florence and Elizabethan London. We learn intriguing facts about eighteenth century Rumania, Tsarist Russia, Victorian aristocracy, and the Chilean upper class of the early twentieth century. Papers specifically devoted to the United States focus on New York high society at the turn of the century, on Metropolitan elites of the Midwest, and on the New Deal intellectual elite of the 'thirties—of particular current interest for its efforts to come to terms with problems of growth and equality.

Clearly there is something here for everyone interested in this seemingly timeless topic, as fascinating as it is elusive. Given such a wide range of topics, however, it is not surprising that the book is uneven, alternately too narrow and too ambitious.

In the preface, the editor states the goal of the volume to be the "analysis of the structure and strategy, tactics and thought, of groups in the upper orders of society" (p. 1) and a documentation of "the religious, familial, military, social, and economic aspects of hegemonic groups" (p. 4). A further aim is to trace the course of the rise and decline of particular elites. Admittedly the editor does not claim that the volume achieves these diverse goals and frankly concedes that the "varied categories that integrate these essays do not coalesce into a general conception of the upper strata" (p. 5). Nonetheless he considers them to constitute a potential basis for building theories in the future.

My own feeling is that the difference between description and generalization is not so easily bridged and is not ultimately one of fact but of attitude. Had the authors been urged to look for general principles to help construct a general comparative framework, these essays could have been most helpful. As they stand, however, they are independent of one another and any generalization depends on the reader's own skill. Not having been asked either to raise or to answer the same sorts of questions about the elite or the upper class they sought to portray, each author proceeded to select whatever problem appealed to him. The result is a profusion of ideas and conclusions with little affinity between them.

Part of the problem lies in the absence of consensus even on elementary definitions. Many terms either are not defined or are defined inconsistently, and the proposed distinction between elites and upper classes on the basis of specialized function and range of impact is not very satisfactory. In my view, each of these terms designates a different form of social supremacy in a different historic era.

Substantively, these essays are extremely instructive, showing that our modern dilemmas are very old indeed. The ancient Greeks, for example, well knew the contradiction between the principle of equality before the law and actual economic and political inequalities, struggling with it no more successfully than we are doing, but their proposed remedies are worth pondering (Robin Seager's essay, pp. 7-26).

Given the history of elites in the past two thousand years, there seem to be only two possible stands for societies to take. One stresses the desirability or at least the necessity of elites and institutionalizes attitudes of privilege, deference, work, and responsibility accordingly. The other stresses elites as unpleasant and unwelcome facts of life needing to be circumvented and opposed. Each ideology seems plausible to its adherents and the prevalence of the one or the other must be sought in the characteristics of the social system defending it.

These essays illustrate the two ideological postures clearly. There is Greece, for example, trying, like our own society, to reconcile its democratic ethos with its pervasive inequalities. Rome, on the other hand, exemplifies a less tortuous appreciation of social superiority. This is evident in its acknowledgment of an aristocrat as "a man of superior character, one of the best men in society, deserving of preferential treatment (Richard E. Mitchell, p. 50).

Another familiar theme emerging in these essays concerns the exclusiveness of elites, their social composition and accessibility, depending on the degree of societal complexity. Elites will generally be more open to talent, merit, and previously excluded social groups when their activities and responsibilities are growing in number and diversity. Stability and continuity, on the other hand, make for more restricted patterns of recruitment. Patterns of recruitment, no matter what the rhetoric, are thus tied to pervasive social forces.

One of the most interesting essays in the book concerns the example of an elite in Renaissance Florence which laid claim to public charity because of the discrepancy between its living standards and its actual resources. Here is a perfect illustration of relative deprivation being used to justify public handouts, poverty having been defined not by objective need but by personal appetite (Richard C. Trexler, pp. 64-109).

Three of the essays, two of them dealing with Russia, hold a special interest for those concerned with social leadership in developing or modernizing societies. One (David L. Ransel, pp. 154-178) concerns the civil service nobility of eighteenth-century Russia and its struggle to come to terms with the new ideals of legality and rational order while continuing to be organized along traditional lines of personal relations and patronage. The other (John P. McKay, pp. 179-202) describes the rivalry between foreign and Russian business elites over important aspects of economic development in the nineteenth century. This case study challenges a number of favorite assumptions about the inevitable dominance of economic elites or the emergence of a super-elite to coordinate others. The third essay (Paul W. Drake, pp. 304-337) focuses on the flexibility and accommodations made by the Chilean upper class to its country's efforts at modernization and provides an important background to the recent history of that country.

Elites are not only select but also tenacious minorities. The British aristocracy, for example, continued to exert power and influence far into the industrial era with which its ideals and mode of operation would have seemed to be at odds. In a splendid essay, judiciously blending facts and theory, Walter L. Arnstein (pp. 203-257) dissects this process in Britain.

Finally, for those reworking the Woman Question, female domination in high society deserves mention as a generally neglected aspect of female power (Frederic Cople Jaher, p. 284).

In short, most of the essays are intrinsically interesting as separate pieces. Despite their diversity, however, some themes emerge as common to a number of elites, and these would have lent themselves to provisional attempts at synthesis, Such a synthesis, perhaps the key lack in the field of elite studies, would seem to be an important next step for an understanding of leadership and control in human societies.

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Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior. Edited by Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner. (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1972. Pp. 186. $8.95.)

Edward E. Jones and his co-editors have brought together in this book nine original contributions to the field of attribution studies. Attribution studies are a fairly recent addition to the general area of cognitive and social psychology. While some of the key concepts can be traced back to very early writings, most of the theoretical and empirical work dates from the last two decades. Attribution studies and attribution theory are now sufficiently developed so that they can stimulate and can contribute substantively to the investigations in other disciplines. The present volume is a well-written introduction to the field and can be warmly recommended to political scientists. Students of political behavior, in particular, will find attribution theory of considerable interest.

Attribution studies investigate the cognitive processes intervening between information and attribution. "Attribution," of course, is a fairly ambiguous term. Most often the reference is to *causal* attribution: To whom or to what do we attribute the causality of some event? But attribution studies also consider other matters: "Attribution theory is usually described as the process [sic] by which people form causal interpretations of the events around them. The theory applies more generally, however, to the process whereby people attribute characteristics, intentions, feelings, and traits to objects in their social world (p. 47).

Most broadly stated, attribution theory deals with the question of "how the person arrives at his answer to the question 'Why?' " (p. 1). Just how widely attribution analysis ranges can be seen by this list of concerns:

> How do individuals integrate conflicting evidence in forming impressions of others? How do we account for our own successes and failures? How do verbal habits help to mediate generalizations from specific behavioral instances? How does the setting influence the subjective meaning of emotional experience? How do group members impute to one another motives of friendly cooperation rather than, . . . aggressive competition? How do we allocate responsibility for an action between the actor and his environment? What are some of the consequences of believing that a person is or is not responsible for a particular event? (p. ix)

Clearly, the interests of attribution analysis range as far as most of cognitive and social psychology. Attribution theory is not defined by a unique subject matter, but by a particular approach.

One of the best supported propositions of attribution theory is the *covariation principle*: when there are several plausible alternative causes, the effect will be attributed to the one with which it most strongly and most regularly covaries over time (p. 3). This may seem obvious, but it is obvious only insofar as everything seems obvious once it has been discovered. The covariation principle receives modification and specification via a number of auxiliary propositions, for example, the principle of the optimal time interval (p. 7), and the discounting principle (". . . the role of a given cause in producing a given effect is discounted if other plausible causes are also present") (p. 8).

An example will help to move the discussion from the abstract to the concrete. An experiment done by Thibaut and Riecken investigated the attribution of an effect to *internal* or *external* causes. Experimental subjects had to persuade two other persons (confederates of the experimenters) to aid them in a task. One of these persons was identified as having higher status, the other as having lower status than the subject. After compliance had been obtained, the subjects were asked "whether each person complied because he wanted to (internal cause) or because he had been forced or pressured to (external cause). The results were quite clear. A large majority of the subjects attributed the high-status person's compliance to an internal cause and the low-status person's compliance to an external cause" (p. 8). In the case of the high-status person, the subject's power over the other person was rejected as cause, given that another plausible cause was available. Not surprisingly, the compliant high-status person also was liked better than the compliant low-status person.

The available space does not permit a systematic review of the numerous principles of attribution theory and of the experiments and observations from which these principles have been derived. A few matters of particular interest to political scientists can be singled out, however.

Persons often have to form single, overall evaluations of complex and diverse entities. In addition, such evaluations may have to be ranked comparatively. Candidates for political office are a case in point. How do people assess information about the diverse aspects of a candidate in order to form an overall evaluation of him? A relevant attribution proposition is the *principle of negativity*, which asserts that people weight the negative aspects of a subject more heavily than the positive aspects (p. 47). Without going into the technical details of this principle and its modifiers, it can be seen that here is a possible theoretical framework for the systematic investigation of an important political "folk wisdom": that voters do not generally reward office holders for their good deeds, but punish them for their bad ones.

One (unnamed) principle of attribution theory has interesting implications for the relationship between office holders and their constituents. The principle holds that ". . . there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions" (p. 80). As Jones and Nisbet note, leaders are more likely to attribute their actions to the requirements of the situation, to role limitations, to conflicting pressures brought to bear on them, etc.; followers, by contrast, a more likely to attribute these actions to the character and ability of leaders (pp. 79-80). Leaders situationalize; the public personalizes. No wonder the explanations of the leader and the accusations of the public appear to be rationalizations or misjudgments to the other party!

Among the limitations of this approach, two issues stand out: First, to this date, the larger part of attribution work has consisted of reinterpretations of experiments done for other purposes and under the guidance of different theories. Reinterpretation is cheaper and less time-consuming, and it cannot be faulted in principle. Heavy reliance upon reinterpretation, and, sometimes, simple renaming, weakens the evidentiary standing of attribution theory. It would be helpful if more specifically designed studies could be undertaken.

Second, in encountering the covariation principle (above), the reader will have been quick to remind himself that "correlation is not causality." It is true that attribution theory does not deal with causality as such, but only with perceptions of causality, the empirical truth of which is not of primary significance. Nevertheless, attribution theorists would seem well advised to give some attention to general epistemological discussions of causality. An examination of such volumes as Daniel Lerner's *Cause and Effect* and Mario Bunge's *Causality* is likely to produce solid benefits for the analysis of perceptions and attributions of causality.

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Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production. By E. G. Liberman. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1973. Pp. 240. $1.95.)

For the student of political systems, this little book by the most publicized (in the West) of contemporary Soviet economists carries a forceful message, albeit mostly between the lines, despite its apparent concern only with narrowly economic problems and theorizing. Published in the original Russian version exactly five years after the announcement of the Soviet economic reform of late 1965, Liberman's book is a product of the particular moment of its appearance and of its author's place in the pre-history of the Reform. It will be recalled that in September 1962, Liberman published in *Pravda* his now famous article calling for substantial loosening of the rigid Soviet economic mechanism. The Reform followed his prescription, but mostly in principle; in its specifics it deviated a good deal from his (rather vague) proposals, usually in a "conservative" direction. In its execution, the Reform proved to be even more conservative, while subsequent measures have all but returned Soviet economic institutions to the *status quo ante*. To my mind, this trend is not surprising; the 1965 Reform set up an institutional halfway (eighth-way?) house that had little chance of economic viability. Political realities dictated reversion to the traditional command economy rather than resolution of the impasse by a far-reaching "marketization" (as in Hungary in 1968).

In the present book, Liberman hails the 1965 Reform as a step in the right direction, but argues at length that it is too small to solve many of the pressing economic problems. He calls for considerably greater devolution of power from the center to the individual firm, a more flexible price system, and an end to an economy of widespread shortages (i.e., balancing "aggregate demand" and "aggregate supply," in Western terminology). The proposals are not presented with the degree of precision and rigor that would allow an outside observer to appraise them properly, but one has the impression that they are not fully internally consistent and partake of the quality of partial measures. Hence, their viability, too, is in serious doubt. (It is difficult to know to what extent censorship is to blame for the weaknesses in the model.)

In any case, by 1970, time was already marching backward, as noted. Liberman's proposals stood little chance of adoption, fundamentally because they strike at two of the three political pillars on which the Soviet economic system rests (apart from state ownership of the means of production). One is the excess of aggregate demand over aggregate supply (a *political* premise because it derives at once from the goals of the regime and the realities of the intra-leadership struggle). The second is the monopoly of rule by the Party's *apparat*, whose powers and day-to-day functions would be undermined by the alleviation of the very problems Liberman seeks to solve. Not unexpectedly, the Party is hardly mentioned in the book. Only in the case of the third pillar—reliance on pecuniary incentives to elicit the individual's compliance and performance—is Liberman's position in tune with the official line. Yet he would couple his force with a more efficient mechanism than is politically acceptable at this juncture.

The book is supplied with a helpful translator's foreword, an "ideologically correct" author's special preface to the American edition, a glossary, and no index. Alas, translating Soviet social science (especially economics) is a horrid undertaking. My sympathy is very much with the translator. Many Soviet economic terms cannot be easily rendered into English. But one should try harder than has been done in this instance. While the glossary is most welcome, it should be several times as long. What is worse, the English is quite awkward throughout. One fears than an American economist (let alone, noneconomist) will find it difficult to follow this translation. For instance, while in Marxist usage the word "commodity" (not in the glossary) has a specific meaning, what could be "commodity acts" (p. 55)? In fact, translation problems begin with the very title. Liberman's title in its Russian version (a more accurate English translation would be "Raising the Efficiency of the Soviet Economy by Increasing the Firm's Autonomy") asserts clearly and forcefully the book's message: *viz.*, that economic methods (incentives, prices, etc.), rather than administrative directives, should be used to raise the *efficiency* (not "effectiveness"!) of the Soviet economy. Would the English language reader have grasped this from the translated title?

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The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays. By Arthur S. Link. (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971. Pp. 425. $12.95.)

Woodrow Wilson holds a special place in the minds of political scientists; he was after all one of us—a teacher of politics who went on to shape the politics of the nation. The story is, of course, well known about Wilson, the political scientist who authored a dozen books on national politics, helped to found APSA, served as the academic reformer while President of Princeton University and innovator in the fields of economic regulation and international cooperation after reaching the summit of his career, the Presidency of the United States.

Professor Arthur S. Link has spent a lifetime writing about Wilson's career and its impact on American politics and history, and is currently directing the monumental task of compiling the complete documentary history of Wilson's life in a projected forty-volume series, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, the first nine of which have been published by Princeton University Press. Dr. Link's latest book, *The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson*, consists of an important collection of 24 essays that previously have appeared in scholarly journals over the last 30 years.

The essays are useful chiefly to students of early twentieth-century American political history since most explore various fascinating and controversial aspects of Wilson's intellectual development and political career. For instance, the first essay, "Woodrow Wilson and His Presbyterian Inheritance," treats the profound impact of his early religious training on his later political orientation. Another, "Woodrow Wilson and the Democratic Party," demonstrates how, once elected President, Wilson gained legislative support for his New Freedom programs by strengthening local conservative party factions through the vigorous use of presidential patronage. "Woodrow Wilson: The American Southerner" is an interesting account of Wilson's intellectual evolution from an ardent American nationalist to his later discovery of his own southern roots and regional identification.

Nearly a quarter of the essays explore aspects of the 1912 presidential campaign, especially from the perspective of how the winning candidate's strategies forged together the progressive Democratic coalitions in various southern states.

"The Negro as a Factor in the Campaign of 1912" provides useful insight into the role of blacks in that election. Link's thesis is that blacks distrusted both lily-white movement of Roosevelt's progressive Republican faction and Wilson's progressive southern coalition, and, on balance, they voted with traditional Taft Republicans.

Several essays in this collection were written as responses in historiographic debates. "The Case for Woodrow Wilson" challenges the methods, evidence, and conclusions of Sigmund Freud's and William Bullitt's controversial psychological study, *Thomas Woodrow Wilson* (1967). In the end, Link contends, their book says more about its authors than their subject. Also, Professor Link's classic essay, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's?" is included in this collection. Contrary to many older historians, Link finds that progressive vitality survived in various subtle ways in America throughout the 1920s. "Wilson and the Ordeal of Neutrality" and "Woodrow Wilson and Peace Moves" challenges the conventional wisdom about Wilsonian moralism in diplomacy by providing a valuable assessment of Wilson's techniques, successes, and failures in dealing with international problems.

In the best sense, this book of essays is a personal statement by a great professional Amercan historian reflecting a lifetime effort at grappling with a number of central themes and problems in early twentieth-century American history. Granted, there are blanks in the total coverage of Link's essays about Wilson's life. For example, little attention is devoted to analyzing Wilson's academic writing, or his domestic programs of the first term, or his classic rivalry with Senator Lodge. Nevertheless, one notes with pleasure Link's clear prose style, his creative process of analysis, and his careful study of the factual data. Also one can observe the subtle transition of Link's own views about Wilson between his early essays written in the mid-1940s and later ones published by Link in the late 1960s.

If there is a major weakness in the book, it is in the central essay that serves as the theme of the book, "The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson." "The Higher Realism" sets forth the argument that Wilson was a "a supreme realist" throughout his public career. While provocative and inventive in his arguments, Dr. Link somehow works too hard at trying to convince us that white is black and that we should really stretch our definition of the term "realist" in order to fit the facts of Wilson's life. These arguments just don't "wash" and leave at least this reader puzzled—why all the effort expended in this direction? In our post-Watergate environment, should not Americans, like Diogenes, delight in finding a few models of integrity, honesty, and idealism in the political past? It seems odd indeed that Dr. Link's years of careful scholarship has found amoralism one of Wilson's more appealing and enduring qualities.

RICHARD J. STILLMAN II

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Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals. By Saul D. Alinsky. (New York: Random House, 1971. Pp. 196. $6.95.)

How People Get Power: Organizing Oppressed Communities for Action. By Si Kahn. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970. Pp. 128. $2.45.)

Action for a Change: A Student's Manual for Public Interest Organizing. By Ralph Nader and Donald Ross. (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971. Pp. 118. $1.35.)

Winning Elections: A Handbook in Participatory Politics. By Dick Simpson. (Chicago: The Swallow Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 194. $6.00.)

Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement Politics. By Michael Walzer. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971. Pp. 125. $1.95.)

"New politics," with its surge of populist sentiment, has spawned a myriad of new left guides to political organizing. The five guides reviewed here are illustrative of this genre. They address slightly different audiences and problems of organization, but have some common themes and shortcomings.

Saul Alinsky's *Rules for Radicals* is the most important of the five guides. Alinsky's thoughts on social change have influenced several generations of organizers. The book is written for people who want to follow in Alinsky's footsteps and become full-time community organizers. Alinsky addresses himself to the problem of creating mass multiple issue organizations which can seize community power. Alinsky is often portrayed as Machiavelli for the masses, writing primers not for princes but for paupers, telling them how to take power away from the Haves. But Alinsky is not writing for the Have-Nots, he is writing for their organizers, telling them how to stimulate the Have-Nots to do the job. Rather than being a primer for the powerless, the book is a primer for their consultants.

The book has many similarities to Alinsky's earlier *Reveille for Radicals.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946). In both books organizers are urged to promote conflict as a way of building powerful organizations which can then create an open society with a more equitable distribution of resources. Attention is given to problems of leadership, communication, programs, and tactics. Alinsky once again shows his skill in formulating aphorisms such as "The means-and-end moralists or non-doers always wind up on their ends without any means" (p. 25). Both books are conversations, not treatises. They reveal Alinsky the activist who can philosophize about his actions and the advocate who chooses to concentrate not on logical clarity but on generating commitment.

The current book, however, has a new tone which is signaled in the subtitle. The earlier book directed its attack at liberals and unions who were squeamish about action and the use of power. In the current book Alinsky challenges young revolutionaries' romantic illusions about how to change the system. Alinsky asserts that it is necessary to work within the system, choose flexible tactics, compromise, and avoid rigid dogma. He stresses the need for continuity in organizing efforts and warns against visions of instant revolution with the accompanying dramatics of infantile rejection and rhetoric. More attention is given to defending the values of equality, justice, and freedom, and our system of democracy as the best means of achieving these ends. This less radical Alinsky drops earlier references to people's owning the means of production and urges us not to forget that "in our system with all its oppressions we can still speak out and denounce the administration, attack its policies, work to build an opposition political base" and this cannot be done in Moscow, Peking, or Havana (p. xxi).

An active organizer since the 1930s and a key influence on the "new politics," Alinsky was an anathema both to Marxist revolutionaries who saw him as accommodationist and to many democrats who saw him as a threat to the system. Nevertheless, this current book shows his intellectual breadth. He raises philosophical issues about the nature of social change and ideology and the relation of ends and means, and links his experiences and ideas with others in different countries and historical periods.

Michael Walzer's book, *Political Action*, like Alinsky's may be of general interest to students of social change. The book is written to tell amateur activists, not Alinsky's organizers, how to create political movements by dramatizing single issues via pressure or electoral politics. Walzer traces the process chronologically beginning with crises which stimulate action, then choices of strategies, defining issues, building support, and designing organizational structures.

Many of the substantive suggestions are similar to Alinsky's: build a constituency by starting where the people are and staying within their experience; choose tactics pragmatically. And Walzer, like Alinsky, is committed to change within the democratic system, rejecting sectarian militants with their fantasies of instant revolution. But Walzer is basically writing for upper-middle-class activists about organizing their peers. For Walzer the search for a constituency basically means appealing to one's own group and then moving outward to form coalitions. The model is the civil-rights and peace movements. Walzer leaves out specific illustrations from his own experience on the grounds that they are "of little interest except to fellow participants" (p. 9). But the generalizations would be more useful if the reader knew the contexts which generated them and thus could better judge their applicability to other contexts.

The book is best understood as the confessions of a converted political theorist, an analyst lured into action. It is spare, clear, and insightful. The author makes interesting observations on the personalities, personal relations, psychological rewards, and conduct of meetings in movement politics. For example, he explores the special role that women have played in citizen politics and notes that the failure of women to assume leadership positions often leaves the movement "rootless, the ideological tool and sometimes the plaything of marginal men" (p. 67). Similarly interesting is his strong critique of the arrogance of organizers who bypass existing leaders of the working-class community because the organizers mistakenly assume "they have some message to deliver that has never yet been thought of" (p. 31).

Walzer provides a cautious, modest defense of movement politics as a feasible and important counterbalance in a society dominated by professionals. He is a relatively realistic advocate of amateur activism and the value of capitalizing on people's periodic sense of outrage to nudge the system toward reform. Questions about the results of movement politics are not addressed, and little attempt is made to place ideas in historical perspective or to link them with other approaches to social change.

The other guides reviewed here are less philosophical than Alinsky's and Walzer's. Si Kahn's book, *How People Get Power*, is written for professional organizers and describes the application of Alinsky-like techniques in activating broadly based poor-people's organizations in the rural South to participate in politics. Kahn stresses the use of a wide range of tactics and the increasing importance of economic, political, and violent tactics for gaining power. He urges organizers to vary their tactics depending on the nature of the problems they are attacking. For example, if the problem is redistributing resources which exist in the area, then power tactics can work. If on the other hand, the problem is the absence of resources in the area, then self-help tactics are the ones to use. Kahn does not claim that his kind of organizing will bring about reform in the national political system. But he is less explicit than the other authors about the kind of reform he wants. He sees the process of organizing for action as an end in itself, one which "brings hope to the people" (p. 124). The book does not get beyond fairly simplistic rhetoric and leaves out questions such as who pays the organizers, but it is a thought provoking compilation of the conventional wisdom of community organizers and some interesting examples of rural organizing.

Ralph Nader and Donald Ross's book, *Action for Change*, is written for student amateur activists. The authors argue that students should organize to hire professional staffs to do public interest research as a prelude to pressure politics. They think that current problems cannot be solved simply by more dramatization and direct citizen action. Solutions are necessarily complex and thus research and expertise are also needed. Amateurs must be supplemented by professionals. Walzer assumes that amateurs will obtain money to hire supporting staff, but Nader and Ross observe that this does not occur automatically. They suggest a vehicle by which the necessary funds and staff can be provided. This vehicle is a Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) which is funded by student contributions. The authors suggest ways of organizing PIRGs, their structures, support, and operation. They describe public interest projects which might be undertaken such as studies of property taxes, occupational safety and health, employment discrimination, and environmental and consumer issues. The narrow topic of the book allows the authors to provide many specific examples which will be helpful to those interested in PIRGs such as the evidence from PIRGs in Oregon and Minnesota. But the book does not provide any perspective on how this type of organizing fits into recurrent reform efforts, though readers will hopefully note the middle-class good government orientation so typical of earlier reform movements, and thus raise questions about who benefits and who loses from such efforts.

Dick Simpson's book, *Winning Elections* tells amateur activists how to succeed in electoral politics. What makes this book fit into the category of "new politics" is that Simpson is talking about independent campaigns which are not linked with existing political parties. The handbook is based on his experiences in organizing the Independent Precinct Organization on the north side of Chicago and becoming a successful candidate himself. It is crammed full of examples and useful samples of election material including flyers and guidelines for workers such as "What Every Great Coffee Chairman Has to Know." The book is also a ready-made course in practical politics with exercises at the end of each chapter, cross-references to audio-visual material, and an excellent annotated bibliography. Simpson argues that new participatory politics differs from old politics because it focuses on issues, on candidates free of control by bosses, and on volunteer workers, rather than patronage workers or expensive public relations campaigns. This distinction may be clear in Chicago but it is less clear in other settings. Independent campaigns may not be nearly as different from party campaigns as Simpson would like to have us believe. In states with a strong nonpartisan tradition like California the distinction is hard to maintain and campaigns may stress, for example, both strong volunteer precinct organizations and expensive public relations campaigns. But Simpson believes that "new politics" at the local level will mobilize new constituencies of conscience and elect new leaders who will eventually reform the national political system. His assertion that outstanding political leaders must be outstanding people is an example of the faith pervading this guide—a faith that may strike some readers as naive.

A review of these five guides reveals some common themes. They all stress the process of organizing and assume that the purpose is clear. Insofar as they discuss purpose, they all share the nebulous goal of giving "power to the people" to create a better society characterized by more equitable distribution of resources, more justice, less oppression, more open decision making, and more representative institutions. The implication is that we know what is needed, and the problem is organizing to achieve that goal. One marvels at the authors' certainty about the content of the public interest.

The guides also share a uniformly optimistic view of human nature. The authors believe that the majority of people in the United States, the Have-Nots and the Have-A-Littles, have a common interest in redistribution and are capable of perceiving and acting upon that interest when properly organized. Thus the authors give little attention to the possibility that their tactics will be used by Have-Nots and Have-A-Littles who do not share that goal. Only Alinsky's book seems to be seriously concerned with the problem of backlash—the possibility that police, hard hats, and firefighter groups will organize to oppose redistribution. Alinsky describes his efforts to organize lower-middle-class groups. He, like Karl Lamb and others, sees them as potentially a liberal force. In spite of the optimism about human nature, all the authors acknowledge at least implicitly, that it is necessary to organize in order to educate people to their true interests (and all of them would probably deny that organization involves manipulation).

How useful are the five books for activists or teachers of activists? As guides go, they are useful, but guides are inherently limited. They generalize from specifics to increase applicability, but the resulting generalizations often seem like mere common sense and are only useful if the reader exercises initiative and judgment in applying them to specific situations. The awful truth is that "how-to-do-it" guides to organizing cannot tell the reader how to organize. But if one has modest expectations, these guides can give the reader encouragement by showing organizers' thoughts about what they have done; they can increase the reader's confidence by showing that organizing involves large measures of common sense. These authors all achieve what they set out to do: Alinsky provides realism for radicals, Walzer offers encouragement for amateurs, and Kahn, Nader and Ross, and Simpson provide details for rural organizers, students, and new politicos.

The five books are also useful for posing questions about the purposes, cycles, and results of reform efforts. They all raise issues about the relation of organization to change. The books suggest the tension between inspiration and institutionalization and the problem of what to do with old Young Turks. And even though the books (except Alinsky's) lack a sense of history, they provide useful raw material for the intellectual history of our era. They illustrate the burst of populist optimism in the 1960s. They disagree on the size of the needed changes and the most promising tactics, but they agree that new organizations are necessary in the quest for a better society.

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The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860. By William L. Barney. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. Pp. 371. $14.50.)

The importance of this fresh study of the road to civil war lies in its analysis of local political activists in Alabama and Mississippi during the presidential campaign of 1860. It finds that the Breckenridge Democrats held a significantly greater attraction than did its Bell-Whig and Douglas-Democratic opposition for the relatively young, native slaveholder-on-the-make. The strongest though not the sole magnet, according to the author, was the party's aggressive support of slavery expansion against the Republican threat to contain the institution within established boundaries. During the 1850s the ambition of these young men had run headlong into the rising costs of slaves and land, with the result that even those who attained wealth and status as large-scale planters lacked the security of older wealth. Their future surety lay in a rapid expansion of cotton production, a development that appeared jeopardized by political victory for any party other than their own.

Professor Barney concludes that the Whiggish minority supporting the Bell candidacy relied for its local leadership more largely upon older established planters, large and small. He points out that their greater security, although not necessarily accompanied by greater wealth, made these men more defensive than aggressive, more open to moderation and compromise to preserve the bonds of union with the North. With less need for widening opportunities, they were hesitant to risk the good life of the present in order to insure the future of slavery and cotton production. Business and commercial interests in the towns, but not the aspiring young lawyers, were their natural allies and participated in the leadership of the Bell forces. Yet the political role of this activist town middle class, largely slaveholders, was minimal; they constituted a *minority within a minority, powerless to shape* policy. Except within a few areas of strong Douglas support, the nonslaveholding yeomanry held an even smaller share of political leadership and power despite the size of their constituency. Decision making in all parties rested firmly in the hands of the wealthy slaveholding elite. Democrats found it politically expedient to invoke the Jacksonian ideology of equality and to stigmatize the opposition as one of class and wealth, yet in those Alabama slaveholding counties where their party predominated Breckenridge leaders held more wealth and as many slaves as their Bell counterparts. These are interesting and significant findings.

William Barney has confirmed the political dominance of the cotton aristocracy in the deep South, and its unity in defense of the peculiar institution; at the same time he has discovered a political fissure that reflected something other than the degree of wealth or the pull of past party loyalties, a fissure that abetted the movement for southern independence. His findings also point to the conclusion, not explicitly stated, that the political controversy over slavery in the territories which convulsed the nation was not, as historians have often argued, a false issue or one primarily symbolic of conflicting moral values. Rather Barney's perspective makes the territorial expansion of slavery a "real" issue involving economic interests, social status, and white racial fears of black population growth unrelieved by expanded geographic dispersion.

In methodology, the study is a model both of diligence and of the effective fusion of traditional historical research with quantitative data analysis. That analysis sustains the generalizations about age and class of active party members and gives some support to the emphasis on expansion by relating growth factors to county voting patterns. The Princeton University Press has made a reasonable, even generous, allotment of space to maps and tables, but the critical reader will have questions unanswerable by the published data. The least excusable omission is the lack of a statement, and statistical breakdown, of the total number of individuals pursued through the tedious examination of original census returns. From a cursory inspection of text and tables they appear to have numbered well over two thousand. Involving fewer census records but some sixty local newspapers as well, their identification and location rival the monumental search of Ralph A. Wooster for members of the secession conventions.

Without the confirmation of quantitative evidence, traditional sources and methodology have been the source of a secondary but noteworthy contribution to secession historiography. The author has presented a devastating picture of the politics of fear and mob hysteria that led to disunion. Pressure for conformity, which historians have recognized in the South's pre-war defence of slavery and in the aftermath of its decision for secession, also operated during and immediately following the presidential election of 1860. It intimidated potential dissenters from disunion and created an illusion of unity that exceeded reality.

In short, William Barney has presented a study which no serious student of secession and civil war can afford to ignore.

LaWanda Cox

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Race Relations and the New York City Commission on Human Rights. By Gerald Benjamin. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974. Pp. 274. $12.50.)

Professor Benjamin's book is a political history of New York City's Commission on Human Rights. The book covers the Commission from its establishment by Mayor La Guardia in 1943 through Mayor Lindsay's first term ending in 1969. It focuses upon both internal and external political processes related to the Commission's development. Professor Benjamin examines areas such as the Commission's personnel (both board members and staff) budget, programs, and relationships to the mayor, to other city agencies, and to nongovernmental groups.

The Commission's story is one of significant change in its approach to the problems of race relations. During its earlier years, the Commission generally reflected the demands of liberal, predominantly white, civil rights organizations. These groups believed that the strategies of communication, education, and low-visibility negotiation could best advance minority interests. With the advent of the 'sixties, the Commission's approach began to change. During this decade, the Commission increasingly became a spokesman for minority group interests who rejected this gradual approach to the race issue.

Professor Benjamin is most successful in describing and explaining the political context which brought about this change in the Commission's approach. His implicit theoretical frame of reference is the bureaucratic bargaining model. He applies this model with deftness and skill and is particularly successful in describing the constraints upon the Commission which arose from the conflicting demands of the mayor's office and its nongovernmental constituency. His best chapters are perhaps those covering the Commission's approach during the twelve years that Robert Wagner was mayor. Professor Benjamin describes and analyzes the attempt by the Commission to formulate programs in the areas of housing, education, and employment while confronted with the demands of City Hall for a conciliatory and low-visibility approach and those of minority groups who increasingly wanted vigorous advocacy of their interests.

The limitations of *Race Relations and the New York City Commission on Human Rights* are those inherent in the bureaucratic bargaining model. The model does not explain many of the facets of organizational behavior. While Professor Benjamin avoids the pitfall of attempting to explain all of the Commission's activities by this one conceptual frame of reference, his failure to utilize other models leaves many aspects of the Commission's story unexplained. This difficulty is particularly highlighted when the author is covering events internal to the Commission. At such times, the content rarely rises above the level of mere description.

In all fairness to the author, his primary concern is with the public policy implications of his data rather than the development of public administration theory. The central issue of the book is whether local human rights commissions serve a useful function and should continue to exist. Professor Benjamin's position is that their utility "for furthering the interests of minorities in the city is inversely related to the centrality of racial issues" (p. 240). The author believes that such commissions were useful when minority groups had limited access to local political arenas and surrogate civil rights groups had a role to play in representing their interests. With recent developments, however, minority groups no longer need these commissions to represent their interests and mayors no longer need be embarrassed by the "militant" positions of these commissions.

On the other hand, a common characteristic of our urban political systems has been the insulation of certain policy arenas and particular local agencies for specific groups. One example among many is the city planning commissions and their usage by urban planners to advocate their interests. It would seem that local human rights commissions could play a similar role for minority groups. The problem would appear to be that mayors can afford the political risks involved in providing planners with a sanctuary, but the situation changes with respect to minorities. This raises the issue of why only certain groups or interests are able to achieve this type of representation in a political system. Why are minority groups unable to develop the necessary political resources? This, unfortunately, is a question which is not adequately addressed by a static model such as the bureaucratic bargaining one. Before Professor Benjamin can reach a definitive judgment on local human rights commissions, he needs to escape the limitation of relying upon this one model for comprehending the totality of political experience.

STEPHEN M. DAVID

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Lobbying at the Illinois Constitutional Convention. By Ian D. Burman. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 119. $3.45.)

This monograph is one of a series analyzing various aspects of the constitutional convention held in Springfield, Illinois, December 1969-September 1970. Voters ratified the new constitution (which replaced one adopted 100 years earlier) at a special election December 15, 1970.

The lobbyist is a familiar and sometimes sinister figure in descriptions of the legislative process at the state and national level, and we think we know what to expect of him or her. But a constitutional convention—a rare event in most states—does not legislate but merely proposes to the people. We know little of how a lobbyist might be expected to operate in the special environment of such an assembly.

Professor Burman has helped to fill that void. An assistant professor of political science at Principia College, Elsah, Illinois, at the time of the convention, he is now a member of the faculty at MacMurray College, Jacksonville, Illinois. In this study, he deals with the significance of interest groups as potential opponents or sources of support for a charter subject to popular acceptance or rejection (chapter I). He describes the organizations that assigned lobbyists to the Illinois convention (chapters II and IV), the reactions and responses of convention delegates to efforts to influence them (chapter III), and the techniques that the lobbyists used (chapter V).

A final chapter (VI) presents his findings, which can be summed up approximately as follows: Most of the groups that lobbied the Illinois legislature did not lobby the convention, either because they did not perceive that their interests were involved in a revision of the basic law or because they did not expect that the delegates would be receptive to them. Actually, the delegates were "susceptible to the inclusion of provisions embodying causes currently popular with reform-oriented people" and "were also willing to grant concessions to interest groups in return for support for ratification of the proposed constitution" (p. 113) so that the few who did lobby benefited.

This study could be helpful to one who has the unlikely responsibility of lobbying at a state constitutional convention. In addition, the information it provides should be useful to the rather limited group of persons who seek to promote the modernization (for lack of a better word) of state governments through constitutional revision. Finally, it sheds additional light on the operation of interest groups; Burman's findings suggest that they are less perspicacious in identifying their own interests than many have been led to believe.

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Black Ghetto Riots and Campus Disorders: A Subcultural and Philosophical Study of Democratic Legitimacy and American Political Violence, 1964-1970. By Roger B. Canfield. (San Francisco, Calif.: R. E. Research Associates, 1973. Pp. 265. $12.00.)

The decade of the 1960s was a period of considerable ghetto and campus violence in America. From June 1963 to May 1968, there were 239 disturbances in black urban centers, involving approximately 200,000 participants and resulting in 50,000 arrests and more than 8,000 casualties. During that same period, there were 91 student protests, demonstrations, or riots, involving over 100,000 participants. These disturbances resulted in nearly 2,000 arrests and 122 casualties. In this book Professor Canfield attempts to "explain and understand" the motivation behind, and the purposes for, this political violence (p. 5).

Social scientists have advanced a number of theories to explain violence. Thus, social psychologists emphasize the "frustration-aggression" and the "relative deprivation" hypotheses; economists promote the "calculus of revolt" and bargaining theories; and sociologists focus on "strain," "stress," and "cramp" theories. Canfield, however, is reluctant to offer nonpolitical explanations for political violence. He focuses instead on the political causes of violence. For this, he is to be credited. He reminds the reader of Aristotle's theory of revolution and attempts to pattern his work along its lines. Aristotle argued that the chief cause of revolution is the existence of differing understandings of equality as a principle of justice. Consistent with this view, Canfield suggests that "values, such as common notions of justice, are independent variables capable of generating political violence on their own" (p. 82). Thus, he argues that the key to any understanding of the recent political violence in America's inner city ghettos and college campuses lies in an appreciation of the great variety and changing character of American opinion on political justice, especially as it relates to the concepts of equality and liberty.

Canfield focuses on the troubling concept of equality. He contends that as the American regime's responsibility in the area of equality has increased, so has the tendency of citizens to believe that the regime itself is the major source of injustice in the society and that, as a consequence, it is illegitimate and no longer worthy of the citizens' obedience. Canfield hypothesizes that the black ghetto and student subcultures have views of equality and, hence, governmental legitimacy, which conflict generally with those of the larger political community and that this conflict leads to political violence.

With this hypothesis before the reader, Canfield sifts through hundreds of public opinion surveys conducted by Harris, Gallup, Roper, and others to ascertain to what extent the views on equality and governmental legitimacy of the black and student subcultures differ from those of the dominant political community. Canfield's contribution in this respect is considerable. From the extensive data available on these issues, he presents a useful compendium of pertinent findings on the questions of equality and governmental legitimacy and on the willingness of the public to engage in, or support the use of, political violence.

These findings generally confirm Canfield's hypothesis, but they are not enough to overcome a major obstacle in this book. Thus, although Canfield identifies different understandings of the concept of equality as the leading source of political violence, he never really critically examines these various understandings. This lack of critical perspective ultimately prevents him from completing his task: i.e., offering a political explanation of political violence.

Canfield treats all definitions—all views—of equality equally. As a result, he is prevented from exploring a different and perhaps more productive line of argument: viz., that political violence may be the result not only of different understandings of equality and hence, political justice, but also of wrong or fundamentally flawed views of equality, even if they are shared by all. Canfield touches upon this argument when he turns in his conclusion to Lowi's criticism of interest group liberalism and how its view of equality tends to "delegitimize" the government and reduce it to nothing more than another interest group. However, his uncritical stance on equality prevents him from pursuing it. Implicit in Lowi's argument is the thought that the only way to preserve governmental legitimacy is by insuring that a proper definition of equality is maintained (i.e., a definition in which only equal things are treated equally and, hence, in which government is treated differently from private interest groups), not by infusing the whole society, its dominant political community and its various minority subcultures alike, with the same definition. Unfortunately, Canfield concludes his work without exploring this provocative theme. As he informs the reader, politics is characterized by both "power and morality," by what *is* as well as what *ought to be*. As a consequence, one would expect his explanation of the political causes of violence to reflect a concern for both of these themes. Canfield, however, skirts the morality dimension; and, as a result, his explanation of political violence is limited. By his own definition of politics, he has only taken up half the question.

RALPH A. ROSSUM

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How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus. By Aage R. Clausen. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973. Pp. 243. $9.95, cloth; $4.50, paper.)

The question of how congressmen decide the issues before them has been frequently addressed, but seldom answered in any conclusive manner. Models built around cue-taking, coalition behavior, and the relative influence of constituency, party, and president have been posited, but the results of these analyses have shown that each model explains a small part of the variance and that the potency of any particular explanatory variable depends in large measure on the issue and the action that one is talking about.

In *How Congressmen Decide*, Professor Aage Clausen finds regularities to legislative behavior and discernible patterns of influence that bear upon congressional decisions. He begins by proposing a "policy dimension theory of congressional decision-making" which asserts that "congressmen develop categories which subsume specific legislative motions so that a common response can be made to all items of legislation included in a more general category" (p. 8). Thus a congressman begins his decision-making process by determining the policy content of a particular piece of legislation; then he determines the level of support for the general policy embodied in the legislation and compares that with his own degree of support for the concept. That degree of support is an amalgam of the legislator's own personal views, and the views of his constituency, of his party, and of the various interest groups to which he is responsive.

Within this framework, Professor Clausen identifies five major policy dimensions: government management, social welfare, international involvement, civil liberties, and agricultural assistance. Based on his voting record, each member of Congress serving between 1953 and 1964 is given a score on each of these dimensions for each Congress in which he served. Clausen demonstrates that these five dimensions are both continuous and stable over the 1953-1964 period. In a chapter on ideology, he makes the important point that labels such as liberal and conservative make more sense to congressmen than they seem to make to political scientists; about one-half of his population are classified as one or the other on the basis of their policy positions. In an excellent chapter, Clausen artfully disentangles the effects of constituency and party and concludes that party influence is minimal on international involvement, a bit stronger in civil liberties, stronger still in agricultural assistance, and strongest in social welfare and government management. In his analyses of the "roots of policy orientations" Clausen finds that party and state of residence account for most of the variance in policy positions, and that variation among members of the same state delegation on the four domestic policy dimensions tends to be minimal. Finally, he suggests that the international involvement dimension is presidentially oriented; a legislator tends to increase his support for international involvement when the presidency is assumed by a member of his own party.

Professor Clausen has conducted a skillful and highly imaginative analysis. He has produced a strong volume that is vulnerable to criticism only at a few points where the author wanders from the cautious and careful scholarship that marks the bulk of the volume.

One criticism involves truth-in-packaging. Chapters 1 and 2, as well as the book title, promise a test of the policy dimension theory—a theory that purports to tell us how congressmen make up their minds. Testing the theory and explaining voting decisions requires an assessment of the connection between policy dimensions and actual votes. By the end of the book, the theory is still untested and, as Professor Clausen admits (p. 236), we still don't know how congressmen make up their minds. Clausen's five policy dimensions are only rough indicators of any one vote in a policy domain. As he says, the dimensions "indicate in very brief terms the points of commonality characterizing the different policy proposals" (p. 23). Thus, explaining a good part of the variance in policy dimension positions—a commendable performance in itself—helps us to explain only a small part of the variance in the roll-call votes that make up the dimension. (Incidentally, it would have been useful if the author had presented the method by which these general policy dimensions were constructed rather than simply referring the reader to the several *APSR* articles that preceded this volume.)

Second, Professor Clausen advocates the merits of roll-call data in tones so strident and extreme that he invites dissent. For example, he asserts that the policy positions indicated by roll-call votes accurately describe the legislator's position at all stages of the decision-making process. According to Clausen, those who argue the contrary are saying, in effect, that when congressmen vote differently from the way they act in committees, they do so to deceive their constituents, and this argument in his view constitutes "a facile deduction from an unsubstantiated theory of conspiratorial politics which explains much but understands little" (p. 19).

The deception argument is, of course, a straw man that Professor Clausen easily knocks down. Knocking it down, however, does not mean that roll-call votes tell us all we need to know about a legislator's policy position. They do not tell us how strongly for or against a proposal a legislator was. They do not tell us what his position in debate was, or how he acted on unrecorded voice votes. It is an easy, but—to borrow Professor Clausen's word—an unsubstantiated assertion that roll-call votes indicate all of this. When roll-call votes vary from other behavior, the reason may be attributable to the ambivalence of the legislator, or to a change of mind—interpretations not without some support in the literature. Committee votes may be dictated by loyalty to or bargains with senior committee personnel—arrangements which may not hold on the floor. As Professor Clausen admits, the legislator seeking to score points with party leaders may vote against his conscience and against his constituency at less visible stages of the decision-making process (p. 125).

The point, of course, is that roll-call votes are both useful and convenient data but those who use them are done a disservice when extravagant claims are made on behalf of their efficacy.

How Congressmen Decide promises more than it delivers, but what it delivers makes it must reading for specialists in American legislative behavior and good and worthwhile reading for serious students of American politics.

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To Judge with Justice: History and Politics of Illinois Judicial Reform. By Rubin G. Cohn. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 164. $3.45, paper.)

Written in very lively, but often overdramatic language, this case study tells of the intrigues and crises faced by a coalition advocating judicial reform, as they first propose and eventually pass a revised judicial article to the Illinois Constitution during the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention. Revealing his prejudices about the political process, Professor Cohn evinces his absolute reverence for anything and anyone associated with judicial reform, as well as his general disdain for opponents of reform and his particular contempt for the Chicago Cook County Democratic Organization. For example, actions taken by such judicial reformers as delegate Wayne Whalen of Hanover, Ill., are described as "bold" (p. 130), "brilliant" (p. 76), and "remarkable" (p. 79), while those of delegate Dwight Friedrich of Centralia, Ill., a chief opponent of reform, are referred to as "hardened," "shrewd," and "crude" (p. 33). When Cohn can find no "obvious" weaknesses of character in the delegates opposed to judicial reform, he even makes unsupported allegations relying on "gossip" to cast aspersions, as in the statement that delegate Harold Nudelman of Chicago allegedly was to receive a judgeship because of his friendship with the Chicago Democratic Organization (p. 39). All of his characterizations throughout the book are similarly drawn in starkly absolute terms.

These biases also impregnate Cohn's descriptions of the political process on the convention floor. He finds the political tactics used by the Chicago Democrats to oppose judicial reform totally distasteful, since they are "ruthless" (p. 98), show signs of "organization" support (p. 96) and provide voting unity against judicial reform. Yet the author fails to see that the delegates of the coalition supporting reform also rely on those same "distasteful" tactics to defeat the Chicago Democrats and other opponents of reform on numerous critical votes. But when the coalition wields political power, Cohn commends them for their powers of "advocacy and persuasion" (p. 78).

This devotion to the reformist cause blinds him to balanced assessments and prevents him from deeply probing serious arguments for and against judicial reform. Because of this narrow perspective, he fails completely to recognize the legitimacy of the opposition's arguments, and offers little support and justification for his own. His major charge against the pre-1970 judicial system is that it was diverse, inharmonious, and unpatterned (pp. 3, 8, 12). Cohn's reform model corrects these weaknesses, providing an orderly, structured, and administratively efficient system but one which concentrates control in the hands of the state supreme court and the legal profession (p. 12). A major strength of the new model, Cohn explains, is that it will allow for the appointment rather than election of judges, guaranteeing total isolation of the judiciary from elective politics. Never once does he suggest what impact such a scheme, unchecked by the election process, might have on the quality of justice and on democratic government in general. Indeed the book never concerns itself with the concept of justice except for mentioning the word in its title.

Rubin Cohn is a professor of law who has spent many years crusading for judicial reform in Illinois. Throughout the book Cohn is too much the advocate of reform, and too little the objective analyst of reform, to offer an insightful study on judicial politics.

BYRON W. DAYNES

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Congress and the Nation, Volume III (1969-1972). (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1973. Pp. xxx, 1019; 137 App. $35.00.)

Guide to the Congress of the United States. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1971. Pp. xxxi, 639; 323 App. $35.00.)

Anybody who has tried to do research on Congress in recent years, whether it be research on internal legislative structures or on Congress's role in domestic or foreign policy processes, can attest to the information gap filled by Congressional Quarterly. Perhaps no single resource is as important to the congressional scholar as the CQ *Weekly Reports*, which provide a full day-to-day description of what is happening in the House and the Senate, along with a goldmine of additional data. They do become unwieldy after a while, though—I have not yet found any easy way of storing or maintaining back years of CQ, without either renting a storeroom or finding a much larger apartment (neither a reasonable alternative in Washington on an academic salary).

In part to cope with the manageability problem (and also no doubt to raise additional revenues), CQ has in recent years begun to organize, rewrite and encapsulate the massive data in the Weekly Reports in a variety of ways. Yearly summary *Almanacs* have been supplemented with policy-oriented histories of the post World War II Congress, called *Congress and the Nation* (Volume I covered 1945-1964; Volume II, 1965-1968; Volume III, the latest in the series, covers 1969-1972). The most recent addition to the CQ reference library is their *Guide to the Congress of the United States*. This review will deal with the *Guide to Congress* as well as Volume III of the *Congress and the Nation* series.

Congressional Quarterly's *Guide to the Congress of the United States* has 639 pages of text and 323 pages of Appendix. Its eight chapters and 32 subchapters contain a historical summary of Congress (including capsule histories of the House and the Senate); a chronological background of internal congressional institutions (rules, leadership, committees); and discussions of congressional powers; housing, staff and support facilities; and Congressional ethics. The *Guide* has a good deal of information which was not originally presented in the Weekly Reports, mostly glossed from historical texts and political science journal articles. The historical background material is excellently researched and presented. The bulk of the contents—most of the tables and charts, sections on the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, campaign financing, lobbying, for example—came directly from previous CQ publications.

There are excellent subchapters on such diverse topics as the Library of Congress, the General Accounting Office, and the seniority system. The largest section, eleven subchapters on "The Powers of Congress," gives concise accounts of the Constitutional background, precedents, and exercise of the broad range of congressional powers. For example, a reader, ignorant about the commerce clause and the Congressional role in regulating interstate commerce can turn to an eight-page subchapter outlining the basics (though, of course, *only* the basics) and describing the federal regulatory agencies.

Although there are only eight pages on Congress and interstate commerce, there are twenty-four pages on the subject of private bills in Congress—an interesting topic, but hardly worthy of three times the coverage. The anomaly is no doubt the result of a previous detailed CQ Special Report on private bills, which could be readily drawn upon.

The chapters are all basically narratives; though some data are presented, in chart and table form, they appear rather randomly throughout the text. The narrative format has both advantages and disadvantages. In some instances—particularly in the 100-page first chapter, "The Origins and Development of Congress"—an individual with little basic knowledge of the subject matter can find a readable and concise historical summary which is unavailable in any other single source. But for the scholar pursuing research on some aspect of Congress, the information provided in the *Guide to Congress* is for the most part rather shallow, and somewhat difficult to extract readily; reading or at least skimming whole sections is necessary. The first problem is probably inherent in putting together a single all-encompassing volume on 180 years of Congress; the second is intensified by the format. The chapters are most useful, it seems to me, to students who need background in a particular subarea, or to professors who want to prepare basic lectures on various aspects of the legislative process.

This is not to say that the *Guide to Congress* is of no use at all as a research reference. There are useful data in the text, including such tables as a record of discharge petitions filed in the House, by Congress, from 1909 to 1971; the number of roll calls by year from 1947 through 1970; presidential nominations rejected since 1929; cloture votes taken in the Senate since 1919; and growth of the congressional workload over time. But there is no real systematic presentation of historical congressional data. A good deal of what *is* presented has little apparent rationale beyond the fact that it was compiled for and included in the *Weekly Reports*. Large gaps exist—for example, there are no tables giving the number and names of House and Senate committees (and /or chairmen) prior to 1947, or of past congressional leaders. These items may simply reflect my own research interests, but the basic point is that one does not know, without searching, just what one may or may not find in the text of the *Guide*. This greatly limits its usefulness as a research tool.

The Appendix contains several things which enhance this volume's worth. Foremost is a 176-page section containing brief biographical information (basically years of service) on every member of Congress since 1789. For those who don't have a Biographical Directory of Congress at hand, this is a nice and reliable reference, one to which I have turned several times. The Appendix also contains the rules of the House and the Senate.

Congress and the Nation, Volume III (1969-1972) is by contrast, an invaluable resource for the congressional scholar, or for that matter, anybody interested in American national public policy for the Nixon years. *Congress and the Nation* is written much more as a reference tool, undominated by bulky narratives. Although it is basically a reorganization of material which had appeared in the *Weekly Reports,* the organization and streamlining of four years of Reports provides a genuine service.

Congress and the Nation, Volume III has sixteen chapters, with 1019 pages of text and 137 pages of appendix. The chapters are organized by policy area. Chapter one deals with politics and national issues, and includes electoral events in 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972. Capsule descriptions of Senate, House, gubernatorial and presidential elections are given, along with about twenty-five pages of charts and tables. The data here are rather spotty; for example, there is no systematic breakdown or analysis of turnover in the House and the Senate for the elections covered. On the other hand, there is much that one wouldn't expect, such as a breakdown of presidential convention votes from 1948-1972, and a list of state governors from 1944-1972. Once again one suspects that they are included because the charts had been previously compiled. (I might note at this point that many of the charts and tables present in the *Guide to Congress* are duplicated in *Congress and the Nation;* some do not really appear to fit in either volume, and were obviously included because they were already in the CQ files.)

Much of *Congress and the Nation* is a recounting of important legislation passed in nearly every broad policy area, ranging from economic policy, through civil liberties and rights, to veteran's legislation, and to foreign policy. Each of the policy chapters recounts in a year-by-year fashion the bills brought up in Congress in the particular policy area, and, for those enacted into law, the provisions of the legislation. For example, a reader concerned with what happened in the 1969–72 era in the area of agricultural policy, can consult chapter six which discusses, for each of the four years, the appropriations bills, food stamp and school lunch legislation, subsidy legislation, as well as the provisions and legislative history of the Agriculture Act of 1970, the Sugar Act of 1971, and the Rural Development Act of 1972. All other agriculture bills passed in the four years are briefly described.

Every major bill enacted in every policy area in the four-year period is outlined in the volume, and can be found easily. Some, such as the 1970 Voting Rights Act, or the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency are not described in enough detail, but still basic summaries are provided. Such important but unsuccessful efforts as the Family Assistance Plan and the Consumer Protection Agency are also covered; there is even a box giving detailed comparisons of the Nixon and Kennedy-Griffiths national health bills in the 92nd Congress. One could readily pinpoint a given bill through the index or in the relevant chapter. Obviously the volume only supplements the *Weekly Reports* and yearly *Almanacs* which contain more detailed information on each piece of legislation. But one can quickly discover the basics (while leaving the old Reports in the back of a closet).

The volume contains other useful information as well. The chapter on the Federal Judiciary includes all 1966–1972 legislation on the courts, as well as all major Supreme Court decisions of 1969–72, by subject area. The chapter on Congress and Government includes the CQ special Report on the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act (a well-written summary) as well as some interesting extraneous information—for example, a table showing all discharge petitions with their disposition, from 1909-1972 (repeated as I noted earlier, in the *Guide to Congress*), and a box describing Wayne Hays's new role as "Housekeeper of the House."

There is a short but informative section on busing in the Civil Liberties and Civil Rights chapter, and one on no-fault insurance in the section on consumer legislation. Unsystematically throughout the book, tables appear which are sometimes quite handy and sometimes largely worthless. As an example of the former, the section on education includes a fascinating table showing the gap between appropriations and authorizations under ESEA for 1969–72—a very nice demonstration of the differences between the Education and Labor and Labor and Public Welfare Committees on the one hand and the Appropriations Committee on the other. The latter problem is typified by a table covering 2/3 of a page in the section on consumer legislation which gives estimated repair costs for slow-speed car crashes for a variety of car models, and which is largely a waste of space.

The chapter on the presidency includes

biographical data on Nixon cabinet members and White House staff, as well as a section on Watergate through the spring of 1973.

The Appendix contains, for each of the four years, roughly a dozen key votes for each body, with brief descriptions; these key votes are referred to in heavy type throughout the text. Also included are lists of party leaders (though unfortunately only the *top* leaders) and committee chairmen from 1947-1972; a biographical index of post–World War II members of Congress; presidential vetoes in the 1969–1972 period; and the texts of various presidential messages—a very useful compilation of data.

In summary, the third volume of the *Congress and the Nation* series is a worthwhile and recommended addition to the reference library of any scholar concerned with American politics. The *Guide to Congress* is not nearly so important a resource though it contains some useful information. All in all, CQ's publications continue to fill gaps in information on Congress, for which political scientists should be grateful.

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The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House. By Joseph Cooper. (Houston: William Marsh Rice University, 1970. Pp. 167. $3.50.)

Within the increasing literature on Congress, a significant number of books and articles continue to swim against the tide of quantitative analysis (see Editorial Comment, June, 1974 *APSR*) and even employ historical methods to explain the development of modern structures. Such works as Nelson Polsby's articles on institutionalization and seniority and Randall Ripley's studies of party leadership in the House of Representatives illustrate the fertility of nonquantitative, essentially historical, analysis. Joseph Cooper's monograph is a valuable addition to this literature. *The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House* seeks to explain the emergence of congressional committees as a product of Jeffersonian thought and congressional experience. The book provides an interesting new perspective on the rise of committees, with an appreciation of Jeffersonian political philosophy as a bonus.

Professor Cooper argues that the theory and practice of Jeffersonian Republicanism first hindered and then permitted development of the standing committee system. Simply put, some of the leading beliefs of the Jeffersonians about the means of democratic decision making had to be modified, little by little, in the face of practical exigencies. Some aspects of the Republican philosophy were revealed to contain the seeds of their own destruction; thus the emphasis on legislative autonomy, which led to the refusal to request advice from the executive branch in the 1790s, necessitated the creation of standing committees, which violated the preference for deliberation by the whole legislature without organizational restraints. Other modifications of theory occurred on a more pragmatic basis, as when Jefferson's accession to the presidency weakened the insistence on freedom from executive management.

Central to Jeffersonian philosophy were the principles "that all legislators should be equal" and "that the legislature as a whole should direct itself" (p. 14). This view led to reliance on the Committee of the Whole House as the body to which initial reference of legislation was made. The Committee of the Whole was well suited for rational deliberation and imposed no "structural infringement" on the equal participation of members in debate. Thus the "sense of the majority" could more easily emerge. Yet by the end of the Jeffersonian era (1829), "insistence on radical egalitarianism disappeared and a new set of values and norms, focused on specialization and deference, crystallized" (p. 105). For reasons which, unfortunately, are not altogether clear, House members retreated from the belief that decisions should be reached through equal deliberation of all members in Committee of the Whole, and accepted a more "modern," post-division-of-labor belief in deference to decisions made by specialized, smaller committees, to which first reference of legislation was made, which had the right to report by bill, and which increasingly became involved in relations with executive agencies. Thus the triumph of practice over theory was attained.

In addition to the rise of the committee system, Cooper notes several important developments of the period 1789–1829. Foremost among these are the appearance of party affiliation as the primary criterion of appointment to committees; expanded importance of the committee chairman's role; and the rise of committee involvement with administration, as the House relaxed its controls on investigations, committee members and administrators regularly exchanged views on legislation, and Congressmen intervened more frequently with the departments on behalf of constituents and local problems. In these many ways, the House was beginning to acquire some of its modern characteristics.

While denying that the House of 1829 is the modern House, Cooper closes his study by applying the themes of the Jeffersonian period to the later history of the House. Here, painting with broad brush strokes, the author describes the rise and fall of party government and the emergence of the modern decentralized House of shifting coalitions in terms of the Jeffersonian conflict between democracy and structure. While suggestive, this portion of the monograph seems to overgeneralize the earlier findings. Where Professor Cooper states that "Jeffersonian orientations toward egalitarianism, individualism, and even rationalism have had a heavy impact on the minds of House members throughout our history" (p. 115), it is apparent that he has fallen into the common error of overestimating the importance of his topic. Surely members can revolt against heavy-handed party discipline without giving evidence of Jeffersonian thought. The tension between organizational needs and members' desires for autonomy merits more careful treatment. The process of institutionalization is much too complex to be subsumed by an analysis of the decline of Jeffersonian theory.

Another factor which detracts from the overall value of the monograph is the rather casual methodology. Jeffersonian theory and practice are both inferred from the texts of speeches delivered by members identified as "Republicans" or "strong Republicans" and recorded in the *Annals of Congress*. While in many respects this is an admirable and hallowed procedure, at times one has the feeling that Cooper is drawing even more from the speeches than is really there, and that remarks made in debate for the sake of persuasion may not be altogether accurate indicators of prevailing thought or procedure.

Nonetheless, in spite of some shortcomings in his book, Professor Cooper has explored an area which has too long been terra incognita, brought some new insight into the development of House structures, and even managed to bridge an academic chasm between political thought and political practice. This reviewer hopes that the near future will bring more such works to supplement our knowledge of congressional institutions.

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Between State and Nation: Regional Organizations of the United States. By Martha Derthick. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974. Pp. 242. $7.95, cloth; $2.95, paper.)

Between State and Nation is a well-written, clear-headed, and critical examination of regional governmental organizations in the American federal system. The author, Martha Derthick, a senior fellow at Brookings, undertakes a realistic and penetrating evaluation of some of the favorite nostrums of reformers—regional authorities, interstate compacts, federal-state regional development commissions, river basin commissions, and federal regional coordinating councils. Her conclusions reflect tough-minded political realism:

> To win the fight for existence and a significant share of public functions, [regional organizations] must have extraordinary constituency support or extraordinary means of self-support. These conditions can be met, if at all, only in very special circumstances, when there is a fortuitous coming together of opportunity, leadership, and political backing, so that it becomes possible to go against the institutional grain and create a genuinely new form (p. 226).

Professor Derthick's cautious appraisal of the utility of regional organizations is based on a series of selected case studies. From an almost limitless universe of transitory and ill-defined federal, federal-state, and interstate organizations, commissions, councils, and coordinating committees, Professor Derthick selects seven specific organizational types for analysis and evaluation:

Tennessee Valley Authority
Delaware River Basin Commission
Appalachian Regional Commission
Water Resource Planning Act of 1965, Title II federal-state river basin planning commissions
Economic Development Act of 1965, Title V federal-state regional economic development commissions
Federal Regional Councils

The origin of each of these organizational types is described in separate chapters, together with their legal structures and political bases, principal activities, strengths and weaknesses, and probably future directions.

It is in the final four chapters of the book that Professor Derthick brings her comparative and critical faculties to bear on her central question: Are regional organizations desirable, and if so, what form should they take?

Regional organizations have been created for different purposes—some for operating, management, and regulatory functions, and others for planning and coordinating only. Some have been created merely to coordinate federal programs, others to decentralize federal bureaucracies and open them to state and local influence, and still others to achieve federal-state "jointness." But whatever their differences in purposes and structure, "regional organizations have a common handicap of being unusual cases, deviant new growths in a governmental landscape whose enduring and predominant features are fifty state governments and a number of federal departments and bureaus with national jurisdictions" (p. 190). In order to survive in a crowded competitive universe of governments, weak regional organizations must make costly adaptations in order to fit the purposes and structures of state governments and federal agencies. In the process of adaptation, regional organizations either narrow the spheres of their activities (as when TVA abandoned the idea of comprehensive social and economic planning in favor of specializing in the generation and sale of electrical power), or they retreat into low profile "coordinating" activities which accomplish very little. Often the price that new regional organizations must pay just to get established is to agree not to diminish the authority or functions of established organizations. "In short, while the particular adaptations to the organizational environment vary widely from one type of regional organization to another, the common result is either specialization of activity or a low level of activity. Regional action proceeds within a narrow sphere or at a slow pace" (pp. 191-192).

The general objectives of regional organization include interstate and federal-state coordination, decentralization of federal authority, and federal interagency coordination. Professor Derthick described how various structures and practices both advance and inhibit these separate objectives. She also proposes some "guiding principles" for regional organizations: "powerful inducements" supplied by the federal government; planning organizations lodged near the operating agencies which must carry out the plans; denial of opportunities for planning agencies to find alternative functions to displace planning; and the delineation of a "region" which has a clear and compelling rationale.

But the long-term outlook for regionalism is uninspiring. "It is no accident that the leading cases of regional organizations are accidents" (p. 226). The states "continue to be powerful claimants on federal resources, to be objects of federal deference, and to perform a wide range of governmental functions" (p. 222). Federal members of federal-state regional organizations seldom have the power to influence the federal departments and agencies they represent, let alone induce state agencies to seek regional goals at their own expense. Even federal interagency councils have generally failed as resolvers of interagency conflict; they have complicated rather than simplified interagency grant administration; and they have even blundered in coordinating federal disaster relief. Only the Appalachian Regional Commission, with a large program budget, competent staff, and high morale, offers a reasonably successful example of regional organization. Yet to cover the nation with comparable commissions is not a realistic possibility; the relative success of the Appalachian Commission was a product of genuine, distinctive regional need.

Professor Derthick's comparisons are necessarily rough, owing to the diverse nature of regional organizations. And criteria for judging successful coordination and decentralization are necessarily imprecise. But this volume sets a high standard in the realistic appraisal of the effectiveness of structural reform in the American federal system.

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Talking Back: Citizen Feedback and Cable Technology. Edited by Ithiel de Sola Pool. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1973. Pp. xiii, 325. $9.95.)

The emergence of novel communications technologies, particularly cable television, is forcing decision makers and the American public to choose new communication policies. The essays assembled in this book attempt to ease this task. They provide a firm information base for policy makers by setting forth a variety of social and economic value criteria which should be weighed. In each case, the authors delimit the costs and benefits of particular policy choices in the light of present conditions and in the light of prognostications for the future. A major value premise which pervades most of the discussions is the idea that communications output should be responsive to consumer needs and desires. Most of the authors whose works are represented in this volume apparently believe that the present system is too unresponsive and alienating. They believe that it needs to be opened up to greater public control through more diversified ownership and multiplication of broadcast facilities. They would like to create a system which provides ready access to mass communication facilities for all proponents of diverse interests and contrasting points of view who want to broadcast their ideas.

The book is divided into three major parts, following an introduction which outlines the dimensions of the policy problems. Part One details current social needs which, in the authors' views, are inadequately met by present public communications systems. New technologies provide hitherto unavailable remedies through multiplication of television channels and through opportunities for audience feedback.

The prospect for increased television exposure for the performing arts is one of several social needs discussed in the volume. Martin Mayer, a free-lance writer, points out that the minuscule size of interested audiences, high costs of professional productions, and disdain for amateur fare seem to doom the prospects for expanded offerings. Harold Mendelsohn, Professor of Mass Communications at the University of Denver, underlines Mayer's argument by scuttling the frequently voiced claims of media critics that television needs to become more educational and intellectual. In a well-documented essay which describes the concerns and television-viewing habits of average working-class Americans, Mendelsohn contends that average viewers are pleased with present exciting entertainment fare, but are puzzled by much of the news and public service broadcasting which presents unrelated snippets of information. They are unwilling to expose themselves to more intellectual fare merely for the sake of learning. This explains why they hardly ever watch educational channels and programs which are geared to the tastes of intellectual elites. Mendelsohn calls working-class Americans "the neglected majority" and argues for cable television facilities operated by and for the needs and tastes of working people.

Charles Tate of the Urban Institute and William T. Knox of the Department of Commerce make much the same argument. Tate urges that inner-city cable facilities, which serve a preponderantly black audience, should be owned and controlled by blacks. Urban CATV systems should produce programs geared to the interests of black audiences. Knox talks more generally about the needs of the poor and of minorities in urban communities, and the types of communication services which could improve the quality of their lives. Gilbert Cranberg, a journalist, explores the uses of cable television surveillance and warning systems for urban crime detection and control.

One social need which has been the subject of much comment is the adequacy of political information presented by television, including the availability of citizen feedback to public officials. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Professor of Political Science at MIT, and Herbert Alexander, director of the Citizens' Research Foundation, speculate about various ways in which cable television, with its potential for two-way communication, could be organized and used to provide more relevant political information exchange. Potential dangers to national unity, to sound policy making, and to the quality of public service broadcasting are assessed, along with the optimistic predictions about the benefits of giving electronic voices to the multiplicity of local political leaders and small interest groups. Pool and Alexander also discuss the pros and cons of various franchising policies and the implications for such current concerns as fairness of presentation, equal time for contending views, and responsibility for obscenity and slander.

Part Two of the book deals with the technology, engineering feasibility, and costs of sophisticated cable systems. Although it is replete with explanatory tables and diagrams and uses relatively nontechnical language, most political scientists will probably skip this part. Even if they do so initially, these chapters are valuable as brief basic reference sources to which social scientists can turn whenever they become involved in technical aspects of cable technology during policy discussions. Subjects discussed include problems of interference in multichannel systems, the merits and costs of alternative ways for providing two-way transmissions, pay television, uses of cable television for business purposes, and various experimental systems which are now in operation.

Part Three is a mixture of technical data about two-way telecommunications systems and speculations about the effects of two-way facilities on social interactions and politics. Political scientists will be most interested in an essay by Thomas B. Sheridan, Professor of Mechanical Engineering at MIT, who describes a feedback technology which would permit audiences at meetings or lectures to interact with the speaker and other audience members and to register their selection of policy alternatives picked from a moderately complete array of choices. Sheridan's essay should be read in conjunction with a philosophical discussion by Ithiel de Sola Pool about the benefits of citizen feedback to the citizen and to the community. Part Three also presents information about the prospects for making data banks, including a vast variety of political data, accessible to the public on demand through the cable television system.

It should be obvious from the description of the book's content that it constitutes a smorgasbord of offerings on policy-relevant matters in the field of cable television. As in any smorgasbord, different readers will prefer different tidbits and will have different ideas about what else might have been included to round out the selections, or what should have been omitted. But no one who is interested in cable technology, particularly its potential for two-way communication, should leave this table of fare unsatisfied. There is a great deal of important information in this volume, presented by knowledgeable scholars in a manner which makes even the more technical aspects easy to comprehend.

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Money and Politics in America, 1755–1775: A Study in the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution. By Joseph Albert Ernst. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973. Pp. 403. $14.95.)

In his *Money and Politics in America* Professor Ernst has written a book that has some value but certainly does not fulfill the expectations aroused by his earlier writings on that subject. The major accomplishments of the book are twofold. First, Professor Ernst has constructed, with painstaking care, the intricacies of British-colonial dealings over pre-Revolutionary colonial paper currency legislation and parliamentary regulation thereof. If anyone should want information about such events and policies this, obviously, is now the best book to look at. Second, by means of his assertions about the importance of such factors as the terms of British credit, British military expenditures in the colonies, and seasonal and short-run fluctuations in local markets in determining economic conditions in the colonies, Professor Ernst has convincingly pointed out the shortcomings of earlier writers who have assumed that the exchange rates between colonial currency and English sterling and, hence, the terms of trade between colonies and metropolis, depended directly on the quantities of colonial money in circulation. Although interested economists and economic historians will undoubtedly have their own rather technical criticisms of Professor Ernst's handling of the structure of economic relationships in the Empire his arguments, it seems, do demonstrate that these relationships were very complex and that the policies of British creditors did have a significant impact on them.

Despite the importance of these two major contributions to historical knowledge, this book is seriously flawed. *Money and Politics in America* is, by the author's profession, not only a study of the Currency Act of 1764 but also of the political economy of revolution. If this is so, then a major question must be, what is the relationship of the currency problem to the American Revolution? By centering his study on the Currency Act of 1764 and on the subsequent dealings between Britain and the southern and middle colonies over questions of colonial currency emissions, Professor Ernst has implied that these were central to the growing estrangement between England and the colonies. Yet, in fact, colonial efforts to repeal the 1764 Currency Act came in a poor third, after attempts to repeal the Stamp Act and the Revenue Act of 1764. Moreover, in the late 1760s and early '70s Britain and the colonies were able to work out acceptable compromises which allowed several colonies to circulate paper currency despite the general prohibition embodied in the 1764 Act. One is left without a clear sense of what the currency issue meant in the context of the revolutionary crisis, and with the possibility still open that it may have had only marginal significance. This seems to have been one issue on which Britain and the colonies were able to work out acceptable compromises during the pre-Revolutionary years.

An alternative way of looking at the evidence in the book—and it is the way Professor Ernst prefers it to be viewed even though his preference is not reflected in the structure of the book—is the following. It was, according to the author, a series of economic crises, occasioned largely by foreclosures and sharp retractions of British credit after periods of liberal credit extension, which brought colonies and mother country into a confrontation over paper currency. The colonists felt they needed paper currency to facilitate economic activity during the recessions; the British were determined to protect the sterling debts the colonists owed them. The least important developments—even though Professor Ernst spends so much time elaborating them—were the compromises the British and colonials worked out on the question of paper currency emissions. Despite these compromises, so the argument goes, the colonists were so profoundly unsettled by their lack of control over economic affairs in the Empire that political and eventually revolutionary action resulted.

One is left, then, with a statement that economic interests were crucial determinants of the conflict between Britain and the colonies and of the intracolonial conflicts that accompanied the Revolutionary crisis. But it is only that—a statement. Professor Ernst admits that ". . . the precise dimensions and the causes of these crises are open to debate . . ." (p. 361); he does not deal with the question of how the colonists' perceptions of their economic disadvantages affected the Revolutionary movement; and he assumes (". . . once it is accepted that much of the important political activity in the Revolution represented an attempt to deal with economic crises and conditions . . ." [p. 360]) what the bulk of his book does not clearly show. Although, historiographically, this book is of some importance in indicating an increased interest among a number of colonial historians in applying a "conflict model" to Revolutionary events, it is very much an assertion of the applicability of such a model, not a major explication of the political economy of the Revolution. In 362 pages of text one would have hoped for something more.

ALAN TULLY

University of British Columbia

Stamford in the Gilded Age: The Political Life of a Connecticut Town, 1868-1893. By Estelle F. Feinstein. (Stamford, Conn.: The Stamford Historical Society, Inc., 1973. Pp. 319. $6.95.)

Despite the apparent narrowness of its subject matter, this is a model study in several ways and a valuable addition to the urban history of the Gilded Age.

Feinstein's subject is the impact of the social-economic evolution of Stamford in the years 1868 1893 upon its political institutions. She describes how population growth, occupational shifts, the expansion of the Yale & Towne manufacture, and the coming-of-age of the Irish minority made the traditional town-meeting system increasingly unsatisfactory. Though the community managed with difficulty to effect certain changes in the areas of public education and sanitation, it failed to resolve pressing problems of protection, pollution, and poverty. Social dysfunction and the proven inadequacies of the old system of public decision making created a demand for a new political structure. The "solution" was a new city structure superimposed upon the anachronistic but familiar town-meeting.

So summarized, Feinstein's study appears of modest importance. It stands, however, as a model not only of the grass-roots approach to urban history but of the use of political science methodology in historical research and the utility of the case method in testing stereotypic judgments respecting the political history of the Gilded Age. Studies such as this offer needed support for those who would look below the surface stupidities of the Gilded Age and recognize that these years saw the emergence of urban problems relevant to the concerns of today's metro-Americans. In Stamford as on the national scene there was political lag and a failure of synchronization between changing economic realities and the evolution of political institutions, but it is one of the strengths of Feinstein's study that she is aware of the novelty and number of challenges that beset the old political structures and is concerned to understand rather than condemn the failures of institutional response.

There are other strengths characteristic of this carefully written and well documented study. Feinstein's analysis is marked by maturity as well as moderation. While analyzing patterns of geographic, class, and ethnic division, she avoids a simplistic or monocausal explanation for the deadlocks that frequently marked the Stamford political scene. Feinstein uses statistical data to illustrate and not avoid evaluation, and she makes a determined effort to compare developments in Stamford with those of other cities. My major quarrel with Feinstein arises over a matter of emphasis. Stamford's faltering response to community social responsibilities was possibly less the result of the town-meeting system than the amateur tradition of politics, the private philanthropic ethic, and the penny-pinching suspicions of the shrinking agricultural component of the population. Feinstein does not ignore these inhibiting factors, but her emphasis is upon the weaknesses of institutional structure.

Whatever one's opinion about the relative importance of social values and institutional constraints, few readers will fail to acknowledge the importance of Feinstein's work not only as a case study of Stamford but also as a supplement to studies that have recently been written on other New England cities. When Juxtaposed, such case studies have a cumulative value for the student of Gilded Age politics. They serve as a necessary corrective to the spleen of Matthew Josephson or the well-worn generalizations of James Bryce.

RICHARD E. WELCH, JR.

Lafayette College

The American Condition. By Richard N. Goodwin. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1974. Pp. 407. $10.00.)

The surprising thing about this book is its pessimism. It is surely not common for a rather young American fresh from the pleasures of intimate involvement in two presidencies to find "the American condition" so hard. Not even the murder of the two men he loved the best and loved working for the most (John and Robert Kennedy) need have had such a disheartening effect. Missing from this book is not only the remembrance of earlier exhilaration but also the aim of inciting others to action. There is no sense of resuming a mission. It is not that Goodwin disowns the substance of his past. Rather, Goodwin now believes that any serious effort to change society by political means must fail. "Many of us who worked in the White House during the early sixties may have been victims of the anxiety for place and recognition; but ambition also extended to the desire to 'make a difference,' to use this force—whose existence was an article of faith—in order to enhance human well-being" (pp. 338-9). The reforms came to little. What Goodwin has only lately seen is that "the inability to exercise authority is almost infallible proof that it does not exist" (p. 339). Goodwin refers here and there to his new life in Maine;

indeed *The American Condition* sometimes seems like an antipolitical pastoral.

What is the trouble? What is the American condition? The larger answer that Goodwin gives is that the source of our woe is found in the devotion of our culture to a private and self-absorbed individualism with a corresponding loss of the sense of community. Much of the first part of the book deals with the growth of individualism since the Renaissance. Goodwin makes some unconvincing references to the rootedness of medieval life, and thus shows, as others show, how the hunger for community can lead to unhistorical and reactionary sentiments. The analysis also suffers from an excess of eloquence: too many artful phrases for too little freshness of perception concerning modern man. One begins to suspect the writer who moves easily from century to century, from idea to idea. The easy movement turns out to be that of someone who dare not stay long with any one consideration if he is to avoid the disclosure of his philosophical infirmity. In writing these pages Goodwin was simply not hard enough on himself: he is presumptuous. If the whole book were what the first third of half is, it would be a disaster.

Which is not to say that what follows is as patiently worked out as the theme requires. Still there is some power, some suggestiveness, and also some poignancy. The smaller answer, that is, the less self-dizzying answer that Goodwin gives to the question of the source of our woe, is that our economic system imprisons us in unhappiness and closes us off from happiness. The system is not only injurious despite the affluence it provides, it also obstructs the emergence of a humane way of life. The material conditions exist for an unalienated community of free persons, but the present system kills the opportunity. The horror of American life lies as much in failing to be what it might be, as in being what it is.

Goodwin's indictment resembles Marcuse's. But there is also divergence. At least some of the time Marcuse blames the few. Goodwin does not: he blames the system. What does it mean to blame the system? It is tough to extract a satisfactory answer from Goodwin's book. It would seem that the system is everybody; it would also seem that the system is nobody, an impersonal force or tendency that exerts itself apart from human volition, perhaps even from human agency. Goodwin speaks as he does of "system" because he wrongly thinks that the unconscious, the semiconscious, the habitual, the inculcated, the unexamined, the dutiful, and the role-governed are not psychological phenomena; that action proceeding from them is not human action. Goodwin could have made much of the persistence of forms of human conduct without indulging people in the undeserved feeling that they lack choice, or that what they do just happens.

Goodwin puts it plainly at one point in a key sentence. He says, "To a large extent the traditional profit motive has been replaced by the craving for expansion. This is the logically inescapable goal of the corporation as end in itself. It is a shared and linking element in the interests of managers, workers, capital and the organization" (p. 285). A widespread *acceptance* of the organizational code thus marks our society. Security, comfort, psychic gratification, and the approval of others reinforce that code with barely a break. There is nothing impersonal, and something only partly mysterious, in our condition.

If we want a metaphor, we can say that we are under a spell, and that only some deep shock or catastrophe, or some wondrous invention or discovery, or some wild movement of enthusiasm, or some other matter not now nameable, can break the spell, can break the hold of a bad life, but a bad life sufficiently pleasurable, and, what is more, a life kept going by a daily renewal of consent.

The quarrel with Goodwin's metaphysic aside, much in the second part of the book is to be commended for its cumulative force. He contributes to a mode of analysis which Galbraith has publicized. He leaves us with an intensified loathing of our universal complicity in bureaucratization. And then, instead of trying to charm us into hope, he produces his pages on the futility of reformist politics. Against the massed strength of our acceptance, adversary action is almost frivolous. He says, "If some find this work cheerless it is only because analysis unveils the unprecedented magnitude of the coercive power which confronts assertions of the awareness of human possibilities which, although suppressed, are fixed attributes of human existence. Cheerlessness, therefore, is not a conclusion but a preparation. To be cheerful is to accept, and one who accepts is forever without hope" (p. 396). At the last, his eloquence is not too much.

GEORGE KATEB

Amherst College

Supreme Court und Politik in den USA: Fragen der Justiziabilität in der höchstrichterlichen Rechtsprechung. By Walter Haller. (Bern: Verlag Stämpfli & Cie., 1972. Pp. xxvi, 384. DM 65.)

Dr. Walter Haller, now a member of the faculty of law and political science at the University of Zürich, Switzerland, spent the year 1969 in Ann

Arbor, Michigan, where he enjoyed the guidance of that eminent constitutional law scholar, the late Professor Paul G. Kauper. The result of that year's sojourn at the University of Michigan law school is an excellent study of the problem of justiciability as it has been handled by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Of the book's five chapters, the first two are essentially introductory, outlining the constitutional system and setting forth the origins and uses of judicial review. The third chapter—almost half of the book—begins with a discussion of such matters as the "case or controversy" requirement, advisory opinions, declaratory judgment, standing, and judicial self-restraint, and then explores at length and in considerable detail the doctrine of "political questions." Of the final two chapters, the fourth takes up the reviewability of administrative acts, while the fifth seeks to set the preceding discussion in a broader context. Here the author leans, not surprisingly, on Kauper's numerous publications and, with Kauper, assumes a rather detached point of view.

Like most continental jurists, Dr. Haller is concerned with the concept of the *Rechtsstaat* and how it is translated into reality. When viewed in this perspective, judicial review represents the ultimate in a people's commitment to government by laws. "The separation of powers, which is to be deduced from the Constitution, is not an end in itself. One has to go back to the basic values underlying the concept [of separation of powers], foremost among which is the limitation of all political power by the law. This precisely is the purpose which judicial review serves" (p. 322).

The debates which periodically rage around the Court involve not so much the questions of *whether* judicial review should be exercised but rather of *how* it should be exercised. Haller has drawn on virtually all recent discussions of this question. Alexander Bickel, Charles Black, Learned Hand, Robert McCloskey, Herbert Wechsler, and numerous others are not only cited and quoted but their arguments are dissected and skillfully criticized. (In fact, Haller's bibliography of more than 250 titles on judicial review and related questions is as good as any I have seen in recent years.) His own reasoning takes Haller to a conclusion that is founded on Cardozo's description of *The Nature of the Judicial Process:*

> In particular, it is the judge who appreciates the subjective elements in judicial decision-making and who does not surrender to the illusion of perfect neutrality who is most likely to keep his likes and dislikes in check. The same judge is also best able to make responsible use of the freedom he enjoys when he interprets legal propositions and balances competing interests, and he will not seek refuge behind seemingly objective formulae (p. 339).

Thus, if judicial review is to serve its purpose, what is needed are justices cast in Cardozo's mold.

But is not the "political question" one of these "seemingly objective formulae"? Haller reviews the cases from *Luther* v. *Borden* to *Powell* v. *McCormack* and concludes with Corwin that "the doctrine of political questions signalizes an early concession by the Court itself at the expense of the strict logic of judicial review" (quoted on p. 369). That institution—judicial review—represents a withdrawal from an absolutist concept of democracy. The Court's practice with respect to "political questions," by contrast, represents a pulling back from the absolutes of the concept of judicial review. Because the Court's effectiveness depends on the respect it enjoys, it strengthens its own position by a deliberate denial of its own omnicompetence.

Two reflections come to mind. One is the obvious contrast between this book and Philippa Strum's recent *The Supreme Court and Political Questions*. The latter is an avowedly political analysis though Ms. Strum uses her legal materials with the skill of the expert. Haller has written a legal study but much of his discussion acknowledges that policy values are ever-present. Regrettably, our Swiss colleague's work is not likely to be translated into English: scholars concerned with the role of the Court in our society would profit if they could read it in conjunction with Dr. Strum's.

The other thought triggered by the reading of Dr. Haller's book is that it represents a fine testimonial to the benefits of scholarly travel which we have seen intensify over the last two decades. I do not know that anyone has counted the doctoral dissertations and *Habilitationsschriften* (Haller's is one of the latter) submitted to universities abroad and based on research done in this country. More often than not, the academic bookkeeping systems of our universities take little cognizance of the effort contributed by the American professor as he or she guides the foreign scholar through the vicissitudes of our academic folkways. Hence it is pleasing to see Dr. Haller acknowledge his debt to Paul Kauper—a great scholar and fine gentleman whose passing in the fall of 1974 is mourned by students of American constitutional law, be they in Ann Arbor or in Zürich.

FRANCIS H. HELLER

University of Kansas

The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro. By Remigio E. Agpalo. (Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1972. Pp. 414. No price indicated.)

The reader expecting a neat case study of elite politics in a Philippine province will be pleasantly surprised at the rich variety of ideas and data in this book. In the years since the early 1960s when Professor Agpalo started writing this book, a number of approaches have become fashionable in interpreting Philippine politics. These have been incorporated in the text, sometimes with vexing kaleidoscopic effects. In his methodological notes, Agpalo admits that the book gradually evolved and that "no rigorous outline was used to develop it in its present form. . . . it just grew out of a dialectical process and serendipitous development. . . ." (p. 394). This lack of deliberate method shows in the book's organization.

Agpalo's classical political science roots are seen in his tendency to quote authors and authorities with almost scriptural voracity. The chapter on the "conceptual framework" in the study of community power and politics, for example, starts with Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution*, and, by the third footnote, has already cited 17 authors and 12 works on communities from Dahl's New Haven to Warner's Yankee City. Nor is Agpalo's scholarship confined to political science. He quotes as avidly Tennyson's *Ulysses* ("to follow knowledge like a sinking star") and Shelley's harangue to the people of England ("rise like Lions after slumber"). The myriad thoughts and ideas incorporated by Agpalo in his work serve as hypotheses, testimonials, confirmations, and denials. Aside from revealing the expanse of Agpalo's readings, they also document the rather eclectic influences on his own view of politics and development. The wonder of this is that the book's parts do hang together. He may preface a description of the province's ruling political family with "variations on a theme by Thrasymachus" from Plato's *Republic*, or start a simple case study of a barrio leader's changing political party affiliations with a full verse from the *Trojan Women* by Euripides, but, somehow, through some curious creative process, he drives home his points.

One complaint that may be aired about this scholarship by citation is, that while it clarifies Agpalo's intellectual heritage, it is sometimes hard to tell where the cited ideas end and where Agpalo's true insights and ideas begin. Another minor complaint is that practically all the citations are for foreign works. Agpalo does make a quick review of community power structure studies in the Philippines, in the mandatory "review of the literature" section, but he never picks up these studies later, to compare or contrast their findings with his own.

The other characteristic of Agpalo's book is that it interprets elite-mass politics in terms of traditional attitudes, belief patterns, and behavior attributed to lowland Filipinos by social anthropologists. The approach, introduced and popularized by Frank Lynch, Mary Hollnsteiner, George Guthrie, and others, attempts to interpret political behavior through such concepts as *hiya* (shame), *bahala na* (come what may), *pakikisama* (smooth interpersonal relations), and other beliefs and attitude patterns allegedly held by Filipinos. While this approach has added insight into what lies behind Philippine political behavior, it has not been very successful in operationalizing how the belief patterns are translated into Philippine political events.

Pursuing this social-anthropological approach, Agpalo likens Philippine politics to the traditional *pandanggo sa ilaw*, a folk dance where performers delicately balance lighted oil lamps on their hands and head. The analogy is apt, but it adds little to true understanding of Philippine politics. Agpalo contends that provincial politics in the Philippines is "based primarily on manipulation and maneuvering, with patronage serving as a principal means of leverage" (p. 164). He likens the *pandanggo* dancers to the political elite and counterelite. The people are the dance audience. The oil lamps are the power and status of the political elite. The imagery is colorful, but when Agpalo tries to describe how elite politicians actually get and retain power, the analogy to the *pandanggo* becomes strained and is soon quietly abandoned.

The other emphasis discernible in this work owes much to public administration and management studies, especially the use of the case method. It is not by chance that Agpalo's book was published by the College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, which has pioneered these approaches in the country. In presenting his case studies, Agpalo has shown close attention to details. His description of how specific political and administrative decisions were carried out in Occidental Mindoro provides a wealth of data and vivid examples. But admirable as Agpalo's efforts have been, he still has to face the difficult problem of trying to generalize from a number of individual case studies to the larger understanding of how politics is played in the Philippines.

To sum up, this book provides many facts and insights on elite/mass politics in a specific province in the Philippines. It is less successful in its efforts, and claims, to provide a broader understanding of Philippine political behavior and, by extension, of politics in developing countries. Many of the generalizations made in the book provide an excellent starting point for further research. One of the merits of Agpalo's book is that there is such a richness and variety of suggested approaches that it may be possible to pursue further research on this topic despite the fact, that since September, 1972, when martial law was declared in the Philippines, no elections have been held in the country and hence a new ingredient has been added to Philippine politics.

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Outlines of Indian Constitutional History (British Period). By W. A. J. Archbold. (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1973. Pp. 367. $13.00.)

This book was first published forty-eight years ago (in 1926), and its new impression in 1973 ostensibly incorporates no changes. Its publishers believe that this work provides "basic materials for study and further research" about the constitutional framework "upon which the modern states of India and Pakistan now largely rest." The late Professor Archbold, a Cambridge University scholar, had spent several years in India. He had served as the Principal of Aligarh, Dacca, and Muir Central Colleges and was a fellow of the University Senates of Calcutta, Benares, and Allahabad. At the time of writing this book, Professor Archbold was back in Cambridge as Whewell University scholar.

This work covers a period between the advent of the East India Company to the port towns of India (1600 A.D.) until the passage of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919) by the British Parliament, devoting much attention to the Reform Act of 1919 and its advocacy. The most fascinating phase of Indian constitutional history (1919 to 1947) is obviously beyond the scope of this treatise, and someone looking for a comprehensive history of the development of the Indian Constitution should look at the other standard works in this field, like Arthur B. Keith's *A Constitutional History of India* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1969; Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai's *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, Vol. I and Vol. II* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1966); C. H. Alexandrowicz's *Constitutional Development of India* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1957); Granville Austin's *Indian Constitution—Cornerstone of a Nation* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); and Gurmukh N. Singh's *Landmarks in Indian Constitutional Development* (Delhi: Atma Ram and Sons, 1959).

Nevertheless, the period covered by this work included significant happenings in the political history of South Asia. The Mutiny of 1857, rise of Indian National Congress, communal representation in the Indian Councils and the entry of Mahatma Gandhi into domestic politics in India were some of the landmarks of this period. The manner in which Professor Archbold deals with these developments may be one way of analyzing his forty-eight-year-old scholarship. His analysis of the Mutiny of 1857 will be disappointing to most Indian historians (who have glorified it as the First War of Indian Independence). The Sepoy Mutiny is dismissed cursorily by Archbold:

> The Mutiny which, whatever else may be said or thought about it, can in no sense be considered to represent any constitutional aspirations. In that the mutineers desired to get rid of English control, it may be said to have a slight connection with later political movements; but it would be truer to say that the latter are more Western than Eastern in origin, and owe their existence very largely to the ideas introduced after the Mutiny, and introduced not by Indians but by Englishmen (p. 113).

On the question of communal representation in the Indian legislatures, introduced by the Indian Councils Act of 1909, the author seems to have no comments. He does not fail, however, to cite the viewpoint of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in this respect, which he probably shared. This report says, "Any system of Communal electorate is a very serious hindrance to the development of the self-governing principles. It is opposed to the teaching of history, it perpetuates class division and it stereotypes existing relations. But that Communal electorate should be maintained for Mohammedans in provinces where they are in minority. The same system may be extended to the Sikhs of Punjab. For other minorities the method of nomination may suffice" (p. 177).

This book was obviously written during a turbulent period of Indian constitutional history. Gandhi had just put into practice his doctrine of *satyagraha* in opposition to the provisions of the Government of India Act 1919 (Montagu-Chelmsford Reform). The British civilians were trying political offenders without juries under the provisions of the Rowlett Act. But Professor Archbold makes only a passing reference to these happenings in his preface, saying, "As a lover of India I can only express the hope that the clouds will pass and we shall live to see India in the enjoyment of a government which will satisfy her aspirations whilst it recognizes her connection with, and obligation to, that greater whole [Pax Britannica? M.M.] of which she forms and must form a part" (p. 6).

Students of Indian constitutional history can guess what has gone wrong with Archbold's attempt to sketch an objective analysis of the constitutional development of India. I believe that Professor Archbold was unwilling to deal with the political realities associated with constitutional forms, at least in the case of India. He was trying to write a descriptive but formal history of Indian constitutional documents and not a politico-legal analysis of the evolution of Indian polity.

Finally, Archbold's prognosis about the future of government and politics in India may seem most interesting to the contemporary students of Indian political behavior. Writing in 1926 Professor Archbold said,

> Those who read India's long and troubled history will, however, be prepared for the statement that it is not probable that Western ideas of representative government and the party system will be what India will finally adopt, and that it is much more probable that a bureaucracy, largely Indian in composition, will be, for many years at least, the form that India will find most suited to her needs and traditions (p. 344-45).

MANINDRA K. MOHAPATRA
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Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China: Changes in Management and the Division of Labor. By Charles Bettelheim. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974. Pp. 128. $6.95.)

This slim volume by the noted French radical economist sets out to gauge the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the nature of management and the social division of labor in Chinese industry. Relying mainly on materials gathered during a trip to the People's Republic in August and September 1971, Professor Bettelheim argues that the Cultural Revolution at its deepest level was an attempt to transform perennial patterns of inequality and hierarchy by eradicating the differences between performance tasks and administrative tasks, between mental and manual work, and between town and countryside.

The book falls into four general sections. In the first chapter, Bettelheim recounts his conversations with members of the revolutionary committee of the General Knitwear Factory in Peking in 1971. The second chapter provides a short introduction to the main principles of Chinese planning. Chapters 3 and 4 ascend to a higher theoretical plane in a discussion of the major ideological goals of the Cultural Revolution and the ways in which it has contributed to the revolutionizing of social relationships in the Chinese economy. A postscript, mainly devoted to the baleful influence of the "ultra-leftists," is added to correct what Bettelheim sees as certain overly deterministic and mechanistic impressions which the reader may have derived from the main body of the book.

It would be easy, but inappropriate, to mount an academic high horse and criticize this book for lacking dispassionate objectivity. The book should be judged on its own terms as an ardent exposition and defence of Maoist views of the meaning of the Cultural Revolution and its impact on the Chinese economy. The criteria for evaluation used here are thus twofold: does Bettelheim provide an accurate picture of the ways in which the Chinese perceive the meaning of their own revolution in the early 1970s and, second, does he present this picture in ways which are cogent and comprehensible to his readers?

On the first count, the book succeeds insofar as it is largely reportage based on Bettelheim's travel notes. For social scientists interested in Chinese views on industrial management and "ultra-leftism" in 1971, this book is a useful source. But the coherence of the analysis is plagued by the ever-changing political realities of China. The tribulations of maintaining a stable Maoist perspective outside China are evident in Bettelheim's work. Since the definition of "correct" lines or policies is constantly changing in the complex ebb and flow of Chinese politics, the China which Bettelheim described approvingly in his book with Charriere and Marchisio, *La Construction du Socialisme en Chine,* published in 1965, is now described as having been distorted by Liu Shao-chi's "bourgeois political line"; the mass participation and Red Guard activity of late 1966 and 1967 are now clouded by imputations of ultra-leftist or Lin Piao manipulation. Even Bettelheim's description of the Peking Knitwear Factory is problematic insofar as it was based on events before the fall of Lin Piao. In fact, one cadre interviewed cites Lin with approbation. In his postscript, however, Bettelheim is clearly trying to "catch up" with more recent changes in Party leadership by appending criticisms of Lin Piao which contradict the words of the factory cadre in 1971. Bettelheim would have strengthened his book if he had disengaged himself to a greater extent from the ideological emphasis of the hour and taken a broader and more critical perspective—one that deals with the ambiguity and fluidity inherent in terms like the "proletarian revolutionary line"—instead of reifying such terms as absolute entities of unambiguous content.

On the analytical side, the book has serious limitations. First, its language and style would be opaque to most American readers, social scientists or non-specialists, who are not accustomed to the distinctive terminology of Chinese politics. For example, it is clear to politically literate Chinese that, by virtue of the idea of "left in form but right in essence," political behavior which appears extremely "left" may merely be a disguised form of the "bourgeois line." For Americans, however, such dialectical inversions are difficult to fathom. Bettelheim would have strengthened his argument by paying more attention to the interpretation of this often confusing and obscure terminology.

Second, the account suffers from a lack of cross-fertilization with other contemporary work in the field of Chinese industrial management and economic division of labor. Bettelheim does not mention Andors's excellent work on the subject (for example, in the latter's contribution to E. Friedman and M. Selden (eds.), *America's Asia* [New York: Pantheon, 1971]), nor Rensselaer Lee's work on the relation between politics and technology (for example, in his contribution to Chalmers Johnson (ed.), *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China* [Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973]). Though his theoretical chapters are provocative and focus on key intellectual and political problems, they are often too abstract to be cogent and fall short of Wheelwright and MacFarlane's more comprehensive and systematic treatment of the same topic in *The Chinese Road to Socialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).

In fact, the lack of references and the generally loose structure of the book show signs of a "quickie." It is to be hoped that Bettelheim will follow up this initial effort to analyze the Chinese economy after the Cultural Revolution with a more concrete, critical and well-thought-out account which will treat the subject with the complexity it deserves.

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Australian National Univesity

Kenya, the Politics of Participation and Control. By Henry Bienen. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. Pp. viii, 215. $10.00.)

In this comparatively short volume Professor Bienen deals with two of the most important themes of contemporary African politics, popular participation in the structure of decision making, and, as a counterpart theme, the exercise of control by government to bring about specific political and economic ends. His thesis, as he succinctly puts it, is ". . . that Kenya is a participant society in important respects, despite a curtailing of political competition and a fall off in voting turnout." He continues, "I also argue that Kenya's leaders are sensitive to rural demands despite the real limits on participation that exist" (p. 21).

The key to the question of participation lies, of course, in the definitional context within which the term is used. Much scholarly ink has been consumed in the attempt to prove the case for or against the existence of genuine popular participation in the African single-party systems that have come and gone in the nearly two decades since independence swept the colonies out of existence. One of the major difficulties in answering the question of the reality of participation in a specific country has frequently been that the content of the word has been supplied by non-African observers from the framework of their own experience. Obviously, the easiest way to observe participation is in the electoral process, but this in itself can lead to endless debate about whether the voters are, in fact, being offered meaningful choices or, indeed, whether they understand the process at all.

Professor Bienen puts his finger on the heart of the matter when he observes that "people may get what they want with relatively low levels of participation" (p. 11), or, it might even be added, with little or no evident participation at all. For large numbers of rural Africans, in Kenya or elsewhere, participation in the decisions made by their new governments was not a primary demand at independence, nor has it been since. On the contrary, the peasant farmer frequently wanted to have as little to do with government as possible, except when there was a real expectation that a specific need could be met by applying to the nearest authority. Government, for many farmers, tended to be seen largely as the taxing agent, and one was well advised to have as little contact with it as possible for fear that some new, and usually undesirable, levy might be imposed. Government, in other words, was seen more as a harassing and obstructing force than as an agent of constructive advance; hence one of the farmer's objectives was to keep government off his back so he could get on with his work.

Barazas (village public meetings) from time to time were acceptable, and were seen as socially enjoyable and occasionally informative gatherings, but forced involvement in discussion of issues which were seen as irrelevant was regarded as a waste of valuable time. As Bienen points out, in Kenya many of the critical decisions which ultimately affected the rural population were, in any case, made by groups outside the country over which any degree of popular participation in decision making would have had little or no influence.

The author points up in substantial detail the peculiarly important role played by the Civil

Service in Kenya as a vehicle of participation. Any visitor to rural Kenya cannot have helped observing that for most rural Kenyans any direct contact with government was with the provincial administration, not with local party headquarters, since the administration was able to produce results whereas the party could not.

Professor Bienen's chapter on party politics stresses that Kenyatta ruled not through the party but through the Civil Service. It would be difficult to quarrel with his observation that Kenyatta's preeminent role has been maintained only by eschewing KANU as a directing mechanism. Unlike the case in other African countries, in Kenya the single-party was never regarded by the leadership as a vehicle for control, in part because of the inability of the party to overcome continuing ethnic divisions. Even within the major ethnic group, factional divisions within the Kikuyu, combined with personal gain for a few members of the elite, have frustrated the government's plans to build a class of farmers with small holdings.

As a generalization, the author's conclusion that the government "has been responsive to the necessity of a farming existence for the great majority of Kenyans" (p. 189) cannot be faulted. Perhaps no other African country has devoted so much of its own resources and of outside aid to rural development, and the results, in terms of popular satisfaction with government and of political stability have been evident, despite the decline in the outward signs of participation.

This is a valuable study, both for its analysis and for its documentation. For the reader familiar with Kenya over the past decade, it does not adduce a startlingly new thesis nor substantially new documentation. But it points up and brings together aspects of Kenyan political and economic development which are indispensable to a full understanding of the Kenyan political process. For this, as well as for the cogent argument of his analysis, social scientists concerned with Kenya, and indeed with many other African states, are in Professor Bienen's debt.

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Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru. By Hugo Blanco. Translated by N. Allen. (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972. Pp. 178. $6.95, cloth; $2.45, paper.)

In *Land or Death,* Hugo Blanco, the greatest revolutionary to operate in the valleys of southern Peru, chronicles the oftentimes coincident campaign for unionizing La Convención and Lares peasants and for fomenting a Trotskyist revolution in Peru. The book is divided into two parts. The first contains a cursory statement on the "peasant campaign" (1958–63), an explanation for the absence of a revolutionary party, a sketch of the confrontation between Stalinism and Trotskyism in the peasant movement, an exposition on the "dual power" concept, an account of the armed struggle, and a report on the trial of Blanco, along with other revolutionaries, after their cause failed. Part II of *Land or Death* consists of other prison writings, useful in obtaining a pardon for Blanco. They kept alive the Trotskyist organization in Lima and, perhaps, succored the peasant cause in La Convención that refused to wither.

A Quechua-speaking mestizo from a middle-class family of Cuzco, Blanco became a Trotskyist while studying agronomy in Argentina. Upon returning to Peru, he became active in the Revolutionary Workers Party—POR. An early assignment for the fledgling was to go to his native Cuzco to organize urban workers. Once there, the new organizer found more militancy among the peasants of La Convención-Lares, who had begun to protest their misery through syndicates. Joining the peasant union of Chaupimayo, Blanco radicalized it so thoroughly that it became the vanguard organization and also the focus of Trotskyist action in La Convención-Lares. Many more unions were organized, schools and health centers built, lands "invaded" for distribution among peasants who worked them, and militias formed for protecting such seizures. Subsequently, government decrees recognized land seizures in the La Convención area. The new owners were expected to pay for their properties at officially established prices. Obligatory work on the remaining estates was abolished.

For much of what went wrong with the Peruvian revolution that he envisioned, Blanco blamed an "underestimation of the Leninist principle of constructing a Bolshevik-type party" (p. 75). In explaining the lack of emphasis on building the party, he cites a negative influence of the Castro Cuban revolution and his own "serious syndicalist deviation" (pp. 36-7). The major obstacle that Blanco found in applying the Trotskyist Transitional Program to the needs of poor peasants in Cuzco Department was the confrontation between that plan and a "minimum program" espoused by the reformist Moscow-liners. After defending his controversial employment of "dual power," Blanco proceeds to explain his resort to guerrilla warfare in La Convención, even though he had a decided preference for mobilizing the masses to carry out the inevitable armed struggle for power (p. 63). Following his capture, a worldwide amnesty campaign saved Blanco from the firing squad; he was pardoned in

1970 after nearly eight years in prison.

Land or Death is an insightful and self-critical account of why the Trotskyist Blanco failed to lead his political movement to power in Peru although he coincidentally assisted a radicalized peasant union movement in La Convención and Lares to gain major changes in the oppressive land tenure system of that area. Of the revolutionary groups active in Peru in the 1960s, only Blanco and the Left Revolutionary Front—FIR—worked closely with the peasantry. While the efforts of Blanco in La Convención served as a catalyst for the radicalization of the unionizing drive in other parts of the Department of Cuzco, the case was too isolated for it to have the desired impact elsewhere. The volume by Blanco provides neither a detailed account of the peasant movement in La Convención-Lares nor a blueprint for revolutionary action by a political party in a peasant environment. This autobiographical work, however, is an important addition to the already ample bibliography on revolution, reform, and reaction in the La Convención and Lares valleys of southern Peru.

LARRY L. PIPPIN

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Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century. By Louis Chevalier. (New York: Howard Fertig, Inc., 1973. Pp. 505. $15.00.)

Professor Chevalier, in his classic work, first published in 1958, insists on the centrality of demographic (he often substitutes the adjective "biological") variables as the powerful explanatory variables for social and political events of the Restoration and July monarchy in Paris. Although he makes no systematic comparisons of this historical situation with other times and places, contextual statements make clear that Chevalier believes his thesis is applicable whenever similar conditions exist. This is true particularly, he suggests, in contemporary United States cities.

Chevalier marshals a large and complex mass of data. One part is contemporary opinion, as written by novelists, social reformers, newspapers. The other part is statistical data (also contemporary) collected by government agencies and private individuals. The urban history Chevalier writes is rich and detailed: the idea of confronting impressionistic evidence and demographic fact is an exciting one. Chevalier argues that nineteenth-century Paris was smothered by an enormous, unprecedented rural-urban migration from which grew urban pathology (miserable poverty, sickness, illegitimacy, suicide, crime, political violence). This version of an "uprooting" explanation, stated repeatedly, is that the demographic changes directly caused the urban problems, and that in both migration and consequences, there was a dramatic break with the past. The exceptionally rich sources of aroused literary opinion and social statistics were themselves consequences of the conditions.

How does Chevalier use these sources and what do they show? His presentation of literary comment—he discusses Hugo, Balzac, and Sue at length—is a synthesis of great artistry. These bourgeois authors' works are full of horror stories. They were certain that conditions had worsened in Paris in the first half of the nineteenth century. Yet similar comment, and similar judgments, can be found in sources back over the centuries. The *volume* of distressed comment increased, but did increased *comment* accurately reflect increased problems? Increased comment could simply reflect increased sensitivity on the part of the observers, higher standards of what was tolerable. It could represent better reporting procedures and more intensive policing. Increased popular circulation of newspapers and books should also be taken into account. This is not to suggest that crime and misery were not real and pervasive in Paris, but simply that Chevalier presses his point that opinion relfects reality with little consideration of alternatives.

Statistics should settle these questions. But the way Chevalier uses statistics is not very illuminating. He presents mainly aggregate statistics of population growth and various indicators of social pathology, such as crime and illegitimacy. Sometimes he gives age-specific rates. But he seldom makes systematic comparisons between the incidence of pathology and the incidence of poverty or migration, neighborhood by neighborhood, social group by social group. The quantitative measures he gives simply do not prove that crime and social pathology were a consequence of biological determinants or that these problems were increasing within affected populations as a result of increased migration into the city, as Chevalier argues.

Although he is a demographer and insists on the importance of demography, Chevalier shows little appreciation of the dynamics of population growth in this book. The simple fact that migrants became the parents of native-born Parisians belies his claim that natives and migrants were two separate and distinct populations. His claim that until the nineteenth century Paris was growing by natural increase rather than migration, and at a very slow rate, is dubious. The age pyramids of native-born and migrant populations in a period of heavy in-migration would show that migrants are young adults, natives primarily, the very young. The urban problems Chevalier describes, illegitimacy, for example, would be concentrated among young adults. In the eighteenth century, illegitimacy was almost exclusively a problem of domestic servants. In the early nineteenth, Chevalier shows, there was a substantial migration of young women who became domestic servants. (Chevalier demonstrates the numerical importance of female migrants in domestic service, but he does not try to quantify this category of women in calculating sex ratios. This is typical of his limited use of statistics.) Higher illegitimacy rates did not necessarily mean a decline in standards of behavior but simply an increase in the number of persons of whom that behavior was characteristic—domestic servants, a vulnerable and exploited group. Unless we have comparisons by composition of the population, we cannot accept Chevalier's analysis.

The final link in Chevalier's argument—that between migration, misery, criminality, and political violence—is left unexplored. In his conclusion, Chevalier admits that those who were arrested in the nineteenth-century revolutions were largely Parisian artisans, and allows that in-migration did not change the complexion of the militant working class or its leaders. This comes almost as an afterthought. The bulk of the preceding pages is in quite another vein—insisting that migration deformed the laboring classes of Paris, made them as one with the dangerous classes, that these classes were dangerous not only in a criminal sense but also in a political sense. Despite his brilliant evocation of the period, Chevalier cannot and does not prove this tendentious theme.

LOUISE A. TILLY

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Groupes de pression en Belgique, Les groupes intermédiaires socio-économiques, Contribution à l'analyse comparative. By Paul H. Claeys. (Brussels: Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, Editions du CRISP, 1973. Pp. 414. BFr. 580.)

In a preliminary section of his book Paul Claeys (who is the chief editor of "Les Editions del l'Université de Bruxelles") maps out what he considers to be the most appropriate strategy for the study of interest groups. What is needed first, he says, is a detailed description of such groups in a given country, i.e., their formal anatomy, their relationship with political parties and the administration, their position and role in decision-making processes. In his view such a description should proceed along the lines set out in 1957 by Gabriel Almond and the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. A second proposal is that even simple monographs should rest on a conceptual framework that makes them easily available for comparative analysis. One way to achieve this goal, the author says, is to use a structural-functional approach in studying interest groups.

It clearly was Claeys's intention to build his own analysis of socioeconomic interest groups in Belgium around this particular research strategy. Let me suggest that the failures in his work largely overshadow the moments of success.

The middle five chapters deal with labor unions, employers' associations, independent workers' unions, farmers' leagues and consumer associations. The data, collected mainly through close reading of annual reports and other periodicals, and through interviews with leaders, cover a wide range of associational characteristics and activities, such as membership, structure, financial resources, representation in legislative bodies, formal contacts with government agencies. This part of the book contains a great many facts which will doubtless be very useful to any foreign scholar of Belgian politics who keeps in mind that although the book was published late in 1973, nearly all the data relate to the year 1967.

The weakest sections in *Groupes de pression en Belgique* are those in which the author discusses theory and comes to an interpretation of his empirical findings. It is quite clear what has gone wrong. On several occasions Claeys preaches the structural-functional gospel, but when it comes to a precise description of the political functions socioeconomic interest groups may have, he only refers to "their role as intermediaries in channeling political demands and participation" (p. 50). A look at the bibliography can help us to understand this paradox. There is one reference to Gabriel Almond, namely his 1958 article in the *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 52, 270-282). Claeys apparently did not profit from Almond's famous elaboration of the functional approach in Almond and Coleman (1960), Almond and Verba (1963), *World Politics* (17 [1965] 183-214) and Almond and Powell (1966), to name but four of his later publications. There is something strange in this omission in a book that on its cover promises the reader the story of a study "inspired by the research program proposed in 1957 by G. A. Almond."

Such doubts are reinforced by a number of additional omissions. In his final chapter Claeys concludes that both leaders and members of the interest groups he studied rarely consider articulation of demands and participation as the main functions of such associations. He adds to this a second conclusion: socioeconomic interest groups in fact do play a great variety of other roles. They are, in other words, multifunctional (p. 334). One may say that Claeys implicitly describes a well-known characteristic of "consociational democracies," namely their poor internal boundary maintenance and weak functional specialization (see A. Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*, Berkeley, 1968). Belgium has been depicted as a strong case for the consociational democracy type (see H. Daalder, *World Politics*, 26 [1974], 604-621). But, again, a look at the bibliography of *Groupes de pression en Belgique* reveals that the author has missed here an important development in the study of political systems. At first, I thought that the omission was due to the obsoleteness of Claeys's reading list (out of 120 publications cited, only eight were published after 1968). But on closer view a clearer picture emerges. Of all the authors known for work on the consociational democracy theme only V. R. Lorwin is cited. What is so remarkable about this citation is that it refers to an article that was published in French.

This brings us to a major criticism: Claeys's book is crippled by parochialism. His structural-functional theory and his interpretation of Belgian politics are overwhelmingly based on the works of his colleagues at the Université Libre de Bruxelles or on publications written in French. Not only did Claeys thus fail to profit from the works of his fellow political scientists at the Flemish universities in Belgium, he also skipped a major development in the comparative analysis of small European democracies, such as Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium: namely, their description as systems of segmented pluralism which reach political stability through inter-elite accommodation, neutralization of majority rule and extensive autonomy of all subcultural segments and interest groups. Such shortcomings are hardly tolerable in a book that, according to its subtitle, aims to be a contribution to comparative politics.

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Modern Australia in Documents (Two Volumes). By F. K. Crowley. (North Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, 1973. Pp. 625, 620. $17.50 each.)

Australia has attracted less attention from American political scientists than might be expected. A handful of American scholars have investigated various features of the Australian political system. There is some awareness in this country of the excellent work being done by a limited number of Australian researchers. And in both countries the efforts of political scientists have been supplemented by rather more extensive research by sociologists. But most American scholars remain largely ignorant of Australia and its politics. This ignorance is regrettable, for Australian politics is of intrinsic interest and might also shed valuable light on certain questions of comparative analysis. There are sufficient similarities with the United States to permit the impact of different political institutions to be examined with some confidence. And Australia offers intriguing opportunities to investigate the transfer of political institutions. The Australian versions of British (and in some cases American) institutions can be surprising to those familiar only with the original models.

An extensive collection of Australian documents might well be useful to American scholars interested in that country. Professor Crowley, an historian presently at the University of New South Wales, has certainly gathered a large assortment. These two volumes, totaling well over 1,200 pages, bring together materials on several hundred topics. These illuminate much that is of interest in Australia. Yet in some respects the book is a disappointment.

Crowley's emphasis is on social, economic, and cultural change more than on political developments. His book's great merit may be its valuable insight into cultural change as seen through Australian eyes at various points in the twentieth century. The political side, however, is dealt with rather less effectively. In contrast with most documentary histories, this one gives little attention to formal governmental materials. There are some excerpts from parliamentary debates but almost none from statutes, administrative regulations, constitutional amendments, treaties, and judicial decisions (the last often as important in Australian politics as in the United States). All of these tend to be ignored or to be dealt with at second hand via newspaper commentary, memoirs, etc. The original sources would often be much more useful.

Indeed, a high proportion of the entire collection consists of items from the press. Too many of these are trivial and of little interest to most readers, either in Australia or elsewhere. Too much space is devoted to events that attracted great attention at the time but that have little lasting significance or impact—natural disasters, spectacular crimes, impressive achievements by aviators and athletes, and appearances by celebrated entertainers. Perhaps it is important for the student to know what was exciting to his parents and grandparents (or at least to the newspaper editors of their time), but there is too much here that was of ephemeral importance or none at all.

On the positive side, Crowley deserves credit for thoughtful headnotes that are quite helpful in placing the items in context and sometimes in giving the unsophisticated reader a critical perspective on them. In fact these notes are sometimes more informative than the selections themselves. The specifically political issues are covered through a balanced pattern of readings. Both extremes are represented, often including the Communist press, with which many Australians have been unfamiliar. To expose Australian students to views on left and right of which they might otherwise be unaware is surely to the good, though in the process the middle ground is sometimes lost sight of.

The worth of Crowley's volumes must be judged in terms of the various audiences they might reach. They are clearly not intended for the specialized researcher, who needs more extensive materials more narrowly concentrated. Their primary use will probably be as supplementary reading for Australian undergraduate history students, and they should be of considerable benefit for that purpose. They may also be helpful to American scholars largely ignorant of Australia who need to acquire some basic familiarity with its historical development since Federation. Crowley's work would certainly add flavor to any of the standard historical treatments of the subject. But the political scientist should be aware that this collection will help him more in gaining an understanding of the social and cultural context of Australian politics than in exploring the latter directly.

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Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China. By John W. Dardess. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. Pp. 245. $12.50.)

This is a welcome addition to the literature on the period known after 1271 as the Yüan. The author concentrates on the years from 1328 to 1355 (although he continues to the year of the dynasty's collapse in 1368), and tells in considerable detail the story of its course, beginning with its break with the empire founded by Chinggis and ending with its diminished power over China proper. These are the years when Confucians made themselves felt at court. They were not just the Chinese subjects, newly rising to posts of influence; they numbered also Mongols and central Asians who had lived two or three generations in China, and included both reform and conservative elements. One feature of Chinese government which Qubilai (reigned 1260-94) chose not to institute was the examination system, a device which required superior knowledge of Confucian literature. Inaugurated in 1315, by thirteen years later it had already begun to have an appreciable effect on the bureaucracy, for out of the thousands of candidates who studied the basic books only a handful were selected to be *chü-jen* (masters) and *chin-shih* (doctors). (In 1315 the quota was 300 for the first degree and 100 for the second.) When, in 1328, the emperor who had reigned for five years passed away at the summer capital, Shang-tu, the Confucian elements at the capital, Ta-tu, managed a *coup d'état*. In the next four years, in spite of a great deal of in-fighting, the Confucian gains were considerable, and led to even greater ones by 1340. A number of significant steps forward were taken: the restoration of the examination system, cancelled in 1335; relaxation of certain prohibitions; cancellation of back taxes; and the writing of the histories of the preceding dynasties of Liao, Chin, and Sung. In 1344 the Yellow River burst its banks and took a northerly course, causing widespread distress. After much disputation at court it was finally determined (1351) to cut a new bed south of the Shantung peninsula, diverting the River into it. Our author calls this "one of the greatest hydraulic projects ever undertaken in China in pre-modern times."

Fine as it was, according to Professor Dardess, the action was too late to save China for the Mongol overlords. Beginning in May 1351 (actually 1348 on the southeastern littoral) a popular rebellion began in the Huai valley, to be followed by a stream of other outbreaks. The Yüan were still militarily superior, but other forces sapped their ability to fight. Political enemies at the court impeached the reformist chancellor (who was also commanding the army in the field), forcing his dismissal. Shipments of food and other supplies up the coast from the lower Yangtze valley fell off drastically. Coinage became debased. Famine and plague in the 1340s, especially after the Yellow River break, swept over the northern provinces of Shantung and Honan, resulting as always in bandit conditions. (The author makes no mention of the fact, but the great cities in the Yangtze delta also were devastated by pestilence. The *Yüan-shih* 38.6b relates that 572,00 families suffered in 1334 alone, and other disasters followed.) Regional governments sprang up in the central and southern provinces. They fought not only the Yüan but also each other until one (the Ming) gained over all, and extinguished the dynasty.

Professor Dardess has handled his subject expertly, helping the uninitiate with useful data on the dramatis personnae, with a table of Yüan emperors, notes, index, and a bibliography of works in six languages. I am happy to commend it.

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World Population Policy: an Annotated Bibliography. By Edwin D. Driver. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1972. Pp. 1280. $30.00.)

This bibliography presents information about a variety of materials published between 1940 and 1969 relating to population policies. The editor offers a broad definition of population policy: those actions by government and other social institutions which directly or indirectly affect the size, distribution, or composition of the population. This volume refers to works on general population and fertility policies; a second volume is planned to offer a list of materials on policies affecting distribution and composition.

Most of the entires are annotated. They are assembled according to continent, region, and country, and then according to type of policy. General population policy sections include literature about policies affecting population size. Fertility and family policy sections refer to specific policies indirectly affecting population size: abortion, contraception, sterilization, income maintenance, marriage, divorce, maternity, and social services. Appendices include a list of journals cited, an author index and a subject index. The subject index, however, is not sufficiently refined to assist the reader in easily locating a specific policy area or political variable.

Most of the studies covered are in English; therefore the materials are more complete for English-speaking countries. There are few entries for many Latin American, Asian, and African states, while there are extensive listings on United Kingdom, United States and Europe including political party literature, law commission studies, and legal studies, in addition to social science references.

The bibliography will be most useful to students of population policy. Not only does it serve as a guide to research materials, but also suggests the trends in government action over the past 35 years in population and fertility concerns, internally and crossculturally. The reference work will also assist comparative policy analysts in their efforts at conceptual development and crosscultural theory by encouraging a comparative perspective on a substantive policy area. World bibliographies on other substantive policy areas would be most welcome.

DOROTHY M. STETSON
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Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960: A Bibliographical Guide to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa. By Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. xii, 552. $27.50.)

Two senior fellows at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, have produced a monumental "bibliographic overview" (their expression), rather than a definitive bibliography, on the ninety-year period which saw both the culmination and the disintegration of colonial systems in Africa. The authors admit that in this vast field they have had to be selective, and they venture the prediction that this volume "will probably be the last of its kind to cover colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa" (p. xi).

The *Guide* is the fifth of a series of five volumes on European colonialism in Africa, the other four being textual material (Volume 4, on colonial economics, has not yet been published). It could easily have been expanded but the authors have wisely chosen not to be comprehensive, and a reader versed in a particular discipline can readily detect omissions.

The *Guide* is divided into three sections: a Guide to Reference Materials, embracing institutions like libraries and archives; a Subject Guide for Africa in General, arranged by disciplines—although the authors acknowledge that modern African studies cannot be imprisoned by conventional disciplinary boundaries; and an Area Guide arranged geographically. Because the coverage ends with 1960, considerable space is given German and Italian sources, though German and Italian colonialism ended decades earlier.

The principal value of this painstaking work may lie in the survey of research by colonial powers and the institutions where research can be carried on. Related to this are shorter descriptions of metropolitan ministries and departments where records are housed in capitals like Brussels and Lisbon.

Recognizing that the listings are selective, one should perhaps not be critical, but possibly greater use could have been made of cross-references and doctoral dissertations. One might also question the inclusion of a novel, *Les paysans noirs*, by Robert Delavignette (p.290), although an influential one.

Despite these qualifications this *Guide* makes a distinct contribution to African studies.

EMMET V. MITTLEBEELER
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Will Japan Rearm? A Study in Attitudes. By John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973. Pp. 165. $3.00, paper.)

At first sight the title of this book seems to pose a question that was answered some time ago. For, as the authors acknowledge in their opening paragraph, Japan has already "re-armed." Twenty years have passed since the Japanese government, by the terms of the 1954 Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty, formally confirmed its intention "to fulfill the military obligations" of the Security Treaty with the United States. By that time Japan's postwar forces, although still very much in their infancy, had become a reality.

What John Emmerson and Leonard Humphreys are really discussing is *full* rearmament, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In their study of this question, or more precisely of Japanese attitudes towards it, they rightly attach importance to the findings of public opinion polls. These indicate on the whole that pacifism remains a factor of considerable significance. The polls also suggest that there is widespread support in Japan for the idea that the world's third greatest industrial state can be a great nation without possessing commensurate military power. For example, an *Asahi* public opinion survey carried out in 1972 shows only 3 per cent of respondents in favor of Japan's attaining the status of a militarily big power; 53 per cent hoped to see their country as a "welfare nation"; 20 per cent gave, as the desired aims for Japan, "aid to developing nations and peaceful coexistence." The authors of *Will Japan Rearm?* point out that opinions regarding the expansion of military power have remained remarkably consistent over the years.

This can be regarded as good news by the rest of the world, including the United States. For it has ceased to be orthodox doctrine in Washington that the Japanese must be wheedled and cajoled into enlarging their defense forces. The climate, or fashion, of opinion has altered beyond recognition since Vice-President Nixon's speech in Tokyo, when he apologized for S.C.A.P.'s insistence on writing Article 9, the pacifist clause, into the Japanese Constitution. Back in the 'fifties and early 'sixties Japanese rearmament was all the rage in the Pentagon, if not in the Department of State. The general complaint was that the Japanese were dragging their feet, spending far too small a proportion of their growing national income on their own defense. Today things seem different. Great military power for Japan, to match her mammoth economic strength, is no longer considered a particularly heartening prospect for what can still be described, without excessive irony, as The Free World.

The conclusions reached by the authors are that there will be some further development of armaments in the 'seventies, and that Japan and the United States will continue to maintain their mutual security pact for the next few years. But it is argued that "it is unlikely that Japan will decide in the foreseeable future to produce nuclear weapons" (p.111).

With this note of sober optimism, based on an admirably judicious and careful study, there can be little disagreement; particularly as one of the authors (John Emmerson) has an intimate knowledge of Japan surpassed by few, if any, Western scholars. One warning, however, has to be uttered, since the authors themselves draw attention to it. On the nuclear question they rightly dwell on the matter of prestige, pointing out that if India or Israel were to go nuclear "the prestige argument would become more persuasive even though neither country would pose a military threat to Japan" (p. 86). Since this book was written India has exploded a nuclear device. It is difficult to believe now that the prestige argument will not become rather more persuasive. It was shrewd, possibly prophetic, of Emmerson and Humphreys to have identified that possibility.

RICHARD STORRY
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The Failure of Democracy in South Korea. By Sungjoo Han. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. Pp. 251. $10.00.)

In April 1960 the capital city of South Korea witnessed waves of student demonstrators battling the police in bloodstained streets. The students won, and the dictatorial regime headed by Syngman Rhee was overthrown. Thirteen months later, armed soldiers led by a small group of young officers marched into Seoul and ousted the ineffectual civilian government of Chang Myŏn (John M. Chang). The two events mark the beginning and the end of an endeavor to establish and maintain a democratic government in Korea. The shortlived experiment began with considerable reasons for optimism: new leaders, greater political freedoms, and the promise of reform and innovation. But it failed. Why? Professor Han's study addresses itself to this basic question.

Previously published studies on South Korea (by John K.C. Oh, Gregory Henderson, Han-Been Lee, Se-jin Kim, among others) include fairly substantial discussions on the events and personalities in the so-called "Second Republic" (1960-1961) of South Korea. But Professor Han's book is the first full-length treatise exclusively devoted to the politics of this eventful and important period.

The author's postmortem on the Chang regime is meant to be an examination of the feasibility and the viability of liberal democracy in Korea (p. xi). He avoids the simple explanation proffered by some, including Chang himself, that tends to exonerate the government leadership and blame only the military rebels for the demise of the "Second Republic." Nor does the author go to the other extreme and engage in discourses in political sociology and political culture to explain the failure of democracy in Korea. Instead, he offers a "sector analysis" as a way of "explaining short-term and middle-range political changes" (p. 6).

The author sets out to examine the behavior of, and the interrelationship between, several politically significant "sectors" of the Korean society: (1) politicians and political parties, (2) the military, (3) police, (4) bureaucracy, (5) student activitists, (6) trade unionists, and (7) business leaders. Relying largely on Korean language sources, including a few interviews, Professor Han gives a well-researched, clearly written, and eloquently presented account of intricate events and conflicting personal and group interests. He is not the first writer to discuss the development of conservative parties in South Korea, but he is highly effective in diagnosing and tracing the divisions within the Liberal party (Rhee's party) and the Democratic party (the ruling party in the "Second Republic"). Of particular interest is his description of the complex maneuvers of the Old Faction and the New Faction, both of the Democratic party, for supremacy in the new government to be created in the summer of 1960 (chapter VI). The author also presents what I believe is the best account in English of the leftist radical movements in South Korea: the Progressive party in the mid-1950s and the Socialist Mass party and others in 1960 (chapters V and VIII). There are interesting and useful discussions on other topics, such as the political role of the police (in chapters II and VII), and the dissension within the military which led to the military coup in 1961 (in chapter VII), that deserve special recognition. Throughout the study, the author displays a sharp insight and sensitivity to the conditions of life in South Korea in the first dozen years of its independence. (Professor Han was a participant in the April 1960 uprising.)

Professor Han's evaluative judgment is forthright and thought-provoking. For example, he considers that the Korean situation in 1960 was "revolutionary" (pp. 31-32); that the caretaker government headed by Foreign Minister Hŏ Chŏng in April-August, 1960 tried unsuccessfully to achieve "revolutionary goals" through "nonrevolutionary" means (p. 64); that the leaders of the Old Faction of the Democratic party, Yun Po-sŏn and Kim To-yŏn, were "more often objects of manipulation by individuals of lesser stature than the prime movers of their own faction or party" (p. 115); that Chang Myŏn was timid and indecisive in situations that called for strong will and fast action (p. 117); that the Chang regime "systematically alienated various political sectors" (p. 176); and that the appointment of General Chang To-yŏng (no relation of Premier Chang) as the chief of staff of the army "proved to be the undoing of the Chang government" (p. 175). These and other statements of similar nature may be disputed on points of semantics or fact, although I, for one, find myself in general agreement with most of them. Professor Han's contribution to scholarship, however, lies primarily in his having articulated the context within which one may arrive at his own evaluation.

The most important question the author raises and attempts to answer in the book is, "Why did liberal democracy fail in Korea in 1960-1961?" The "sector analysis" that he employs throughout the study leads him to identify "the ideological and social cleavages between various opposing groups and sectors" as the key factor (p. 207). More specifically, the author argues that the loose coalition of intellectuals, students, and party politicians that had ousted Syngman Rhee and helped bring Chang into power became disenchanted when the Chang government would not punish the former pro-Rhee officials except through due process of law. Similarly, the government's inability to suppress radical leftists who became much more openly active in this period led to alienation of anti-Communist groups and, more importantly, most of the professional military; when the coup came, they merely stood by and watched the government fall. In short, the Chang government was doomed when its adherence to democratic norms at a time of extreme political polarization antagonized those who could have been its defenders. There is considerable truth in these observations. But I also feel that the author overemphasizes, in his final chapter, the political dilemma faced by the Chang government without paying due attention to the shortcomings of those in power—their ineptitude, indecisiveness, internal division. Should we not place some, if not most, of the blame for the failure of democracy at the doorstep of the ruling group?

Professor Han's study is the first solid landmark for the systematic analysis of the "democratic interlude" in South Korea. Students of political development, as well as those interested in Korean affairs, will find its a valuable source of information and insight. Should a second edition be prepared, as I hope it will be, an additional "sector" may be suggested for Professor Han's analysis: the press. Mass media, especially the daily newspapers in Seoul, have played an extremely important role in the recent political history of South Korea. They merit special attention as we study a period when the freedom of the press prevailed to a degree higher than the preceding and the succeeding years.

HAN-KYO KIM

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Harijan: A Journal of Applied Gandhiism, 1933-1955. Vols. I-XIX. (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1973. Pp. 7885. $19.50 per volume; $370.00, set.)

For the greater part of Gandhi's public life he employed newspapers as vehicles to disseminate his teachings, to comment on ethical, political and social issues, and to respond to a wide variety of questioners, opponents, and seekers. The last of Gandhi's three newspapers was *Harijan*, which he founded in 1933 after failing to achieve nationalist goals through civil protest and after participating as the spokesman for the Indian National Congress in the London Round Table Conference. As part of a series of peace classics, Garland Publishing has reprinted the English-language edition of the newspaper that appeared with some interruptions throughout the last fifteen years of Gandhi's life and continued for another eight years. During Gandhi's lifetime, his associates, notably Mahadev Desai, edited the newspaper and reported on the leader's messages and activities. Congress party documents and official British communications found their way into *Harijan's* pages, although not so frequently as to make it a newspaper of record. Selections from *Harijan* were published some years ago by the Navajivan Publishing House, and Gandhi's writings in the newspaper will be contained in *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, a project of the Indian government which has thus far produced 52 volumes, covering materials up to early 1933. Thus the Garland reprint offers a complete source of *Harijan* which is not available in book form.

Among the leading subjects considered in *Harijan* are untouchability, Hindu-Muslim relations, civil disobedience, Gandhi's directives for free India, the Congress and the anti-colonial struggle, village industry and peasant uplift, self-realization, and educational and language policies. There are rudimentary indexes for these and other subjects. Gandhi treated them with a blend of modesty and authority. By 1933 he had experienced disappointments which had convinced hm that there were limits to his capacity to shape events according to his norms and goals. Yet by then he had also acquired a considerable certainty about his values and objectives. Because a review of this kind can not do justice to all of these subjects, attention is focused on the first four.

Calling the casteless "harijans" (God's people), Gandhi established the newspaper to serve the depressed millions. Although he had long been a critic of untouchability, he began to concentrate on the problem during a time of political shortfalls and frustrations. Extending the work of other Hindu reformers, Gandhi attempted with some success to persuade caste Hindus to humanize their interpretations of scripture used to justify exclusion and servitude and to incorporate *harijans* into Hindu society. Gandhi believe in an egalitarian form of *varnashramadharma*, the idealized, fourfold division of society, a construct grounded in metaphysics and socially expressed in adherence to hereditary occupations, subject to noncompetitive mobility over time (I, February 18, 1933; V, March 6, 1937).

Gandhi's views were challenged by B. R. Ambedkhar, the untouchable leader who became the chief draftsman of the Indian Constitution, and finally a Buddhist out of despair with caste Hinduism. In a classic exchange, Gandhi focused on the abuses of caste, while Ambedkhar held that caste itself was at fault (I, February 11, 1933). The difficulty of distinguishing caste and *varnashramadharma* helped Gandhi's education of caste Hindus but injured his debate with Ambedkhar. The two men also differed on remedies: Gandhi stressed appeals to sentiment and voluntarism; his affirmative action opponent looked also to political remedies and mandatory changes. Although the *varna* approach to untouchability and caste has persisted among social reformers in India after independence and although the Congress party has capitalized on Gandhi's *harijan* work, much of Ambedkhar's strategy has overtaken the Gandhian way. Together they have produced some progress without ending the disabilities of one in seven Indians.

Relations with the Muslim minority provided Gandhi with more vexing political difficulties than did the *harijan* issue. From Gandhi's post-

1919 rejection of the British connection onward he worked for attitudes and behavior supportive of a common loyalty to a national authority that would inspire trust and deal justly with the citizens of a highly pluralistic society. His understanding of nation building required a distinct improvement in Hindu-Muslim relations so that individually and collectively there would emerge a common loyalty to one nation, superior to and inclusive of subordinate fidelities and identities with their own integrity.

No secularist, Gandhi sought to create the common loyalty by teaching the ultimate unity of all religious systems, their complementarity at lower, partial levels, and intercommunal harmony and respect. Although he tried assiduously before and after 1933 to include Muslim Indians in a single anticolonial struggle, he did not secure many recruits. Gandhi's frequent claim that he was an orthodox Hindu, his use of cow symbolism and Hindu mythological referents, and his evangelical vegetarianism strengthened—against his wishes—militants in the two communities and indirectly contributed to Hindu-Muslim tensions. The transformation of Hindu-Muslim tensions into Muslim nationalism should not, however, be attributed to Gandhi in any important respect. The Muslim League's announcement in 1940 of its goal of Pakistan provoked Gandhi to respond, "I can never be a partner to vivesection" (VIII, April 13, 1940). These volumes do not add to or amend what is already known about the crucial political decisions of the 1940s leading to the subcontinent's partition. When the *Collected Works* and Nehru's papers, now being published, reach 1940-47 there may be new insights.

Although Gandhi did not urge Indians to oppose partition by resorting to his version of civil disobedience, he considered that such disobedience was an essential and legitimate expression of political participation. Controversies in 1940 and 1942 about whether India should be granted wartime independence revealed Gandhi's criteria for licit rule-breaking. They were essentially the requirements which he had developed in South Africa—the need for preliminary bargaining, adherence to comprehensive nonviolence, advance notice of intent to disobey, nonexploitation of an opponent's vulnerability derived from other sources, willingness to submit to repression, and abstention from score-settling after the event. The *Harijan* accounts of the 1942 "Quit India" campaign suggest that Gandhi did not carefully estimate the likely, unintended results of massive, nonviolent resistance—namely, sabotage and assaults. Also, by launching the campaign he violated one of his own norms because the war had made the British Empire vulnerable (e.g., IX, May 17, 1942). Renewed consideration should be given to the evidence that Gandhi's nationalism occasionally overcame his optimal ethics. Another issue deserving attention is whether there is any ethical or functional benefit to be derived from evidence in *Harijan* and elsewhere that Gandhi was a monopolist on the questions of who is qualified to initiate and to terminate group civil disobedience. His monarchical stand contrasts with much recent theory in which everyone is entitled to be a political saint.

Gandhi's journal is replete with his policy directives for free India. They conflict with the regime's adoption of central planning and birth control programs, high priority for industrialization, and the development of a nuclear explosive device. The Congress party did not follow the advice he gave in his last political writing to disband and render social service (XII, February 15, 1948). Instead the Congress became one of the world's most durable political parties, securing central power and retaining it by competitive means until recently when monopolist, emergency rule emerged. The pre-emergency record of the Congress also included dubious patronage and fund raising methods. Such practices, indeed, the entire issue of corruption in Indian politics which domestic opponents of Indira Gandhi stressed in 1974-75 until they were arrested has been left generally uncriticized by specialists on Indian affairs. Presumably there is an explanation of why Gandhian probity did not become a significant part of India's political culture, but none has been put forward.

A partial explanation lies in the course of the Gandhian movement after the Mahatma's assassination in early 1948. The last eight volumes of *Harijan* provide evidence of difficulties which divided and made the Gandhian movement less than effective in political affairs. Following Gandhi's advice, many Gandhians of whom Jayaprakash Narayan and Vinoba Bhave are the best known rejected competitive, party politics and turned to social uplift in the villages. Other Gandhians became youth workers, educationists, social theorists and guardians of Gandhi's historical reputation, notably Pyarelal. Some Gandhians rose high in the Congress party, but the more independent of the politically involved Gandhians attacked the Congress leadership from outside, as in the case of J.B. Kripalani who censured Nehru's Marxist bent and failure to condemn Communist violations of human rights abroad. In sum, the Gandhian movement diffused its energies and talents and thus was unable to focus critically on the uneven, ethical quality of the political system of which the Congress was the main actor.

After Gandhi's passing, the Congress regime endorsed and perpetuated his imprecise ideology of social justice, illusory economic nationalism and rejection of communalism. In 1969 India held elaborate Gandhi centennial events without facing such issues as the salience of Gandhi's metapolitics. *Satyagraha*, often abused, persisted to the increasing concern of the regime which was weak in relation to social forces. The opposition's threat of mass protest and civil disobedience in June 1975 to pressure Mrs. Gandhi to resign in the midst of court appeals from her conviction on minor electoral law violations was used by the Prime Minister to justify the introduction of emergency rule, including press censorship which *Harijan* had fought under British imperialism, and the detention of thousands of critics. Yet the Indian government did not lose touch with multi-faceted Gandhism as shown in its campaign against economic crimes and stress on austerity, work and discipline. That Gandhi valued only self-imposed discipline should not be overlooked.

The written record which great men leave behind them may cause disappointment because it is incomplete, meager, self-serving, or unavailable to the scholar. *Harijan* has none of these defects. As Joan V. Bondurant says in her introduction to the set, it is a valuable resource for Indian studies and comparative analysis. The latter includes especially the areas of civil rights, religion and politics, political ethics, anticolonial movements and nation building. The sheer bulk of the record should not deter inquirers.

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Befolkningsfrågan och Välfärden: Debatten om familjepolitik och nativitetsfrågan under 1930- och 1940-talen. With an English Summary. By Ann-Katrin Hatje. (Stockholm: Allmanna forlaget, 1974. Pp. 284. No price indicated)

Dr. Ann-Katrin Hatje's study describes the development of family welfare policies in Sweden during the 1930s and 1940s. She shows how the welfare policy was related to the population question and the concern for Sweden's exceptionally low fertility. The study is one of the monographs in a very ambitious series dealing with Sweden during the Second World War and organized by the Department of History at the University of Stockholm. Other volumes in the series have dealt with Sweden's relationships with and reactions to Germany, the functioning of democracy during a time with a heavy focus on national defence, the Swedish Communist party, and other topics. Hatje's theme, the relationship between the population question and family welfare, has of course today a great actuality. The main importance of the study for political science and the study of public policy, however, is that it traces one of the roots of the Swedish welfare state. Of considerable political interest is also the analysis of the different policy alternatives adopted by the Swedish Social Democrats in relationship to the policy options favored by the bourgeois parties.

As Dr. Hatje points out, the Swedish population debate started with Alva and Gunnar Myrdal's book, *Kris i befolkningsfrågan* (*Crisis in the Population Question*) published in 1934. The originality of the Myrdals' book lay in the authors' bringing together two demands which had been considered incompatible at the time. On the one hand, they stressed the importance of a rise in fertility, and on the other hand they suggested a number of radical reforms in the realms of family and sexual policy. Among other things they advocated an increase in the dissemination of contraceptive methods under the assumption that no unwanted children should have to be born and that population policy should emphasize not only quantity but also quality. This combination of national and social concern caught many others by surprise and aroused especially the Conservatives, who hitherto had considered population policy as their own issue. Among their own party friends, the Social Democrats, the first reactions to the Myrdals' book was divided. It was met with some suspicion in workers' circles where neo-Malthusian views were popular but it was enthusiastically received by young academic Social Democrats who saw new opportunities for comprehensive social change.

The Myrdals' book was the most important and spectacular element in the debate which preceded the creation of government commissions on population, debates and dealings in the Riksdag, new important legislation, and changes in public attitudes towards family planning and childbirth. Meanwhile the world situation—first the expectation of a crisis, and then the external threat felt during the Second World War—had an important impact on the options chosen by different political groups. Hatje documents and describes these complex political processes clearly and consistently, separating the more important themes from the less important ones. First, in its references to the Myrdals' book, it illustrates how a new political innovation stirs up the feelings and get things moving. Second, it describes how a crucial national issue is handled in the Swedish political system, through parties, pressure groups, and formal political bodies.

Third, it shows the influence of the world crisis on the methods, tactics, and political rhetoric of population control. Fourth, it gives factual information about how some important practical solutions in the field of family welfare policy such as legislation concerning abortion were born. Last but not least, it shows how national feelings can be used as a motivation force for social reform. Thus, the book may give a clue to an understanding of the political successes of the Swedish welfare state and its dominant political party, the Social Democrats.

In the book's occasional comparative references a more systematic treatment would have been very fruitful. It is, for instance, striking how racial-biological ideas and an urge to preserve "Swedishness" formed important arguments both in the Swedish population and the welfare debate. In the 1930s such ideas were common all over Europe—not only in Nazi Germany as often thought. There certainly were important differences in public attitudes concerning hereditary defectives, racial purity, and "motherhood" in different European nations, but the differences become blurred unless a systematic comparative treatment is carried out. In any case, Hatje's book is an important source for all who strive for an understanding of the Swedish form of the welfare state.

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East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949-72. By Dale Roy Herspring. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 216. $17.50.)

The degree of political reliability of the military elites of the Warsaw Pact states has never failed to stimulate speculation among students of comparative Communist systems, and Dale Roy Herspring has made a valuable contribution to the subject through his pioneering study of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic (DDR). Relying largely on a survey of professional East German military publications, the author has assembled a wealth of statistical data grouped into the two basic categories of "technology" and "political control." Each classification encompasses a wide variety of indicators, such as the educational level of officers or the amount of horsepower per military unit under the rubric of technology. The purpose of collecting and manipulating these data was to test empirically the frequently advanced proposition that in a European Communist state the military establishment is composed of indispensable technicians who constitute a group apart in the political order. While this condition may obtain in the Soviet Union, Mr. Herspring's research offers convincing proof that the Socialist Unity Party (SED) has succeeded in creating a military "dual executive" who is both technologically proficient and ideologically dependable.

Although the dearth of literature on the GDR enhances the importance of this research, the thrust of the study does suggest several problems worthy of further investigation. For example, the central concept of "political control" does not allow a differentiation between mere passive acceptance of a regime and a genuinely positive affective relationship between the party and the military services. Indeed, some of the data presented indicate that the prospect of advanced technical training, rather than political commitment, is a major incentive in the recruitment of air force officers. Despite efforts to develop a sense of identity betwen miltary personnel and the state, the DDR remains without a convincing national tradition. Perhaps for this reason alone the government has historically been unwilling to tolerate a superficially indoctrinated army with a strong sense of group interest. Political mobilization within the framework of the SED invariably takes precedence over the requirements of purely tactical or technical training. It is notable, however, that the author did not take into account an early effort to provide the military with a political base outside the SED. In 1948, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD) was founded in what was then the Soviet Zone for the purpose of forging a link between the goals of nationalism and Marxism-Leninism. The NDPD recruited heavily among former *Wehrmacht* officers and attempted to become an alternative to direct control through the SED. With the passage of time this experiment with a minor party lost significance.

The author has examined the available literature, yet the bibliography would have profited from the addition of a commentary on the accuracy and intended readership of the periodicals consulted. Although these periodicals are described in terms of content and frequency of publication, the reader is left to guess whether a given citation is to a journal of military science or to a pictorial information bulletin designed for general distribution to the troops. Nevertheless, the substantive sections are impressive, and the contribution to the theory of the "dual executive" makes Mr. Herspring's study significant reading for the student of civil-military relations in a comparative perspective.

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The Ombudsman in Finland: The First Fifty Years. By Mikael Hidén. (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1973. Pp. 198. $8.00.)

Mikael Hidén, Associate Professor in Public Law at the University of Turku, Finland, presents a revised and substantially shortened English version of his work on the Finnish ombudsman, *Eduskunnan oikeusasiamies,* first published in 1970. The revision is a concise, straightforward description of the office as it is institutionalized today. In a brief introduction and second chapter, Hidén places the office of ombudsman within the constitutional structure of the Finnish government. From legal documents, the author in chapter 3 outlines the salient formal features of the office—term of office, tenure, requisite qualifications, functions, staff, finances, etc. Chapter 4 focuses on the ombudsman's jurisdiction, emphasizing the extreme breadth of the Finnish office. In addition to the actions of public administrative and court officials, the Finnish ombudsman can respond to the decisions of private institutional officials performing public functions, e.g., he can reprimand the governing board of a private university for refusing to give the students access to minutes of its meetings. Hiden argues that the concept of the ombudsman as serving to check one branch of government in behalf of another is only partially correct; in practice the ombudsman protects the entire citizenry from errors committed by all officials performing public duties. Also of interest in this chapter is the functional juxtaposition of the ombudsman to the chancellor of justice.

Chapter 5 describes procedures for obtaining and processing information pertinent to cases; chapter 6 evaluates the types of actions the ombudsman can and must take in response to public complaints. In chapter 7, Hidén discusses the "low-key" public profile of the ombudsman. Unlike his counterpart in Sweden, the Finnish ombudsman seeks and receives very little media coverage. The concluding chapter 8 makes the case for a more active and effective ombudsman. Hidén argues that precedents make possible a broader jurisdiction and encourage greater activity; the willingness of the incumbent ombudsman to initiate action and to make greater use of the media are critical factors affecting the possibility of a more creative and constructive role.

Hidén intends to give a fifty-year perspective of the office in Finland. This is perhaps best gleaned from a lengthy and potentially useful appendix covering annual case load since the office's inception in 1919, types and sources of cases, background data on all of the ombudsmen, etc. Inclusion and interpretation of these data in the text would have made for a substantially more effective study. Hidén's work is a case study; no attempt is made to compare the Finnish ombudsman with his counterpart in other nations. Some comparative data would have strengthened the presentation of distinguishing features of the Finnish institution and its operation and effectiveness. The work is in essence a useful source of information on the Finnish ombudsman as it discusses laws that define the office and as it presents the effects of landmark cases on the modern institution. There is a brief bibliography citing the major literature relevant to the study of the Finnish ombudsman.

ROBERT B. KVAVIK

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Decline or Renewal: France Since the 1930s. By Stanley Hoffmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1974. Pp. 529. $15.00)

Most readers of Stanley Hoffmann's latest book will derive maximum benefit from it if they ignore the claim made in his preface to have succeeded in transforming into "a coherent volume" (p. vii) its 14 essays dealing with different aspects of French political life and thought between 1956 and 1972. The coherence, he says, lies in the fact that he has grouped the essays so as to constitute four main themes, the treatment of which is intended to provide the answer to one underlying question: "What has been happening in the French political community since the 1930s?" (p. vii). The four main themes are: the meaning and impact of the war years and the Vichy regime; the postwar internal transformation of French society; the reaction of France to her postwar situation in relation to Europe and the two superpowers; and lastly, the impact on France of "the vision of one man: Charles de Gaulle" (p. ix).

In reality, the book is both less and more than is implied in this claim. It is less, because owing to some overlapping and a number of gaps, "coherence" is sought within a perhaps arbitrarily narrow scope. The themes of nationalism and of de Gaulle, for instance, are omnipresent, while others—the economic and social evolution of postwar France, political attitudes and party politics, constitutional issues—are either absent or do not emerge with any clarity. There is, for instance, no consideration of the performance of de Gaulle's successor, though M. Pompidou was elected President in 1969 and so had already held office for three years in 1972, when the two most recent of the essays were published. The book is more than its four main themes, however, in that it combines political analysis with historical, biographical, philosophical, and sociological comment and reflection in a way that provides fascinating material for political scientists in general, as well as for those whose special interest is in France.

The fact that these 14 essays were written at different dates is, indeed, part of their attraction. They give much of the book the kind of immediacy that is often lost in chronological summary. And the author's selectivity—his preoccupation with topics rather than with events and with analysis rather than with description—enables him to concentrate his attention, which is never superficial, on a certain number of issues on which he has a great deal to say. For instance, the long essay on *de Gaulle as Political Artist: The Will to Grandeur,* written in conjunction with his wife, really loses nothing from the omission of the last sad year of the de Gaulle presidency, with the inevitable speculations that that period has aroused in the minds of all students of French politics. The essay gains enormously, however, from the intellectual elbowroom that the authors accord themselves in their treatment of the early years of de Gaulle.

In general, Stanley Hoffman uses these essays to do what he does best, which is to provide for his fellow-students in the field of French politics both analysis in depth and a host of reflections and suggestions that help to illuminate French attitudes and policies. Most of those who will read the book with pleasure and profit do not need any thematic unity, artificial or real. They can supply their own. But they will welcome the many examples of his gift for stimulating thought by providing neat and sometimes lapidary summaries of highly complicated periods or episodes in French history, such as, for instance, his five-line summary of the valuable "spin-off" of Gaullist decolonization (p. 294) and his phrase describing France's German policy as "the pursuit of reconciliation without equality" (p. 297). They will welcome, too, the subtlety of his analysis of General de Gaulle's skill in exploiting France's inadequate defense assets (pp. 290-307) and especially his demonstration of Gaullist use of what he calls "the elevator", that is, essentially, of the use of (or attempt to use) other nations in order to serve the interests of France—a process he describes as "drawing a check on other people's bank accounts" (p. 314).

Essays four, five, and six, first published respectively in 1967, 1962 and 1968, concentrate attention on certain aspects of internal Gaullist policies. Mr. Hoffmann is not, however, directly concerned with what could be termed the French 'economic miracle' (or, as the General liked to call it, *les grandes mutations*), that is, with the abrupt transformation into a modern, industrial, export-minded community of what Herbert Lüthy had called in the 1950s "the France of the small town, the small workshop, the small plot of land," which, he said, had "slowly spun itself into a cocoon of established rights and privileges for everything that is small, old, traditional, and stationary." Nor is he concerned with the principal political controversies of the period—the Algerian struggle, the battle over the 1962 referendum, the trials of rebel generals and of OAS conspirators, the vicissitudes of general and presidential election campaigns. His concern is with the basic relations of political society in general, and of French political society in particular. It is with the relations between leader and led (especially in the fields of administration and education), with the clash between heroic leadership and the sometimes far from heroic manifestations of resistance to it.

Throughout this section, the influence of the sociologist, Michel Crozier, is pervasive, and it is hard at times to resist the conclusion that Stanley Hoffmann has succumbed to what he admits to be the temptation to regard the Crozier theory as "so powerful that it sometimes seems to explain everything" (p. viii). Some political scientists, and perhaps especially in Great Britain, will find this temptation easier to resist. They may, indeed, tend to regard this section, in spite of some thought-provoking suggestions (as for instance the reasons advanced for the failure of the idea of "participation" in France) as belonging rightly to a different book.

The book's final speculations on the future of France and Western Europe, with their "sad and simple" conclusion that France and Western Europe "have not been able to stop time and fragment space" (p. 364), are in sharp contrast with the narrower focus of the opening essays on the Vichy years. Intelligent and perceptive as these first essays are, they appear to one reader, whose daily job was at that time to follow the events as recorded in the French daily press, as recollections in tranquillity that inevitably lose something of the claustrophobia and despair that determined the reactions of so many ordinary French people during the occupation. It is nevertheless true, as Stanley Hoffman reminds us, that a gulf separated Vichy conservatism from fascism and that, however inevitable or respectable *"attentisme"* might have appeared to many, it was bound to be a fundamental delusion. Although, in some ways, he does less than justice to the achievement of Marcel Ophuls in his impossible task of trying to re-create the atmosphere of those years, it is no less true that, as he says, *The Sorrow and the Pity* does not, and could not, reveal the *whole* truth of that complex and saddening period of French history.

Altogether, this is a book that all students of

France will want to return to again and again.

DOROTHY PICKLES

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Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919-1972. By Christopher Howe. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. 171. $11.95.)

This is a pioneering study of a most important problem heretofore neglected by students of the Chinese economy. The "book is an attempt to provide a statistical analysis of changes in the level and structure of Chinese wages from the 1920s to the early 1970s. It also seeks to elucidate both the mechanisms responsible for these changes and their economic significance" (p. xl).

The author succeeds admirably in the first two of his objectives but falls somewhat short in the third. That is, the book does provide a rich and meaty statistical analysis of wage patterns in China before 1949 and between 1949 and 1957. The material thins out considerably after the end of the First Five-Year Plan Period (1953-57), with only scattered references to 1963 and 1971-1972 as benchmark years after 1957. To a predominant extent this is inherent in the character of the material Professor Howe had to work with. Nevertheless one cannot help but wonder whether one could not have done better by the 1960s.

The book also maintains a high standard in describing and assessing the mechanisms responsible for changing wage patterns and policies. It is less strong, however, in coming to grips with the economic meaning of the material presented.

The book starts with a brief analysis of wage structures in less developed countries on the one hand and in the Soviet command system on the other. In the course of this analysis it also explores some of the relationships between changing wage structures and the process of industrialization. It then investigates China's industrial wage structure first in the 1920s and 1930s and then in the period since 1949. The real wages of all employed nonfarm workers and salaried employees are shown to have risen very rapidly (6 per cent a year) between 1952 and 1957, declined at a 2 per cent a year rate between 1957 and 1963, and then risen slowly (at slightly less than 2 per cent a year) between 1963 and 1972. As a result, for the two decades as a whole (1952-72) the real wage rose at an average annual rate of just below 2 per cent. This statistic is based on official price indices which give preponderant weight to goods subject to price control and rationing. Moreover, since no such indices were published for 1972, Howe assumes that retail prices remained stable between 1963 and 1972. While there is no evidence of a price inflation in China, it is far from certain that this assumption is valid. For all of these reasons combined, real wages may have increased more slowly than Howe's data show.

The author then goes on to analyze wage policy and the process of wage determination in the People's Republic on the basis of the wage trends and structure presented earlier. He shows that policymakers assigned highest priority to the macroeconomic objectives of price stability and inflation control. Therefore the dominant goal of wage policy was close control of the average wage and the total nonagricultural wage bill.

It is much less clear from Howe's analysis precisely what role did wages play as allocators of labor, or to put it differently what role did market versus command mechanisms play in occupational choice and labor assignment. The problem is not ignored but is not confronted systematically, and as a result the author's own judgments on these critical issues do not come through clearly.

If I understand Howe correctly, wages played a more important role up to 1956 or 1957 than thereafter. Even then, however, their role was supporting with labor being largely allocated administratively. This was certainly the case in the 1960s. The commitment to a more or less stable average wage severely limited the reliance one could place on the wage structure as an allocative instrument, since this would have required lowering some wages which would have evoked enormous resistance.

The lack of clarity on these issues, however, is apparent. Thus, on p. 115 Howe indicates that although policies towards average wage control and interindustrial wage structure were implemented with fair success, the occupational, intersectoral, and interregional wage structure proved difficult to manipulate. But on p. 143 he states that wage systems performed some allocative functions, particularly in regard to movement of labor between industries and occupations and, in varying degrees, between sectors and regions.

This book also presents a great deal of very valuable information which illuminates Chinese distributional policies. It is clear that wage and salary spans within enterprises are more egalitarian than in the Soviet Union as evidenced for instance by the treatment of managerial bonuses. Again one would wish that the author had analyzed more directly and explicitly the relationships between wage patterns and income distribution in China.

Since the job of a reviewer is to cast himself in the role of a critic, it would be misleading to conclude from my comments that Howe's is not a first rate piece of work, highly sophisticated and thoroughly researched. It is indispensable for anyone interested in wage policies and trends or in problems of income distribution in developing countries on the one hand and in socialist countries on the other.

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Guyana: A composite Monograph. Edited by Brian Irving. (Hato Rey, Puerto Rico: Inter American University Press. 1972. Pp. 87. $5.00, paper.)

This slender little volume is a collection of seven brief essays held together by nothing more than the thin thread of common concern for Guyana. As to the "composite monograph" which the title promises, one looks in vain for a recognizable principle of composition. Alas! there is none. And more's the pity, since Guyana offers an imposing array of problems and examples for the social scientist interested in the dilemmas facing the "new" nations of the Third World.

The possibilities are many and challenging, but this book as a whole fails to address any of them. The editor does claim in his introduction that "the central problem" arising from the study of Guyana is that of "creating unity in a land of diversity" (p. 1), but as a conceptual tool for ordering meaningful analyses of Guyana's problems this formulation seldom rises in this volume above the level of cliché. It is really not a central focus in any of the articles, save a four-page excursis by anthropologist Della Walker, and that deals not with the major problem of integration of the East Indian and Black populations into a viable national culture, but with the interesting but far less crucial one of the relatively small Amerindian population.

The essays that discuss recent political events and economic problems allude to such things as the tendency under Forbes Burnham to one partyism, the accusations of corruption and venality in the government bureaucracy (though both these matters are treated very circumspectly), the appeals of the "black-power" ideology in Guyana, and the continuation of economic dependence. Although they are competent and accurate enough as far as they go (Harold Lutchman's on "Recent Political Developments" is the most lucid and informative of the lot), they leave an overall impression of inadequacy and conceptual incoherence, again because of an apparent lack of a common theoretical frame of reference beyond a vague concern for Guyana's well-being. Thus, for example, in the article entitled "Black Power?" the interesting description which Yereth Knowles offers of the populist appeals to certain Guyanese groups of this particular brand of contemporary anti-imperialist ideology stands in no meaningful analytic relationship to the political currents described in the previous articles. And the tendency toward a one-party system is asserted, with virtually no analytic clues about what it would mean ideologically or structurally, or how it might be brought about in the face of the profound political and cultural cleavages which characterize the country.

Other important policy areas relevant to contemporary Guyana are skimmed over much too lightly, even for such a brief work as this. Prime Minister Burnham's "Cooperative Republic" was declared in early 1970. Although these essays were brought together presumably over a year later, this move is merely mentioned, with no attempt to evaluate its meaning or to speculate as to its significance in the light of what is said about economic problems, Burnham's political style, or the structure of the political system. The problem of Guyana's role in the Caribbean region is also dealt with in an oblique and summary manner. Participation in the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) is treated most gingerly and not at all systematically. The controversial and problematic nature of the whole CARIFTA enterprise is alluded to ever so cautiously be a couple of the contributors, but no stand is taken, either analytic or polemic.

The contents of this monograph are much too bland and innocuous to do justice to the contentious and vigorous potential of its topic.

The final article, on "Wildlife and Pollution," is written by a zoologist and includes interesting descriptions of the fauna of the country and some general policy recommendations for the control of water and air pollution before things get as bad as they are in the more industrialized countries. The strictures implied in this review should not really be held as applicable to this essay, whose subject matter is not comparable to that of the other chapters. Its inclusion illustrates the book's lack of editorial cohesion.

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Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries. Edited by W. A. Douglas Jackson. (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1971. Pp. viii, 488. $15.00.)

If this volume and the two other works that preceded it had been required reading for the delegates to the November, 1974, World Food

Conference in Rome, the speeches made at that meeting might have had a very different focus. Rather than damning the U. S. for its asserted "imperialistic" food export policies of the past, the major stress could have been on the enormous losses in food output the world has suffered because of production shortcomings in the collectivized Communist systems.

This collection is the third in a series of volumes that started with the 1962 conference at The University of Kansas, and was followed by conferences at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and the University of Washington. While the two previous volumes focused almost exclusively on Soviet and Eastern European agriculture, this work, resulting from a conference at the University of Washington, adds studies of Asian Communist systems, plus comparisons with other noncollectivized systems. The comparative approach adds a vital new measure to understanding the successes and failures of collectivized agriculture.

Predictably, the papers and commentaries of the twenty-nine European, Asian, and American scholars are of uneven quality. For example, although Professor Lau employs an impressive array of econometric measures of agriculture in studying mainland China, a less fancy approach to the problems he addresses might have borne more fruit. In an otherwise brilliant (and devastating) review of the Soviet decision to force collectivization on the countryside, Professor Nove totally ignores the vital importance that the invention of the Machine Tractor Stations must have had on Stalin's decision to impose his "revolution from above." My major criticism, however, is that in their otherwise admirable attempts to be fair and judicious in criticizing the collectivized systems, too many of the scholars ignore in their conclusions the overwhelmingly damaging case their research makes against "socialized" agriculture.

That Stalin's man-made famine resulting from forced collectivization is one of the major human tragedies of the present century is well known (at least in the West). How many know, however, that the Chinese leaders themselves admitted (while trying to shift the blame to bad weather) that the imposition of the rural communes was followed by an agricultural disaster worse than any other China had "suffered during the last hundred years" (p. 48)? When the full story is known, how many millions of lives will be shown to have been lost as a result? One often hears that the Chinese have solved their food problem; after all, there has been no major famine in recent years. Part of the answer, however, is that China has become a major importer of grain. Certainly the Chinese Communist leaders can be credited with spreading malnutrition more evenly. *Have* the Chinese solved their food problem? Werner Klatt calculates that as of the mid-1960's available calories per capita per day were some "5% less than was available at the time of the Japanese invasion of China in 1931" (p. 473).

Grain and potatoes still make up the bulk of the Soviet protein-short diet. The Soviet Union, too, has become increasingly dependent upon grain imports. Whether the comparison is of North Korea with South Korea, West Germany with East Germany, Taiwan with Mainland China, the U.S. with the U.S.S.R. or the noncollectivized sectors of Yugoslavia and Poland with their collectivized farms, when all of the necessary qualifications and adjustments are made, if the prime measure is maximizing food output, collectivized agriculture is demonstrated to be seriously wanting. If, however, the prime measure is maximization of central controls over the countryside, collectivized agriculture is an unqualified success.

Karl A. Wittfogel's comparative piece alone is worth the price of the volume. As he documents, the roots of Communist agricultural failures can be traced to the agricultural illiteracy of Marx, Lenin, and their present day successors. The problem is the failure to tap the initiative of collectivized peasants, partially stemming from the unwieldy hugeness of collectivized farms, and very much rooted in their bureaucratic form of management.

Japan's and Taiwan's farms undoubtedly are too small for maximum production efficiency (averaging only some 2.5 acres/farm). Yet, however much economic sense the large, extensive, U.S. farms (nearing an average of 400 acres/farm) may make, the tiny, labor-intensive Taiwan farms produce six times the U.S. output per unit of land (p. 383).

Everywhere, successful farming must be tailored to the prevailing physical and human environment. However, if the climate will support crops, the most vital of all determinants of success is the human element. As Wittfogel underscores, it is necessary for farmers everywhere "to employ their tools effectively and perform their tasks carefully, industriously and with initiative. It is exactly here that the Communist agrarian system flounders" (p. 24).

Marx spoke the truth when he observed that the wage system of nineteenth-century capitalism involved an enormous tendency to dehumanize labor. As Wittfogel underlines, since wage labor is only a miniscule portion of agricultural labor input in the West, by Marx's key measure, agriculture, even in U.S. grain production, "would not be capitalist" (p. 30). Most ironically, now that the Soviet *kolkhozy* have gone over to a guaranteed minimum wage (where the sovkhozy long have been), Soviet agriculture is the major example of capitalist agriculture in the world—again, if exploitation of wage labor is the key to the definition. As Marx stressed, one of the worst attributes of such a system is the dehumanization of the worker at his tasks. Ask, as we have, on Soviet farms, what choices, what initiative, the peasant workers have in their tasks. The answer is "none."

In Marx's terms, the great bulk of collectivized peasants are wage slaves, for all intents and purposes "chained" to the animals and implements they serve at the pleasure of the Party managers who, semantics aside, are the owners of the means of production.

ROY D. LAIRD

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The Bureaucratization of the World. By Henry Jacoby. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 241. $12.95.)

This is an English translation of a book originally published in German in 1969. While it is a good introduction to the vast literature on the problem of bureaucracy it will be of little use to the professional political scientist. The first part of the book (fifty-seven pages) is devoted to a superficial account of "the bird of modern government." The second part deals with the development of capitalism, and the third part is concerned with bureaucratic government in Russia. The fourth and concluding part summarizes Max Weber's writings on bureaucracy, discusses the emergence of bureaucracies in the Third World, and concludes with a discussion of the problem of reconciling the need for bureaucracy with the ideals of democracy.

The author quotes extensively from the writings of both German and American social scientists but without any underlying philosophical or, for that matter, conceptual framework of his own. The result is a hodgepodge of undigested quotations which are simply regurgitated. One previous reviewer of the volume says that "Jacoby has managed to consult a wide variety of sources and goes far beyond the kinds of materials ordinarily considered by sociologists . . . not hampered by disciplinary restraints" (Lewis A. Coser quoted on the flyleaf). Jacoby is not only unhampered by disciplinary restraints but submits to no discipline whatsoever. The author concludes that "the future of democracy is . . . dependent on the restoration of a politically aware public" (p. 222). But nowhere in the book does he attempt to define either politics or the public.

JOHN H. HALLOWELL

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Pakistan Crisis. By David Loshak. (New York; McGraw Hill Book Company, 1971. Pp. xxv, 152. $6.95.)

In 1971 the world's fifth largest nation, Pakistan, was finally sectioned by civil war. For twenty-five years that union had strained its common bonds, and what many observers had considered the inevitable finally occurred: East Bengal achieved not only autonomy but independence. This phenomenon is particularly important to political scientists, representing a largely untapped source for studies of racial discrimination, minority oppression, "controlled" democracy, military elites, the politics of poverty, the value of foreign aid, and the more general scope of the politics of South and Southeast Asia.

Although a spate of books about the 1971 war has resulted, the quality is generally poor. David Loshak has produced one of the better in his *Pakistan Crisis*, and this book is recommended for students exploring the causes of the 1971 war, the events that took place prior to the Indian invasion, and the general political situation involving Pakistan and Bangladesh. Unfortunately, nonjournalistic data concerning the Bengali struggle for independence are limited, and it will probably be a long time, if ever, before an objective evaluation of the situation is available.

Loshak, a staff correspondent for the London *Daily Telegraph* and *Sunday Telegraph* in India and Pakistan from 1969 to 1971, has produced a brief but balanced account of the events leading up to the war beginning in the late 1960s. It is not an academic analysis and does not pretend to be, and it includes only a short summary of Pakistani politics from Partition in 1947 to the resignation of Ayub Khan in 1969. Those who need a more extensive background are encouraged to do some additional reading. Yet the author exhibits a perceptive knowledge of the politics of the subcontinent, and the basic conflicts between Islamabad and Dacca are identified—55 per cent of the population earning two-thirds of the foreign exchange and receiving one-third of the imports; significant exclusion of Bengalis from the civil, military, and foreign services; the perennial floods and cyclones, ignored by the central government; industrial expansion in the West with the rention of the East as a captive market for second-class goods. On top of this, of course, he identifies the more basic problems of poverty and population. Pakistan, Loshak suggests, was "doomed from the start" and a "fallacious concept." The civil war, he concludes, was a direct result of "chronic neglect and cynical exploitation since Partition by Pakistan's predominantly West wing leadership" (p. 22).

Loshak recounts the importance of the 1970 cyclone and the inept governmental response as perhaps the final blow to any possible détente, and he describes the characteristics and qualities of the key figures—Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Yahya Khan, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He correctly portrays the limitations that forced the hands of the generals, without excusing them, and the eventual ruthless attempt during 1971 to suppress the revolt by a systematic extermination of Bengali leadership and intelligentsia. But he tempers his judgement of the individuals by recounting the force of events that seems to have led inextricably to this tragic period. "What really went wrong went wrong years before" (p. 95). If anything, he is to be criticized for his projections: "It is hard to see that a West Pakistan standing alone would have much future. The prospects for an independent Bangla Desh look a little better—though, given its vast problems, not much" (p. 141). In this respect, Loshak is ignoring, or perhaps not aware of, the possibility that by 1971 the West had milked most of the profits from the East and was willing to let it go.

It is important to note that this book was written prior to the Indian invasion in December and that only a postscript, added in December, 1971, hints at the final outcome of the war. But the book does not suffer from this limitation because the author's analysis is consequently not clouded by attempts to arrange the events from 1969 to 1971 to fit the results. He is critical of the U. S. position in support of Yahya Khan and suggests, I believe without much evidence, that the Indian position was comparable to that of France during the American Revolution. Actually, the roles of India, the United States and the Soviet Union are not really explored. While this book is only of limited value for the experienced student of politics of the subcontinent, it is a useful reference for those general readers who are searching for an account of the events leading to independence for Bangladesh.

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The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings. By Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973. Pp. 256. $11.00, cloth; $7.00, paper.)

In a relatively short time, the *Survey* has become a highly influential summary-evaluation of the work in a rapidly growing field. (See references to the book in Andriole, Wilkenfeld, and Hopple, 1974; Kirk, 1974; and Chittick and Jenkins, 1974.) Like the field, however, it suffers from a major confusion: what is "foreign policy," and what is most important about it?

The authors have three basic aims: (1) to help build cumulative knowledge by drawing together much of the work in comparative foreign policy; (2) to pinpoint the areas of research which remain unexamined; (3) to assist in the construction of "pre-theories" or hypotheses about the causes of foreign policy behavior (pp. 13-14). Much of the recent literature on frameworks for foreign policy analysis reflects the third objective. (See James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. B. Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966], pp. 27-92; Stephen J. Andriole, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Gerald W. Hopple, "A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Behavior," *International Studies Quarterly* [forthcoming, 1975], pp. 1-4; Elizabeth Kirk, "Foreign Policy Research and Policy Influence: Different Levels, Different Targets" [Purdue University; mimeo, 1974], pp. 1-2; William O. Chittick and Jerry B. Jenkins, "A Reconceptualization of the Sources of Foreign Policy Behavior: Questioning the Internal vs. External Dichotomy," [Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 1975], p. 1.) Proceeding from assertions about the importance of careful specification and control of independent and dependent variables in theory building (chapter 1) and from presentation of an input-output framework for organizing these variables (chapter 2), Professors McGowan and Shapiro review, evaluate, and attempt to interrelate general propositions from roughly 200 published "empirical" (though not necessarily quantitative) studies (chapters 3–15). Propositions are classified and chapters constructed according to the factors in the framework which are thought to influence foreign policy behavior; thus, chapters cover such independent variables as individual decision-maker characteristics, elite group characteristics, political or governmental characteristics, world system characteristics, linkages between foreign and domestic policies or events, etc. Chapters are not arranged according to types of foreign policy being predicted or explained.

Cumulative theory requires frameworks specifying important variables and relations among variables. While McGowan and Shapiro present a potentially useful framework, they sometimes lose sight of what foreign policy theory is designed to explain. Their dependent variable, foreign policy behavior, encompasses "identifiable acts undertaken by the official representatives of national societies . . . in order to control the behavior of their counterparts in ways desired by the actors" (p. 40). The reader is left wondering which acts are important to explain and why.

Certain types of variables might be more important in explaining certain behaviors than others; certain behaviors might result more often from certain policies or decision rules than from others. Important actions can be directed at colleagues in government, rather than at foreign governments. Attempts to build foreign policy theory should identify and focus on particular policies; evaluation and explanation of foreign policy is impossible unless classes of behavior and events are related to decisions, decision-rules, and doctrines.

McGowan and Shapiro do not specifically categorize behavior; one proposition included is designed to explain "activity in the international system" (p. 108). Generally the only fairly specific types of foreign policy behavior covered in the *Survey* are conflictual and economic. Even "conflict," however, is very general, and we have no idea whether economic, verbal, military, or political conflict is being predicted.

McGowan and Shapiro include propositions from impressionistic or unsystematic studies (e.g., Brzezinski and Huntington, [1973], and Hilsman, [1967], with little effort to define or evaluate notions like policy "success" contained in such studies (p. 71). Thus, the reader cannot tell whether the criteria for policy success or failure make sense logically or ethically, although McGowan and Shapiro see that "while the goods created by a successful foreign policy (such as 'security' or 'peace') are in many respects less tangible than goods delivered by domestic health, education, and housing programs, in other cases, such as trade negotiations or foreign aid agreements, they provide concrete public rewards to the concerned sectors of society" (p. 74). The authors suggest that establishment elites which influence foreign policy may be the primary beneficiaries of such "goods." Also, occasionally McGowan and Shapiro evaluate methodology, operationalization, and comprehensiveness (e.g., p. 57) in accounting for differences in findings. But criticism cannot go very deep in short summaries of many studies.

If criticism had been more thorough, we might have been led to question the importance of findings such as the following: "A nation which imports a great deal is more prone to enter into economic/cultural agreements" (p. 115). Such findings supposedly support the general proposition that "the greater a nation's trade, the more ties of other kinds it will have with other nations." Political and economic contexts are missing from such isolated propositions, and McGowan and Shapiro give few clues about how propositions might fit into larger theories about important problems—especially problems arising from policy decisions.

Underspecification of dependent variables is not peculiar to the McGowan-Shapiro study; it has been typical in comparative foreign policy works. Since the publication of the innovative and provocative Rosenau (1966) "pre-theory," researchers have been busy trying to determine whether governmental, as opposed to idiosyncratic, societal, or systemic variables best predict foreign policy decisions and acts. Few have bothered to wonder whether the same framework can be used to predict economic, military, political, crisis, routine, international, transnational acts, decisions, relations, statements, perceptions. The field is engaged in a stampeding search for general theories of foreign policy; yet foreign policy is extremely complex and hardly a single phenomenon.

Furthermore, comparative foreign policy propositions have generally been evaluated through analysis of aggregate and event data; measures of decision-making processes and perceptions in bureaucracies and governments, and of interest group pressure in a wide variety of countries have been neglected. McGowan and Shapiro note some of these deficiencies and call for fewer case studies and more general cross-country comparisons (pp. 217-221); but the specificity of variables in case studies must be carried into cross-country comparisons. Variables such as "open" or "closed" polity are hardly specific enough for clear explanation.

It could be argued that McGowan and Shapiro merely reflect the deficiencies of the foreign policy literature in failing to present clearer propositions, better specification of dependent variables, and sets of propositions clearly related to the same types of behavior. The *Survey* is not comprehensive, however, and the criteria for inclusion are somewhat vague. Therefore, we cannot tell whether certain areas of research have indeed been neglected and whether more refined propositions are available. For example, regarding the effects of stress on foreign policy-makers, Kelman (1965) has published extensive reviews of studies on perceptions. McGowan and Shapiro might have included some of these findings to make the following rather watered down proposition a bit more informative: "As stress increases in a crisis situation, the decision-maker's perceptions of the factors involved in the decision-making process changes also" (p. 58).

While their goal of helping produce cumulative theory seems a bit ambitious in view of the quality of findings they present, McGowan and Shapiro raise the reader's interest in finding better and more complete categories and explanations of foreign policy decisions and behavior. They have provided a coherent framework for analysis, which if turned around to stress types of dependent variables, would facilitate reconciliation of many studies and specification of the types of variables most likely to account for variations in policy, decisions, behavior, and outcomes. Along with Jones and Singer's collection of data-based research abstracts, (*Beyond Conjecture in International Politics,* [Itasca, Illinois: Peacock, 1972]) and Rosenau's anthology of recent research (*Comparing Foreign Policies,* [New York: Sage-Halsted, 1974]), the McGowan-Shapiro volume is an important bibliographic source for advanced students.

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Berlin im geteilten Deutschland. By Dieter Mahncke. Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Vol. 34 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1973. Pp. 325. DM 42.00.)

Having been a focal point of East-West relations for almost three decades, the divided city of Berlin has attracted considerable scholarly attention. In response to Soviet and East German attacks on the status of Berlin, most Western analysts in the past have sought to challenge Communist claims be concentrating on the legal context of the Berlin controversy. Comparatively speaking, little attention has been devoted to other elements such as the changing political position of Berlin in the "era of negotiations" and the city's future economic viability. The same is true for the study of the psychological effects which geographical isolation and continued division have on the city's population.

Dieter Mahncke's composite analysis of Berlin's role of international relations does take these long-neglected topics into consideration. It therefore comes as a most welcome addition to the literature on this city. The author, professor of International Politics at the *Hochschule der Bundeswehr* in Hamburg, has approached his topic with a historical orientation; his analyses cover the entire postwar period. However, he focusses on the current situation of Berlin, i.e., following the Quadripartite and supplementtary Inter-German Agreements of 1971.

Mahncke has demonstrated great organizational skill in dealing with the many facets of his subject. He begins by examining the position of Berlin in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a time of changing East-West relations. Then follows an account of the course and outcome of the four-power negotiations and the agreements subsequently reached between the German governments in East and West. Having reviewed the political and legal developments in Berlin between 1944 and 1972, the author analyzes the respective political interests of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic on the one hand and those of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany on the other. He then discusses various issues related to Berlin's security, its economic development, and special problems such as access to Berlin and traffic between the two parts of the divided community. He closes his study with an interpretation of the psychological condition of the Berliners and with a speculative assessment of the city's future development. An appendix containing the most important documents in connection with the 1971 Berlin negotiations facilitates cross-reference.

Central to this study is a close analysis of the consequences which the Quadripartite and Inter-German Agreements have for the present status and future development of Berlin. The decisive question is whether the city, as a result of these agreements, will cease to be one of the major crisis centers in East-West relations. Mahncke's answer to this question is cautiously optimistic. To him the agreements represent an acceptable compromise. The Western allies and the FRG made concessions regarding the political status of Berlin vis-à-vis the Federal Republic. In return the Soviet Union and the GDR facilitated Western travel to and from Berlin and permitted more contacts between the city's two halves. In exchange for certain restrictions upon the symbolic as well as upon the substantive political presence of the West German government in Berlin, the Soviet Union formally accepted the Western Allies' rights in that city.

Mahncke holds that a continued application of the agreements remains essentially dependent upon the course of East-West relations, particularly those between the U.S. and the USSR. Lucidly written and carefully argued, this monograph is recommended as an exemplary work of scholarship.

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The Emperor's New Clothes: and Other Irreverent Essays for the Seventies. By Norman Z. Alcock. (Oakville, Ontario, Canada: CPRI Press, 1971. Pp. 177. $4.00.)

Norman Alcock, Director of the Canadian Peace Research Institute, hopes with this book to stimulate political action against war and also against overpopulation and poverty. He tries to do so by analyzing some aspects of contemporary reality, demystifying some prevalent ideas, proposing some specific alternatives, and then suggesting a course of action.

The two aspects of the current reality he chooses to emphasize are the military-industrial personality and the bureaucracy. The military-industrial personality, characterized by zero-sum thinking, authoritarianism and dogmatism, is formed in early life at home and in school. The contemporary bureaucratic organizations and their adversary character sustain the military-industrial personality. Alcock argues that democratic organizations produce more socially conscious, responsible and mature people; that the social structure can determine how a person will act despite his basic personality (p. 28). These statements are supported by references to several studies. Alcock goes on to argue that certain myths sustain the bureaucrats and military-industrial personalities he has described. The myths relate to the beliefs that military defense provides national security, the sovereign nation is sacred, economic growth is a virtue, and developing countries benefit from foreign aid.

Given these myths and the characterizations of reality, Alcock proposes a number of specific alternatives. First, he urges disarmament, giving priority to limiting the major powers' exports of arms to other nations. A second and related proposal is the establishment of a guaranteed national income, financed by a sales tax and a tax on nonrenewable resources. He then goes on to discuss a guaranteed annual income on a world scale through the United Nations; this would entail a weighted voting, based upon a national social development index and equalization payments from richer countries to the poorer in terms of that index. Finally, Alcock proposes that the U.N. Charter be revised so that voting in the Security Council be based on the social development index and without a veto.

Alcock concludes by suggesting the following actions which individuals and groups can undertake to help realize the objectives he urges: becoming more knowledgeable, choosing particular problems and working with others to bring about change, undertaking a new life style, and working through the political system. This discussion, like much of the book, is written within the context of Canadian society.

Alcock seems to be arguing that if we would only stop thinking in the competitive, zero-sum way we do, we could come up with non-zero-sum solutions to our terrible problems. He offers some intriguing examples of such solutions. But I fear his book will not attain his objectives. First by stressing the way people think as being the underlying reality to be altered, he underestimates the global differences in experiences, power, development, and values, and therefore the structurally grounded resistance to his solutions. I think his book would be more effective in provoking action for change if he could give evidence that what he proposes is already under way. The book's effectiveness might also be enhanced if the solutions were less precise or given in the form of multiple possibilities. His prescriptions would then be less vulnerable to criticism and rejection, the occasional tone of self-righteousness would be lessened, and more fundamentally, people would be urged to do what they must do anyway: formulate their collective goals as they seek to attain them. Finally, the recommendations and solutions are too consistent with one of the myths he would destroy—the sanctity of the sovereign nation. Transcending the national governments in efforts and objectives would seem more appropriate given his analysis.

Despite my disagreements with the book, it does offer in a brief and readable form a number of provocative possible solutions to ominous world problems. It does this within the context of an overarching conception of interrelated problems and therefore the solutions themselves are usefully interrelated.

LOUIS KRIESBERG

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The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict: Ideological and Religious Aspects. By Yonah Alexander. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 287. $17.50.)

Professor Yonah Alexander raises an exceedingly important question in this book, one to which political science has paid very little attention. In an era when religious wars are considered an artifact of the past—one's thoughts turn back to seventeenth-century England, for example—how does one explain the use of religion as a tool in the Arab-Israeli conflict? The question can even be taken one step farther than Alexander does, for the Middle East is proving not to be a deviation: how does one explain the rising number of internal and international conflicts having strong religious overtones, such as those in Ireland or Cyprus, in the age of secular nationalism? It has been assumed most freqently that the rise of the modern nation-state entailed a process in which nationalism gradually displaced religion as a prime basis for self-identity and for political action.

Such an assumption derives, I believe, from an implicit model many scholars hold which views the Western European experience as a basis for understanding more recent changes in other parts of the world. Yet, the relationship between nationalism and religion in a number of the states which industrialized earliest in Europe was very specific to the region: nationalism grew in a period in which there was a break from the universality of Catholicism and a movement toward state churches. The latter posed much less of a challenge to rulers eager to integrate the people into a unified, centralized political system. In other parts of Europe, such as Ireland, and in vast areas outside Europe, religion and nationalism have existed in much more complex (and poorly understood) relationships.

Alexander does not overemphasize the role of religion in the Arab-Israeli conflict by elevating it to a sole or primary cause. On the contrary, in his first two chapters he demonstrates that the core problem in the Middle East is the clash between two rival nationalist movements, that of Arab nationalism and that of Zionism. His survey gives a good account of the background factors which crystallized during the British Mandate and which put the Jews and Arabs on a collision course. Particular attention is given to the complex phenomenon of Arab nationalism, with its paradox of separatism among the various states and the unity ". . .of a common historical legacy, cultural heritage, and unfulfilled aspirations" (p. 3). As a result of this duality, the Arab-Israeli problem exists on two planes, that of the conflict between the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs and that of inter-state conflict.

Religion, Alexander claims, has become interwoven in this clash of nationalist ideologies as both sides have sought to use religious symbols to further their political aims. Both governments and private groups in the Middle East have used Islam, Christianty, and Judaism to justify their actions internally and to further internationalize the conflict by recruiting support from governments and groups outside the Middle East. The bulk of the book consists of a truly impressive array of quotes which demonstrate the use of religion as a tool of vilification, self-justification, viciousness, and hate. Well researched (with a good bibliography) and well organized, *The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict* presents an element of the Arab-Israeli conflict which is usually limited to internal consumption in the hostile states themselves or to specific groups outside the Middle East. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible for other scholars to use readily the great quantity of data collected by Alexander since the book lacks an index.

What we need analytically is to begin unraveling the complex, interwoven relationship between religion and nationalism and their effects on interstate conflict. To this end, Alexander contributes very little. He does not use his mass of data to address the theoretical questions raised. Certainly, he is right when he states that one cannot measure the impact of the barrage of religious statements which are made. But vague assumptions—that religion *does* play an important role and that the populations' images of the antagonists are important to peace—are left as unexamined assumptions.

The indiscriminate use of the data themselves is a contributory factor to this lack of solid analysis. Little attempt is made to give a sense of proportion to the quotations: questions of saliency and relevancy tend to be almost totally ignored. No distinctions are made among the countries—from highly theological Saudi Arabia to more secular Lebanon—in order to gauge when and where religion has an impact and of what order of magnitude. Perspective about the effect of religion is inevitably lost by giving equal weight, for example, to quotations on the very sensitive issue of Jerusalem, on the one hand, and to the following deathbed statement by General Riad, Egyptian chief of staff, on the other hand: "Not only will you clash with the enemy tomorrow—with Allah's help, you will cross the water and trample the enemy underfoot" (p. 44).

Both the Israeli and Arab states have spent huge sums of money on mammoth radio transmitters and other propaganda activities and obviously give a rather high priority to these efforts. Alexander, however, does not utilize his data to analyze the role of propaganda on either the local populations or outside groups. Rather he chooses merely to overlay his presentation of data with terms that do not substantially add to our understanding of the problem. Thus people who make statements are called "communicators" and groups that issue statements are called "communication bodies."

Alexander wrote *The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict* prior to the October War and correctly predicted that no alternative route had been found to avoid the "fourth futile confrontation on the battlefield." The tragedy of the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to exist against the backdrop of a collision of nationalistic and religious aspirations. Alexander's book notwithstanding, how these two factors combine to mold images and how these images affect the course of political events are questions still left unexplored by political scientists.

JOEL S. MIGDAL
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The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute. By Tai Sung An. (Philadelphia, Pa.: The Westminister Press, 1973. Pp. 254. $8.95.)

There has long been a need for a comprehensive survey of territorial relations between Russia and China, together with a translation into English of the various treaties and other relevant documents. That gap has now been filled by this book by Tai Sung An, Professor of Political Science and International Studies, Washington College, Chestertown, Maryland.

The volume possesses several virtues. It is based on a survey of almost all the relevant sources, in several languages. It covers the topic from the beginning of Russian-Chinese border contacts in the seventeenth century to the recent border clashes and unproductive negotiations. It combines an overall historical summary with an analysis and evaluation of the main items of difference between the two powers and, importantly, relates them to the internal orderings of the two states. The author manages the very difficult task of maintaining overall objectivity despite his slight pro-Chinese bias. Finally, he does not shirk from providing a forecast of future Sino-Soviet border relations.

After a comprehensive survey of border relations from earliest times to the Communist accession to power in 1949, An sketches the background to and the outbreak of the border clashes of the 1960s, which culminated in the Ussuri incidents of March 1969. He then forecasts development of this aspect of Sino-Soviet relations into the 1970s, detailing possible levels of conflict, phases, and outcomes. An concludes that, although actual war is unlikely, some form of continuation of conflict is probable, even though he himself gives many reasons—Mao's death, military opposition to Sino-Soviet conflict, and artificiality of the border question itself—why this conflict is capable of being settled soon.

The author does not introduce new data and, wisely, avoids extreme interpretations. Because this is a survey volume, dependent for the most part upon secondary sources, it does not provide detailed analysis of given border incidents, of particular negotiations or treaties, or of Russian/Soviet or Manchu/Chinese documents claiming specific stretches of territory. An does provide the reader with enough references, however, to allow him quickly to move to whatever level of detail he pleases and he himself occasionally penetrates to finer levels when the narrative demands. The result is a model of its kind.

One could, of course, wish for a somewhat more sophisticated framework of analysis possibly encompassing recent propositions concerning the behavior of two large nations with a long common border who maintain contact during vastly different domestic and international circumstances. Subsequent authors addressing territorial disputes as a whole from this point of view will find Professor An's volume a rich reference source. In a few instances the author's account is at variance with the facts: border incidents, for example, continued after the beginning of Sino-Soviet negotiations after October 1969, although reduced in frequency and scale. There are also places where readers may differ with the author's judgment. There has been, for instance, almost no likelihood of a Soviet "surgical" strike at Chinese nuclear installations, as the author avers, merely because the size and dispersion of Chinese nuclear facilities and air fields make the necessary scale of such an attack prohibitively large.

Overall, however, the author has illuminated all the corners of this aspect of Sino-Soviet relations and has produced a volume whose historical sections are of enduring worth and whose comprehensiveness and documentary translations make it useful for both general reader and specialist.

THOMAS W. ROBINSON
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Le Origini Dell' Imperialismo Americano (The Origins of American Imperialism). By Alberto Aquarone. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1973. Pp. 591. £ 8,000.)

This new book by Professor Aquarone is an excellent scholarly analysis of the initial and critical years of America's long rise to the international pre-eminence she now holds. This history brings together the most varied and rich materials dealing with American policy and decision making, elite coalitions and belief systems, the making of alliances and the transfer of power across international frontiers. It should be considered above all a work of synthesis, and it is admirably successful.

One word of caution. The promise in the title, that the work is concerned with the "origins" of American imperialism, will be found misleading by the knowledgeable reader. This treatise does not examine the formation of those economic, psychosocial, and political mechanisms embedded in "the American way of life" that have led American elites to solve "internal contradictions" by outward expansion in preference to internal adjustments. The formation of such mechanisms occurred as much as one hundred and twenty-five years before the period covered by the book. Only endings and consequences are treated here. By "origins" Professor Aquarone really means the beginnings of a visible and sustained move by the United States toward expansion.

The beginnings cover a critical period: roughly the first twelve of the seventy-five years it took the United States to emerge as the undisputed leader of the international system with the advent of World War II. The author picks up his story with the Spanish American War, when the

United States, already a great power, begins her climb to pre-eminence; he concludes the book with an analysis of the conduct of American foreign affairs by President Taft and Secretary Knox. One can have little doubt that events in this period imprinted the conduct of American foreign dealings and give it shape and direction from that day to ours. "Critical," then, is used advisedly. Although not all "the initial critical years" are examined in this book, in the slice of time covered one begins to see: (a) *who* will guide and *who* will oppose American moves toward expansion (the "best and the brightest" have remained startlingly unchanged over the decades); (b) *which* elite beliefs would be selected to fashion a consensus that would guide American expansion; (c) *where, when* and *how* American resources would be used in the exercise of power; and (d) *what kind of relations* would make up the international system America was to head.

There is too much interesting material in this book to describe in detail. The author begins with a discussion of the consequences of the increase in American productivity, so critical in rendering American society capable of generating resources essential for imperial power. The widespread acceptance by the elite of the need to service the massive economic machine was an important ingredient in motivating it to look for dominions beyond American frontiers. Also important is the discussion of the development of an ideology of expansion. Here one finds a familiar story; what was profitable was soon considered necessary, then became inevitable, then was accepted as just. Expectedly, much attention is given to the Spanish-American conflict. The easy victory of American arms added to mounting elite and mass support for expansion; the spoils of that war—the Philippines and Cuba—served as bases for further expansion of American influence. This same embarrassing war booty also precipitated elite division and debate over the possibility and nature of an American empire.

At least three more topics must be mentioned. A major portion of this volume explores American behavior and policies in the Far East, with particular attention to American behavior in the Philippines and the development of ties with China. Surprisingly, in Professor Aquarone's skilled hands even the exhausted subject of the Open Door Policy gains a measure of interest and freshness. A parallel investigation explores the extension of American influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Finally there is a noteworthy review of behavior and attitudes in foreign affairs during the stewardship of President Taft and Secretary Knox, including a fascinating section on the beginnings of what has been dubbed "dollar diplomacy"—the famous, or infamous, alleged guide of American elites for their behavior in international affairs.

This abbreviated sketch suggests the wide range of rich material in this book meriting attention, but lack of space permits only two more comments here: one on the complex evolution of a coalition and consensus backing expansion; the other on the nature of America's relations with her dependents.

Professor Aquarone notes that two types of issues caused profound divisions among American elites. One was the wisdom of United States expansion; the other was the level and nature of her involvement beyond her own frontiers. The *mano a mano* over the direction of American foreign affairs was fought in a number of different arenas; some of the principal battlegrounds were the presidency, some executive departments, the military establishments, the Congress, some institutions of higher learning, the foreign ministries and governments of European powers, major economic institutions, and some rebel forces in the areas in which the US was extending its influence. The principal actors in the debate were people occupying positions of power in these institutions. i.e., presidents, generals, legislators, bankers, intellectuals, etc. These lists are by no means exhaustive.

Debates over expansion were long and bitter. Professor Aquarone tells us opponents repeatedly questioned expansionist policies; but of course the expansionists won the first battle and the ultimate victory for control. These confrontations, however, in the initial period shaped the nature of expansion. Because at the turn of the century major sectors of the elite would not consent—it was too contrary to their culture, too many convictions would need to be changed to sustain their support for an American empire—America moved away from political colonialism. Consensus for expansion could be obtained, however, and was found to be rooted in the widespread elite concern to service the needs of the American economy by investing in foreign areas and securing markets and sources of raw materials; if America were to have dependencies, they were to be economic and not political.

The difference proved immense. That American elites should have turned their backs on political empires at the time of that model's greatest success—when half of the real estate and one-third of the population of the world were in colonial possession—is amazing. Equally amazing, perhaps, is the grasp by American elites that England was a rapidly declining power, needing help; and this again at a time when England had an empire that included half of all that was colonial. Only the decisions that led to the War Between the States and to sever colonial ties with Britain are comparable in importance. And it makes for fascinating reading.

This brings us to the second point. It is clear from Aquarone's treatise that the American international system worked better and was cheaper to maintain than the political empires which preceded it. The tending of ties between the colonizer and the dependencies was not the responsibility of political and governmental elites but rather of those in the economy. Because ties were economic, such arrangements went light in their demands on political and public economic resources. Governmental elites were there only to help. Force was in the background. With economic dependence there was no need to import the alien colonizing elite; the indigenous elite performed their task. In short, in the American system controls on dependencies were less visible, narrower, less vulnerable, more flexible, cheaper, safer, and possibly longer lasting than those of political empires. For the system to work smoothly, however, levels of mobilization of populations in both the metropole and the colony had to be kept down.

All this material sheds light on current problems. And Professor Aquarone's work will be extremely useful for other scholars in advancing their own research in this area. This is the highest praise one can give a scholar and nothing more need be added. Yet in this case one should also point out the fact that Professor Aquarone is an Italian—not an American—historian, and it adds to the wonder of his knowledge of American materials and to the praise this book deserves.

A. F. K. ORGANSKI

The University of Michigan

South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1970. By James Barber. (London: Oxford University Press. 1973. Pp. 330. $14.50.)

The main thesis of Dr. Barber's book is that the foreign policy of South Africa since the Second World War has been determined by her internal political and social structure, to a greater extent than the foreign policy of any other non-Communist country. To this effect on page 137 he cites the late prime minister, Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd: "Our motto is to maintain white supremacy for all time to come over our own people and our own country, by force if necessary."

The book is divided chronologically into four sections. "The Aftermath of War (1945-1948)" explains how in his final years as prime minister Jan Christian Smuts, one of the drafters of the Charter of the United Nations, clung to his ideal of a western-dominated international order when it was already becoming irreconcilable with reality, with the result that he was not able to check the growth of foreign criticism of South Africa's control over South West Africa and its treatment of its Indian population. Second, "The Early Years of National Party Rule (1948-1959)" shows how the damaging effects of the Nationalist government's internal policy of apartheid and external policy of removing the last vestiges of British imperial authority were partially compensated by its extreme anticommunism, without, however, bringing South Africa into a military alliance with any Western power. Third, in "The Years of Crisis and Doubt (1960-1966)," we are shown how Verwoerd's administration weathered the stresses created by the Sharpeville incident, the decolonization of British Africa, and the foundation of the Organization of African Unity and its Liberation Committee, by adopting ruthless measures against internal dissidents, embarking on a massive armament program, and attracting large-scale Western participation in the burgeoning South African economy. Finally, "Years of Confidence (1966-1970)" explains how the dangers receded both at home and abroad: South Africa consolidated its position of dominance over a Southern African bloc including Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, settler-ruled Rhodesia, and the former British dependencies Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland which, though ruled by Africans, were constrained by their economic dependence on the Republic.

As an empirical record, rich in detail, objective in tone, and sound in judgment, this is greatly superior to other works on the subject. The only errors I have noted are cases where the footnote references have been muddled, as on page 126 where Dr. Barber confuses two books by this reviewer.

This meticulous account by Dr. Barber, who is a Reader in the Department of Government in the British Open University, stresses the skill of the National Party leadership in accommodating to internal and external challenges to White supremacy. For example, Verwoerd launched the Bantustan program in the early 1960s both as a response to external pressures for "decolonization" and as a technique for diverting internal African political activities from the center to the periphery and splintering them into "tribal" segments.

One wonders how Dr. Barber would assess the period since 1970. By 1975 the peculiar institutions of South Africa had entered another period of crisis. White supremacy was being threatened in at least four respects. The Black industrial workers, on whom White South African prosperity depends, were beginning to flex their muscles. The Bantustan leaders were not limiting themselves to the subservient roles envisaged by Verwoerd. The movement toward detente between the capitalist and the Communist powers was reducing the value of South Africa's claim to legitimacy in the eyes of the West as a bastion of anti-communism. And Portuguese decolonization was depriving South Africa of its buffer zone to the north.

Dr. Barber's admirable book is a splendidly researched and well-organized history, and it provides essential background for an understanding of the contemporary situation in a potentially explosive region.

LEONARD THOMPSON

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Power and Law: American Dilemma in World Affairs. Edited by Charles A. Barker. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. Pp. 205. $8.50.)

This volume, which consists of papers presented at a meeting in September 1968 by Charles A. Barker, Charles E. Rosenberg, Walter LaFeber, William L. Neumann, Cameron Nish, William J. Bruce, Nam-Yearl Chai, Gerald A. Sumida, Arthur I. Waskow, and Berenice A. Carroll, is the third publication sponsored by the Conference on Peace Research in History. As stated in the preface, the collaborators aimed ". . . to take long views in the history of the peace policy and war policy in our country, rather than to analyze current events" (p. vii). Furthermore, they agreed to do so by associating political science with history in what is described as a bidisciplinary approach. The design does not come off convincingly for a variety of reasons.

On the plane of methodology it appears that history is not congenial to most of the contributors, who evidently share the view expressed by Saul Mendlovitz at the original colloquium that "history is too passive a kind of scholarship to serve world order" (p. x). Although the editor had hoped that the finished papers would correct this estimate, we find him expressing impatience with history, LaFeber chastising Americans for believing themselves immune to history, and Carroll arguing in the course of her excellent concluding review that "historians have been regrettably prone to neglect peace both as a subject and as a value premise in their professional work" (p. 197). The fact that historians may not make up for the deficiencies in the real records at their disposal by surmise and supposition is entirely overlooked. The answer to Carroll's question: "Why There Is No Peace History" may thus well be that world peace cannot be extrapolated convincingly from the records of Africa, Asia, Europe, and America either as an idea or a norm; or that the variegated regional records of the past are not reducible to the same time scale; or that peace, being merely one of numerous themes in world affairs, is analyzed best in the context of general histories of international relations. These possibilities are not explored. Indeed, a reading of the essays suggests that the entire work was conceived and executed in the service rather of hopes, despairs, and other emotions than of scholarly concerns with history.

This mood is communicated on the first page of the book, where attention is drawn to the "shocking" events of 1970, namely the American military intervention in Cambodia and the killing of students in the context of antiwar protests, as well as to such unsettling events in 1968 as the election defeat of Senator McCarthy and the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy. And it is explicitly endorsed by Rosenberg when he states that issues of war and peace are governed by emotions universally felt—surely a sweeping proposition, yet one for which absolutely no historical or sociological evidence is adduced. The book, then, is disconcerting also on the conceptual side. It purports to discuss American dilemmas in *world* affairs (and to judge by the essays, the dilemmas are legion); yet most of the chapters studiously avoid coming to terms with the world environment in which this nation's government and citizenry are supposed to perceive "the dilemma of power and law." The cause of world peace—which is the symposium's primary concern—is thus discussed exclusively as a function of what the authors consider "good" (very little) or "bad" (a lot) about America.

The formula or paradigm for this concerted approach is borrowed from Gunnar Myrdal's treatment of the American dilemma in *domestic* race relations. Now this "dilemma" could indeed be analyzed in the framework of American constitutional norms and moral values. But it is, after all, axiomatic that domestic affairs are not foreign affairs. If the authors were unaware of this elementary fact, they might have done well to study Myrdal's *Asian Drama* in which the differences between oriental and occidental value systems are set out with admirable clarity. And here they might have learned that issues relating to war and peace in world affairs are not reducible to American thought patterns. What is disturbing about the present volume, then, is the self-righteous assumption first, that non-American forces have nothing to do either with the actualities of international relations or with American reactions to troublesome situations in this field; and second, that all American policy responses in foreign affairs which do not conform to the authors' values can be safely adjudged loathsome and immoral. For example, Neumann is shocked that President Truman could think that Americans value freedom more than peace (p. 57).

The corollaries of this frankly biased approach consist in seeing every "iffy" question in foreign affairs as a nationally crucial moral dilemma, and in casting the latter in such unreasonably polarized terms as: Power vs. Law; War vs. Peace; Peace men vs. National Will men; Imperialism vs. Anti-Imperialism; Peace and Multilateralism vs. Militarism and Unilateralism; Assertion of Power by Military Force vs. Commitment to Peace and Order. Nothing in international history or foreign relations can be seriously scrutinized in this way, and therefore it is not surprising that the authors evade the challenge by simply flaying the U.S. for being "the bad guy" all the way through. Barker thus refers to "our country's practice of unilateral violence against other peoples" (p. 4); Neumann notes "the American reluctance to accept peace on other than bargain terms" (p. 59); and LaFeber complains that American foreign policy as conducted by presidents in the last 150 years has become ever more aggressive, and that it is the nation's traditional aggressiveness which initiated the American-Soviet rivalry in 1917-18 and triggered the Cold War after 1941. The lists of American misdeeds are endless; they are also repetitious because the authors proceed from identical ideological premises.

Law receives merely passing treatment from the American contributors. For Bruce ("The United States and the Law of Mankind") it appears to stand mainly for UN resolutions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and certain other present trends and practices which all of the authors feel ought to become part of the law of mankind, but which the U.S., to their regret, has not yet recognized as law. Conventional international law is scarcely mentioned by the North American writers and is written off entirely by the two Asian scholars. Sumida thus argues in an interesting article on "The Right of Revolution: Implications for International Law and World Order" that while rebellions and revolutions in the Third World may have been tactically aided by the existence of the doctrine of state sovereignty, the utilitarian value of the norm is likely to be limited in time. For not only have the new states shown themselves to be less reluctant than those of the West to use force even when it might "technically" violate Art. 2, par. 4 of the Charter (p. 160), but they are also likely to be engaged in internal wars for years to come. The Koreans, meanwhile, we learn from Chai in "Law as a Barrier to Change: A Korean Experience", have had to wage "an incessant war against the law" (p. 112) so as to keep their independence. Therefore they also had to demonstrate hostility toward such a proposal as "world peace through the rule of law," for it reminded all Asians of "the colonialist-tailored legal norms of the bygone days" (p. 113). Furthermore, and most important for the purposes of the book under review, this Asian spokesman assures us that even precolonial (i.e., pre-Japanese) Koreans "had never really developed any fondness for law. They had preferred government by a virtuous ruler . . ." (p. 127-28). In short, then, the reminder is in order that dilemmas between peace and war, or law and power, are not readily perceived beyond our shores.

ADDA B. BOZEMAN

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The Future of the International Legal Order. Volume III: Conflict Management. Edited by Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 413. $12.50.); **Volume IV: The Structure of the International Environment.** Edited by Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. 637. $17.50.)

Owing to what may be described as acts of God in the Western Hemisphere, the writing of this review has been delayed. Yet, if the sufferers are futurologists, they should probably not complain. Lapse of time enables the reviewer to deal with past futures rather than future pasts.

The two volumes under review, to be followed by a final volume in quest of an international consensus on diagnoses made and remedies proposed in the earlier volumes, are concerned with conflict management (Volume III) and the structure of the international environment (Volume IV).

The general scheme of Volume III is as simple as it is ingenious: framework, central world-order concerns, and the moderation of conflict. In choosing the contributors, the editors have found a neat balance between the lasting and the ephemeral. Perhaps they might have made more decisive use of their blue pencils and been less permissive about linguistic horrors such as "interface" (p. ix), "specificity" (p. 33), "integrality" (p. 276), and "autopunitive" (p. 96).

While any choice is invidious, pride of place should probably be given to Tom J. Farer's incisive paper on "Law and War." Similarly, the application to civil strife of Rosalyn Higgin's technique of grouping conflicting claims helps one to view in perspective strenuous attempts made to change the law as it stands. The list of "new" countries with religiously defended "old"—that is, colonial—frontiers in Daniel Wilkes's unassuming paper on "Territorial Stability and Conflict" alone is worth more than many a lengthy disquisition. Finally, the steadily accelerating proliferation of nuclear weapons receives justifiably concerned treatment from Arnold Kramish.

Turning to Volume IV, one notes that Part One extends well beyond the limits set in the title of the Volume: *The Structure of the International Environment.* At least potentially, it covers the whole of "Man and his Environment," a worthy subject for an encyclopedia. Even so, one would not wish Harold D. Lasswell's scintillating essay on "Future Systems of Identity in the World Community" to be curtailed. But Mary Ellen Caldwell's impressive analysis of the movements in population trends would have gained by transfer to a missing Part (on which more will have to be said later).

Denis Livingstone's strictures on the inadequate attention paid by the majority of international lawyers to the impact of scientific and technological changes on their own field have some justification. Yet it might have been advisable to add the names of J. E. S. Fawcett and the late M. W. Mouton to the list of honorable exceptions. Also, L. Gordenker's attempt to rouse interest in the potentialities of international social law, an unduly neglected branch of international law, deserves support.

In Part II, more directly concerned with structures of the international environment, the emphasis is on international law (G. Gottlieb) and institutions (J. S. Nye, D. McNemar, and J. P. Sewell).

Gottlieb's conclusion is representative of the spirit of informed but constructive skepticism permeating both volumes: "Short of a cataclysmic conflict and short of ecological collapse no major changes are likely to transform the international system itself" (p. 380).

This conclusion makes apparent the limitations of the structural approach chosen in Volume IV. To balance the essentially static character of structuralism, it might have helped to pay greater attention than has been done in any of the four volumes to the actual forces determining the dynamics of the international system. It is even arguable that room should have been found in Volume IV—if necessary by ruthless pruning elsewhere—for an additional section on forces shaping the international environment.

Moreover, if the specific character of this international system had been more concretely identified and if the difference between law and order in general, and international law and order in particular, had been more clearly perceived, the insights gained might have changed the whole emphasis in the two volumes under review. It might have emerged that the assumption of the possibility of avoiding indefinitely another cataclysmic conflict—we have already had two in living memory—runs counter to everything we know about international systems of open power politics and power politics in disguise. Moreover, the disruptive trends inherent in the contemporary variant of world politics in disguise are intensified by other powerful forces tending in the same direction: population growth; famine; inflation; the ungovernable character of large areas by other than oppressive methods; the evanescence of stabilizing values in the majority of the world's centers of civilization; and widespread resignation to the emergence of neobarbarism in various shapes.

Be this as it may, due tribute must be paid to Myres McDougal, the spiritual progenitor of these volumes. In the 1973 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, he confesses that Volume IV of *The Future of the International Legal Order* would not have been his personal choice for the Society's Certificate of Merit for the best book on international law published in 1972. He, however, added that he was not wholly displeased with the Committee's decision; for "most of the four volumes were written by my associates and former students" (p. 94). To have inspired four teams as dedicated and versatile as those responsible for *The Future of International Legal Order* is an achievement unequaled by any international lawyer of McDougal's or any other generation.

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The European Convention on Human Rights. By Frede Castberg. Updated and edited by Torkel Opsahl and Thomas Ouchterlony. (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff and Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.: Oceana Publications, 1974. Pp. 198. $16.50.)

Commissaires et Juges Dans Les Communautés Européennes. By Nicole Condorelli Braun. (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1972. Pp. 232. No price indicated.)

European scholars, sometimes from envy and occasionally with admiration, have long noted that the more interesting works on the integration of Western Europe were not written by Europeans. The voluminous European scholarly literature on the institutions and practices of integration tended to be rigorously formal or painstakingly descriptive. It is a pleasure to report that these grounds for envy no longer exist: the books here reviewed cannot be faulted on either score. They are competent, interesting, and useful even by the standards of American political science.

The Castberg book on the regional system for protecting human rights is unique among the very large number of works treating the same subject. As a former member of the Commission on Human Rights, the author, instead of merely commenting on the provisions of the Convention and summarizing the ten decisions rendered by the Court or staking out an ideological position, skillfully summarizes the case law of all three institutions. He emphasizes the 6400 cases handled by the Commission, including many which were eventually found inadmissible, and thus recapitulates the evolution of jurisprudence over a twenty-year span. He goes so far as to record split votes and to report on the implementation by national authorities of some key decisions. While the central legal doctrines and issues involved are always brought out, they do not dominate the discussion to the extent of making a political evaluation impossible. Unfortunately, Castberg's conclusions are very brief so that I must make the effort to assess the meaning of this material.

Given the current emotive appeal of the protection of human rights by international legal and political means, the nature of the European system must be clearly established, if only to warn enthusiasts of its very limited applicability to extra-European situations. International regimes dealing with human rights may take several forms. They may *prohibit* the state from certain acts against individuals, i.e., protect the individual from the state. They may also order the state to act in creating new rights or programs, (i.e., the state *shall act for* groups and collectivities). The European system illustrates the first and the United Nations system the second of these approaches. Finally, such regimes can also seek to define what the state *may* do in seeking to protect the collectivity against individuals. The tension between the first and the last of these approaches provides the focus for analyzing the European experience. But first recall another caveat for those who would compare Europe with the UN system: the European Convention is designed to provide minimum protection against national administrative and judicial practices in a setting in which the member states are *already committed* to the maintenance of the rule of law and the rights of the individual; nobody expected them to require persuasion.

Individuals have been so protected primarily in the area of criminal procedure (Austria, Belgium) and administrative practices relating to immigration (Britain). The exercise of the right of individual petition has been successfully safeguarded. But in almost all other areas covered by the Convention, the discretionary power of the democratic state has been upheld. The prohibition against discrimination has *not* been interpreted to mean that compulsory linguistic segregation in education (in Belgium) is illegal or that speakers of minority languages are entitled to special rights in court proceedings (Austria). Small religious sects do not enjoy the same rights as established churches (Sweden, Germany). National emergencies and the threat to human rights *can* be invoked to suspend rights guaranteed by the convention if a democratic regime seeks to protect itself (Ireland, Germany), but not if an authoritarian regime makes such claims (Greece). The right to property does not protect the individual against nationalization (Britain), nor does the right to education entitle one to a school or a curriculum of one's choice (Belgium, Denmark, Sweden). And the prohibition against forced labor cannot be invoked against compulsory civilian service laws (Norway, Germany).

How effective, then, is the system? Only 130 of 6400 complaints have actually been found admissible, and of these perhaps a dozen resulted in decisions favoring the plaintiffs! Castberg makes no claim that this record has resulted in any appreciable harmonization or standardization of European law. In fact, he agrees that the doctrine of the "margin of appreciation" in favor of state discretion militates against such a trend. The Commission, the Court, and the Committee of Ministers expressly reject the role of a final European appeals tribunal. Effects then must be measured in a different way. Castberg shows that the "ombudsman role" of the Commission has been more important than its judicial rulings because of the number of cases in which respondent governments agreed to a friendly settlement, to a change of administrative procedure, or to amended legislation without any rulings having to be made (Norway, Belgium, Britain, Sweden, Austria). He also notes that even in cases found not to be admissible, practices may have been at stake which were subsequently discontinued, particularly in the area of prison administration.

And yet the question remains: how effective is the system in dealing with a government that does not share the presumed consensus in favor of individual rights? The key case is the complaint of the three Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands against the Papadopoulos regime—and it fails to answer the question. Commission and Committee of Ministers ruled against Greece in sweeping terms, and for the first time in such a manner as to condemn not merely a single law or administrative procedure, but an entire "legal" order, including the failure to hold elections. Yet hours before the Committee of Ministers was to "pronounce sentence," Greece denounced the Convention and withdrew from the Council of Europe. The restoration of democratic government much later can hardly be credited to the procedures in Strasbourg. Castberg and his editors deserve enormous credit for not making inflated claims for the system and for permitting the reader to draw these inferences with the help of admirably arranged materials.

The unique value of the volume by Nicole Braun lies in its marshaling of biographical information on 71 individuals who have served between 1952 and 1970 as members of the European Community Court, the High Authority, and the Commissions of Euratom and the EEC, also including the unified Commission. The information is neatly arranged and tabulated. It includes items on the professional activities and affiliations of the individuals before going to Brussels or Luxembourg or both, their political beliefs and ties, their roles in the European integration movement, their links with national and regional groups and clienteles, and their personal political "styles." Most of the information deals with the way each individual played his supranational role after being appointed. While the discussion is focused on individuals, these individuals are grouped in "typical" career pattern categories which follow the major political events and crises of the Communities. The discussion of roles is thus presented in a setting of political conflict and process. Braun contrasts the behavioral roles defined by the relevant treaties (independent judgment, freedom from instructions and pressure from the governments, collegial decision making, technical and specialized competence) with the *actual conduct* of most of the individuals included in relation to member state behavior. The author's intent is to show the extent of conformity between legally defined and actual behavior, for the judges and commissioners as well as for their home governments. In short: when, where, and why did these European officials abandon independent judgment and resistance to governmental pressure; when and why did they behave like politicians rather than technical specialists? When and how were they punished or rewarded for their behavior?

While certain facts regarding the careers of the better-known Eurocrats are common knowledge (e.g., Mansholt, Hallstein, Monnet, Hirsch), the bulk of the findings are quite new. States tended to appoint individuals who were prominent in the drafting of the key treaties or in the national parliaments. Appointments tended to be balanced according to sensitive national representation issues: major political parties must be given satisfaction as well as an occasional crucial minor party coalition partner. In Holland the religious groups must be satisfied; in Belgium, the linguistic groups. De Gaulle, of course, disregarded all these niceties in his appointments, the Italian government tends to reward deserving Christian-Democrats by sending them to Brussels, and Adenauer took care to send his political supporters. Governments tend to accept each other's appointments without questioning them; the practice of choosing the President of the High Authority by cooptation among the members of the college was abandoned in favor of straight national nomination. Even at the European level, appointments are nicely balanced—through unwritten rules—in terms of nationality, party and interest group ties.

How do these officials behave after being appointed? Most stay within the specialist roles in which they were formally cast; some do not. Those who seek to play a larger role prosper as long as the political milieu is favorable and the Community fares well financially and economically; they suffer attack and opprobrium when these conditions no longer hold. Moreover, as crises develop, the presidencies of the colleges are likely to be taken over by specialists unwilling to take political risks. France tends to punish officials who have disappointed her in Brussels after they leave European service by depriving them of prestigious positions at home. In the Hirsch case de Gaulle actually forced a resignation. Italy simply refuses to support the renomination of her nationals who have been found wanting. Benelux nationals, on the other hand, seem to be quite free to act out the roles they choose for themselves. Does the recruitment pattern follow the rules laid down by the treaties in terms of formal roles? Braun finds that it does not, but she also concludes that this is preferable for Europe because it makes possible a closer rapport between the officials and the political trends at home which constrain their actions in any case. Do the institutions examined behave strictly in terms of the independent and supraordinate (if not supranational) powers conferred upon them? Clearly they do not, for reasons too well understood to require further comment. What happens to the careers of European officials after they leave Brussels? Some prosper by returning to national government service, some go into private business and consulting work, most of them fade into obscurity. Working for Europe turns out to be a mixed blessing.

If these findings and conclusions are far from startling, the reason lies less in the data than in the use made of it. Braun's emphasis is on role conformity with respect to the progress of the European unification movement. Conformity of informal with formal behavioral roles is thought to advance unification. Lack of conformity—as observed in practice—is equated with stagnation. A more illuminating perspective could have been adopted if the author had asked a different set of questions of her excellent data; what is it about the character of the professional and political roles of these individuals which explains the *maintenance* of the unique European pattern of mixed regional/national decision making in the realm of economics? How did it come to be, admitting that practice did not always follow the rules of the treaties? How do we account for the cycles of growth and stagnation in Community influence, given the attributes of the key individuals and their interaction with national political systems?

This set of questions could have been answered with the data at hand. Braun was in a position to explain how individual commissioners respond to and influence the key domestic groups with whom they had been (or were) affiliated. In some cases this would mean political parties, in others, industrial and agricultural interest groups. in still others, trade unions. She could have taken advantage of the fact that almost half of all commissioners were formerly ministers. Do they have special access to or ties with their old colleagues in the national cabinets—especially if their European "portfolios" corresponded with their former national ones? The same question could have been raised about ex-ministers whose national clientele was easily identified in terms of economic interest. A very large number of commissioners and judges are former national bureaucrats. Does this give them a special line of access to their old shops at home and to their successors? Does their behavior support the thesis that temporary seconding to European service is a more effective socialization mechanism than permanent service in Brussels? Does it make a difference for system maintenance if appointments are made on the basis of protecting national interests (France) or of rewarding faithful service (Italy)? Does the principle of judicial independence survive a close scrutiny about whether the decisions of the Court conform to key national and interest group preferences? The French and Italian officials tend to spend less time in European service than their Dutch and Belgian colleagues. Does that pattern affect the character of the decisions made? It is time that we had answers to these questions, but Braun's work is a useful first step.

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Fidel in Chile: A Symbolic Meeting Between Two Historical Processes. By Fidel Castro. (New York: International Publishers, 1972. Pp. 234. $7.50.)

This book is a compilation of speeches, dialogues, and interviews of Fidel Castro during his three-week visit to Chile in 1971. It is not a rigorous piece of scholarly work, but rather consists of long-winded discourses between Castro and his audiences which are biased in nature and repetitive in content.

The book is perhaps most useful as a blueprint for what not to do if you seek to conduct a successful revolution. For example, take Castro's advice to Chile (pp. 11-12) concerning arranging trade arrangements between the two countries for the exchange of Chilean saltpeter and potassium nitrate for Cuba's sugar. According to Castro, it would be in Cuba's interest to import Chile's saltpeter instead of buying European nitrogen for agricultural purposes. For anyone familiar with the characteristics of Chile's saltpeter vs. European nitrogen, this is not the most practical way to increase agricultural production. What is interesting is Castro's reflections on his own revolutionary experience ("There are the problems of the revolutionaries themselves; their lack of know-how and experience," p. 39).

The book is most interesting when Castro discusses his perceptions of the differences between Chile and Cuba and the style of revolution that would be appropriate in each case; and when he discusses the U.S. Bay-of-Pigs attempt to overthrow his regime. This is particularly true in view of recent revelations regarding U.S. activities through the CIA between 1971–3 to "destabilize" the Allende regime.

We now have two authoritarian regimes—one from the left in Cuba and one from the right in Chile. One can not help but speculate as to whether both countries would not now be more truly democratic if we had simply left the nations to choose their own paths. The U.S.'s vital interests in Latin America might have also been more secure than they apparently are now if we had done so.

Weston H. Agor

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British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968. By Phillip Darby. (London and New York: Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1973. Pp. 366. £6.50; $21.00.)

Britain's lingering presence in the Indian Ocean and Far East, the result of her tenure of

Empire in India has now been reduced to such tiny proportions that it is not unreasonable to regard it as a suitable subject for historical enquiry. It may be that the time to pronounce judgment has not yet arrived, not only because all the material is not yet available—the thirty-years rule bars the official archives—but also because our own perspectives are changing. Only now with the oil crisis in the forefront of political concern is it beginning to be noted that Britain's presence in the Gulf, for instance, was not unimportant in making for an uninterrupted supply.

Mr. Darby, a very able young Australian student of international affairs has, however, looked at the matter in a rather different light, as a case study in the interrelations of defense and foreign policy. He is concerned to show the inadequacy of the commonly repeated claim that "defence policy is the servant of foreign policy" by showing that this notion suggests an "assumption of the rationality of the decision-making process" which itself is open to challenge. It was not so much alterations in foreign policy that changed Britain's defense posture in the postwar period—indeed, there were no great changes in foreign policy—but pressures for economy on the defense establishment, which in making the necessary cuts rendered certain objectives of foreign policy unattainable. Changes in proclaimed policy were thus largely the result of decisions taken for quite different reasons.

The other important aspect of the matter well brought out by Mr. Darby is the difficulty that faced defense planners in their inability to estimate clearly the impact of the advent of nuclear weapons upon traditional thinking. The idea that the "deterrent" would render minor wars less likely and so permit cuts in conventional forces was to be shown to be a complete misreading of the new situation. Furthermore, the new conditions of warfare arising from other technical developments were also only slowly assimilated by defense chiefs and even more slowly by politicians. After so much bombast about the moral iniquities of the "Suez" affair, it is useful to be reminded of the inadequacy of its planning and the effect of the hesitations of the political leadership. A more rapidly conducted operation might have pre-empted the political opposition it aroused.

It was also true that the whole process of imperial disengagement was difficult for the military to bring into their calculations. They thought of positions in territories over which sovereignty could be taken for granted; the colonial office meanwhile went on with its own program of granting independence to them. Mr. Darby notes, without being able to document, the charge that before 1956 the Ministry of Defence and the Colonial Office were pursuing inconsistent policies in Singapore. In the case of Kenya the evidence is public and striking—large sums being spent in creating facilities that would never be used.

In Britain the alternation of parties in power can also have its effect on defense policy. After being the great protagonist of imperial retreat, the Labour Party in 1963 discovered a new role for Britain in the new Asia and came into power in 1964 with the idea of staying "East of Suez" to provide a factor for stability, only to be defeated in that object by the cost-factor. And the inconsistency was heightened by the fact that in political terms, the priority was then being given to "entry into Europe." The distant chronicler might see between Attlee and Wilson a measure of ideological continuity—one giving independence to India, the other carrying the process forward to the peripheries of the old Empire. But looked at more closely the similarity disappears. The Wilson government did not intend to leave the "East of Suez" area: it found itself with no option for basically financial reasons. In the end the commitment to Europe was given preference, but the choice was reluctantly arrived at and not defended in principle.

From the point of view of democratic theory Mr. Darby's conclusions are even less palatable. At no time was the whole question the subject of serious public debate. Britain accepted a continuing role East of Suez and then abandoned it without ever reckoning the cost of either decision. Labour's innate pacifism found a ready echo among a people wedded to an easy materialism. It is all very far from the textbook distinction between ends and means. Mr. Darby has done a useful service in a cool and scholarly way.

MAX BELOFF

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International Law and the Revolutionary State: A Case Study of the Soviet Union and International Law. By Richard J. Erickson. (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972. Pp. 254. $15.00.)

This study is an analysis of how the Soviet Union, as the archetypal revolutionary state, has interacted with customary international law. While the thesis that the Soviet Union is an archetypal revolutionary state is obviously debatable, the subject matter of the book is clearly of great intrinsic interest. Unfortunately, the book was quite out of date by the time it was printed and is marred by the apparent attempt of the author to work with Russian materials despite an inadequate knowledge of the Russian language. The most recent source cited was published in 1966, and some portions of the book appear not to have been revised since 1964. The introduction contains references to two French and six Russian publications. Only one of the French and one of the Russian references are spelled correctly. The author's batting average improves somewhat in the later chapters, but never reaches an acceptable level.

The work covers the development of Soviet theory of customary international law from Stuchka to Tunkin, and then examines the current application of this theory to various major areas of international law. The book also contains appendices devoted to Soviet representation in international organizations, Soviet scholars of international law and an extensive bibliography. All of these are useful, though dated and full of minor technical errors.

The reader who does not know Russian will find a good deal of information about Soviet views in this book. He or she could get most of it, however, in much more up to date and reliable form in the works of such specialists in Soviet international law as Butler, Ginsburgs, Grzybowski, Osakwe, Slusser, and Triska. The reader might also wish to consult Dr. William Butler's recent translation of Professor Grigorii Tunkin's treatise, and for the early period, Timothy A. Taracouzio's classic 1935 study, *The Soviet Union and International Law.*

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The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations. By Isaiah Friedman. (New York: Schocken Books, 1973. Pp. 450. $12.00.)

Few documents of modern diplomacy compare with the Balfour Declaration for the amount of governmental scrutiny it received prior to publication in 1917 or for the public controversy and detailed analysis it has been subjected to ever since. Was the Declaration a sinister plot consistent with imperial behavior, an act of farsighted and principled statesmanship, or possibly some of both? Was it blatantly contradictory to other, parallel British pledges to the Arabs and to France regarding future disposition of the Middle East in general and of Palestine specifically, or was it actually compatible with them?

Exchanges between apologists for the Declaration and its critics, often acrimonious and extending over more than half a century, have done little to resolve these central questions of British motivation and intent. If anything, the debate becomes more desultory, less conclusive, and further removed from contemporary political realities of the Arab-Israel struggle. Similarly, research efforts have contributed little that is original—certainly not since the late Leonard Stein's classic study of the Balfour Declaration in 1961—and thus serve neither to sharpen the debate nor to terminate it.

This latest study ought to be the last word on the subject, for it is an impressive summation of virtually all the interpretations, explanations and arguments put forth previously. In its amassing of detail and primary sources, the book is unlikely to be rivaled by any future historical treatment. Moreover, the author, a professor of history at Dropsie College, has been careful to place the Declaration in its proper context: not solely limited to the bilateral Anglo-Zionist relationship, but viewed in the broader yet infinitely more complex regional and international perspective. And while emphasizing the salience of political interests, Friedman alerts his reader to the important role played by various individuals whose perceptions and convictions greatly affected the policy outcome. The dynamism of Sir Mark Sykes; the forceful opposition to any such pro-Zionist public statement by the two leading Anglo-Jewish figures, Edwin Montague and Lucien Wolf, effectively countered by the discreet penetration of Britain's political circles by Chaim Weizmann and, hitherto unappreciated, by the wartime contribution of Aaron Aaronsohn in Palestine; the idiosyncracies of a Balfour or of a Lloyd George —these receive their just due in Friedman's long and involved narrative.

Meticulous research, careful documentation, and a high standard of scholarship in handling a subject notable for partisanship rather than detachment or objectivity are the book's obvious strengths. Another stems from Friedman's comprehensiveness, which sets this book apart from so many earlier essays viewing the Balfour Declaration in terms of single-factor analysis, i.e., that the British pledge was awarded to Weizmann for his wartime scientific contribution.

But the price paid for such thoroughness may be too high. The sheer size of the book, compounded by the writing style of its author in which copious quotes and countless memoranda are unrelieved by a clear outline or by occasional summaries of key points, will deter most people from reading it through. Although admirable historiography, it is too bulky and unstructured a tool for foreign policy analysts. It lacks sharpness, since the author does not explicate and fails to nail down central points. As a result, much of the natural drama of an intense political struggle between men and nations is lost in the overwhelming mass of detail. Letting the documents speak for themselves is not always the wisest form of scholarly argumentation.

As suggested by his material, rather than by the author himself, the Balfour Declaration, far from being a case of willful British deception, was the product of several factors, including miscalculation and misunderstanding. What links the Husayn-MacMahon correspondence and the Sykes-Picot treaty with the Declaration is not so much the image of a "perfidious Albion" as of a Great Power inflicted with bureaucratic rivalries and deficiencies in interdepartmental coordination in the face of demands and pressures posed by wartime diplomacy.

Incompetence, not duplicity, is the weightiest charge that Great Britain must bear for her contribution in that initial, formative phase of the Palestine problem during 1914-1918. That Zionist aspirations played directly into British hands is well known. It is less appreciated that, conversely, British anxieties and images served Zionist interests equally well. Witness the compelling need felt by those in London to pre-empt a comparable initiative by the Central Powers; or Britain's hope that by means of an expression of sympathy towards Zionism, the Jewish intelligentsia, "whose ranks contain so many of the journalists, teachers, political wire-pullers, etc. of the world" (p. 297), in the words of War Office's William Ormsby-Gore, might be won over to the Allied cause.

Now that Friedman has said virtually everything that can be said about the Balfour Declaration, its background and motives, surely the time is appropriate for proceeding beyond the events and discussions leading up to its becoming official British policy. Balfour's short letter to Lord Rothschild was, after all, merely an informal statement of intent on the part of His Majesty's Government to countenance the Zionist enterprise—"view with favour" was the actual, diluted phraseology adopted by the Cabinet. As such, it was neither self-implementing nor a commitment of substantive support for the building of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

Friedman only refers in passing to "a darker and less controllable phase" which followed release of the Declaration. Yet it is this later period which is decisive. What matters, in political terms, is not why Great Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, but why successive British governments acknowledged its enduring validity. It is necessary for current research to move on and to come to grips with how the several participants to the Palestine contest exploited the Balfour Declaration or maneuvered around it. Friedman's book now provides an excellent foundation for pushing on with these challenging questions.

AARON S. KLIEMAN

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The New Era in American Foreign Policy. Edited by John H. Gilbert. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973. Pp. 216. $8.95, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

This book of essays is based, with one exception, on papers prepared for a symposium at North Carolina State University in 1972. The authors are all distinguished scholars who were asked to adopt the perspective of the next decade in considering the important issues of American foreign policy.

The essays are of varying quality and scope, but each is an intelligent discussion within the boundaries the author sets for himself. Several interesting issues are dealt with, although very little attention is given to the problems and issues of American foreign policy in the next decade. Indeed, most of the essays do not stand up well in the first biennium of the decade.

Stanley Hoffmann's 1972 *Foreign Affairs* article, reprinted here, is the outstanding essay. It is a brilliant and sophisticated critique of the Nixon-Kissinger view of a pentagonal world system, which not only persuasively argues the inapplicability and undesirability of the balance-of-power model for maintaining strategic stability but also questions its relevance for playing nonstrategic games like trade and ecology.

The felicitous and graceful writing of Inis L. Claude, Jr., is a pleasure to read. His essay offers the advice that the United States should use the United Nations maturely in the next decade.

In one of the more interesting essays, Ernest R. May attempts to identify which factors will be influential in the next decade and then goes on, despite his own advice to the contrary, to make predictions which may or may not hold up for a decade but which look pretty good in 1974.

Hans J. Morgenthau argues again that the Vietnam war was a mistake, and William Van Alstyne argues that only Congress has the power to declare war and that American hostilities were illegal after the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. James C. Thomson, Jr., has a nice essay on what to expect of American relations with China.

The "fights, games, and debates" distinctions of Anatol Rapoport are applied by him in an analysis of detente. He sees the system as fundamentally structured by insane elites who keep it going for their own purposes, both in the Cold War and in detente.

George W. Rathjens gives a perceptive analysis of the beliefs underlying the maintenance of nuclear weapons—basically, the view that they are not different in kind from conventional weapons—and concludes that there will be "for the years immediately ahead continuing, and possibly increasing, emphasis on nuclear strength" (p. 173).

In his essay on disarmament, J. David Singer outlines an analysis of the political process involved in armaments/disarmament and then proposes a scheme so far-fetched that one is tempted to characterize his essay as merely symbolic ("Look at me, guys—I'm for peace.").

These essays were prepared while the Vietnam war was still going on but after President Nixon had made clear his view of the world in his Guam speech and his State of the World messages. Two of the essays—Morgenthau's and Van Alstyne's—deal essentially with the war and might be thought to provide examples of the alienation of the intellectuals from American foreign policy. Two others—Rapoport's and Singer's—are pretty much irrelevant to policy making, at least in the short run (which includes the decade to which these essays are ostensibly addressed).

The others, however, are clearly addressing policy-relevant problems. In point of fact, a number of these essays use the Nixon-Kissinger definition of the issues as their focus, or at least their point of departure. To that extent, these authors are members of the establishment. Moreover, despite Vietnam, there are remnants of consensus. They all believe that the United States should remain involved in the world and not become isolationist. (What, after all, do foreign policy analysts do, if the nation turns inward and loses interest in the rest of the world—drive taxis?) Beyond that elementary consensus, however, even these establishment scholars do not agree on very much.

Perhaps they could agree on their task, but that agreement seems to be missing. The authors were asked to deal in futures, a task which presumes that social scientists have sufficiently explanatory theories to predict, which they don't. They could have posed important questions, but, on the whole, the authors of these essays accept the questions posed by policy makers.

Could these authors have done otherwise? The editor posed to them what appears, at a very superficial level, an important question. In reality, however, it is not an important question at all. The editor's question was so vague and provided so much scope that the authors were limited only by their own time, inclination, ambition, and imagination.

Some issues of American foreign policy are intelligently discussed in this volume, but it has no coherence and no structure. It will very probably be useful as a focus of discussion for introductory courses in American foreign policy or for adult discussion groups. But it is time-bound and, as a whole, unimaginative. It does not deal with the Middle East, oil, the environment, population, international economic structures and processes, and other continuing problems of American foreign policy. Neither does it focus systematically on underlying forces that can be expected to persist for the next decade.

HOWARD H. LENTNER

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The League of Nations. Edited by Ruth B. Henig. (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1973. Pp. 203. $11.50, cloth; $5.75, paper.)

Publication of documents books as required or supplementary reading for college and university courses has been mostly an American enterprise, so one might have thought, but it is clear that the expansion of higher education in England is leading to similar enterprises. The present volume is part of a series originally published in England, and in many ways it is an attractive book. The editor has placed her documents in six chapters to show the rise, progress, and decline of the League. She covers the League's creation, early problems, the disarmament conference at Geneva in 1932–1934, and the Manchurian and Ethiopian crises, and she includes a chapter on the League's social and humanitarian interests. There is a briskly written introduction, and a concluding essay subtitled "The League is dead, long live the United Nations!" Documents are mostly from standard printed series such as the British foreign office records now being published in a long row of large black volumes, and from Hansard, and the League's official journal; in presenting the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the League, the editor has used appropriate newspaper editorials. She has searched into the manuscript records of the British foreign office and printed such items as Lord Robert Cecil's memorandum on "Proposals for Diminishing the Occasion of Future Wars," written in the autumn of 1916 and given to the cabinet. The bibliography contains a modestly annotated list of titles.

For American students this compilation may not prove as useful as it would for British readers or for Commonwealth or other English-speaking peoples who do not have easy access to libraries. Documents do not usually make interesting reading and most of the documents here do not disprove the rule. The editor remarks that not much has appeared about the League of Nations other than monographs, since the publication more than two decades ago of Walters's two-volume work. How much better would it have been if the editor, who is a good writer, had done a little book on the League like J. L. Brierly's classic volume on international law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1928). Such a book would have to generalize about the large forces that made one World War lead to another. No group of documents about disarmament or Manchuria or Ethiopia can relate the breakdown of international organization during those two decades. The League came out of the Somme and Passchendaele and Versailles and died in the Great Depression and the Rhineland and Czechoslovak crises. It expired because it could not deal with a national leader like Hitler who was disrupting the peace of Europe, rather than because of failures outside the Continent. Despite all the ingenuity of the editor of the present volume, a document book is the wrong approach to the complex era of the League of Nations—an era that needs reassessing.

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The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action. Edited by Robert E. Hunter. (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1973. Pp. 164. $2.50, paper.)

As stated in the foreword by James P. Grant, President of the Overseas Development Council (ODC), this publication is the ODC's first attempt at providing "a comprehensive, periodic, non-partisan survey of the important and difficult problems involving the United States and the poor countries." The second book in the series appeared in 1974, and another is due in 1975.

The book consists of twelve short articles and a 40-page statistical appendix. Clearly aimed at the general, college-educated audience, the *Agenda* as a whole makes the case for increased assistance to the less developed countries by the United States. The statistical annexes simply and graphically remind the reader that the development gap is widening and U.S. official assistance is diminishing, while the dependence of the U.S. on imported raw materials from the less developed countries is growing both greater and more crucial. One bar graph portrays the relationship between expenditures on official development assistance and spending by American consumers on selected product categories (e.g., on toilet articles and preparations, consumers spend three times as much; on tobacco products, five times as much). Evidently, the categories are selected to make the reader question the value priorities of American spending habits.

The articles on different facets of the relationship between the U.S. and poor nations—aid, trade, finance, security, energy, environment, and population—are replete with recommendations for what U.S. policy "should" be. The Overseas Development Council with its moderate liberal establishment Board does not hedge its position: a substantial portion of the world's population is unacceptably poor and the U.S. has the responsibility and the means to do something about it.

The authors of the *Agenda,* most of whom are associated with the ODC, write within the policy framework outlined by Hunter and Grant. In essence the argument proceeds as follows:

(1) The cold war as characterized by political and military uncertainty between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. is over.

(2) The focus in international relations has shifted from political to economic matters.

(3) The role of the less-developed countries has become more important in the world.

(4) Paradoxically, the economic conditions of most of the world's population continues to deteriorate while the economic importance (especially raw material exports) of the less developed countries to the developed continues to increase.

Therefore, it is in the interests of the United States to improve its relations with the poor countries by:

(1) Separating military from economic assistance,

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(3) Removing trade barriers to exports from LDC's, especially on processed products, and preparing for the internal displacements by adequate adjustment assistance,

(4) Providing debt relief for the most heavily burdened LDC's,

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(6) Facilitating the establishment of cooperative arrangements for mutually beneficial private investment flows, and

(7) Involving more fully the LDC's in international trade and monetary institutions and decision making.

Buttressed by appropriately selected statistics, the *Agenda for Action* makes an effective moral appeal. And as a political case the book does a reasonably good job. It makes excellent reading material for foreign policy study groups and introductory college courses. Radicals may regard it as another "liberal cop-out," for except for a few lines in Robert Hunter's introduction devoted to a dismissal of the "liberation" school of thought, no mention is made of any revolutionary change in the world order. Enlightened self-interest is expected to lead the United States into adopting the recommended policies. The *Agenda* makes no attempt to suggest a strategy for getting these policies implemented.

Because the *Agenda* is a general reader, assertions are made without any specific references to theoretical discussions or well-documented justifications for the positions taken. For example, several of the authors utilize a simplistic free-trade, comparative advantage argument to rationalize their policy proposals. Recent developments, both pratical and theoretical, raise considerable questions about the soundness of this argument.

Finally, a book of this kind necessarily suffers from its dated orientation. Even so, it has weathered well, though the authors did not foresee the quadrupling of oil prices nor (by their standards) the disappointing results of the later international conferences on population, the oceans, and food, with which we are by now familiar. Possibly the major over-simplification was the emphasized distinction between political and economic relations. Who, except for diehard adherents to conventional specialized models, can deny the reality of a world political economy which needs to be studied as one phenomenon rather than as separate political and economic entities?

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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